


**Pavel Sudoplatov**  
**Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin**



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**annotation**

*Subversive work of Soviet intelligence abroad, secret diplomacy, secret operations, nuclear espionage in the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the NKVD P.A. Sudoplatov, one of the leaders of the Soviet security agencies.*

**Pavel SUDOPLATOV**  
**SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

*IN MEMORY OF THE WIFE, FIGHTING COMPANIES,  
COMRADES WHO DIE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FASCISM AND  
I dedicate the victims of arbitrariness*

**From the author**

Whether we like it or not, but time passes, and what was the Great State Secret, loses its exclusivity and secrecy due to steep turns in the history of the state and becomes common property - there would be a desire to know the

truth. Fate decreed that by the time this book was completed, I, one of heads of independent centers of military and foreign policy intelligence of the Soviet Union, remained the only witness of the confrontation between the special services and zigzags in the internal and foreign policy of the Kremlin in the period 1930-1950.

Despite the repressions in the pre-war and post-war years, I, who was in imprisoned for 15 years, due to a bizarre combination of circumstances and undoubted luck, managed to survive and write down a number of memories related to the controversial and tragic development of events at that time.

The affairs of intelligence and counterintelligence have never been held in high esteem by the leading circles of Russia. However, under totalitarian rule, they sometimes acquired significant significance in

the actions of the authorities. My own popularity as a professional concerns me least of all, but after the collapse of the USSR, it seems to me, primarily due to unprincipled squabbling and struggle for power in the country, I consider it my duty to tell people the truth about what happened on actually in the 1930s and 1950s, so that they would understand the logic of the tragic and heroic events in history of our country. Motives of criminal repressions in which the leadership is guilty countries and security agencies were associated not only with the personal ambitions of Stalin and other "leaders", but also with the struggle for power that was constantly going on inside their environment. This struggle was always skillfully covered up with loud slogans - "fight against deviations" in the ruling parties of "accelerated construction of communism", "fight against the enemies of the people", "fight against cosmopolitans", "perestroika". And in the end, the victims of all these campaigns have always been millions of innocent people.

For me, this is the main theme of the book. I am sure it is very different from the myth of motives for the actions of the so-called "conservative" or "democratic" circles of the former Kremlin leadership.

For a long time I led the service of reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the Soviet security agencies from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, including the period of the Great Patriotic War. However, I was not a terrorist, of course. In any case, I never thought of myself as such. I was and remain a professional revolutionary.

At the risk of his life, he fought against the leaders of the fascist terrorist organizations of the OUN in Europe and Western Ukraine, against terrorists - Hitler's henchmen — Konovalts and Shukhevych, who destroyed thousands of my compatriots.

My work was precisely aimed at countering terror, criminal elements that waged a secret armed struggle against our society. These terrorists acted, as a rule, under the slogans of the struggle against the Soviet state.

The liquidations of Leon Trotsky, Konovalts were a continuation of the bloody civil war, only outside the USSR, military actions against the worst enemies of the Soviet states. Such operations were conceived by the political leadership of the country and carried out under his direct control. As you know, many Western the special services have not yet abandoned the practice of conducting such special operations related to the murder or kidnapping of people. I speak of this with regret.

According to official data and media reports, not without assistance of foreign intelligence services against Russian military personnel in Chechnya is still there are not only local terrorist fighters, but also mercenaries from among foreigners.

Those who spread various speculations about my past supposedly terrorist activity, apparently, do not notice the unbridled wave of criminal and political terror that has now swept over Russia, as well as other territories of the former USSR.

The sources of the conflict in Chechnya, of course, are not devoid of a certain historical background. It is a pity, however, that very influential personalities often forget about the most important and The primary tasks of the Russian special services are to ensure the safety of citizens and not to allow rampant terrorism in the country. We must be honest with history and do correct conclusions not only from others, but also from their own mistakes.

I am not surprised, for example, by the frequent contacts of a number of our well-known figures with Chechen opposition and gang leaders. Although it seems to me that this is not the business of politicians is to conduct a "full-fledged dialogue" with bandits who stained their hands with blood hundreds and thousands of innocent people. Another question is when employees are engaged in these negotiations. intelligence agencies, diplomats, or other government proxies. In the past,

not only our state, but also the military leadership allowed rude mistakes in politics in the Caucasus. After all, not the NKVD, but directly the People's Commissariat of Defense spoke with the initiative to conduct special operations for mass eviction in the North Caucasus in in order to clear the rear of the fighting Red Army. These facts can be confirm documented. To those

who, not without reason, but sometimes too emotionally moralize about elimination of Trotsky in 1940, as well as double agents and murderers from terrorist nationalist organizations during the Cold War, it would be good to think about

the moral permissibility of contacts between today's politicians and terrorists who put on the national wanted list. Of course, this audience must be contacted, because it facilitates the path to peace. However, it is unacceptable when hard, sometimes thankless work intelligence agencies are engaged in politics. But since they take on such functions, they must bear and full responsibility.

It is characteristic that all high-profile political murders of the 20th century are like in our country (attempted assassination of Stolypin), and committed by various persons abroad (liquidation Trotsky, the abduction of Mussolini, the assassinations of Kennedy, I. and R. Gandhi, U. Palme, I. Rabin, etc.) were carried out in one form or another by people who had certain connections with intelligence agencies of their states. It is important to emphasize at the same time that the terrorist perpetrators who shot at top government officials, as it irrefutably follows from reliable materials, "got out of control" of their former owners and were used extremist political groups that in no way wanted to be directly involved in terrorist acts. However, one should be

aware that the special services are the only institutions of power that are prescribed by law to actively engage in extremist groups, organizations and movements, to introduce their agents and proxies into them. "working" with

terrorists, involving in some cases extremist organizations in combat operations, special services either "involuntarily" or "forced", due to their special interest to intelligence data about events, they "let" militants, potential perpetrators terrorist attacks, to the objects of assassination.

So it was, for example, with Bogrov, who collaborated with the tsarist secret police, who shot at Stolypin, as well as with Amir, who killed Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. As a rule, all

judicial verdicts on perpetrators of terrorist acts are carried out as soon as possible in order to hide the facts, cover up traces, and destroy witnesses of the cooperation of perpetrators of murders with special services.

By the way, the original dossiers on the perpetrators of political terror actions, as a rule, are not available to the public. In the conditions of political struggle, they also apply provocative methods of creating a situation for conducting extremist terrorist shares. The tragedy is that special services function, as a rule, in the conditions of their subordination to the regime of personal power, which makes it possible to manipulate visible parties to the circumstances of political assassinations, to hide in the actions of the killer any personal or political motivation, and thereby unleash political terror, as this was after Nikolaev's shot at Kirov.

It is my duty to call on society to promote the abolition of the practice of individual control over the activities of power structures, because in the conditions of "political struggle without rules", local wars and ethnic conflicts, in an atmosphere of rampant political terrorism, the lack of control over the conduct of forceful actions turns into the most tragic consequences.

Another lesson of the political history of the 1930s-1950s is the need establish control by the democratic institutions of society over the practice of so-called "behind the scenes", secret negotiations, as well as any unofficial connections statesmen of Russia with the leaders of foreign countries, primarily the United States, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea.

It is extremely important that state secrets in the sphere of external contacts do not turn around manipulating the fate of millions of people. In this regard, I want to emphasize: those who are more they talk about the "anti-people conspiracy of Stalin and Hitler" and "secret protocols Molotov-Ribbentrop", always stubbornly hushed up three secret protocols - annexes to the decisions of the Yalta Conference, signed on February 11, 1945 leaders of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR. But these documents for leadership The USA and Great Britain were actually assigned the obligation to fill the seats imprisonment in the Soviet Union: immediately after the war, hundreds of thousands of "political opponents" and other "suspicious" persons who found themselves on the territory of Western Europe and in the allied zone of occupation of Germany. Moreover, forced repatriation

applied not only to former Soviet citizens, but also to those emigrants who never had Soviet citizenship!

The cynical connivance on the part of the leaders of England and America Gulag points to their involvement in political repression in the Soviet Union. This confirms the well-known thesis: the real policy of the Western powers is based on balance of power, rational calculation, political interests, and not at all on their mythical "commitment to the ideals of freedom and democracy."

It was those who cared most about democracy in the "countries behind the Iron Curtain" who actually sanctioned repression by the USSR against its political adversaries in foreign territories. And this is an unheard of violation of elementary norms international law. And after the publication of this fact, is anyone really will believe that the state interests of Western countries presuppose their "sincere care" about the state of democracy in Russia and other CIS countries?

My book refutes the "version" artificially ascribed to me about the actions of the great Western scientists - Oppenheimer, Fermi, Bohr and others - as "agents of the Soviet intelligence." They never were. However, they deliberately shared with trusted officials of the Soviet government and intelligence important information about scientific and technical developments in the field of nuclear weapons. Their scientific works ended up in the Soviet Union and Sweden with their

knowledge. Our scientists also used materials obtained by intelligence in the United States and England. How recalls a veteran of our scientific and technical intelligence A. N. Rylov, he and his colleague Professor Ya. P. Terletsky handed over to Yu. B. Khariton and A. D. Sakharov received from the USA scientific developments related to the use of a magnetic cumulation scheme with designing a thermonuclear explosive device. Recently, at

an international conference on the history of the creation of the Soviet nuclear weapons, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation L.P. Feoktistov also confirmed that I.V. Kurchatov received foreign materials related to the creation of a hydrogen bomb from the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.P. Zavenyagin. Naturally, all that has been said above does not at all detract from the merits of our science in the creation of a domestic nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. But if the scientists - the creators of these weapons have always been in favor and enjoyed honor and special respect from the heads of state, then attitude towards those who helped them, risking their lives, to obtain the extremely necessary at that moment scientific information, other than cynical and cruel can not be called.

Direct creators of the main undercover approaches to the most prominent physicists of the West G. B. Ovakimyan, S. M. Semenov, L. P. Vasilevsky, Z. I. Rybkina, S. I. Apresyan, P. P. Pastelnyak, G. M. Kheifets were dismissed from intelligence during the shameful purges. none of intelligence leaders never apologized to them, let alone noted all of them with high state awards. The most valuable agents of our intelligence S. N. Kurnakov, an ally of the Rosenbergs Sarant (in the USSR he lived under the surname Starov), who supported direct contact with American physicists, in fact, until the end of their days they remained without due material and moral support from the leaders of scientific and technical intelligence services of the 50-60s, which, by the way, are responsible for the death of spouses Rosenberg. Even more cynical was the oblivion of the feat of the prominent scientist Klaus Fuchs, to whom a number of intelligence historians unofficially attribute the blame for admitting the fact cooperation with the USSR and do not consider it possible to petition for at least his posthumous awarding.

I am far from having any thoughts or suspicions about the "undercover cooperation" of our leading physicists with state security agencies. The point here is in a different. The main task of Soviet intelligence was to supply information to our political and scientific and technical leadership on the real situation in all areas social life, scientific and technological progress. As many

current intelligence workers, prominent figures in our domestic science, including Academician R.3, who is now living in the USA. Sagdeev, scientists carried out important assignments of the Soviet leadership (in the field of political sounding,



disinformation, collection of scientific and technical materials) with the assistance of the residencies of our intelligence agencies abroad, without being formally bound by any obligations with the Soviet secret services ...

All this is discussed in the book. Maybe that's why the attitude towards its author is far from unambiguous. But they are especially critical of the "terrible figure" Sudoplatov, for some reason, those who in one way or another owe their careers to their former, fairly close ties with the Soviet special services - I mean people like V. Nadein from Izvestia (actively "developing" Academician A. D. Sakharov, as he told me Deputy Head of the 5th Department, Major General of the KGB V.P. Shadrin), N. Gevorkyan from Moscow News, commentators from Ekho Moskv. It remains only to wonder why it is they who so fiercely condemn my person. I am absolutely sincere: after all, their parents - employees of Soviet intelligence in Iran, Lithuania and France repeatedly 30-40s took part in the abductions and liquidation of people objectionable to the Soviet leadership. By the way, I write about this in my book, which I can only recommend. Ms. Gevorkyan to read sometime at her leisure.

Life is life, and it flows according to its own laws that are not subject to us. We are from the past should draw some conclusions for themselves, try to comprehend the past time to avoid tripping over the same stone a second time. I think there's a lot here to help us historical science, which should objectively look at the past from a height of time. And to give not only assessments of the past, but also to explain it, so that our descendants do not have to solve the same problems that we did not always solve in the best way.

I also consider it necessary to point out that my reminiscences are by no means least do not pretend to be a scientific-historical narrative. This is a subjective view of an eyewitness to how the mechanisms that set the political machine in motion in the USSR, how it was possible to create at the cost of colossal sacrifices a powerful state, in a certain extent determined the development of world events in the 30s and 50s, which became a superpower that kept in fear not only its citizens, but the whole world. His strength was the elimination of poverty and devastation that engulfed the country after the civil war, in a deep faith in the correctness of the great social revolution of the 20th century. That is why, sympathizing with the USSR, he directly and indirectly supported the great minds of the modern world - Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein and others. In the

cruel confrontation between the USSR and the Western world lies the main reason for the mutual intolerance in all events of domestic and foreign policy of our country.

I have no doubt, no matter how it is disputed today, that the ruling circles of the West not only hated our state, but throughout its history they did everything in his power to kill him. The forced alliance of the USA, England and the USSR in the fight against Hitlerism during the war years was also not a respite in their confrontation. The Cold War continued, just the rapid defeat of the USSR in the fight against Germany was unprofitable for the West, which feared for its world domination. Until December 1991, everything was done to the weakening of the USSR. And now we are experiencing painful experiences in connection with the transition to a new stage of confrontation and cooperation with Western countries, which will still be based on the historical role of Russia as one of the modern superpowers. However now, unlike in past years, we are not talking about the survival of our state. Heritage of the USSR reliably guarantees permissible turns and zigzags, makes us a powerful partner in negotiations in the international arena. Of course, internal instability in the country, failures in economic policy inevitably force the ruling circles and now - for the umpteenth time - to lay responsibility for the mistakes made on the past leadership. From here constant hostility, sometimes developing into hatred for those who, with their real work contributed to the basis of modern development, which is still indestructible a factor of pride and prestige of the motherland.

Observing the military oath, I was silent as long as the Soviet Union existed. When the activities of Soviet intelligence and a number of aspects of the foreign policy of the USSR ceased to be secret after the well-known events of 1991, and everything that I faithfully served ceased to exist, I could not and had no right to remain silent any longer. Unfortunately, I had no other

way out, how to publish memories initially in the West, as domestic publishers they intended to publish them only after consultation with the "competent authorities". I am grateful to J. and L. Schechter that the book was published

there. In the creation of this book, I received great support from my comrades-in-arms, with which I shared all the difficulties of our difficult and dangerous work. I consider it my duty Special thanks for moral assistance to the head of the Soviet foreign intelligence KGB L. V. Shebarshin, veterans of the state security agencies S. A. Ananyin, P. I. Massya, A. N. Rylov, I. A. Shchors, Yu. A. Kolesnikov, Z. V. Zarubin, A. F. Kamaev-Filonenko, writer-publicist K. A. Stolyarova.

*P. SUDOPLATOV*

*August 6, 1996*

## CHAPTER 1. THE BEGINNING

### Childhood and the beginning of work in the Cheka

I was born in 1907 in Ukraine, in the city of Melitopol, located in a rich fruits of the region and at that time numbering about twenty thousand inhabitants. I have mother Russian, and my father was Ukrainian - a laborer, a baker, a baker, a cook, a waiter. Like all the children - and there were five of us in the family - I was baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church on day of Peter and Paul. My primary education included the study of the New and the Old Testament and the foundations of the Russian language, since in tsarist times the teaching of Ukrainian in schools was forbidden. They were used only as a conversational. Until the age of ten, until my father died, I had the most ordinary childhood. After his death, the care of the family fell on the shoulders of the mother and older sister. In the year of his father's death, a revolution took place, the Bolsheviks took power.

At first, life in the city changed little, and everything flowed as usual. However, as food supplies had just come to an end, chaos began, accompanied by gangster terror. Our family did not have any property, we rented a two-room apartment in a small one-story house that belonged to the landlord Khrolenko. My the perception of the events of that time can be considered typical for low-income families who had nothing to lose. Quite naturally, I believed with all my heart when I read what was written. Bukharin's ABC of Revolution, that public ownership would mean building fair society, where everyone will be equal, and the country will be ruled by representatives peasantry and working class in the interests of ordinary people, not landowners and capitalists.

My older brother Nikolai joined the Red Army in 1918 - two years later he became a fighter in the detachment of the Cheka. The year before, at the age of twelve, I had run away from home and joined the Red Army regiment, which was soon forced to leave Melitopol. Our regiment was defeated by the whites, and only small groups of fighters managed to join to units of the 44th Infantry Division of the Red Army in the Kyiv region. Because to that By the time I had already graduated from elementary school and could read, I was assigned to the communications company. Later, I took part in the battles near Kiev. In 1921, when I was fourteen, employees of the Special Department of the division were ambushed by Ukrainian nationalists, and many of them died. At that time, we fought mostly not with White Guards, and with the troops of Ukrainian nationalists, led by Petlyura and Konovalts, commander of the "Sich Riflemen" corps. When the civil war began, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed an independent republic and officially declared war on Russia and the Ukrainian Bolshevik leadership in January 1919. (In the 30s, and then more once in the 40s, I also took a direct part in the fight against Ukrainian nationalists.) This struggle actually ended only in January 1992, after Ukrainian government-in-exile and the rest of the world recognized President Kravchuk legitimate head of the sovereign state of Ukraine. In the

Special Department, which suffered heavy losses, a telephone operator was urgently needed and cryptographer. So I was sent to work in the security agencies. This was the beginning of my

service in the Cheka-

KGB. In the division where I served, Poles, Austrians, Germans, Serbs and even Chinese fought with us. The latter were very disciplined and fought to the last drop of blood. The struggle was fierce, and it happened that entire villages were destroyed by Ukrainian nationalists and gangs: in total, over a million people died during the civil war in Ukraine. My generation soon became accustomed to the brutality of this war, loss and hardship. We thought it was all natural. The country had been in a state of war since 1914, and the tragedy of Russia was that until the very end of the civil war, that is, until 1922, it was not possible to create a stable society based on normal, humanistic values.

The experience gained while performing the duties of a telephone operator, and then a cryptographer, proved to be useful. I typed documents classified as "secret" sent to the command, and deciphered the telegrams that we received directly from the head of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky from Moscow.

1921 was a turning point in my life. The division was transferred to Zhitomir. The main task of our Special Department was to help the local Cheka in infiltrating the partisan underground of Ukrainian nationalists led by Petliura and Konovalts. Their armed bands staged acts of sabotage against local Soviet authorities. Potazhevich and Savin, who headed the Cheka, managed to establish a dialogue with the partisan leaders and hold informal negotiations with them. My leadership met with them in Zhitomir at a safe house. I, as a junior employee on the sidelines, had to live in the house where the safe house was located and serve the negotiations. The experience of communicating with the leaders of the formations of Ukrainian nationalists, who were, in fact, the real masters in their district, helped me in the future, when I became an operative worker of state security. I have experienced in my own skin what it is like to deal with conspiracies in

underground.

The war with the Ukrainian nationalists lasted almost two years and ended in a compromise - their leaders accepted the amnesty that the government of Soviet Ukraine gave them. This happened only after the cavalry detachment of two thousand sabers, sent by Konovalts to Zhitomir, was surrounded by units of the Red Army and surrendered. The Konovalts gang suffered a crushing defeat. In these battles, my older brother Nikolai, who served in the border troops on the Polish border, died. I filed a report on the transfer to Melitopol in order to be closer to the family and be able to help her.

During the last three years of my stay in Melitopol, I was a junior operative in the district department of the GPU and was responsible for the work of informants operating in the Greek, Bulgarian and German settlements. In 1927 I received a promotion and was transferred to Kharkov, then the capital of Ukraine, where I began to work in the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, in Kharkov, that I met my future wife, Emma Kaganova: I was twenty, she was two years older - she came to Ukraine from the Belarusian city of Gomel.

Emma was capable, and she managed to enter the gymnasium, where there was a restrictive norm for Jews. She graduated from several classes of the gymnasium and later began working as a secretary-typist for Khataevich, secretary of the Gomel provincial organization of the Bolsheviks. When her boss was transferred to Odessa, where he headed the party organization, she followed him. It was in Odessa that Emma transferred to the local GPU. She was assigned to work among the German colonists living in the city. A blue-eyed blonde, she spoke a close German Yiddish and could easily pass for a German.

She was transferred to Kharkov a year before I moved there. Emma occupied a more significant position in the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR than such a novice as I was then. As an educated and attractive woman, moreover, well-read and feeling quite free in the society of writers and poets, she was entrusted with leading the activities of informers among the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia - writers and theater figures. We met her at the service, and I was struck by her beauty and intelligence. Emma's father, a lumberjack, died when she was only ten years old. She started working and single-handedly supported the whole family, where there were eight children. So Emma and I had a lot in common: both I and she were a support for the family and

had to grow up early due to circumstances. Despite the

fact that our whole life was filled with work, my wife encouraged me to take studying law at Kharkov University. But I, however, managed to visit only ten lectures and pass one exam - in economic geography. I have more there just wasn't enough time. My working day began at ten o'clock in the morning and ended at six in the evening with a short lunch break. This was followed by meetings with informants at safe houses. They lasted from half past seven in the evening until eleven. Then I returned to the service to report to the authorities about the received operational materials. Since

1922, the GPU, and later the NKVD-KGB (now the FSB) and the foreign intelligence service under making important decisions in matters of foreign and domestic policy of the state should were to become the main source of information for all levels of the Soviet and Russian guides. Even today, the country's leadership receives monthly reports on the situation in state from the state security agencies through their agents. This kind of report includes a presentation of internal difficulties and shortcomings in the work of various organizations, enterprises and institutions. According to the established order under Stalin, to meet with his an informant in the daytime was not supposed to. That's why we met in the evenings. It was known that Stalin stayed up late, and we worked in the same mode.

Ironically, the information department of our department was headed by the former tsarist officer Kozelsky, who came from an impoverished noble family. Although this person served in the tsarist army, his sympathy for the Bolsheviks, manifested during the years of the revolution, allowed him to win our trust. In 1937 he committed suicide to avoid arrest during the purge campaign...

For me, Emma was the ideal of a real woman, and in 1928 we got married, although officially registered our marriage only in 1951. This is how many of my comrades, without formalizing their marriage for years.

Meanwhile, the work went on as usual, and I received a new one - a very unusual, but very important - a task that was jointly controlled by the leaders of the OGPU and party bodies. My new position was called: commissioner of the special colony in Priluki for homeless children. After the civil war, this kind of colonies set as their goal put an end to the homelessness of orphans, whose hunger and unbearable living conditions compelled to take the path of crime. For the maintenance of these colonies, each Chekist had to pay ten percent of his salary. Under them were created workshops and vocational training groups: the work activity of the children was given then crucial. Having won the trust of the colonists, I managed to organize a factory fire extinguishers, which soon began to generate income.

Thanks to my wife's position in Ukrainian party circles, I met twice with Kosior, then secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. These meetings took place at Khataevich's apartment, where we were invited as guests. special impression it made me feel how both leaders looked at the future of Ukraine. Economic they considered the problems and the tragedy of collectivization as temporary difficulties that should be overcome by all possible means. According to them, it was necessary to educate a new generation absolutely devoted to the cause of communism and free from all obligations to the old morality. The greatest attention should be paid to the development and support of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia, hostile to the nationalist ideas. It took another sixty years and the collapse of the Soviet Union for it to become obvious: it was necessary to show at least tolerance and try to understand the other side, and do not seek to destroy it at all costs. My wife and I were

flattered that people like Kosior and Khataevich spoke to us like with my party comrades, although both of us were Komsomol members then. Candidates for party members we became later.

In 1933, the head of the Ukrainian GPU, Balitsky, was appointed deputy chairman. All-Union OGPU. Moving to Moscow for a new job, he took with him several employees, including me. I received in the personnel department of the central office

State Security, the position of senior inspector, who oversaw the movement of the service and new appointments in the Foreign Department (foreign intelligence) of the

OGPU. At that time, I began to often collide at work with Artuzov, the then head of Foreign Department, and his deputy Slutsky. A prominent

role in the leadership of the Foreign Department, in addition to Artuzov and Slutsky, was played by Berman, Fedorov (who led the fight against emigration), Shpigelglaz, Minsker, Eitingon and City dweller (Mayakovsky dedicated his poem "Soldiers of Dzerzhinsky" to the latter).

## Deadly duel with the OUN

In 1933, Kulinich, an officer in charge of operational monitoring and combating Ukrainian emigration in the West, filed a resignation for health reasons. Upon learning that I was originally from Ukraine and had local experience, Artuzov suggested this position to me. By that time, Emma had also transferred to Moscow and was assigned to Secret political department. Since 1934, her duties included working with the network informers in the newly created Union of Writers and among the creative intelligentsia.

After the tragic assassination of the Soviet diplomat Maylov in Lvov by OUN terrorist Lemek in 1934, the chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky issued an order to development of an action plan to neutralize the terrorist actions of Ukrainian nationalists. The Ukrainian GPU reported that it managed to infiltrate the underground military organization of Ukrainian nationalists in exile (OUN) of his trusted agent - Lebed. This was a major achievement.

Slutsky, by that time the head of the Foreign Department, offered me to become an illegal employee working abroad. At first this seemed unrealistic to me, since I had no experience of working abroad and knew nothing about living conditions in West. In addition, my knowledge of German, which I should have needed in Germany and Poland, where they had to work, were equal to zero.

However, the more I thought about this offer, the more tempting it became to me. it seemed. And I agreed. After that, he immediately began an intensive study German - classes were held in a safe house five times a week. Experienced the instructors also taught me the techniques of hand-to-hand combat and the use of weapons. The meetings with the Deputy Head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU-NKVD Shpigelglaz. He had extensive experience working abroad in as an illegal immigrant in China and Western Europe. In the early 30s in Paris, "roof" to him served as a fish shop specializing in the sale of lobsters, located near Montmartre.

After eight months of study, I was ready to go to my first foreign business trip, accompanied by Lebed, the "chief representative" of the OUN in Ukraine, and reality of our secret agent for many years. Swan from 1915 to 1918 spent time together with Konovalets in a prisoner of war camp near Tsaritsyn. (In the years of the first World War Lebed and Konovalets fought together as officers of the Austro-Hungarian army against Russia on the Southwestern Front as part of the so-called Sich Corps archers.") During the civil war, he became Konovalets's deputy and commanded an infantry division that fought against the Red Army in Ukraine. After the retreat Konovalets to Poland in 1920, Lebed was sent by him to Ukraine to organize underground network of the OUN. But there he was arrested. The choice before him was simple: either work for us or die.

Lebed became for us a key figure in the fight against banditry in Ukraine in the 1920s. His reputation in nationalist circles abroad remained as before high: Konovalets considered his representative as a person capable of carrying out preparatory work for the seizure of power by the OUN in Kyiv in case of war. From Lebed, whom we allowed to travel to the West in the 20s and 30s through illegal channels, we and it became known that Konovalets cherished plans to seize Ukraine in a future war. In Berlin Lebed met with Colonel Alexander, the predecessor of Admiral Wilhelm

Canaris as head of the German intelligence service in the early 1930s, and learned from him that Konovalets had seen Hitler twice, who suggested that several supporters Konovalets were trained at the Nazi party school in Leipzig.

I went abroad as Lebed's "nephew", ostensibly to help him with his work. My wife was transferred to the Foreign Department of the NKVD so that through it I could support connection with the Center. She was supposed to act as a student from Geneva, which allowed her meet with agents in Western Europe from time to time. To this end, she went special course.

Lebed did not know that another agent was working for us, Poluvedko, the chief representative of Konovalets in Finland. He lived on a false passport in Helsinki, organizing contacts between Ukrainian nationalists in exile and their underground organization in Leningrad. OUN members hid their archives in Leningrad, in the famous Library named after Saltykov-Shchedrin. Although we knew it, we only managed to find the archives after the end of World War II, in 1949. I left for Helsinki

accompanied by Lebed. The swan handed me over to care Poluvedko and immediately returned to Kharkov through Moscow. Half-witted, who knew nothing about my true work, regularly sent reports about me to the NKVD through Zoya Voskresenskaya-Rybkin, who was responsible for communication with him. I had to let the Center know what everything is fine with me, and, as agreed in advance, I wrote a note to my "girlfriend", and then tore it up and threw it into the wastebasket. Acting as my involuntary assistant, Poluvedko collected the scraps and handed them over to Zoya. And at some stage Poluvedko in general offered to remove me, which he reported in one of his reports, but, fortunately, the decision this issue was not up to him. In Finland (and later in Germany) I lived very poorly: I had no pocket money, and I was constantly hungry. Half-way gave me only ten Finnish marks a day, and they were barely enough for lunch - while one coin is needed it was necessary to leave it for the evening for the gas meter, otherwise the heating and the gas stove would not work. To secret meetings between us, the schedule of which was determined before my departure from Moscow, Zoya Rybkina and her husband Boris Rybkin, a resident in Finland who led my intelligence activities in this country, they brought sandwiches and chocolates. Before leaving they going through my pockets to make sure I didn't take any food: after all, this could fail our "game".

After two months of waiting, messengers from Konovalets arrived in Helsinki - Gribivsky ("Chancellor") from Prague and Andrievsky from Brussels. We went to Stockholm steamer.

Upon boarding, I was handed a passport in the name of Nikols Baravskas, issued by the Lithuanian special services at the request of the OUN leadership. When we arrived in Stockholm, all passengers collected in the dining room, and the waiter began to distribute passports that had passed the border control. At first, he refused to return my passport to me, saying that the photo clearly did not match original. Indeed, the passport was in the name of Stsiborsky, a member of the Central leadership OUN, a Ukrainian activist, with a photo of Stsiborsky. Fortunately, intervened outraged Poluvedko, who threatened the waiter and forced him to return the document to me. After a week in Stockholm, we went to Germany, where there were no I didn't have any troubles with the same passport. In June 1936 they arrived in Berlin, and there I met with Konovalets, who questioned me about everything with great addiction. Our meeting took place in an apartment located in the building of the Museum of Ethnography and provided to him by the German intelligence service. In September I was sent for three months to Nazi school in Leipzig. During my studies, I had the opportunity to meet OUN leadership. The students of the school were naturally interested in my personality. However no problems with my "legend" did not arise. Meanwhile,

my conversations with Konovalets became more and more serious. His plans included preparation of administrative bodies for a number of regions of Ukraine, which were supposed be released in the near future, and Ukrainian nationalists were supposed to act in alliance with the Germans. I learned that they already had two brigades at their disposal, in total complexity of about two thousand people who were supposed to be used as

police forces in Galicia (part of Western Ukraine, then part of Poland) and in Germany.

The OUN tried in every possible way to involve me in the struggle for power that was going on between the two their main groupings: "old people" and "youth". The first were represented by Konovalets and his Deputy Melnik, and the "youth" was headed by Bandera and Kostarev. My main task was to convince them that terrorist activity in Ukraine has no chances of success that the authorities will immediately crush small pockets of resistance. I insisted that we should keep our forces and the underground network in reserve until the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, and in this case immediately use them.

The terrorist ties of this organization were especially disturbing, in particular agreement with Croatian nationalists and participation in the assassination of the Yugoslav king Alexander and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. It was a revelation for me that all these terrorists are financed by the Abwehr - intelligence and counterintelligence service of the Wehrmacht. The news came as a complete surprise to me that the murder Polish Minister General Peratsky in 1934, the Ukrainian terrorist Matseyko was carried out contrary to the order of Konovalets and Bandera was behind this, competing with the latter for power. Bandera sought to control the organization, playing on natural hostility Ukrainians to Peratsky, who was responsible for the repressions against the Ukrainian minorities in Poland. Konovalets told me that by this time between Poland and Germany signed a friendship treaty, so the Germans were in no way satisfied any hostile actions towards the Poles. They were so furious that they gave Bandera, who was hiding in Germany. The general's killer, Maceyko, managed to escape.

The matter was as follows. Maceyko planned to kill Peratsky by blowing up grenade, but for some reason it did not explode, and he shot the Polish minister. Behind a crowd of people immediately rushed to him. Matseyko managed to slip in front of the oncoming tram, which cut him off from his pursuers, ran into the entrance of the first house, climbed platform on the 7th floor, there he threw off his cloak and hat, threw away his revolver and, unrecognized, calmly went out into the street. Polish counterintelligence ambushed all safe houses Ukrainian nationalists in Warsaw, but he did not appear on any of them. He spent the night with his girlfriend, also a Ukrainian terrorist Chemerinskaya. She was the one who organized it. escape through the Carpathians to Czechoslovakia, using his connections in the Czech police.

In Czechoslovakia, the OUN had strong support from the authorities. President Benes had a personal relationship with Konovalets since the First World War. However, when the OUN "got out of control" of the authorities and carried out the assassination of Peratsky, these relations worsened.

Despite Bandera's emotional speech at the trial in defense of the Ukrainian nationalism, he and other organizers were sentenced to death by hanging. However, German pressure on the Polish authorities eventually saved their lives. Mortal the sentence was commuted to prison. After the capture of Poland, the Germans immediately released Bandera on freedom. And between the two groups of Ukrainian nationalists, a bloody internecine war. In

dealing with my colleagues in the Nazi party school, I was absolutely confidently and independently: after all, I represented the head of their underground organization on Ukraine, while they were just emigrants who existed on the German handouts. I had the right to veto their proposals because I followed the instructions his "uncle" ("vuiiko"). If I did not like something in their statements, it was enough just say: "Vuiiko did not order!"

It was in this manner that I rejected the offer of my meeting with Colonel Lahousen of Abwehr headquarters. To enter into direct contact with German intelligence would be risky, as the Germans might try to force me to cooperate. Again and again I had to repeat my objections to meeting someone from the Abwehr.

Once, when we were walking with Konovalets, a street photographer came up to us and photographed us, handing over the film to Konovalets, who paid two marks for it. I indignant. It was clear that my Berlin entourage wanted to have a photograph in their file,

so that later, when they need it, they can look for me. Then, on the street, I expressed his unambiguous protest to Konovalets. It would be an unforgivable mistake if such the photograph would end up in the hands of the Germans, I told him, not at all doubting what it was this was his true purpose. Konovalets tried to somehow calm me down. According to him, no there was nothing reprehensible in the fact that some street photographer who earns his own for life, photographed the two of us walking along a Berlin street.

Later I found out that I was right. During the war SMERSH (SMERSH - the name Soviet military counterintelligence in 1943-1946.) captured two scouts in the Western Ukraine, one of them had this photo. When asked why he needed her, he replied: "I have no idea who this person is, but we have received orders to liquidate him if we find him." I managed

to gain confidence in Konovalets by handing over to him the contents of one confidential conversation. Once Kostarev and several other young Ukrainian nationalists, students of the Nazi party school, began to say that Konovalets too old to run an organization and should only be used as a decorative figure. When they asked my opinion, I replied indignantly:

"Who are you to suggest such a thing?" Our organization is not only completely trusts Konovalets, but also regularly receives support from him, but about you before my arrival We didn't hear anything here. When I

told Konovalets about this, his face turned pale. Later Kostarev was destruction think it's a coincidence. It was decided at

the Center that as soon as I arrived in Germany, I should complete independence and maintain no contact with either our residency or with illegals. Konovalets took me under his wing and often visited me: the two of us wandered around town. Once he even took me to a performance at the Berlin Opera, but on the whole there was not much entertainment in my life there. The Ukrainian community was very poor, and to afford any luxury was out of the question. If you were invited for tea, it was customary to bring sugar with you. The Ukrainians with whom I spoke are naive believed that they could help finance the OUN at the expense of the income of some shoe polish factory owned by their relatives in Poland. They literally wanted war Germany with Poland and the USSR as liberation from the yoke of "national oppression".

Konovalets became attached to me and even suggested that I accompany him to inspection trip to Paris and Vienna in order to check the state of affairs in the Ukrainian emigre circles that supported him. He had money received from the Germans, and this allowed him to play the role of leader of a powerful organization.

We stayed in different hotels in Paris. During our stay in the city there was a general strike, and all the restaurants were closed, so Konovalets took me to dinner at ... Versailles. The subway did not work either, and we had to take a taxi, which, by the way, was very expensive. I was greatly impressed by Paris and remain a fan of it until today.

The Center was aware that Konovalets and I intended to hold three weeks, and decided to take this opportunity to arrange a meeting for me with my by courier. According to instructions from Moscow, I was to, if possible, go to such meeting in Paris and later in Vienna. For this I had to appear twice a week between five and six in the evening at the corner of Place de Clichy and Boulevard de Clichy. The courier must was personally known to me, but his name was not revealed to me - these were the "rules conspiracy," it could be anyone. In his first appearance on the agreed where I saw ... my own wife, dressed in the latest fashion: she was sitting at a cafe table outside and slowly sipped black coffee. At that moment I was overwhelmed by the most heterogeneous feelings. By an effort of will, I managed to force myself to make sure that I have no surveillance, and only after that I approached Emma. I immediately became it is quite clear: the place for the rendezvous was chosen extremely unsuccessfully, since the crowd scurrying around did not give the opportunity to check whether there is a "tail" behind you

or not. The experience of my work in Kharkov against the Polish agents taught me that in almost all



failures were to blame for the poor choice of meeting place. Pulling myself together, I'm in bad German asked permission to sit next to a table. We were both extremely stressed. Emma when I sat down next to her and asked if I was all right.

"Although you have lost weight, you look, in my opinion, excellent," she added with smile. - Yes, and shaved this time perfectly.

This remark of hers clearly hinted at the fact that at home, in Russia, I often shaved every other day. After sitting at a table for a while, we quietly left: this cafe was too open for prying eyes. Walking towards the boulevard, we noticed two gendarmes, obviously heading in our direction: Obeying an inner instinct, we immediately crossed street to avoid the police. Now, looking back, I see how it was stupid.

The inexpensive hotel where Emma was staying (quite appropriate for a student spending her holidays in Paris) was only a few blocks away from where we meetings. Although I was delighted to meet my wife, whom I had not seen for almost a year, I was afraid to put her at even the slightest risk because of a date with me. We hugged and I'm here told her to convey to the Center my demand: under no circumstances should Emma should be my contact. After all, I was not one of those who live permanently in the West, so I could say with complete confidence: all my contacts are most carefully are studied and analyzed both by the intelligence of Ukrainian nationalists and by the Germans. And if German or even French counterintelligence will have reason to believe that Emma associated with me, she will most certainly be captured and subjected to severe interrogation. That's why I ordered her to immediately return to Switzerland, and from there - home. I should have been like this act to get rid of anxiety for her fate and feel safe. Emma immediately assured me that she would leave for Berne immediately. I informed her about state of affairs in Ukrainian emigrant circles and the significant support that they received from Germany. Particularly curious was the information concerning strife within the Ukrainian organization: I told Emma about my proposed trip with Konovalets to Vienna and convincingly asked her not to appear there as a courier near Schönbrunn Palace - the place of the proposed meeting.

During our stay in Paris, Konovalets invited me to visit with him the grave of Petliura, after the defeat of the Red Army, fled to the capital of France, where in 1926 he was killed. Konovalets idolized this man, calling him "our banner and most beloved leader. He said that the memory of Petliura must be preserved. To me I was pleased that Konovalets was taking me with him, but one thought haunted me: to the grave in visiting time is supposed to put flowers. Meanwhile, my purse was empty, and reminded of such trifles I did not consider Konovalets possible for myself. It would just be tactless attitude towards a person who occupied a steel high position, although, in essence, to take care about flowers in this case belonged to him, not to me. What to do? All the way to the graveyard me continued to torment this thought.

We walked through the entire cemetery and stopped in front of a modest tombstone on the grave Petliura. Konovalets crossed himself - I followed his example. For a while we stood silently, then I took a handkerchief from my pocket and wrapped a handful of earth from the grave in it.

- What are you doing?! exclaimed Konovalets. "I will take this land from Petlyura's grave to Ukraine," I answered, "we are in his memory plant a tree and take care of it.

The horseman was delighted. He hugged me, kissed me, and warmly praised me for the beautiful idea. As a result, our friendship and his trust in me grew even stronger.

Konovalets told me that one of his assistants, Gribivsky, was suspected of cooperation with the Czechoslovak counterintelligence, and asked me to meet with him and tried to probe him. After the assassination of General Peratsky in Warsaw by Ukrainian nationalists, the Czechs promptly, in one day, captured all the appearances of the Ukrainian organization in Prague and took away many dossiers that were under the jurisdiction of Gribivsky. I already knew this story. My close friend and colleague Kaminsky, who was in Germany two years before me as illegal immigrant, tried to recruit Gribivsky, allegedly on behalf of the Slovak police, to work

an informant, when in fact it was about working for us. Gribivsky, for his part, intended to capture Kaminsky during the appointed meeting, but he, seeing the shadowing, avoided the trap, having time to jump into a passing tram.

Konovalets completely

correctly suspected that Kaminsky was not a Slovak at all, but a Soviet agent, and, knowing this, I strongly objected to my meeting with Gribovsky, declaring that he might be controlled by the Bolsheviks (after all, he could deliberately pretend that he had not been able to

capture Kaminsky), and therefore contacts with him can illuminate me and lead to failure  
my mission is here.

After our arrival in Vienna, I went to a predetermined meeting point where I found my curator and mentor for work in Moscow, Zubov. He was an experienced scout, and I always tried to get as much knowledge from him as possible. I informed him in detail about the activities of Konovalets and said that our trip to the opera was scheduled for the next day. Zubov managed to buy a ticket for the same performance - he was sitting right behind us and could hear everything we talked with my companion. Leaving the theater, I purposely ran into Zubov in the crowd of spectators and even apologized for pushing him. In essence, it was a stupid children's trick.

From Vienna I returned to Berlin, where for several months there were useless negotiations on the possible deployment of underground forces in Ukraine in the event of a war. IN During this period, I traveled twice from Germany to Paris, meeting there with the leaders of the Ukrainian governments in exile. Konovalets warned me about these people: according to his words, they should not be taken seriously, since in reality everything will decide not these gentlemen who wiped their trousers in Parisian cafes, but his military organization.

Meanwhile, my "uncle", Lebed, using his connections, sent through Finland an order for my return to Ukraine, where I was to be registered as a radio operator for Soviet ship that regularly called at foreign ports. This would give me the opportunity to maintain constant communication between the OUN underground in Ukraine and the nationalist organizations abroad. Konovalets liked the idea and agreed with my return to the Soviet Union.

With false documents, accompanied by Sushko, deputy Konovalets (Konovalets wanted to make sure that I crossed the border safely), through Finland I reached the Soviet-Finnish border. Sushko led me to a place where it seemed possible to safely cross the border, which passed here through the swamp. However, as soon as I approached the very border, I was intercepted by the Finnish border patrol. I was arrested and imprisoned in Helsinki. I was interrogated there for a month. I explained to them that I was a Ukrainian nationalist and I was striving to return to the Soviet Union, following the order of its organization (In Finland and Sweden, archival documents of the police and counterintelligence until 1947. In June 1996, I was given photocopies of my interrogations and explanations in a Finnish prison).

All this month the atmosphere in the Center was very tense, since Zoya Rybkina reported from Helsinki about my return. To find out what happened to me Zubov and Shpigelglaz left the border. Everyone thought that, most likely, I was eliminated by Sushko.

Three weeks after my arrest, the official Ukrainian representative in Helsinki, Poluvedko received a request from the Finnish police and Abwehr officers about a certain Ukrainian who tried to sneak into the Soviet Union. Between the Abwehr and Finnish intelligence there was an agreement to control the Soviet border - any defectors checked by them together. In the end, I was handed over to Poluvedko, who accompanied me to Tallinn. There they gave me another fake Lithuanian passport, and in the Soviet consulate issued a short-term tourist visa for a trip to Leningrad. This time there were no problems crossing the border: the border guard stamped my passport, and then I managed to slip away from the Intourist guide who was waiting for me in Leningrad. I am sure that this caused a real commotion in the Intourist department and the police for sure was put on her feet to find a missing Lithuanian tourist in the city.

A successful business trip to Western Europe changed my position in intelligence. ABOUT the results of the work were reported to Stalin and Kosior, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, as well as Petrovsky, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic. IN Slutsky's office, where I reported in detail about my trip, I was introduced to two people: one of them was Serebryansky, head of the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - an independent and at that time unknown to me Center for Cordon Intelligence security, and the other, in my opinion, Vasiliev, an employee of Stalin's secretariat. Neither that nor I didn't know the other one

before. Later, I was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, which was presented to me by the head of State M. I. Kalinin. Together with me in the Kremlin, I received the Order of the Red Banner and outstanding illegal immigrant of the Soviet intelligence Zarubin, who had just returned from a trip to Western Europe, almost at the same time as me. We met him then for the first time once. Later we became close, and this friendship lasted all my life, although he was much older than

me. During a friendly dinner in honor of Zarubin and me at Slutsky's apartment, I had to drink - for the second time in my life - a glass of vodka. This happened for the first time in Odessa, when I was fifteen years old. Although I was a physically healthy person, the doctors determined that I alcoholic beverages with a strength above twelve degrees are contraindicated. However, Slutsky and Shpigelglaz was ordered to accept the "norm" for a military order, and the next day I lay layer. The reaction of the body was terrible: unbearable headache and vomiting.

Throughout 1937 and part of 1938, I made numerous trips to the West as a courier. roof for me served as a radio operator on a cargo ship. Having met with Konovalets, I was horrified to hear that the OUN had given the Germans disinformation that a number of commanders Red Army from among the Ukrainians - Fedko, Oak and others (later they were all eliminated by Stalin) - expressed their sympathy for the cause of Ukrainian nationalists. People The Konovalets invented such stories to impress the Germans and get as much money from them as possible. Later I happened to read in the Ukrainian emigrant press that such Red commanders as Dubovoy, Fedko and a number of others shared allegedly their loyalty between the Soviet government and Ukrainian nationalism. Konovalets decided to tell me about it, because I knew that as the organizer of the Ukrainian underground, I I can find out the truth.

When I reported this to Spiegelglaz in 1937, he suggested that contacts of Dubovoy and other commanders with Ukrainian nationalists and Germans were not impossible. I think Spiegel-Eye just wanted to cover for me in case I conveyed this information that is unpleasant for our leadership - after all, the fate of these commanders has already been decided.

In November 1937, after the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution, I was summoned along with Slutsky to Yezhov, the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. I met him for the first time, and I was literally struck by his unsightly appearance. The questions he asked were about the most elementary things for any intelligence officer and sounded incompetent. It was felt that he did not know the very basics of working with sources of information. Moreover, it seems that he was not at all interested in strife within the organization of Ukrainian emigrants. Meanwhile, Yezhov was both People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and Secretary of the Central party committee. I sincerely believed that I was simply not able to appreciate those intellectual qualities that allowed this person to occupy such high positions. Although to this time I was already a very experienced professional in the intelligence service, but as far as career in the highest echelons of power, remained a naive person: after all, those leaders with which I have encountered so far, such as Kosior and Petrovsky, who headed Communist Party of Ukraine, were highly intelligent people with a broad outlook.

### **The liquidation of the leader of the fascist OUN Konovalets**

After listening to my message regarding the upcoming meetings with the Ukrainian nationalists, Yezhov suddenly suggested that I accompany him to the Central Committee. I was just

amazed when our car drove into the Kremlin, the admission to which had a very limited circle of people. My surprise increased even more after Yezhov announced that he would receive us. Comrade Stalin personally. It was my first meeting with the leader. I was thirty, but I didn't learn to control my emotions. I was overjoyed and could hardly believe that the head of the country wanted to meet with an ordinary operative worker. After Stalin shook my hand, I couldn't bring myself to give a clear answer to his questions. Smiling, Stalin remarked:

"Don't worry, young man. Report key facts. In our available only twenty minutes. "Comrade

Stalin," I answered, "for an ordinary member of the Party, meeting you is the greatest event in life. I understand that I was called here on business. In a minute I'll take myself in hand and I can report the main facts to you and Comrade Yezhov.

Stalin, nodding, asked me about the relations between political figures in Ukrainian emigrant movement. I briefly described the fruitless discussions between

Ukrainian nationalist politicians on the question of which of them

to play a role in the future government. The real threat, however, was

Konovalets, because he was actively preparing to participate in the war against us together with the Germans. The weakness of his position lay in the constant pressure on him and the organization by the Polish authorities who wanted to send the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia against Soviet Ukraine.

- Your suggestions? Stalin asked. Yezhov remained silent. Me too. Then, gathering my courage, I said that I was not ready to answer now. "Then in a week,"

Stalin remarked, "submit your proposals. The audience is over. He shook hands

with us and we left the office. Returning to the Lubyanka, Yezhov

immediately instructed me to immediately begin work.

together with Spiegelglaz on our proposals. The next day Slutsky, as

head of the Foreign Department, sent a prepared note to Yezhov. That was the plan

intensive implementation in the OUN, primarily in Germany. For this it was

in particular, it was proposed to send three employees of the Ukrainian NKVD as listeners to Nazi party school. It seemed necessary to us to send with them for

insurance of one genuine Ukrainian nationalist, preferably not too

quick-witted. Yezhov did not ask a single question and only said that Comrade Stalin had given

instructions to consult with Comrades Kosior and Petrovsky, who may have their own

considerations. I had to immediately leave for Kyiv, talk with them and

return to Moscow the next day. Our

conversation took place in Kosior's office, where Petrovsky was also present. Both of them

showed interest in our proposed double game. However, they were most concerned

the then proposed proclamation of an independent Carpathian Ukrainian Republic. Exactly one week

after my return to Moscow, Yezhov at eleven o'clock again

led me to Stalin's office. This time Petrovsky was there, which did not surprise me. In just five

minutes, I laid out a plan of operational measures against the OUN, emphasizing that

the main goal is to infiltrate the Abwehr through Ukrainian channels, since the Abwehr is

our main adversary in the coming war. Stalin asked

Petrovsky to speak. He solemnly announced that in Ukraine

Konovalets was sentenced to death in absentia for the gravest crimes against

Ukrainian proletariat: he ordered and personally supervised the execution of revolutionary workers

Kyiv "Arsenal" in January 1918. Stalin,

interrupting him, said: - This

is not an act of revenge, although Konovalets is an agent of German fascism. Our goal

- decapitate the movement of Ukrainian fascism on the eve of the war and force these bandits

destroy each other in the struggle for power. He immediately turned to me with a question:

what are the tastes, weaknesses and affections of Konovalets? Try to use them.

"Konovalets loves chocolates very much," I answered, adding that wherever we they didn't go to him, he everywhere first of all bought a chic box of chocolates.

"Think about it," suggested Stalin. During the entire conversation Yezhov did not utter a word. Saying goodbye, Stalin asked me whether I correctly understood the political significance of the entrusted me a combat mission.

"Yes," I replied, and assured him that I would give my life, if necessary, to fulfill party assignments.

"I wish you success," Stalin said, shaking my hand. I was ordered to liquidate Konovalts. After my meeting with Stalin Slutsky and Shpigelglaz developed several variants of the operation. The first of them assumed that I would shoot Konovalts point-blank. True, it's always accompanied by assistant Baranovsky, whose code name is "Pan Engineer". It was almost impossible to find a moment when I would be alone with Konovalts.

The second option was to give him a "valuable gift" with embedded explosive device. This option seemed to be the most acceptable: if the clockwork will work as expected, I will have time to leave.

An employee of the department of operational and technical means Timashkov received the task make an explosive device that looks like a box of chocolates, painted in the traditional Ukrainian style. The whole problem was that I

you had to discreetly press the switch to start the clockwork. me this I did not like the option too much, since a bright box would immediately attract the attention of Konovalts. In addition, he could pass this box to Baranovsky, who constantly accompanied him.

Using my cover - I was enlisted as a radio operator on the Shilka cargo ship - I met with Konovalts in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Le Havre, where he came on a false Lithuanian passport in the name of Mr Novak. Lithuanian authorities in the 30s regularly supplied OUN functionaries with false passports.

The game, which had been going on for more than two years, was about to end. It was the spring of 1938, and war seemed imminent. We knew that during the war Konovalts would head the OUN and will be on the side of Germany.

On the way, going to meet with Konovalts, I checked the network of our illegal immigrants in Norway, whose task was to prepare sabotage on German ships and Japan, based in Europe and used to supply weapons and raw materials to the regime Franco in Spain. This network was headed by Ernst Wollweber, known to me at that time under codename Anton. Under his leadership was, in particular, a group of Poles who had experience working in mines with explosives. These people had previously emigrated to France and Belgium due to unemployment in Poland, where we attracted them to cooperate to participate in sabotage in case of war. I was ordered to check the Polish bombers. Wollweber spoke almost no Polish, but my Western Ukrainian dialect was quite enough to communicate with our people. With a group of five Polish agents, we met in the Norwegian port of Bergen. I heard a report on the operation on the Polish cargo ship "Stefan Batory", en route to Spain with a batch of strategic materials for Franco. It never reached its destination, sinking in the North Sea after the fire that arose in its hold as a result of the explosion of a bomb planted by our people.

Wollweber made a strong impression on me. German communist, he served in Germany in the navy, led the uprising of sailors against the Kaiser in 1918. Military the tribunal sentenced him to death, but he managed to escape first to Holland, and then to Scandinavia. He was later arrested by the Swedish authorities, and the Gestapo immediately demanded his extradition. However, he received Soviet citizenship, so his expulsion from Sweden to German-occupied Norway did not take place. Already after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939, he came to Moscow and was ordered to continue training sabotage in the inevitable war with Hitler. The Wollweber organization played an important role in Norwegian Resistance. Wollweber and his people, who returned to Moscow in 1941-1944, helped us recruit German prisoners of war for operations after the start of the war. our intelligence.

After the end of the war, Wollweber headed the Ministry for some time. State Security of the GDR. In 1958, in connection with the conflict that arose between him and Khrushchev,

Ulbricht removed Wollweber from his post. And the following happened. Wollweber told Serov, the then chairman of the KGB, about the disagreements among the leadership of the GDR, considering them a manifestation of pro-Western sentiments that contradicted the line of the international communist movement. Serov reported this conversation to Khrushchev. And he, at a dinner, accompanied by heavy drinking, said to Ulbricht: - Why are

you holding the Minister of State Security, who informs us about ideological differences within your party? This is a continuation of the tradition of Beria and Merkulov, whom Wollweber met in the forties when he came to Moscow.

Ulbricht understood what had to be done and immediately fired Wollweber for "anti-party behavior". He died in disgrace in the 60s. In the end, an

explosive device in the form of a box of chocolates was made, and the clock mechanism did not have to be actuated by a special switch. Explosion must was to occur exactly half an hour after changing the position of the box from vertical to horizontal. I was supposed to keep the box in the first position in the big inner pocket of your jacket. I was supposed to give this "gift" to Konovalts and leave room before the mine goes off. Shpigelglaz

escorted me to Yezhov's office, who personally wanted to receive me. before leaving. When we left him, Shpigelglaz said:

- You must act in case of failure of the operation and the threat of capture by the enemy like a real man, so as not to fall into the hands of the police under any circumstances.

In fact, it was an order to die. It meant that I would have to use pistol "Walter", which he gave me.

Shpigelglaz spent more than eight hours with me, discussing various options for my leaving the scene. He provided me with a seasonal train ticket, valid for two months throughout Western Europe, and also handed over a fake Czechoslovak passport and three thousand American dollars, which at that time was a lot of money. On his advice, I had to definitely change my appearance after "leaving": to buy hat, raincoat in the nearest store.

Before leaving Murmansk, I read in Pravda that Slutsky suddenly died of a heart attack.

The circumstances of Slutsky's death are still among the unsolved mysteries. Stalin's time and the fate of the leaders of the NKVD. Slutsky was seriously ill core, he, in particular, received visitors in a darkened office, lying on a sofa. It seems that he was doomed to destruction in the course of Stalin's reprisals against the leadership of the State Security Service, who worked with Yezhov. Yezhov, as follows from the interrogations, investigation showed that Slutsky was liquidated by injection of poison, carried out head of the toxicological laboratory of the NKVD Alekhin. However, for me this seems unlikely. Why was it necessary to put on a play with a violent an injection to a seriously ill heart known to all in the office of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD Frinovsky. With several witnesses. And, finally, and most importantly, Slutsky's younger brother, an employee of the operational department of the Gulag NKVD, also a seriously ill core, died in his aged in 1946 from an acute heart attack while eating in the canteen in front of colleagues. Therefore, I have great doubts about the testimony of Yezhov, Frinovsky, Alekhin about the circumstances of the death of Slutsky, given by them during the investigation, which was conducted with the use of torture against them in 1938-1940, referred to in official documents "measures of physical influence." I

deeply respected Slutsky as an experienced head of intelligence. in a purely human On the other hand, he was unfailingly attentive to me and to Emma. This man had great merit. It was he who at one time managed to steal a technical secret of production in Sweden ball bearings. For our industry, this was of the utmost importance. Slutsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Together with Nikolsky (later known as Orlov), head of the economic intelligence department, in 1930 or 1931 they met with Swedish match king Ivar Kruger. Blackmailing him with what we'll flood Western markets with our cheap matches, they demanded for the Soviet government

a settlement sum of three hundred thousand American dollars. The reception worked, the money was received. I

carefully studied all possible escape routes in those cities where our meeting with Konovalts could take place. For each of them I had a detailed developed plan. However, before the last trip to meet with Konovalts, unexpected problems. In response to my call from Norway, he suddenly suggested that we met in Kiel (Germany) or I would have flown to him in Italy on a German plane, which he would send for me. I replied that I did not have time: although the captain of the ship and was a member of the Ukrainian organization, but this time I can't leave during the stops more than five hours. Then we agreed that we would meet in Rotterdam, in a restaurant "Atlanta", located near the central post office, just ten minutes walk from the train station. Before I went ashore in Rotterdam, I said to the captain, who was instructed to follow all my orders, that if I did not return to the ship by four o'clock in the afternoon, she must sail without me. Timashkov, manufacturer explosive device, accompanied me on this trip and ten minutes before my departure from the ship loaded it. He himself remained on board the ship. (Later Timashkov became head of the department operational technology, it was he who designed magnetic mines: one of them was killed German Gauleiter of Belarus Wilhelm Kube. This happened in 1943, and after the end of the Second World War, he served as an adviser to the Greek partisans during civil war.) On May 23,

1938, after a rain, the weather was warm and sunny. Time without ten twelve. Walking down the alley near the Atlanta restaurant, I saw a table at the window of Konovalts, who was waiting for my arrival. This time he was alone. I entered restaurant, sat down to it, and after a short conversation we agreed again meet in the center of Rotterdam at 17.00. I gave him a present, a box of chocolates, and said that I must now return to the ship. As I left, I put the box on the table next to me. with him. We shook hands and I walked out, holding back my instinctive desire to take off running. I

remember how, after leaving the restaurant, I turned right into a side street, on both sides which housed numerous shops. In the first of them, which traded men's clothes, I bought a hat and a light raincoat. As I was leaving the store, I heard a sound like the sound of a burst tire. People around me ran towards the restaurant. I hurried to station, got on the very first train bound for Paris, where in the morning I was supposed to meet someone I know personally. So that the train crew would not remember me, I got off at a bus stop an hour from Rotterdam. There, near the Belgian border, I ordered lunch at local restaurant, but was unable to touch the food due to a terrible headache. I crossed the border in a taxi - the border guards did not pay any attention to my Czech passport the slightest attention. I took the same taxi to Brussels, where I discovered that the nearest the train to Paris has just left. The next one, fortunately, departed pretty soon, and by the evening I was already in Paris. Everything went off without a hitch. In Paris, I remember, I was deceived in the exchange office at the train station when I exchanged a hundred dollars. I decided that I didn't should be staying at a hotel to avoid check-in: dutch stamps in

my passport, delivered at the border crossing, could be of interest to the police.

The counterintelligence service will probably begin to check everyone who entered France from Holland.

I spent the night walking along the boulevards that surrounded the center of Paris. To kill time, I went to the cinema. Early in the morning, after many hours of walking, I went to the barbershop to shave and wash your hair. Then I hurried to the agreed meeting point to be at the metro station by ten in the morning. When I went out onto the platform, I immediately saw a member of our intelligence Agayants, who worked as the third secretary of the Soviet embassy in Paris. He was already leaving, but, noticing me, he immediately returned and made a sign to follow him. We took a taxi to Boulogne woods, where they had breakfast, and I handed him my gun and a small note, the contents which had to be sent to Moscow in cipher. The note said:

"The gift has been given. The package is in Paris now, and the tire of the car I'm driving traveled, burst while I was shopping." Agayants, who had no

idea of my assignment, escorted me to a safe house in the suburbs of Paris, where I stayed for two weeks.

There was not a single line in the newspapers about the incident in Rotterdam. However, emigrant Russian newspapers wrote with might and main about the future fate of Yezhov: in their opinion, he is doomed as another victim of purge campaigns. As I read this, I couldn't help but laugh to myself, "How stupid all these articles are. After all, just two months ago, this man wished me success in completing the task, and besides I myself saw that Comrade Stalin completely trusted him. From

Paris, using forged Polish documents, I went by car and train to Barcelona. Local newspapers reported on a strange incident in Rotterdam, where a Ukrainian nationalist leader Konovalets, who was traveling on a false passport, died in an explosion in the street. Three versions were put forward in newspaper reports: either he was killed by the Bolsheviks, or by a rival group of Ukrainians, or, finally, he was removed by the Poles - in retaliation for the death of General Peratsky.

Fate would have it that Baranovsky, who arrived an hour after the explosion in Rotterdam from Germany to meet with Konovalets, was arrested by the Dutch police, who suspected him of committing this action, but when he was taken to the hospital and showed the body killed, he exclaimed: "My Fuhrer!" - and this, coupled with a train ticket, was enough to convince the police of his complete innocence. The day after the explosion, the Dutch police,

accompanied by Baranovsky conducted an inspection of the crews of all Soviet ships in the port of Rotterdam. They were looking for the person depicted in the photo they had in their possession. It was the one photograph taken by a street photographer in Berlin. Baranovsky knew that Konovalets was going to meet with a courier-radio operator from a Soviet ship, who appeared in Western Europe. However, he was not at all sure that it was me. The Dutch police knew about a phone call to Konovalets from Norway and, of course, suspected that he had called me. True, no one knew for sure who exactly Konovalets met on that fateful day. When there was an explosion on the street, there was no one near him. His personality remained clarified by the police until late in the evening, while my ship "Shilka" had long since left Rotterdam harbor (the death of Konovalets caused a split in the OUN. The fate of the OUN leaders who worked under Konovalets was tragic in 1939-1945. During the struggle for power inside the OUN between Bandera, liberated by the Germans in 1939, and the official Konovalets successor Melnik killed prominent militants and associates of Konovalets. Bandera shot Baranovsky, Stsiborsky, Gribovsky, Sushko in Zhitomir and Lvov in 1942-1943. The militant Lemek was liquidated by them in Poltava in 1942).

In Spain I stayed for three weeks as a Polish volunteer in the unit led by the NKVD of the international partisan unit under the republican army.

## CHAPTER 2. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN SPAIN

During my stay in Barcelona, I first met Ramon Mercader del Rio, a young lieutenant who had just returned from a guerrilla mission. He had assignments in the rear of the Francoists. Charming young man - at that time he was just twenty years. His older brother, as I was told, died heroically in battle: having tied himself grenades, he threw himself under a German tank that broke through to the positions of the Republicans. Their mother Caridad was also highly respected in the Republican guerrilla underground, showing miracles of bravery in combat operations. Then I had no idea what the future was destined for Mercader: after all, he was destined to liquidate Trotsky, and with this operation I should have been in charge.

During the years 1936-1939, in Spain, there was, in fact, not one, but two wars, both not on life, but to death. In one war, nationalist forces clashed, led by Franco, who was aided by Hitler, and the forces of the Spanish Republicans, aided by the Soviet Union. The second, completely separate war was fought within the republican camps. On the one hand, Stalin was in the Soviet Union, and on the other, Trotsky, who was in



exile: both wanted to appear before the world as saviors and guarantors of the cause republicans and bring the Spanish revolutionary anti-fascist movement.

In Spain, we sent both our young, inexperienced operatives, and experienced professional instructors. This country has become a kind of testing ground where and practiced our future military and intelligence operations. Many of subsequent moves of Soviet intelligence relied on the contacts established in Spain and on the conclusions that we were able to draw from our Spanish experience. Yes, Republicans Spain were defeated, but the people who worked for the Soviet Union became ours permanent allies in the fight against fascism. When the civil war in this country ended, it became clear that there was no more room for Trotsky in the world.

## **N. Eitingon - head of the Soviet illegal intelligence**

In Spain, my new meeting with Eitingon, one of the prominent heads of Soviet intelligence in the 1920s and 1950s. I met him five years ago when he headed the 1st branch (illegal intelligence) of the Foreign Department. (Eitingon in the 1920s and 1930s, he led the creation of an agent network abroad, not connected in its activities with official representatives of Soviet organizations abroad).

In Spain, Eitingon, major of state security (until 1945 in the Soviet bodies State Security was a special system of military ranks, different from the Red Army. The military rank of major (rhombus on the buttonholes) roughly corresponded to the rank of brigade commander. It was below the rank of "commissar of state security", which was later equated to the rank "Major General"), was responsible for the conduct of partisan operations in the rear of the Francoists and the introduction agents at the top of the fascist movement. His pseudonym in Spain was "General Kotov", and in the Center he went under the names "Tom" and "Pierre". It was Eitingon, following the instructions Center, organized in 1938 my return to Moscow. He accompanied me to Le Havre and put on board a Soviet ship. I still remember how he looked: look at him and you would think that this is an ordinary French street vendor - without a tie, in an unchanged cap, which he wore even in the heat.

Naum Isaakovich Eitingon was born on December 6, 1899 in Belorussia, in the city of Shklov, not far from Gomel, where my wife was from. At Lubyanka and among friends he was called Leonid Alexandrovich, since in the 1920s Jewish Chekists took Russian names for themselves, so as not to draw undue attention to one's nationality, both among informants and informants from the circles of the nobility and former officers, and colleagues with whom they worked.

The Eitingon family belonged to the poorest sections of society, but in Europe and They had very wealthy relatives in the United States. Eitingon

joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1917. A year later in age At the age of nineteen, he joined the Red Army and was soon sent to work in the Cheka. In 1919 he was appointed deputy chairman of the Cheka of the Gomel region. He left the party Socialist-Revolutionaries and joined the Bolsheviks in 1920. Eitingon's career began when he took an active part in the suppression of the uprising of the White Guard officers in Gomel, during during which they managed to briefly capture the city.

Dzerzhinsky noticed a young Chekist and sent him to lead the Cheka in Bashkiria for suppression of banditry. There, in a battle with local bandits, he was wounded in the leg and often He later complained to me of pain in his leg. In 1921 he was sent to Moscow in the military Academy, where he studied with future prominent military leaders. I remember he showed me photographs depicting him with Chuikov, later marshal, defender Stalingrad.

After completing his studies at the military academy, Eitingon was sent to work in Foreign department of the OGPU. European relatives refused to comply with his request to send necessary recommendations, papers and money for a trip to Western Europe. And this could

be his legal cover for operational work. As a result, Eitingon was sent to China as a resident of the OGPU: first to Shanghai (where he worked together with the network Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, which also included as one of the agents of Richard Sorge), and then in Beijing and

Harbin. Eitingon managed to achieve the release of a group of Soviet military advisers captured by the Chinese nationalists in Manchuria. He was just as successful another operation, thwarting an attempt by agents of Chiang Kai-shek to seize the Soviet consulate in Shanghai. After that, he was recalled to Moscow.

For a short time in 1930, Eitingon became the deputy of Serebryansky, head of the Special Group under the chairman of the OGPU. This independent and independent The Foreign Intelligence Division Center was created by Menzhinsky, the successor Dzerzhinsky, in 1926 as a parallel intelligence service for deep the introduction of agents to objects of a military-strategic nature and the preparation of sabotage operations in Western Europe and Japan in case of war. For this purpose, Eitingon traveled from China to the USA (California) to organize an agent network there. In 1932, Eitingon was transferred to Foreign department, led by Artuzov, and later by Slutsky, as chief department that coordinated the work of illegal residencies. In addition, he replied also for making forged passports for covert operations abroad.

When we first met him in Moscow in 1933, I was the new inspector in personnel department. At that time, we were not particularly close, since he occupied a higher position than me. In his face I saw an experienced head of intelligence, respected for his success in work and professional skills, so he was assigned to work with illegal immigrants - the holy of holies in our business. In those years, this work was of the utmost importance, since we had relatively few residencies under diplomatic cover. We tried to ensure that our agents, in case of failure, could not direct Western special services to Soviet embassies abroad. Eitingon's

handsome face and his lively brown eyes shone with intelligence. Sight piercing, hair thick and jet black, scar on chin from car accident (most people took it for a trace of a combat wound), - all this gave him the appearance of a seasoned man. He literally charmed people by reciting Pushkin's poems, but his main weapons were irony and humor. He drank little - glasses of cognac enough for the whole evening. I immediately noticed that this man was not in the least looks like a high-ranking arrogant bureaucrat. Complete lack of interest in money comfort in everyday life at Eitingon was simply amazing. He never had any savings, and even the modest furnishings in the apartment were state-

owned. I remember once I brought him the file of a young Chekist who served near Polish border, with a request, if possible, to transfer him to work as one of employees of the department, which Eitingon led. The file contained a note from the deputy head of the department of the Ukrainian GPU, who recommended him for service in Poland, not far from where he lived and worked. Eitingon did not want to send this young man to Poland, near the border, where they could recognize him. And he commented on it like this: "If this a guy with no experience will be caught in a routine check, then whose head then fly? If I start listening to such recommendations, I will need to start a special basket for collecting heads.

I have decided that the matter is closed and he does not want to be disturbed about the device this man. But unexpectedly, Eitingon himself called Minsker, who headed the department in the Far East, and invited him to hire this employee.

### **Intelligence actions in Spain in 1936-1939.**

The name of Eitingon in Spain is associated with a number of unknown episodes of the most important foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership carried out during the years of civil war. He managed to persuade one of the founders of the fascist phalanx party of Ferdinandode Cuesta. He, the only leader of the Nazis who found themselves in

captured by the Republicans, a life was saved. Through our illegal "Yuzik" (Grigulevich), with the help of de Cuesta, we managed to maintain a secret channel of negotiations with Franco. De Cuesta was later exchanged for prominent Republicans in 1938. Unfortunately, through him, with his secret mediation, it was not possible to agree on a peaceful compromise in the civil war after the defeat of the Italian expeditionary force in the battles near Guadalupe in March 1937. However, on the recommendations of Cuesta, it was possible to reach a number of prominent officials from Franco's entourage and force them to cooperate with Soviet intelligence.

Eitingon also carried out a deep reconnaissance of the rear of the fascist troops on the Aragonese front. The data obtained, however, did not play their due role. The unexpected blow of the Republicans in the battle on the Ebro River in 1938, although it delayed the advance of Franco's troops, did not change the general unfavorable development of the military situation.

Secret mediation negotiations were conducted under the control of Eitingon with one of the founders of the Spanish Communist Party X. Hernandez, Minister of Justice in the republican government. In exile in Mexico, his relations with Dolores Ibarruri and X. Diaz, who were in Moscow, sharply worsened. Eitingon's attempts to resolve the conflict by personal correspondence with "Pedro" were unsuccessful. In Moscow, Hernandez was declared an agent and a schismatic, "Tito's henchman."

Our next meeting, operational, was already in Spain, from where he illegally transported me to France in 1938 after the liquidation of Konovalovs. Eitingon had been sent to Spain two years earlier as a deputy resident in charge of guerrilla operations, including railroad and airfield sabotage. After Nikolsky, our resident in Spain (under the name Alexander Orlov), disappeared in July 1938, Eitingon became a resident. I could not help but appreciate the skill with which he adapted to local conditions.

In 1939, Franco won the Spanish Civil War and Eitingon moved to France, where for several months he reorganized and restored everything that was left of his agent network, and kept in touch with Guy Burges, one of the members of the Cambridge group, who went under the code name "Young woman". Then Burges was handed over to Gorsky, the NKVD resident in England, for communication. Around the same time, Eitingon managed to attract the nephew of the head of the Spanish fascist party, Primo de Riveira, a friend of Hitler, to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. Until 1942, he was an important source of information about the plans of Franco and Hitler. In 1938, the Center was literally enraged by the flight of our resident in Spain, Orlov. We soon learned that he had fled for fear of arrest. However, Eitingon suggested, despite Orlov's betrayal, to continue contacts with members of the Cambridge group, since Orlov, living in the United States, could not betray his connections with these people without the risk of exposing himself to prosecution. In 1934-1935, Orlov lived in England on a fake American passport, so if American counterintelligence had checked the Cambridge group, Orlov might not have received American citizenship and would have been deported from the United States. Moreover, undesirable facts would have surfaced for him: terrorist operations under his leadership and with his participation against Trotskyists and NKVD agents suspected of playing a double game in Spain. In 1941, Eitingon was sent to Turkey and stayed there for almost

the entire year 1942 under the name of Leonid Naumov. There he prepared an assassination attempt on Franz von Papen, then the German ambassador to Turkey. According to rumors, von Papen was to head the German government if Hitler was removed from power by Wehrmacht generals. This opened the way to a separate peace between Germany, England and the USA. The assassination attempt was unsuccessful - our Bulgarian agent was nervous, and the bomb exploded ahead of time in his hands. As a result, he himself died, and von Papen escaped with only light scratches.

In later years, my wife and Eitingon turned out to be much more realistic in their assessment of our arrangements than I was. I remember Leonid often saying, for example, that the party is no longer a detachment of like-minded people devoted to socialist ideas and the principles of justice, but has become just a machine for governing the country. At first, his jokes about the country's leadership upset me, but then I got used to them and began to understand how right he was, believing that our leaders put their own selfish interests are higher than the interests of the people and the Soviet state. Wife,

however, she always scolded Eitingon as soon as he began to complain about inflated privileges Kremlin leadership. "On the one hand," she said, "I agree with you. Too much many people use them, and most of them for nothing and certainly not for their heavy work. Do not forget, however, that both you and your family received benefits and, like us, did not think refuse them."

In the last years of his life, Eitingon was married to Bubbles, the only a woman - an employee of the KGB, awarded the British order. Eitingon was arrested a second time with me in the wave that followed removal of Beria from power in 1953, and released only in 1964. Eitingon passed away in 1981, without being rehabilitated - officially he was considered simply released on freedom for the criminal. It was not until April 1992 that the family received a certificate of his posthumous rehabilitation. Leonid

was a truly gifted person, and if he did not become a scout, for sure would have succeeded in public service or pursued a scientific career. Still in memory The joke lives on: "Under our system, there is only one, however, also not guaranteed, opportunity not to end your days in prison. You don't have to be a Jew or a general state security."

In 1992, Eitingon's daughter Svetlana called me on the phone and asked me to take her distant relative from England, who came to Moscow to collect materials for books about the Eitingons. During our meeting in May 1992, I learned from her that the branches The "clan" of the Eitingons can be found in Belarus, Moscow, New York and Leipzig. However relatives who moved from Europe to America and enjoyed special benefits under trade in fur products from the Soviet Union, did not play any role in professional career of Eitingon, and he did not maintain contact with them even after release from Vladimir prison.

Reports that appeared earlier in the West, in which Eitingon was attributed an important role in the kidnapping operation in 1937 in Paris of General Miller, leader ROVS (Russian All-Military Union) do not correspond to reality. He is kidnapped was with the participation of General Skoblin (code name "Farmer"), who emigrated to Paris, who acted under the direct supervision of Spiegelglaz. Skoblin succeeded lure Miller to the safe house of the NKVD, where his meeting was allegedly to take place with German intelligence officers. There he was arrested. In connection with the disappearance of Miller French authorities made a strong protest to the Soviet ambassador in France, insisting on that he was in fact abducted and taken aboard a Soviet ship. They even threatened to send their own destroyer to intercept a Soviet ship at sea. Our Ambassador Surits categorically denied all accusations, warning the French that they would be held responsible if a peaceful Soviet ship was stopped and searched by them in international waters. IN In any case, according to the Ambassador, General Miller would still not be found there. As a result the Soviet ship was not detained and safely made its way from Le Havre to Leningrad. Miller was taken to Moscow, where he was interrogated, he refused to sign appeal to the white emigration to stop the fight against Soviet power, was tried and shot in 1939 at the Lubyanka. His kidnapping made a lot of noise at that time. What the general was neutralized, led to the collapse of the entire organization of the former tsarist officers, frustrating their plans for cooperation with the Germans in the war against us.

Skoblin fled from Paris to Spain on a plane ordered for him by Orlov (when Orlov fled in 1938, he kept Skoblin's gold ring as evidence his involvement in this matter). Skoblin himself was killed during an air raid on Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War. His wife was a famous Russian singer Nadezhda Plevitskaya, who maintained contact with the NKVD. She did not suspect that Spiegel-eye led the operation to capture Miller, and considered him a friend of her husband. She only knew that Shpigelglaz ("Douglas") was connected with the Soviet representatives and supported them. financially. She was arrested in France for complicity in the kidnapping of Miller and sentenced to twenty years hard labor. She died in prison in 1944. If Skoblin carried out this operation, as some "experts" in the history of our intelligence write, with the knowledge

Germans, then Plevitskaya would have been liberated by them, or, in any case, the Germans would certainly have tried to use her to get in touch with our intelligence in France.

## Meeting with Beria

But let us return to the events of 1938. Having received my message from Paris about the successful operation to liquidate Konovalts, Shpigelglaz called my wife to him and said: "Andrey (my code name) is safe. He saw how people rushed to the scene, and everything became clear to him. Indeed, in Western Europe, no one will run in order to look at a car tire bursting nearby. In July 1938, the ship I was on landed in the port of Leningrad. I immediately took the night train to Moscow. At the station I was met by Passov, who had

just been appointed to replace Slutsky, Shpigelglaz and my wife. I was congratulated and hugged. Needless to say, how happy I was to return to Moscow to my former life. I considered the liquidation of Konovalts justified from all points of view and was proud that no innocent people were injured in the explosion. Neither the Abwehr nor the organization of Ukrainian nationalists had evidence to reveal the true reasons for the death of Konovalts. Of course, they could suspect a courier or a messenger who arrived for a meeting in Rotterdam, but in their hands there were no

evidence.

There was another important circumstance that convinced me that the work had been done correctly. The nationalist leaders I encountered in Berlin and Warsaw belonged to the so-called "pro-Western" Ukrainians, they already had a poor command of their native language, mixing Ukrainian words with German, and I often had to correct them. These people, I sincerely believed, were doomed by history itself. Completely cut off from real life in Ukraine, they did not understand the essence and strength of the Soviet system. Nor did they know about the rise of Ukrainian literature and art. They received their education mainly in Vienna or Prague. Ukrainian culture and language in Polish Galicia at that time were ruthlessly suppressed by the local authorities. Regularly following the periodicals, they, however, could not explain the difference between collective farms and state farms or understand the relationship of various state and public organizations responsible for social policy in Ukraine. They claimed that their views were supported by the rural population and consumer cooperatives, not knowing that in reality consumer cooperatives in the countryside had long become an integral attribute of the collective farm system.

The next day, early in the morning, I was called to Beria, the new head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, Yezhov's first deputy. Before that, I only knew about Beria that he headed the GPU of Georgia in the 20s, and then became the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Passov, who had succeeded Slutsky as head of the Foreign Department, took me to Beria's office next to Yezhov's waiting room. My first meeting with Beria lasted, it seems, for about four hours. All this time, Passov kept silent. Beria asked me question after question, wanting to know about all the details of the operation against Konovalts and about the OUN since its inception. An hour later, Beria ordered that Passov bring a folder with a lettered file "Stavka", where all the details of this operation were recorded. From Beria's

questions, it became clear to me that he was a highly competent person in matters of intelligence work and sabotage. Later I realized that Beria was asking his questions in order to better understand how I was able to fit into Western life. Beria was particularly impressed by the seemingly simple procedure for acquiring seasonal railway tickets, which allowed me to travel freely throughout Western Europe. I remember how he was interested in the technique of selling railway tickets

for passengers on domestic lines and on foreign routes. In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, passengers traveling to other countries approached the cashier one at a time - and only after the call from the attendant. We assumed that this was done for a specific purpose, namely to allow the cashier to better remember who purchased the tickets. Next, Beria asked if I had paid attention to the number of exits, including

and a spare, in a safe house, which was located in the suburbs of Paris. He was rather surprised that I did not do this, because I was too tired. From this I concluded that Beria possessed experience in the underground, acquired in the Transcaucasian Cheka.

He was dressed, I remember, in a very modest suit. I found it strange that he tie, and the sleeves of the shirt, by the way, are of fairly good quality, rolled up. This circumstance made me feel a bit uneasy as I was wearing a beautifully tailored Suit: During my brief stay in Paris, I ordered three trendy suits, a coat, and a few shirts and ties. The tailor took measurements, and Agayants came in to pick up the things and sent them to Moscow by diplomatic mail.

Beria showed great interest in the subversive partisan detachment based in Barcelona. He personally knew Vasilevsky, one of the partisan commanders - at one time he served under him in the counterintelligence of the Georgian GPU. Beria spoke good Russian with a slight Georgian accent and towards me behaved very politely. However, he failed to remain unperturbed throughout throughout our conversation. So, Beria became very excited when I told what gave arguments to Konovalts to dissuade him from carrying out OUN terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet government in Ukraine. I objected to him, referring to the fact that this can lead to the death of the entire Ukrainian nationalist underground, since the NKVD quickly get on the trail of the terrorists. Konovalts believed that such acts could done in isolated groups. This, he insisted, would give them a halo of heroism in the eyes of local population, will serve as an incentive to launch a broad anti-Soviet campaign, in intervened by Germany and Japan.

Being nearsighted, Beria wore pince-nez, which made him look like a modest co-employee. Probably, I thought, he deliberately chose this image for himself: in Moscow he no one knows, and people, of course, when they meet, do not fix their attention on such ordinary appearance, which will give him the opportunity, visiting safe houses for conversations with agents, remain unrecognized. It must be remembered that in those years some of the safe houses in Moscow, held by the NKVD, were in communal apartments. Later I learned that the first thing did Beria, becoming Yezhov's deputy, this switched over to himself connections with the most valuable agents who were previously in contact with the heads of leading departments and departments NKVD, who were subjected to repression.

I got five days' leave to visit my mother, who still lived in Melitopol, and then the wife's parents in Kharkov. It was assumed that, returning to Moscow, I will get the position of Assistant Head of the Foreign Department. Spiegelglaz and Passov were in delighted with my meeting with Beria and, seeing me off at the Kiev railway station, they assured me that return to Moscow, I will also be entrusted with the direct supervision reconnaissance and sabotage work in Spain. During the

trip, my wife told me about the tragic events that had taken place in country and security forces. Yezhov carried out the most severe repressions: he arrested the entire the leadership of the counterintelligence of the NKVD in 1937. In 1938, repression reached Foreign department. The victims were many of our friends, whom we fully trusted and whose devotion was not in doubt. We thought at the time that this was possible because criminal incompetence of Yezhov, which became obvious even to ordinary operational workers. Here I

would like to cite a fact which, for all its importance, is not mentioned in books on the history of the Soviet special services. Before Yezhov came to the NKVD, there were no the unit involved in the investigation, that is, the investigative unit. Operator at Dzerzhinsky (as well as Menzhinsky), working with agents and informants of the supervised section, he had to conduct the investigation, interrogations, and prepare indictments. At Yezhov and Beria, a special investigative unit was created, which literally knocked out testimonies from those arrested about "criminal activity" that had nothing to do with the real reality. Operational

workers who oversaw specific industrial facilities and state apparatus, had more or less clear ideas about the personnel of these institutions and

organizations. Those who came at the party call, mostly young people without a life experience, the personnel of the investigation unit from the very beginning were involved in a vicious circle. They operated on confessions knocked out from the defendants. Without knowing the basics of operational work, checking real materials, they turned out to be accomplices in the criminal reprisal against innocent people, committed at the initiative of the highest and middle levels of the country's leadership. As a result, a whole wave of arrests arose, caused by an inflamed imagination. investigators and "evidence" knocked out of those under investigation. We

all hoped that with the appointment of Beria in December 1938 as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs due to his high professionalism and in connection with the well-known decision of the Central Committee, admitted folds will be corrected. It is clear that this hope was naive, but we sincerely believed then into the decency and unconditional honesty of our immediate supervisors. We knew, for example, that Slutsky and Shpigelglaz were sent from Moscow and arranged for the residence of the wives and children of some of our colleagues who were arrested, so that they, in their turn, did not become victims of repression.

From the trip, I returned to Moscow quite puzzled by the rumors about what was going on in Ukraine atrocities we heard about from our relatives. I couldn't bring myself to believe, for example, that Khataevich, who by that time had become secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Ukraine, was an enemy of the people. Kosior, allegedly in contact with the disbanded Comintern of the Communist Party of Poland, was arrested in Moscow. The real reason for all these arrests, as I thought then, were really mistakes made by them. In particular, Khataevich, during the mass famine, agreed to the sale of flour, which amounted to emergency reserve in case of war. For this, in 1934, he received a reprimand from Moscow. along party lines. Maybe, I thought, he made some other mistake in the same kind. I repeat again: alas, I was naive.

In Moscow, Passov and Shpigelglaz informed me that a new appointment awaited me: the position of Assistant Chief of the Foreign Department. This appointment, however, was even the approval of the Central Committee of the party, since it was a question of a leading position that was part of nomenclature. And although there was no order for my new appointment, in fact, since August until November 1938, I performed these duties.

### Spanish gold

The start of my new job was not a good one. I quickly realized that my Chief Passov had no operational experience abroad. Questions for him recruitment of agents in the West and contacts with them were a real "terra incognita". He is completely trusted any information received from agents, and had no idea about the methods verification of reports from foreign sources. His operational experience in counterintelligence and in the field of investigative actions against the "enemies of the people" could not help him. I was just in horrified to learn that he had signed a directive allowing every operational officer foreign residency to use their own cipher and bypass the resident to send messages directly to the Center, if he could have reason not to trust his immediate supervisor. Only later did it become clear why such a document came into being. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party in March 1937, the NKVD was required to "strengthen Personnel" of the Foreign Department. The criminality of this demand lay in the fact that they covered the desire of the country's leadership to get rid of the objectionable old leadership of the Soviet intelligence agencies.

In 1936, the Spanish Republicans agreed to deposit a large part of the Spanish gold reserves with a total value of more than half a billion dollars. Except In addition, in the spring of 1939, Republicans were taken to Mexico by steamer from France also great value. In March 1939, Agayants sent a telegram to the Center from Paris, which he reported that far from all Spanish gold, precious metals and stones. The telegram stated that allegedly part of these stocks were squandered Republican government with the participation of the leadership of the NKVD residency in Spain.

The telegram was immediately reported to Stalin and Molotov, who ordered Beria

check the information. However, when we turned to Eitingon, resident in Spain, for an explanation of the circumstances of this case, he sent in response an indignant telegram that consisted almost entirely of curse words. "I," he wrote, "is not an accountant and clerk. It's time for the Center to resolve the issue of trusting Dolores Ibarruri, José Díaz, me and others Spanish comrades who risk their lives every day in the anti-fascist war in the name of common cause. All requests should be forwarded to trusted representatives of the leadership of the Central Committee French and Spanish Communist Parties Jacques Duclos, Dolores Ibarruri and others. At the same time, it is necessary understand that the export of gold and valuables took place in the conditions of hostilities.

Eitingon's telegram made a great impression on Stalin and Beria. Followed order: to understand the relationship between the employees of the NKVD residency in France and Spain.

I also received a personal assignment from Beria to familiarize myself with all the documents on the transfer and the acceptance of Spanish valuables in the Gokhran of the USSR. But this was easier said than done, since Molotov had to sign the permission to work with Gokhran materials. His assistant, meanwhile, refused to submit a document for signature without Yezhov's visa, the people's Commissioner of the NKVD, - the signature of Beria alone was not enough then. At that time I was completely unfamiliar with all these bureaucratic rules and handed the document to Yezhov through its secretariat. The next morning it still hadn't been signed. Beria scolded me for phone for slowness, but I replied that I could not find Yezhov - he was not in the Lubyanka. Beria irritably threw: - This is not a personal,

but an urgent state matter. Send a courier to Yezhov's dacha, he unwell and is there. His

disrespectful tone towards Yezhov, a candidate member of the Politburo, somewhat puzzled and surprised me.

Together with a courier, we were taken to the dacha of the people's commissar in Ozyory, not far from Moscow. looked Yezhov somehow strange: it seemed to me that I was giving a document for signature or death a sick person, or a person who has been drinking all night long. He endorsed paper, without asking a single question and without expressing his attitude to this matter. I'm here he went to the Kremlin to hand over the document to the secretariat of the government. From there I went to Gokhran accompanied by two auditors, one of whom, Berenzon, was the chief accountant of the Cheka-NKVD since 1918. Before the revolution, he held the position of auditor in Russian insurance company, whose premises were occupied by Dzerzhinsky. The

auditors worked at the Gokhran for two weeks, checking all available documentation. No traces of shortage were found. Neither gold nor jewelry in 1936-1938 for operational purposes by residents of the NKVD in Spain and France were not used. It was then that I learned that the document on the transfer of gold was signed Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic Francisco Largo Caballero and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Krestinsky, later shot as an enemy of the people, along with Bukharin after a show trial in 1938. The gold was taken out of

Spain on a Soviet cargo ship that brought the treasure from Cartagena, the Spanish naval base, to Odessa, and then placed in the cellars of the State Bank. At the time, its total cost was estimated at \$518 million. Other valuables intended for the operational needs of the Spanish government of the Republicans in order to

financing of covert operations were illegally taken from Spain to France, and from there they were delivered to Moscow as a diplomatic cargo. Spanish

gold largely covered our military and material assistance to the Republicans in their war with Franco and Hitler who supported him and Mussolini, as well as to support the Spanish emigration. These tools are also useful for funding intelligence operations on the eve of the war in Western Europe in 1939.

After Orlov's revelations in 1953-1954, the question of gold received a new development. The Spanish government of Franco has repeatedly raised the issue of compensation for the exported values. About the fate of the gold, Eitingon and I were interrogated by KGB intelligence officers in 1950—1960s when we were in prison. In the end, as I was informed, "above" was accepted decision in the 1960s to compensate the Spanish authorities for the gold lost in 1937



supply of oil to Spain at clearing prices. In July 1938, on the eve of the escape of Orlov, our resident in Spain, rumors that he would soon replace Passov as head of NKVD intelligence. However arrest of his son-in-law, Katsnelson, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, repressed in 1937 or 1938, frightened Orlov.

## Liquidation of Trotskyists abroad

The real name of Orlov-Nikolsky is Feldbin, aka "Swede" or "Leva" in operational correspondence. In the West, however, he became known as Alexander Orlov. I met him both in the West and in the Center, but fleetingly. However, I think important to dwell on this figure in more detail, since it was his revelations in the 50s and 60s years greatly contributed to understanding the nature of the repressions of the 37th year in Soviet Union. By the way, contrary to his assertion, Orlov was never a general of the NKVD. In fact, he had the rank of major of state security, a special rank equivalent to 1945 to the rank of colonel. In the early 1930s, Orlov headed the department of economic intelligence of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, was a member of secret contacts and ties with Western businessmen and played an important role in the export of new foreign technology from Germany and Sweden into the

Union. In addition, Orlov was also a talented journalist. He was not in Moscow when they went arrests and reprisals in 1934-1937, but his book version of these events was accepted public as true. Some of our authors even use this version also today to describe the atrocities of the Stalinist regime. Of course, in what he wrote, a lot truth, but we must remember: this man was not very aware of the real events. Orlov was fluent in English, German and French. He is very successful played on the German stock market. He wrote an explanatory textbook for a higher special school NKVD to attract foreigners to agent cooperation. Raisa Sobol, nearest my wife's friend, who became a famous writer Irina Guro, in the 1920s worked in The economic department of the GPU was under his command and highly valued him. From among their informants, Orlov managed to create an informal audit group, which revealed the true income of NEPmen. This secret revision service of Orlov was led by personally Slutsky, at that time the head of the Economic Department, who then, becoming head of the Foreign Department, transferred Orlov to serve in overseas intelligence. IN 1934-1935 Orlov was an illegal resident in London, he managed to secure ties with a group now known to the whole world: Philby, McLean, Burgess, Cairncross, Blunt. In August 1936 he was sent to Spain after a tragic love affair with

young employee of the NKVD Galina Voitova. She shot herself right in front of the building Lubyanka, after Orlov left her, refusing to divorce his wife. Slutsky, his close friend, immediately nominated him for the post of resident in Spain just before Yezhov's appointment as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in September 1936. Orlov was entrusted the most important secret missions, one of which was the successful delivery of gold Spanish Republic to Moscow. For this daring operation, he was promoted. Newspaper Pravda reported that senior major of state security Nikolsky was being awarded Order of Lenin for the implementation of an important government task. In the same issue of the newspaper It was reported that Major of State Security Naumov (actually Eitingon) was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and Captain of State Security Vasilevsky was awarded the Order of Red Star. Orlov

was also highly respected by Shpigelglaz. He often visited Spain and told me that Orlov, who was there, did an excellent job of recruiting an important agents. By

the way, Orlov played a prominent role in the liquidation of the leader of the Spanish Trotskyists Andrew Nina. The entire operation to remove Nin from prison was carried out with the personal participation Orlov-Nikolsky with the help of a special group of militants - German anti-fascists, fighters of a sabotage partisan detachment. Gustav Ruberlein was at the head of the German group,

later, during the GDR, head of the international department of the Central Committee of the Socialist United Party of Germany. The participation of the Germans in this action, as it were, confirmed the version Nikolsky about the involvement of German intelligence services in the kidnapping of his agent from Republican prison. Nevertheless, the scandal associated with the kidnapping of Nina was never settled. The Republican government reacted extremely painfully to this incident. It is precisely because of these circumstances that Nin for participating in the Trotskyist uprising in Barcelona was arrested by the republican authorities, and then abducted by Orlov from prison and killed near Barcelona. The action

to eliminate Nina appears in the archives of the NKVD as Operation Nikolai. The prehistory of this case is connected with the successful penetration of Orlov-Nikolsky's agents into Trotskyist movement. Through the Minister of the Republican Government of Catalonia, Gaodosio Orivero succeeded in blocking the arrival of anarchist reinforcements to help the Trotskyists. rebels in Barcelona in June 1937. In addition, the chief recruited by Nikolsky The Catalan Republican Security Service V. Sala - "Jota" regularly reported on intentions of the Trotskyists and contributed to complete control over correspondence and negotiations all the leaders of the Trotskyist movement in Catalonia, where it had its support.

It was Jota who captured the German couriers, who provoked riots in Barcelona, which quickly turned into an armed uprising by the Trotskyists. irrefutable evidence of the involvement of German intelligence services in organizing the riots in Barcelona radically compromised the Trotskyist leaders. Then Orlov wrote anti-Trotskyist pamphlet, circulating it on behalf of Andrey Nin, and created an accepted official authorities version of the assistance of the German special services to escape Nin from under guards. This action caused serious damage to the prestige of the Trotskyist movement in Spain. About successful disinformation actions of Orlov and the liquidation of the Trotskyists in Spain Yezhov reported directly to Stalin. In July 1938,

Shpigelglaz, as planned in advance, was to meet with Orlov on board a Soviet ship in Belgian territorial waters to receive regular report. Spiegelglaz suspected that the French and Belgian intelligence services there are reasons to detain him, since a year earlier some of his agents who were involved in the abduction of the White Guard General Miller were arrested. For this reason Shpigelglaz was afraid to go ashore. Orlov, on the other hand, was afraid of something completely different: he suspected that the date on the ship is set up to capture him and arrest him. Meeting with Spiegelglaz he never showed up.

Orlov disappeared, and only in November did we learn that he had turned up in America. Before that how it happened, I signed the so-called "orientation" on his search, which was to be transmitted through our channels to all residencies. This document contained a full description of Orlov and his habits, as well as a description of his wife and daughter, whom last seen with him in France. Reason given in the guide possible disappearance of Orlov and his family - their abduction by one of the special services: British, German or French. In particular, I emphasized the fact that Orlov was known to the French and British authorities as an expert of the Soviet delegation, who participated, moreover, twice, in the work of the International Committee for Non-Intervention in civil war in Spain. Another reason could be his treason: from the residency safe sixty thousand dollars, intended for operational purposes, disappeared in Barcelona. His disappearance worried us also because Orlov was well aware of our agent network in England, France, Germany and, of course, in Spain.

In November 1938, Beria summoned me and, giving instructions, unexpectedly ordered stop further search for Orlov. I had to resume the search only for him direct instruction. Orlov, it turns out, sent a letter from America personally to Stalin and Yezhov, in which he explained his flight by the fact that he feared the inevitable arrest on board the Soviet vessel.

The letter also stated that in the event of attempts to find out his whereabouts or to put him under surveillance, he will instruct his lawyer to make public the documents he has placed in a safe in a Swiss bank. They contained information about falsification

materials handed over to the International Committee for Non-Intervention in the Civil War in Spain. Orlov also threatened to tell the whole story related to the export of the Spanish gold, its secret delivery to Moscow with reference to the relevant documents. This exposure would embarrass both the Soviet government and numerous Spanish refugees as Soviet military support for the Republicans in the civil war was considered officially disinterested. Payment received by us in the form of gold and jewels, was surrounded by mystery. Orlov asked Stalin not to persecute him, an elderly mother who remained in Moscow, and if his terms are accepted, he will not disclose foreign agents and the secrets of the NKVD, which he knows.

I do not believe that the reason why Orlov did not betray the Cambridge group or circumstances of the abduction of General Miller, was his loyalty to Soviet power. It was just about survival.

In August 1938, I first learned about the kidnappings and liquidation of Trotskyists and defectors carried out by the OGPU-NKVD in Europe in the 1930s. In this regard, it deserves some clarifications in the case of Reiss (real name Poretsky), an illegal intelligence agent sent to Western Europe. He received large sums of money for which he did not was able to report, and Reiss feared that he might become a victim of repression. He took the money intended for operational purposes and fled. He put money in one of American banks. Before his escape in 1937, Reiss wrote a letter to the Soviet embassy in France, in which he condemned Stalin. This letter appeared later in one of Trotskyist publications and became fatal for him, although it was clear from the Reiss dossier that he never sympathized with Trotsky himself, nor with any of the groups that supported. Nevertheless, after the appearance in the Trotskyist press of this letter to Reiss was sentenced to death in absentia.

Reiss led a rather hectic life, and Spiegelglaz's intelligence network in Paris very soon spotted him. The liquidation was carried out by two agents: a Bulgarian (our illegal immigrant) Afanasiev and his brother-in-law Pravdin in Switzerland. They sat down to him at a table in a small restaurant in the suburbs of Lausanne. Reiss with pleasure drinking with two Bulgarians pretending to be businessmen. Afanasiev and Pravdin imitated a quarrel with Reiss, pushed him out of the restaurant and, stuffing him into his car, took him away. Three kilometers from this place, they shot Reiss, leaving the corpse on the side of the road.

I received Afanasyev and Pravdin at a safe house in Moscow, where they returned after completing the task. Together with them was Shpigelglaz, who supervised them. Afanasiev and Pravdin were awarded orders. According to a special government By decree, Pravdin's mother, who lived in Paris, received a lifelong pension. Afanasiev became an intelligence officer and served until 1953, while Pravdin went to work in Publishing house of foreign literature in Moscow, where he worked until his death in 1970. In my opinion, it should be clarified: the rumors that Sergei Efron, the husband of the poetess Marina Tsvetaeva, was one of those who brought the NKVD to Reiss, is pure fiction. Efron, who worked at the NKVD in Paris, did not have any information about the whereabouts of Reiss.

Another episode, which also requires comments, concerns Agabekov. In the 20s Agabekov was a resident of the OGPU in Istanbul. He became a defector due to his proximity to Blumkin, who was accused of sympathizing with the views of Trotsky. It is believed that she played her role and his love for the daughter of a British intelligence officer in Istanbul. In desperate need in money, Agabekov wrote and published two books in the West. He was also involved in dark machinations with Caucasian emigrants, whom he promised to smuggle family treasures hidden by them from the Soviet Union.

It was reported that Agabekov disappeared in the Pyrenees on the border with Spain. Actually it eliminated in Paris, lured to a safe house, where he was allegedly supposed to agree on the secret export of diamonds, pearls and precious metals belonging to wealthy Armenian family. Greek merchant, middleman in the transaction, whom he met in Antwerp, was G. Takhchianov, an illegal employee of the NKVD in France. He lured Agabekov to a safe house, playing on his national feelings. There in his apartment were already waiting for a militant, a former officer of the Turkish army, and a young illegal immigrant Korotkov, in the 40s

became the head of illegal intelligence of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. The Turk killed Agabekov with a knife, after causing his body to be stuffed into a suitcase, which was thrown into the river. The corpse was never detected. Turk

and Korotkov carried out another terrorist operation in 1938. ail

Taubman, a young agent with the code name "Junets", a native of Lithuania, managed to gain confidence to Rudolf Klement, who headed the Trotskyist organization in Europe and was secretary of the so-called Fourth International. For a year and a half, Taubman worked Clement's assistant. One evening, Taubman invited Clement to have dinner with his friends and brought him to an apartment on the Boulevard Saint-Michel, where the Turks and Korotkov. The Turk stabbed Clement, again the body was put in a suitcase, then thrown into the Seine. The body was found and identified by the French police, but by this time Taubman, Korotkov and the Turks were already far from Paris.

In Moscow, they were waiting for awards, and I had to take care of their future work. Turk became the "owner" of a safe house in Moscow. G. Takhchianov became one of the leaders illegal intelligence in the 1940s. Taubman changed his surname to Semyonov and was sent to studying at the Institute of Chemical Engineering. He later moved to serve in the state security.

The next episode is connected with the fate of one of the defectors in the 30s, Krivitsky. Military intelligence officer Krivitsky, who fled in 1937 and appeared in America in 1939, published a book called "I was an agent of Stalin." In February 1941 he found dead in a Washington hotel. It was assumed that he was killed by the NKVD, although it was officially reported that it was suicide. There was, however, an orientation search for Krivitsky, but this was the usual practice in all cases of defectors.

In the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army and the NKVD, of course, they did not regret his death, but, as far as I know, it was not the work of our hands. We thought he shot himself in the result of a nervous breakdown, unable to cope with depression.

## CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL REPRESSIONS IN THE USSR IN 1934-1939

### Kirov's assassination. Myths and political speculation

When a defector or one of the political figures dies, they immediately begin put forward a variety of versions of the departure of a person from life. The most natural reason death or a logical motive for murder often remains buried under layers of lies due to omissions and mutual settling of accounts.

A classic example in this respect is the death of Kirov, the Leningrad party leader who was killed in 1934.

Kirov was killed by Nikolaev. Nikolaev's wife, Milda Draule, worked as a waitress at the Kirov secretariat in Smolny. Naturally, the guards let Nikolaev into Smolny by membership card. By the way, with a party card one could enter any party authority other than the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6). In Smolny, as in other regional committees, there was no system special passes for party members, and Nikolaev only needed to present his party card in order to get to where outsiders were not allowed to enter. From his wife, who in 1933-1935 worked in the

NKVD in a secret political department dealing with issues of ideology and culture (her group, in particular, oversaw The Bolshoi Theater and the Leningrad Opera and Ballet Theater, later the Theater. S. M. Kirova), I found out that Sergei Mironovich was very fond of women, and he had many mistresses both in Bolshoi Theater, and in Leningrad. (After the assassination of Kirov, the NKVD department in detail clarified the intimate relationship of Sergei Mironovich with the artists.) Milda Draule served at some Kirov parties. This young attractive woman was also one of his "girlfriends". Her husband Nikolaev was distinguished by a quarrelsome character, entered into disputes with his superiors and, as a result, was expelled from the party. Through his wife he

turned to Kirov for help, and he contributed to his restoration in the party and the device to work in the district committee. Milda was about to file for divorce, and the jealous husband killed the "rival". This murder was used to the maximum by Stalin to eliminate his opponents and unleashing a campaign of terror. The so-called conspiracy of the Trotskyists, the victim of which allegedly Kirov fell, was fabricated from the very beginning by Stalin himself. Stalin, followed by Khrushchev and Gorbachev, proceeding from his own interests and wishing to divert attention from the obvious failures of the leadership of the country, tried to maintain the reputation of Kirov as a knight without fear and reproach. The Communist Party, which demanded impeccable behavior from its members in personal life, could not announce publicly that one of her pillars, the leader Leningrad party organization, in fact, got entangled in ties with married women.

The official versions of the murder published in the press are fiction from the beginning to the end. The Stalinist version was that Nikolaev was helped leaders of the Leningrad NKVD Medved and Zaporozhets on the orders of Trotsky and Zinoviev. For Stalin, Kirov's death created a convenient conspiracy myth that allowed him to attack their enemies and potential rivals with reprisals. Khrushchev's version is as follows: Kirov was killed by Nikolaev with the help of Medved and Zaporozhets on the orders of Stalin. But documents show that Zaporozhets, considered a key figure among the conspirators and allegedly connected with Nikolaev through the NKVD, at that time he broke his leg and was on treatment in the Crimea. The question arises: could one of the leaders who prepared the conspiracy be absent for so long during the most decisive period of the tragic events? Khrushchev,

emphasizing the fact that many party leaders begged Kirov put forward his candidacy for the post of General Secretary at the 17th Party Congress, accused Stalin is that, having learned about the existing opposition, he decided to liquidate Kirov. For Khrushchev, such a version made it possible to raise another accusation of a long Stalin's list of crimes. Documents and certificates confirming involvement Stalin or the apparatus of the NKVD to assassinate Kirov does not exist. Kirov was not an alternative Stalin. He was one of the adamant Stalinists who played an active role in the fight against party opposition, merciless towards the oppositionists and nothing in this respect different from other associates of Stalin.

Khrushchev's version was later approved and accepted by Gorbachev as part of the anti-Stalinist campaigns. Hiding the true facts, the leaders tried to save the reputation Communist Party, were looking for figures popular in the party who allegedly opposed the leader. A myth was created about a healthy core in the Central Committee, headed by Kirov, in opposition to Stalin and his associates.

The entire Nikolaev family, Milda Draule and her mother, were shot after two or three months after the attack. Milda and her family, innocent victims of arbitrariness, were not rehabilitated until December 30, 1990, when their case surfaced on the pages of the Soviet presses.

The highest ranks of the NKVD, especially those who were aware of Kirov's personal life, knew that the reason for his murder was the jealousy of a deceived husband. But none of them dared even talk about it, since the version of a conspiracy against the party was put forward by Stalin himself and it was extremely dangerous to challenge it.

Before the assassination of Kirov, Stalin could often be met on the Arbat, accompanied by Vlasik - the head of personal protection and two bodyguards. He often visited the poet Demyan Bedny, sometimes visited his friends who lived in communal apartments. Employees of the NKVD and veterans who had the badge "Honorary Chekist", which depicts a shield and a sword, and a certificate to it, could freely pass to the Lubyanka; they had the right of passage everywhere except prisons. This whole system was immediately changed: killing Kirov was a pretext for tightening control, which will never again weakened.

Speculation about Kirov's death continued into the 1960s. I remember anonymous letters claiming that the real killer managed to escape. Dmitry Efimov, Minister of the Lithuanian state security in the 40s, after the war he told me that he had received an order to search for

the murderer of Kirov, who is allegedly hiding in a small Lithuanian town. to his staff managed to find the author of an anonymous letter, which served as a signal to search. It turned out to be alcoholic. However, this anonymous signal was investigated under direct supervision of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The conclusion of the Party Control Commission on the circumstances of Kirov's death was never made. published. Only after in July 1990 the well-known repression commission was dissolved, the prosecutor's office sent a supervisory protest to the Supreme Court of the USSR on the issue of posthumous rehabilitation of members of the Nikolaev family. The case was closed only on December 30 1990, when all members of the Nikolaev family were officially rehabilitated by the Supreme Court of the USSR, the ruling of the court noted that there was no conspiracy to kill Kirov existed and all of Nikolaev's "accomplices" were simply acquaintances of Kirov or witnesses to his excesses.

But even then, under this system of the so-called rule of law, neither the Bear nor Zaporozhets were not rehabilitated and charges of treason were not dropped from them, including a conspiracy to assassinate Kirov and cooperation with the German and Latvian intelligence. What is the reason? It is that the prosecutor's office was simply afraid to raise this question, since Medved and Zaporozhets are considered guilty of repressions committed in early period of Stalin's purges.

There has long been an opinion among party historians that Milda Drauls' romance with Kirov ended in death due to the jealousy of her husband, Nikolaev, known for his unbalanced and scandalous character. If this opinion were made public, then an unattractive picture of Kirov's personal life would be put on public display and most violated the sacred rule of the party - never to lift the veil over the personal the lives of members of the Politburo and not delve into their dirty linen.

On November 4, 1990, the Pravda newspaper published new materials from the KGB and the prosecutor's office. on the investigation of the Kirov case, where it was alleged that his murder was purely personal character, although the details and motives of the crime were not disclosed. "Truth" is not even mentioned the name of Milda Draule. The publication contained an accusation against Yakovlev, who left the post of chairman of the party commission for the investigation of Stalinist repressions, who allegedly hindered the rehabilitation of the Nikolaev family and innocent people accused of that they were involved in the conspiracy.

Outraged, Yakovlev replied through the same newspaper (Pravda, January 28, 1991) that he still believes in the existence of a conspiracy to assassinate Kirov and several versions of how this assassination was planned. At the same time, Yakovlev did not mention either Milda Draul or alleged attempt to nominate Kirov to replace Stalin as General Secretary for XVII Party Congress. In

the book "Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy" Dmitry Volkogonov refers to the rumors about the novel Milda Draule with Kirov, but dismisses them as slanderous. Materials showing special relationship between Milda Draule and Kirov, which I learned about from my wife and General Raikhman, at that time the head of counterintelligence in Leningrad, were kept in operational reports of NKVD informants from the Leningrad ballet. Ballerinas from among mistresses of Kirov, who considered Draule their rival and did not show sufficient restraint in their statements on this subject, were put in camps for "slander and anti-Soviet agitation.

... The name of Kirov and his memory were sacred. In the eyes of the people, Kirov was an ideal a solid Bolshevik, a loyal Stalinist and, of course, only enemies could kill such person. At that time I did not doubt for a moment the need to protect the prestige of the ruling party and not reveal the true facts concerning the assassination of Kirov. We, the Chekists, were unofficially called people who took on the role of laborers of the revolution, but still while experiencing the most conflicting feelings. In those days I sincerely believed - I continue believe even now - that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky and Bukharin were real enemies Stalin. Within the framework of the totalitarian system of which they were a part, the struggle against Stalin meant opposition to the party-state system of the Soviet states. Considering them as our enemies, I could not feel any

sympathy. That is why it seemed to me that even if the accusations leveled against them and exaggerated, these are, in essence, trifles. Being an idealist communist, I'm too late I realized the importance of such "little things" and I regret to see that I was wrong.

Consciously or unconsciously, we have allowed ourselves to be drawn into the work of a colossal mechanism of repression, and each of us has an obligation to repent for the suffering of the innocent. Scales these repressions terrify me. Giving today a historical assessment of that time, time mass repressions - and they affected the army, the peasantry and employees - I think they can be likened to the massacres carried out during the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. No wonder Stalin is called Ivan the Terrible of the 20th century. It is tragic that our country has such cruel traditions. Stalin

manipulated the Kirov case in his own interests, and the "conspiracy" against Kirov was artfully inflated by him. He fabricated a "grand conspiracy" not only against Kirov, but also against himself. He skillfully used the murder of Kirov in order to remove those whom he suspected as his potential rivals or disloyal opponents, which he simply could not bear. First, Nikolaev's acquaintances were among the "conspirators", then the Draule family, after which it was the turn of Zinoviev and Kamenev, initially accused of moral responsibility for this murder, and then in his immediate organizations. Colleagues and acquaintances of Nikolaev were ranked among the Zinoviev opposition. Then Stalin decided to get rid of Yagoda and those officials who knew the truth. They too were drawn to the conspiracy and were destroyed. Later, Yagoda was made the main organizer of Kirov's assassination and, as Raikhman told me, Stalin, who was afraid disclosure of personal motives for the "terrorist attack" of Nikolaev, even ordered to establish an unspoken supervision of Kirov's widow until her death.

In such circumstances, telling the truth about Kirov was unthinkable. Nobody at the top echelons of power could not prevent Stalin from using this murder for his own purposes. Subsequently, the Kirov case was hushed up for the sake of political considerations or used to divert public attention from the deteriorating economic and political situation. Each new investigation subordinated requirements of the political situation, only spawned lies, making it even more difficult for future generations the opportunity to reconstruct actual events.

I am convinced that the assassination of Kirov was an act of personal revenge, but to publish this fact meant to harm the party, which was an instrument of power and an example of high morality. for the Soviet people. Until today, the truth continues to be hidden, and Kirov remains a symbol of holiness for adherents of the old regime.

### Repressions in the NKVD

In 1938, the atmosphere was literally permeated with fear, it felt something sinister. Shpigelglaz, deputy head of the NKVD overseas intelligence, every day was getting uglier. He left the habit of spending Sundays with me and others work friends. In September, the secretary of Yezhov, then head of the NKVD, shot himself in boat, riding on the Moscow River. This came as a complete surprise to us. Soon appeared puzzled all the order, which read: arrest warrants without the signature of Beria, the first Yezhov's deputy are invalid. There were rumors that Beria was affectionately diminutive called Yezhov "my dear Hedgehog" and used to pat him on the back, but he friendly behavior was purely ostentatious. In the Lubyanka, people seemed reserved and avoided any conversation. A special inspection commission from the Central Committee worked in the NKVD. I clearly remember the events that soon followed. November came, eve October celebrations. And at 4 o'clock in the morning I was awakened by a persistent telephone call: Kozlov, the head of the secretariat of the Foreign Department, called. The voice sounded formal, but he felt unusual excitement.

- Pavel Anatolyevich, - I heard, - the first deputy urgently summons you Comrade Merkulov, head of the State Security Department. The car is already waiting for you. Come as soon as possible. Shpigelglaz and Passov have just been arrested.

The wife was extremely worried. I decided it was my turn. Kozlov

himself met me at the Lubyanka and took me to Merkulov's office. He greeted me in his usual polite, calm manner and suggested that I go to Lavrenty Pavlovich. My nerves were strained to the limit. I imagined being interrogated about my connections with Spiegel-Eye. But, amazingly enough, Beria did not inflict any interrogation on me. In a very official tone, he announced that Passov and Shpigelglaz had been arrested for deceiving the party, and that I should immediately take up the duties of head of the Foreign Department, that is, the department of overseas intelligence. I will have to report directly to him on all the most urgent matters. To this I replied that Passov's office was sealed and I could not enter it. "Remove the seals immediately, and for the future remember: don't fool my head with such

nonsense. You are not a schoolboy to ask childish questions.

Ten minutes later I was sorting through the documents in Passov's safe. Some were just amazing. For example, a certificate for Heifetz, then a resident in Italy. It talked about his connections with elements sympathetic to the ideological deviations in the Comintern, where he worked at one time. The suspicious nature of his contacts with former graduates of the Polytechnic Institute in Jena (Germany) in 1926 was also pointed out. I still remember Yezhov's resolution on the certificate: "Recall to Moscow. To arrest immediately".

The next document is a submission to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Presidium of the Supreme Council on awarding me, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, with the Order of the Red Banner for fulfilling an important government assignment abroad in May 1938, signed by Yezhov. There was also an unsigned order on my appointment as an assistant to the head of the Foreign Department. I took these documents to Merkulov. Smiling, to my considerable surprise, he tore them up in front of my eyes and threw them into the trash can for destruction. I was silent, but there was a feeling of resentment in my soul - after all, I was presented with a reward for the fact that I really, risking my life, completed a dangerous task. At that moment, I did not understand how lucky I was: if the order on my appointment had been signed, then, according to the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I would automatically be subject to arrest as a leading operative worker of the NKVD apparatus, to whom

political distrust was expressed. Later, in the office where I worked, the phone rang. It was Kiselyov, Malenkov's assistant in the Central Committee. He indignantly began to reprimand me for the delay in the transfer of funds from special funds intended to finance the secret operations of the Comintern in Western Europe. He was even more enraged by the fact that at the meeting of the Spanish Commission in the Central Committee there was no representative from the NKVD. I tried to explain to him that I do not know about any funds and do not know who exactly is involved in their transfer. "And at the meeting in the Central Committee," I said, "no one from the NKVD was present because Passov and his deputy had just been arrested as enemies of the people." To this I added that I had taken up my duties only two hours before. Kiselev hung up the phone.

During my three weeks as acting head of the department, I was able to learn the structure and organization of intelligence operations abroad. Within the framework of the NKVD, there were two divisions engaged in intelligence abroad. This is the Foreign Department, which was first led by Trilisser, then by Artuzov, Slutsky and Passov. The task of the department is to collect intelligence for the Center obtained both through legal (through our employees who had diplomatic cover or worked in trade missions abroad) and through illegal channels. Of particular importance was information about the activities of governments and private corporations that secretly financed the subversive activities of Russian emigrants and White Guard officers in European countries and in China, directed against the Soviet Union. The foreign department was divided into departments according to the geographical principle, and also included divisions involved in the collection of scientific, technical and economic intelligence. These departments summarized the materials coming from our residencies abroad, both legal and illegal. The priority of illegal channels was quite natural, since there were not so many abroad then.



Soviet diplomatic and trade missions. That's why illegal channels for getting the intelligence we wanted was so important.

At the same time, there was another intelligence service - the Special Group under People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, directly subordinate to him and deeply conspiratorial. Its task was to create a reserve network of illegal immigrants for carrying out sabotage operations behind enemy lines in Western Europe, the Middle East, China and USA in case of war. given the nature of the work. The special group did not have its employees in diplomatic and trade missions abroad. Her apparatus consisted of twenty operatives responsible for coordinating the activities of foreign agents. All the remaining employees worked abroad as illegal immigrants. At the time that I lead speech, the number of such illegal immigrants was about sixty people. It soon became clear to me that the leadership of the NKVD could, at its choice, use the forces and means of the Foreign department and the Special Group for carrying out especially important operations, including sabotage and elimination of opponents of the USSR abroad.

The special group was sometimes referred to as the "Yasha Group", because for more than ten years headed by Yakov Serebryansky. It was his people who organized the abduction in 1930 head of the White Guard ROVS in Paris, General Kutepov. Before the revolution Serebryansky was member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. He took a personal part in the liquidation of the Okhrana officials who organized the Jewish pogroms in Mogilev (Belarus). Yasha Group has created a powerful agent network in the 20-30s in France, Germany, Palestine, the USA and Scandinavia. They recruited agents from the Comintern underground, those who did not participate in propaganda activities and whose membership in the national communist parties was held in secret. Serebryansky's group brilliantly proved itself in secret deliveries of the latest aircraft from France to Republican Spain in 1937. In November 1938 Serebryansky, among the leaders of the NKVD, was under arrest - he was sentenced to death penalty, but not shot. In 1941, after the war began, he was released and, on my initiative, became head of the recruiting department agents for deep subsidence in the countries of Western Europe and the USA.

In 1946, Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security, and Serebryansky had to retire, since in 1938 it was Abakumov who conducted his case and, using brutal torture, knocked out false testimony. Naturally, Serebryansky could not stay on work with the arrival of a new minister. He retired with the rank of colonel and received pension. After Stalin's death, he was returned to the service and appointed one of my deputies. in connection with the plan to expand reconnaissance and sabotage operations. It was under Beria, in April 1953, and in October of the same year he was arrested with his wife for the second time - now he was accused of participating in the so-called Beria plot to kill members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. He died in prison in 1956 time of the next interrogation and was posthumously rehabilitated in 1971 under Andropov, who recognized about the fate of Serebryansky during the preparation of the first textbook on the history of Soviet intelligence, which began to be written at his direction.

It was not until 1963 that I learned what was really behind the radical reshuffling and purge in the ranks of the NKVD in the last months of 1938. The full truth about these events, which was never made public, was told to me by Mamulov and Ludwigov, who headed the secretariat of Beria - they were in the Vladimir prison with me. Here how the fake was launched, which opened the way for a campaign against Yezhov and those who worked with him of people. Incited by Beria, two heads of the regional departments of the NKVD from Yaroslavl and Kazakhstan wrote to Stalin in October 1938, slanderously claiming that in conversations with them, Yezhov hinted at the upcoming arrests of members of the Soviet leadership in the eve of the October celebrations. The action to compromise Yezhov was successfully carried out. Through a few weeks Yezhov was accused of plotting to overthrow the legitimate government. The Politburo adopted a special resolution in which the top officials of the NKVD were declared "politically unreliable". This led to mass arrests of all the leadership of the security agencies, and I was really lucky that Yezhov's order on my promotion remained unsigned in Passov's safe.

In December 1938, Beria officially took over the reins of government in the NKVD, and Dekanozov became the new head of the Foreign Department. He had experience in Azerbaijani GPU under Beria as a supplier. Later in Georgia, Dekanozov was people's commissar of the food industry, where he became famous for his immoderate love for luxury. Handing over cases, I, as the acting head of the department, explained to him some of the features of our intelligence work in Western Europe, the USA and China. But Dekanozov, without listening to me to the end, ordered me to follow things fled Orlov, who were sent from Barcelona to Moscow. I should have delivered them to his office - he wanted to see them personally. The next day,

Beria introduced Dekanozov to the intelligence service. In an official and stern tone, Beria announced the creation of a special commission headed by Dekanozov to check all operational intelligence officers. The commission should have found out how traitors and adventurers who deceive the Central Committee are exposed parties. Beria announced the new appointments of Garanin, Fitin, Leonenko and Lyagin. He also emphasized that all remaining employees will be carefully checked. New leaders came to intelligence on the party recruitment. The Central Committee flooded the ranks of the NKVD party activists and graduates of the Military Academy. Frunze. As for me, I was demoted to Deputy Head of the Spanish Section. In the same way did the same with other veterans of the intelligence service, who were also demoted to assistant department heads.

Beria, in a conversation with every employee who was present at the meeting, tried to find out if he was a double agent, and said that everyone was now under suspicion. My wife was one of four female employees of the intelligence service. Having brazenly measured her with his eyes, Beria asked who she was: a German or a Ukrainian. "Jewish," to Beria's surprise, answered she. From that day on, my wife constantly warned me to beware of Beria. Assuming that our apartment might be bugged, she came up with a code for it. nickname so that we don't mention his name in our conversations at home. She called him prince Shadiman, named after the hero of Antonovskaya's novel "The Great Mouravi", who fell in the struggle for power between the Georgian feudal lords. The foresight of my wife regarding the fate of Beria and her constant advice to stay away from him and his entourage proved prophetic.

After the presentation of the new leadership, Beria was followed by a party meeting - it was the next phase of the campaign. On it, my colleague, whom I knew from Kharkov, Gukasov, an Armenian, unexpectedly suggested that the party bureau consider my suspicious connections. He said that Balitsky, an enemy of the people, had transferred me to Moscow. He also accused me of being maintained friendly relations with other recently exposed enemies of the people Shpigelglaz, Raisa Sobol and her husband, Revzin, Yarikov, deputy of our resident in China, known for his sarcastic witticisms about fulfilling five-year plans (I remember one of them: "In the fourth final blat is decisive").

The Party Bureau set up a commission on my case. One of my close acquaintances, Hesselberg, an employee of the Foreign Department, a brilliant master of portrait photography (he was responsible for the reliability of photojournalists who filmed Stalin), asked stupid questions and claimed that I was defending myself as "a typical Trotskyist double-dealer."

I do not hold a grudge against either Gukasov or Hesselberg. Three years later, Gukasov, being Soviet consul in Paris, woke up when the Gestapo stormed the building where he was. Our cryptographer Marina Sirotkina started burning code books, and when one of the Gestapo tore a portrait of Stalin off the wall, Gukasov used this as an excuse to start a fight. He was severely beaten, but during this time all the ciphers were destroyed. Gukasov was deported by the Germans to Turkey to be exchanged for employees of the German diplomatic mission in Moscow. Later, Gukasov was assigned to lead the department for development of repatriates and emigrants. He died in Moscow in 1956.

Gesselberg prepared a draft decision of the party bureau under the dictation of Dekanozov. In him it was proposed to expel me from the ranks of the Communist Party for my association with the enemies of the people and non-exposure of Spiegel's eye. It is characteristic that in this document Slutsky, although he died in February 1938 and was buried with all due honors, also featured

as an enemy of the people.

The Party Bureau adopted this decision with one abstention. Fitin, recently appointed to the post of Deputy Head of the Foreign Department, abstained because that, according to him, I was completely unknown to him. His honesty and integrity are very unusual in the circumstances, did not hurt his career. In 1939 he became chief Foreign Department of Foreign Intelligence and died of natural causes in 1971.

In December 1938, the Party Bureau decided to expel me from the Party. This decision I had to approve the general party meeting of the intelligence service, scheduled for January 1939, but for now I came to work and sat at my desk at my office, doing nothing. New employees did not dare to communicate with me, fearing to compromise themselves. I remember the chief Department Garanin, talking with his deputy in my presence, switched to a whisper, fearing that I might eavesdrop. In order to do something, I decided to replenish my knowledge and began to study the files from the archive, waiting for the decision

of his fate. I felt depressed. My wife was also very worried, realizing that above us a serious threat loomed. We were sure that we already had compromising material, fabricated and knocked out during the investigation from our friends. But I still hoped that, since I was personally known to the leadership of the NKVD as a dedicated worker, my arrest will not be authorized. In those years, I still lived with the illusion that in relation to a member of the Party injustice can be allowed only because of incompetence or due to simple mistakes, especially if the decision of his fate depended on a person standing high enough in the party hierarchy and enjoying the full support of Stalin.

Knowing that a terrible injustice was being committed against me, I thought of turning to the Party Control Commission of the Central Committee with a request to look into my case, but my wife believed that it was necessary to prepare a letter addressed to Stalin, which she would send herself, and if we will both be arrested, sent by my mother.

When our friends were arrested, we all thought there had been a mistake. But with the arrival Dekanozov realized for the first time that these were not mistakes. No, that was a deliberate policy. On leadership positions were appointed by incompetent people who could be given any orders. For the first time we feared for our lives, threatened with destruction of our own system. It was then that I began to reflect on the nature of the system, which sacrifices people who serve it faithfully.

Another of my friends, Petr Zubov, also fell victim and fell into the same meat grinder. IN In 1937 he was appointed resident in Prague. For the first time in his career in intelligence, he worked under diplomatic cover. Zubov met with President Eduard Beneš and, on Stalin's instructions, handed over ten thousand dollars to the latter, since Beneš could not use his money to organize his departure from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain loved ones and the people he needs. A receipt for the money was given to Zubov Secretary of the Czechoslovak President. Benes himself fled to England in 1938. Teeth excellent completed the task. The British and French authorities had no idea about our connections with people who left Czechoslovakia. Six months after Benes left Prague, Zubov was recalled to Moscow and arrested on Stalin's personal order.

The reason for the arrest was that Beneš—through Zubov—offered to Stalin that the Soviet Union should subsidize a coup in 1938 against government of Stojadinovic in Yugoslavia in order to establish a military regime there and to ease the pressure on Czechoslovakia in this way. Benes asked for an amount of two hundred thousand dollars in cash for the Serbian officers who were supposed to stage the coup. Having received this amount from the Center, Zubov went to Belgrade to get acquainted with position. When he became convinced that the officers in question were only a handful unreliable adventurers and could not count on any successful conspiracy, he was shocked and refused to pay them an advance. Returning to Prague with the money, he reported to Center about the current situation. Stalin was furious: Zubov dared to disobey the order. On the Zubov telegram explaining his actions, Stalin wrote in his own hand: "Arrest immediately." (I saw this telegram in 1941 when I was shown the case Zubova.)

Meeting with Zubov in the corridor of the 7th floor on the Lubyanka on the very first day of his return from Czechoslovakia made me happy: the party bureau had to put on meeting the question of my exclusion from the party, and I hoped for his support, since he enjoyed great prestige in the Foreign Department. We agreed to meet the next day, but he did not come. I figured he was just avoiding contact with me, but Emma met his wife on the street and learned of his arrest. I had no idea what it was accuse: those were the times when one could only look closely at what is happening and try not to lose hope.

And then the unexpected happened. The meeting scheduled for January, which was to approve my exclusion from the ranks of the party, was postponed. Soon Yezhov, removed from duties of People's Commissar in December last year, was arrested. business Yezhov, as I learned later, Beria and one of his deputies, Bogdan Kobulov, were personally involved. Many years later, Kobulov told me that Yezhov had been arrested in Malenkov's office in Central Committee. When they led him to be shot, he sang the Internationale.

I still hold Yezhov responsible for many serious crimes - more In addition, he was also a professionally incompetent leader. Sure: Crime Stalin acquired such an insane scope due to the fact, in particular, that Yezhov turned out to be completely unsuitable for intelligence and counterintelligence work.

To understand the nature of Yezhovshchina, it is necessary to take into account the political traditions characteristic of our country. All political campaigns under a dictatorship invariably become insane, and Stalin is to blame not only for the crimes committed on his orders, but also for allowing his subordinates on his behalf to destroy those who turned out to be objectionable to the local party authorities at the district and regional levels. The leaders of the party and the NKVD were given the opportunity to decide even the most ordinary disputes that arose almost every day, by eliminating their opponents.

Of course, in those days I did not yet know everything, but in order to have reason to fear for my life, my knowledge was enough. Based on the logic of events, I expected to be arrested at the end January or, in extreme cases, early February 1939. Every day I went to work and did nothing - sat and waited for arrest. One of the March days I was called to the office Beria, and unexpectedly for myself I heard a reproach that for the last two months I have been idle. "I am following the order received from the head of the department," I said. Beria did not count necessary to somehow comment on my words and ordered to accompany him to an important, to him, a meeting. I assumed that this was a meeting with one of the agents, whom he personally supervised, in a safe house. In September 1938 I accompanied him twice on similar events. Meanwhile, the car took us to the Kremlin, where we entered through Spassky Gate. The driver stopped the car at a dead end near Ivanovskaya Square. Here I am I suddenly realized that Stalin would receive me.

## CHAPTER 4. THE LIQUIDATION OF TROTSKY

### The plan of the operation against the "Old Man". Meeting with Stalin

The entrance to the Kremlin building, where Stalin worked, was familiar to me from past meetings with him. We climbed the stairs to the second floor and walked along a long deserted corridor covered with red carpet, past cabinets with high doors, such as are found in museums. Us Beria was let in by the same security officer who was on duty when he brought me Yezhov here. Now he was no longer greeting Yezhov, but Beria: "I wish you good health, Comrade Beria!" Beria opened the door, and we entered a waiting room of such enormous proportions that those standing there the three desks looked quite tiny. There were three people in the waiting room: two in jackets of the same cut as Stalin's, and one in military uniform. Beria welcomed short, stocky-looking man in a green tunic, whose voice sounded quietly and dispassionately. (Later I found out that it was Poskrebyshev, head of the secretariat

Stalin.) It seemed to me that in this room the rule was the complete absence of external manifestations of any kind of emotion. And indeed, such was the unwritten and once for all order approved by Stalin and Molotov in this building. Poskrebyshev led us into Stalin's office and then silently closed the door behind us. At that moment, I experienced the same feelings as in previous meetings with Stalin: excitement, mixed with intense expectation, and delight engulfing you all. To me it seemed that the beating of my heart could be heard by those around me.

At our appearance, Stalin rose from the table. Standing in the middle of the office, we shook hands, and he motioned for us to sit down at a long table covered with green cloth. The desktop of Stalin himself was very close in the corner of the office. edge eyes, I managed to notice that all the folders on his desk were laid out in perfect order, above on the desk is a portrait of Lenin, and on the other wall is a portrait of Marx and Engels. All in The office looked the same as the last time I was here. But Stalin himself seemed others: attentive, calm and focused. Listening to the interlocutor, he seems to pondered every word spoken to him, which seemed to have a special meaning for him. AND it simply could not occur to the interlocutor that this person could be insincere.

Was it really so? Not sure. But Stalin really listened to Beria with great attention.

"Comrade Stalin," he turned to him, "at the direction of the Party, we exposed former leadership of the NKVD foreign intelligence and thwarted their treacherous attempt to deceive government. We are making a proposal to appoint Comrade Sudoplatov as Deputy intelligence chief of the NKVD in order to help young party cadres mobilized to work in the bodies, to cope with the implementation of government tasks.

Stalin frowned. He still held his pipe in his hand without lighting it. Then he struck a match (a gesture familiar to anyone who has watched at least one newsreel magazine) and pulled the ashtray towards him.

He did not say a word about my appointment, but asked Beria to briefly talk about the main directions of intelligence operations abroad. While Beria spoke, Stalin got up from the table and began to pace the office, he moved slowly and completely inaudibly in their soft Caucasian boots.

Although Stalin walked without stopping, it seemed to me that he did not relax his attention, on the contrary, he became more concentrated. His remarks were distinguished by a certain harshness, which he did not think to hide. Such harshness towards the people invited to the reception was, perhaps, the most typical feature in his behavior, constituting an integral part of Stalin's personality - the same as the pockmarks on his face, giving him a stern look.

According to Beria, overseas intelligence in modern conditions should change main areas of their work. Its main task should not be the fight against emigration, but the preparation of residencies for war in Europe and the Far East. A much greater role, he believed, would be played by our agents of influence, that is, people from business government circles of the West and Japan, which have access to the leadership of these countries and can be used to achieve our foreign policy goals. Such people should seek among the figures of the liberal movement who are tolerant of the communists. Between meanwhile, according to Beria, the left movement was in a state of serious confusion due to attempts by the Trotskyists to subdue him. Thus, Trotsky and his supporters threw a serious challenge to the Soviet Union. They sought to deprive the USSR of the position of the leader of the world communist movement. Beria proposed to deliver a decisive blow to the center Trotskyist movement abroad and put me in charge of carrying out these operations. In conclusion, he said that it was for this purpose that my candidacy was put forward for the post of deputy head of the Foreign Department, which was then led by Dekanozov. My task was to use all the possibilities of the NKVD to eliminate Trotsky.

There was a pause. Stalin continued the conversation. -

There are no important political figures in the Trotskyist movement, except for Trotsky himself. If Trotsky is done away with, the threat to the Comintern will be eliminated.

He again took his place in front of us and began to slowly say

dissatisfaction with the way intelligence operations are conducted. In his opinion, they lack of proper activity. He emphasized that the elimination of Trotsky in 1937 was entrusted to Spiegelglaz, but he failed this important government task. Then Stalin became stern and, minting words, as if giving an order, he said: - Trotsky, or as you call him in your affairs, the "Old Man", must be eliminated in for a year before the inevitable war breaks out. Without the elimination of Trotsky, how shows the Spanish experience, we cannot be sure in the event of an attack by the imperialists on Soviet Union, in support of our allies in the international communist movement. It will be very difficult for them to fulfill their international duty to destabilize the rear of the enemy, deploy a guerrilla war. We do not have historical experience in building a powerful industrial and military power simultaneously with the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat," Stalin continued, and after evaluating international situation and the impending war in Europe, he turned to a question that directly concerned me. I was supposed to lead a group of militants for conducting an operation to eliminate Trotsky, who was at that time in exile in Mexico. Stalin clearly preferred streamlined words like "action" (instead of "liquidation"), while noting that if the action was successful, "the party will never forget those who are in it participated, and will take care not only of themselves, but also of all members of their families."

When I tried to protest that I was not well suited for this task in Mexico, since I do not speak Spanish at all, Stalin did not react in any way. I asked for permission to involve veterans of sabotage operations in civil war in Spain.

"It is your duty and party duty to find and select suitable and reliable people to carry out the task of the party. You will be provided with any help and support. Report directly to Comrade Beria and no one else, but remember, all You are responsible for completing this action. You are personally responsible for all preparatory work and personally send a special team from Europe to Mexico. Central Committee authorizes the submission of all reporting on the operation exclusively in handwritten form.

The audience ended, we said goodbye and left the office. After meeting with Stalin immediately appointed me deputy chief of intelligence. I was allocated office on the seventh floor of the main building of the Lubyanka at number 755 - it once occupied Shpigelglaz.

My wife was concerned about my quick promotion in 1938. She preferred that I remain in an inconspicuous position, and she was right, since bullying me began precisely because of this, although the appointment was purely temporary. I was not enemy of the people, but the enemy of envious colleagues - such was the ordinary motive for persecution in the years purges.

The new appointment left no time for long reflections on the campaign against me, which nearly cost me my life. The dizzying speed with which events that drew me in. The party meeting never considered my personal case. Two days after the conversation in the Kremlin, I was informed that the party bureau had revised its decision to expel me from the party and instead issued a reprimand with inclusion in an index card for losing vigilance and not exposing the hostile activities of the former leadership of the Foreign Department.

The next day, as soon as I arrived at my new office, I got a call from home. Eitingon, recently returned from France.

- Pavlusha, I've been in Moscow for ten days, doing nothing. Operations department put me under constant surveillance. I'm sure my phone is being tapped. You know how I worked. Please report to your superiors: if they want to arrest me, let them they do it right away, and do not arrange children's

games. I replied to Eitingon that the first day in a leadership position and about no plans I don't know about his arrest. Immediately I invited him to come to me, then called Merkulov and reported on the conversation. He laughed and said:

"These idiots are putting Eitingon and his group under surveillance, they don't understand

that deal with professionals. Ten

minutes later, Beria called me over a direct wire and suggested: since Eitingon is a suitable candidate for the case known to me, by the end of the day he is waiting for both of us with suggestions.

When Eitingon appeared, I told him about the plan for the operation in Mexico. He was assigned to her leading role. He agreed without the slightest hesitation. Eitingon was the perfect figure in order to lead a special illegal residency in the US and Mexico. It was possible to get close to Trotsky only through our agents, who settled in Mexico after end of the war in Spain. Nobody knew these people better than him. Working together, we have become close friends. The order to liquidate Trotsky surprised neither him nor me; For ten years, the OGPU-NKVD waged a real war against Trotsky and his organization.

Forced to leave the Soviet Union in 1929, Trotsky changed several countries (Turkey, Norway and France) before settling in Mexico in 1937. Even before his exile, he essentially lost to Stalin in the struggle for power and, being in exile, made considerable efforts to split, and then lead the world communist movement, causing ferment in the ranks of the communists, weakening our position in Western Europe and especially in Germany in the early 30s. At the

suggestion of Eitingon, the operation against Trotsky was named "Duck". In that In the code name, the word "duck", of course, was used in the meaning of "disinformation": when they say that "ducks have flown", they mean the publication of false information in the press.

Leonid knew our intelligence network in the United States and Western Europe, so was able to realistically imagine which of the agents we can with certainty rely. Unfortunately, Maria de Las Heras, our best agent for Patria, whom we managed to introduce Trotsky into the secretariat during his stay in Norway and which was with him in Mexico, it was necessary to withdraw immediately. She planned to use Shpigelglaz in 1937-1938, but the flight of Orlov, who knew her well, destroyed this plan. We couldn't risk it and we were right. It is possible that the forced temporary the refusal of the military operation in Mexico led to the tragic fate of Shpigelglaz. He is too knew a lot and ceased to be needed.

The fate of Maria de Las Heras turned out to be legendary. During the Great Patriotic of the war, she was parachuted into the rear of the Germans, where she fought in a partisan detachment Hero of the Soviet Union Medvedev. After the war, she actively worked in the KGB spy network. in Latin America, served as a radio operator. A total of Maria de las Heras been illegal for over two decades. She returned to the USSR only in the 70s in the rank Colonel, and died in 1988.

Two months after his flight to America, Orlov wrote an anonymous letter Trotsky, warning that plans were being developed to assassinate him and to carry out this action will be people from his entourage, who came from Spain. At the time we didn't know about Orlov's letter with this warning, but it was quite possible that Orlov might go for such an action. My original plan was to use the recruited Eitingon agents among the Trotskyists in Western Europe and especially in Spain. Eitingon, for example, personally recruited the leaders of the Spanish Trotskyists, the Ruan brothers. Him former anarchists who sympathized with Trotsky, ministers Republican Government of Spain Gaodosio Olivero and Frederico Amundseni. However Eitingon insisted on using those agents in Western Europe, Latin America and the USA, which never participated in any operations against Trotsky and his supporters. In accordance with his plan, it was necessary to create two independent groups. The first is the Horse group led by David Alfaro Siqueiros, a Mexican an artist personally known to Stalin, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War. He moved to Mexico and became one of the organizers of the Mexican Communist Party. The second is the so-called group "Mother" under the leadership of Caridad Mercader. Among her wealthy ancestors was vice-governor of Cuba, and her great-grandfather was the Spanish ambassador to Russia. Caridad left her husband, a Spanish railway magnate, to the anarchists and fled to Paris with four children in their early 30s. She had to earn a living by knitting. When in

In 1936, the Spanish Civil War began, she returned to Barcelona, joined the ranks of the anarchists and was badly wounded in the stomach during an air raid. The eldest son Caridad died (he threw himself under a tank, tied with grenades), and the middle one, Ramon, fought in a partisan detachment. The youngest son Luis came to Moscow in 1939, along with other Children of the Spanish Republicans who fled from Franco, the daughter remained in Paris. Since Ramon was completely unknown among the Trotskyists, Eitingon, then still in Spain, decided to send him from Barcelona to Paris in the summer of 1938 under the guise of a young businessman, adventurer and playboy who would occasionally financially support political extremists from -for its hostile attitude towards any authorities.

By 1938, Ramon and his mother Caridad, both living in Paris, had committed themselves to cooperating with Soviet intelligence. In September, on a tip from the Rouen brothers, Ramon met Sylvia Agelof, who was then in Paris, and the Rosmers, who were friends with the Trotsky family. Following Eitingon's instructions, he refrained from any political activity. His role was to sometimes help friends and those with whom he sympathized with money, but not to interfere in politics. He was not interested in the affairs of these people and rejected offers to join

their movement.

We also had another important agent under the codename "Harry" - the Englishman Morrison, unknown to either Orlov or Spiegelglaz. Harry worked for Serebryansky's Special Group and played a key role in the December 1937 theft of Trotsky's archives in Europe. (At my prompting, this archive was requested by Dmitry Volkogonov and used by him in his book Trotsky, 1992.) Harry also had strong connections in the seventh district of the Paris police department. This enabled him to obtain for us genuine French police and gendarmerie seals and forms to forge passports and residence permits that allowed our agents to settle in France. Eitingon believed that his agents should operate completely independently of our local stations in the US and Mexico. I agreed with him, but warned that we would not be able to relocate all the necessary people from

Western Europe to America, relying only on conventional sources of funding. According to our estimates, for the redeployment and equipment of the groups, it was necessary to have at least three hundred thousand dollars. To create a reliable cover, Eitingon offered to use his personal family ties in the United States in the operation. His relatives received large benefits from the Soviet government from 1930 until 1948 when they participated in fur auctions-fairs in Leningrad. We outlined our considerations to Beria, emphasizing that in Trotsky's entourage we have no one who would have direct access to him. We did not rule out that we would have to take his residence by storm. Frustrated by the recall of the Patria agent from Trotsky's entourage, agreeing to use Eitingon's personal connections, Beria unexpectedly suggested that we use Orlov's connections, for which we should contact him on his behalf. Orlov was known to Beria from Georgia, where he commanded a border detachment in 1921. Eitingon strongly objected, and not only for personal reasons: in Spain, he had a strained relationship with Orlov. He believed that Orlov, being a professional who participated in the liquidations of defectors, would certainly not believe us, no matter whose name we turn to him. Moreover, if he notices surveillance or any attempts to reach him, he can endanger all of our people. Reluctantly, Beria was forced to agree with us. As a result, the order of authority transmitted to me by Beria read: leave Orlov alone and not look for any connections with him.

Beria was very preoccupied with how to use his old personal connections in operational affairs. Through his wife Nina, Beria had two famous relatives of Gegechkori: one was a convinced Bolshevik, a district in Georgia was named after him, the other, who lived in exile in Paris, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia. (Later, this was the basis for the accusation, fabricated against Beria, that he was connected with imperialist intelligence services through his relatives.) Our residency in France was literally inundated with his directives to develop Georgian emigration, in



features of the Mensheviks, whose government in exile was in Paris. To me

I remember that some Georgian princes fooled us for a long time with rumors about incredible treasures allegedly hidden in caches throughout our country.

From the then conversation with us, Beria, however, realized that we really a new agent network will be needed, which would exclude the possibility of betrayal. He told us to get started without worrying about the financial side of things. After a group was formed, he wanted to add to it several agents known to him personally. Beria ordered that I go with Eitingon to Paris to assess group sent to Mexico. In June 1939, Georg Miller, an Austrian émigré who served as head of the "passport technique" department, supplied us with false documents. When we left Moscow, Eitingon rejoiced like a child that one of his sisters, a chronic grouch, did not come to the station to see him off. Their family had superstitious belief that any business that she blessed with her presence, in advance doomed to fail. From Moscow we went to Odessa, and from there by sea to Athens, where changed documents and sailed to Marseille on another ship.

We got to Paris by train. There I met with Ramon and Caridad Mercader and then, separately, with members of the Siqueiros group. The two groups did not communicate and did not know about each other's existence. I found them to be quite reliable, and more importantly, they were involved in sabotage operations behind Franco's front lines. This experience is certain was supposed to help them in the action against Trotsky. I suggested that Eitingon over stayed with Caridad and Ramon for a month, introduced them to the basics of undercover work. They are not had knowledge in such elementary things as source development methods, recruitment agents, detection of surveillance or a change in appearance. This knowledge was necessary for them to avoid the traps of the counterintelligence service of a small group of Trotskyists in Mexico, but the delay almost became fatal for Eitingon.

I returned to Moscow at the end or middle of July, and in August 1939 Caridad and Ramon sailed from Le Havre to New York. Eitingon was to follow them shortly, but besides time, the Polish passport with which he arrived in Paris became a dangerous document. After German invasion of Poland, which marked the beginning of the Second World War, it was collected mobilize into the French army as a Polish refugee or be interned as suspicious foreigner. At the same time, new, more stringent restrictions were introduced. on foreign trips for the Poles, so Eitingon had to go underground.

I returned to Moscow, cursing myself for the delay caused by the preparation of agents, but, unfortunately, we had no other choice. We instructed our resident in Paris Vasilevsky (code name "Tarasov"), who worked as Consul General, to make everything possible to provide "Tom" (as Eitingon got through the operational correspondence) with the appropriate documents for a trip to America. Vasilevsky needed almost month to complete this task. While the court and the case, he placed Eitingon in psychiatric hospital, the head physician of which was a Russian emigrant. In my Vasilevsky used Morrison's connections to get Tom a fake French residence permit. Now Tom has become a Syrian Jew suffering from a mental disorder. Naturally, he was unfit for military service, and the document gave him the opportunity to be in France and could be used to obtain a foreign passports. Vasilevsky was sure that the passport was genuine (the French official received appropriate bribe), but there was still the problem of obtaining a US visa.

Our only contact with the American consulate was through respectable businessman from Switzerland - in fact it was our illegal Steinberg. However, there is an additional difficulty here. He refused to return to Moscow, where he was recalled in 1938. In the letter, he declared his loyalty, but said that he was afraid of a purge in the NKVD. Vasilevsky sent a liaison officer, our illegal Takhchianov, to meet him in Lausanne. He was insured by another illegal immigrant, Alakhverdov. During meeting, Steinberg was ready to shoot the messenger, fearing that he was a murderer. In the end he agreed to arrange a visa for a Syrian Jew, he did not recognize Eitingon in the photo in passport - he grew a mustache and changed his hairstyle. A week later, Steinberg got a visa, and our

the messenger returned with her to Paris.

## Completion of Operation Duck

Eitingon arrived in New York in October 1939 and based in Brooklyn import-export firm that we used as our communications center. And most importantly, this firm provided a "roof" for Ramon Mercader, who settled in Mexico with fake Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jackson. Now he could make frequent trips to New York to meet with Eitingon, who provided him with money.

Gradually, a cover was found in Mexico for the Siqueiros group. We had two illegal radio operator, but, unfortunately, radio communication was ineffective due to poor quality equipment. Eitingon developed options for entering Trotsky's villa in Coyacan, a suburb of Mexico City. The owner of the villa, Mexican painter Diego Rivera, rented it Trotsky. The Siqueiros group planned to take the building by storm, while the main target Ramon, who had no idea about the existence of the Siqueiros group, was using his a love affair with Sylvia Agelof in order to befriend Trotsky's entourage.

Ramon looked like the current star of French cinema, Alain Delon. Sylvia is not resisted its peculiar magnetism back in Paris. She rode with Ramon to New York, but he tried to keep her away from Eitingon. It happened that Eitingon watched behind Ramon and Silvia in a restaurant, but was never introduced to her.

In Trotskyist circles, Ramon kept himself independent, without making any attempts win their trust "by expressing sympathy for the common cause." He kept playing out himself as a businessman who "supports Trotsky due to the eccentricity of his character," and not as a dedicated follower.

The Siqueiros group had a plan of the rooms of Trotsky's villa, secretly forwarded by Maria de Las Heras, before she was recalled to Moscow. She gave a description of the bodyguards Trotsky, as well as a detailed analysis of the activities of his small secretariat. This very important information was sent by me to Eitingon. At the end

of 1939, Beria proposed to strengthen the network of our illegal immigrants in Mexico. He brought to a safe house and introduced me to Grigulevich (code name "Yuzik"), who arrived in Moscow after working as an illegal immigrant in Western Europe. He was known in Trotskyist circles its political neutrality. Nobody suspected him of trying to infiltrate them. organization. His presence in Latin America was quite natural, since Grigulevich's father owned a large pharmacy in Argentina.

Grigulevich arrived in Mexico in April 1940 and, at the direction of Eitingon, created a third, reserve, network of illegal immigrants for operations in Mexico and California. He collaborated with the Siqueiros group. Grigulevich managed to make friends with one of Trotsky's bodyguards, Sheldon Hart. When Hart was on May 23, 1940, on duty, in the predawn hours, Grigulevich knocked on the gates of the villa. Hart admitted an unforgivable mistake - he opened the gates, and the group of Siqueiros broke into the residence Trotsky. They riddled with automatic bursts the room where Trotsky was. But since they fired through a closed door and the results of the shelling were not verified, Trotsky, who hid under the bed, remained alive. Hart was liquidated because he knew Grigulevich

and could betray us. Incident ended with the arrest of only Siqueiros, which gave good cover for the continuation of actions Grigulevich and Mercader, who still did not know about the existence of each other.

The attempt failed due to the fact that the capture group was not professional prepared for a specific action. Eitingon, for reasons of secrecy, did not accept participating in this attack. He would certainly have corrected the actions of the attackers. In Group Siqueiros had no one who had experience of searching and checking premises or houses. The members of his group were peasants and miners with elementary training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

Eitingon radioed a coded message about the failure of the operation. Message came to us with some delay, because it went through a Soviet ship,

located in New York Harbor, from there the cipher message on the radio went to Paris to Vasilevsky. He handed it over to Moscow, but did not attach much importance to the message, since did not know the code. As a result, Beria and Stalin learned about the failed assassination attempt from a message TASS. I don't remember the exact date, obviously it was a May Sunday in 1940. Me I was called to Beria's dacha - they sent his car for me. There were guests at the dacha: Serov, the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and Kruglov, Beria's deputy for personnel. When I came in, they were

having dinner. Beria, apparently, did not want to discuss our case in their presence. He gestured me to a garden where subtropical plants grew, planted by him in the hope that they would be able to survive in the harsh Moscow climate. The garden was taken care of by his wife Nina, an agronomist education, and son Sergei. Beria introduced me to them and walked with me to the far corner of the garden. He was furious. Looking at me point-blank, he began to ask about the composition of the Paris group and the plan for the destruction of Trotsky. I replied that the professional level group of Siqueiros is low, but these are people dedicated to our cause and ready to sacrifice for the sake of him with their lives. I await a detailed report from Mexico via radio channels via day or two. After our conversation, we returned to the dining room, and Beria ordered me to immediately return to work and inform him as soon as I know of further events.

Two days later I received a brief report from Eitingon from Paris and reported to Beria. Eitingon indicated that he was ready, with the approval of the Center, to proceed with an alternative plan - to use for the liquidation of Trotsky the main of our agents - "outsiders" - Mercader. To implement this plan, it was necessary to abandon the use of Mercader as our agent in Trotsky's entourage and not introduce new ones: the arrest of an agent who tried to kill Trotsky could mean the failure of the entire agent network connected directly with Trotsky and his entourage. I felt that such a decision was neither me nor Eitingon could not accept on their own. It could only be accepted by Beria and Stalin. The introduction of agents into Trotskyist groups abroad was one of the important priorities in the work of Soviet intelligence in 1930-1940. How else could you get information about what will happen in Trotskyist circles after the assassination of Trotsky? Will the Trotskyists wield power and pose a threat to the USSR without their leader? Stalin regularly read the messages coming from our agent, who managed to infiltrate the state Trotskyist newspaper published in New York. From him we received information about the plans and the aims of their movement, and accordingly organized their activities in the fight against Trotskyism. Often Stalin had the opportunity to read Trotskyist articles and documents even before they published in the West.

Nowadays, for the sake of the political situation, the activities of Trotsky and his supporters are frontier in 1930-1940 are reduced only to propaganda work. But it's not. The Trotskyists acted actively: they organized, using the support of persons associated with Abwehr, rebellion against the republican government in Barcelona in 1937. From Trotskyist circles sent "suggestive" materials to the secret services of France and Germany about actions of the communist parties in support of the Soviet Union. About connections with Abwehr leaders Trotskyist uprising in Barcelona in 1937 was told to us by Schulze-Boysen, who later became one of the leaders of our underground group "Red Chapel". Subsequently, after arrest, the Gestapo accused him of giving us this information, and this fact figured in the death sentence of the Hitlerite court in his case.

On other examples of the use of Trotskyist connections by the Abwehr to search for hiding people in 1941, our resident in Paris reported to the underground leaders of the French Communist Party Vasilevsky, appointed in 1940 as an authorized executive committee of the Comintern.

I explained all this to Beria. At first he didn't react at all. I returned to my office and started waiting...

I didn't have to wait long. Just two hours later I was called to the third floor to Beria. "Come with me," he said to me. This time we went to see

Stalin at the nearest dacha, which was half an hour away from west of Moscow. The first part of the meeting was very short. I reported a failure

Siqueiros' attempt to eliminate Trotsky by explaining that the alternative plan meant the threat of losing the anti-Trotskyist network in the United States and Latin America after destruction of Trotsky.

Stalin asked just one question: "To

what extent is the intelligence network in the United States and Mexico, which is led by Hovakimyan involved in the operation against Trotsky? I

replied that the operation of Eitingon, who was given special powers independently recruit and attract people without the sanction of the Center, completely independent of Hovakimyan, whose intelligence activities under the guise of our company "Amtorg" are carried out without connection with the action against Trotsky.

Stalin confirmed his earlier decision, remarking: "An

action against Trotsky would mean the collapse of the entire Trotskyist movement. AND we will not have to spend money to fight them and their attempts to undermine The Comintern and Our Relations with Left Circles Abroad. Get Started alternative plan, despite the failure of Siqueiros, and send a telegram to Eitingon with an expression of our complete confidence.

I prepared the text of the telegram and added at the end: "Pavel sends his best wishes."

"Pavel" was Beria's codename. When I

was arrested in 1953, the investigators, looking through the materials of the operation "Duck" in my working papers kept in a safe, they asked who was hiding under the name "Paul". I did not consider it necessary to emphasize that Eitingon highly valued Beria, who, to this time was arrested and shot, and said that this was my name, added for confirmation of the authenticity of the sent message. The

time was already late, eleven in the evening, and Stalin invited Beria and me to stay for dinner. I remember the food was the simplest. Stalin, joking about the fact that I do not drink, suggested that I try Georgian wine mixed with Lagidze sparkling water. This water daily Delivered to him by plane from Georgia. Contrary to what they write about him now, Stalin was not at all furious because of the unsuccessful attempt on Trotsky's life. If he was angry, he masked it well. Outwardly, he looked calm and ready to follow through. an operation to destroy your enemy, putting the fate of the entire intelligence network at stake surrounded by Trotsky.

Eitingon later told me that Ramon Mercader volunteered for the task himself, using the knowledge he had gained during the guerrilla war in Spain. During this war he learned not only to shoot, but also mastered the technique of hand-to-hand combat. Considering that our people at that time did not have special equipment at their disposal, Mercader was ready shoot, stab or kill an enemy by stabbing with a heavy object. Caridad gave her son her "blessing". When Eitingon and she met with Ramon to analyze the security system at Trotsky's villa and choose the murder weapon, they came to the conclusion that it was better just use a knife or a small climber's ice ax: firstly, they are easier to hide from guards, and secondly, these murder weapons are silent, so that no one from the household the environment will not have time to come running to help. Physically Ramon was strong enough.

It was also important to put forward a suitable motive for the murder, so that compromise Trotsky and thus discredit his movement. Murder was supposed to look like an act of personal revenge on Trotsky, who allegedly dissuaded Sylvia from Agelof to marry Mercader. If Mercader had been captured, he should have declared that the Trotskyists intended to use the funds donated to them for personal purposes, and not at all to the needs of the movement, and to report that Trotsky tried to persuade him to enter the international terrorist organization whose goal was to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders.

On a winter evening, early in 1969, I met Ramon Mercader at the apartment Eitingon, then we went to dinner at the restaurant of the House of Writers in Moscow. Since our Almost three decades have passed since the last meeting. And only now Ramon could tell me in full detail about what happened on August 20, 1940.

At his meeting with his mother at a safe house in Mexico City, Eitingon, according to Ramon, suggested the following: while Mercader would be at Trotsky's villa, he himself Eitingon, Caridad and a group of five fighters will attempt to break into the villa. A shootout with the guards will begin, during which Mercader will be able to eliminate Trotsky.

"I," Mercader told me, "did not agree with this plan and convinced him that one I will carry out the death sentence.

Contrary to what was written about the murder itself, Ramon did not close his eyes before hit Trotsky on the head with a small, sharp ice pick that was hidden under him raincoat. Trotsky sat at his desk and read an article by Mercader written in his protection. As Mercader prepared to strike, Trotsky, absorbed in reading the article, turned his head slightly, and this changed the direction of the blow, weakening its force. That's why Trotsky was not killed immediately and screamed for help. Ramon was confused and could not to stab Trotsky, although he had a knife with him.

- Imagine, after all, I went through a guerrilla war and stabbed a sentry on a bridge in during the civil war in Spain, but Trotsky's cry literally paralyzed me," Ramon explained.

When Trotsky's wife ran into the room with the guards, Mercader was knocked down, and he did not was able to use the gun. However, this turned out not to be necessary. Trotsky died the next day in the hospital.

"I was knocked down with the butt of a pistol by one of Trotsky's bodyguards. Then mine the lawyer used this episode to prove that I was not a professional killer. I adhered to the version that I was guided by love for Sylvia and that the Trotskyists squandered the money I donated to their movement and tried to get me involved in terrorist activities," Mercader told me. - I did not deviate from the agreed versions: my actions are caused by purely personal motives.

Our original plan was that Trotsky would be assassinated quietly and Ramon will be able to leave unnoticed - after all, Mercader regularly visited the villa and the security is good for him knew. Eitingon and Caridad, who were waiting for Ramon in a car near the villa, had to hide when the house started a clear commotion. They first fled to Cuba, where Caridad, using her family connections, managed to go underground. Grigulevich fled from Mexico City to California - few people knew him there.

The first message came to us in Moscow through TASS channels. Then, a week later, Eitingon sent a coded radio message from Cuba, again via Paris. I was it is officially announced that the people of Eitingon and their work at the top are satisfied, but the participants operations will be awarded only after returning to Moscow. As for me, I was too busy at this moment with our affairs in Latvia to think any further about the Trotsky affair. Beria asked me if Caridad, Eitingon and Grigulevich managed to escape and safely hide. I replied that they had a good hiding place unknown to Mercader. Arrested Mercader as Frank Jackson, a Canadian businessman, and the authorities did not know his true name for six years.

Ramon also reminded me that I had given him and his mother advice at a meeting in Paris: if one of you gets caught, go on a hunger strike in prison, but at the same time try not to arouse unnecessary suspicions in their jailers. Eat everything first less and less, preparing for a complete rejection of food. Eventually they will start artificial feeding, and the investigation period will stretch for an indefinitely long time, and passions subside. This is what you will need.

Mercader went on a hunger strike for two or three months, during the investigation he claimed that he one of Trotsky's angry supporters. He was beaten twice a day by officers Mexican intelligence services - and so it went on for six years, until it was possible to uncover it true name. In addition, he was kept all this time in a cell where there was no window.

Beria announced to me his decision to spare no means to protect Mercader. The lawyers had to prove that the murder was committed on the basis of squabbles and internal confusion in the Trotskyist movement. Eitingon and Caridad were ordered to remain in

underground. They spent six months in Cuba, and then went by sea to New York, where Eitingon used his contacts in the Jewish community to get new documents and passports. Together with Caridad, he crossed America and came to Los Angeles, and then to San Francisco. Eitingon took the opportunity to renew contacts with two agents that he and Serebryansky sent to California in the early 30s, and they took on duties of liaison with an illegal intelligence network that mined American nuclear secrets from 1942 to 1945. In February 1941, Eitingon and Caridad on the steamer sailed to China. In May 1941, just before the start of the Great Patriotic War, they returned to Moscow from Shanghai via the Trans-Siberian Railway. The

identity of Mercader, the secret services managed to establish only after in 1946 one of the prominent figures of the Spanish Communist Party, who was before his escape in Moscow. By the way, this man was a distant relative of Fidel Castro. Behind part of the blame lies with Caridad. During the war, Ramon's mother was evacuated from Moscow to Tashkent, where she lived from 1941 to 1943. It was there that she told her an acquaintance that Ramon killed Trotsky. Caridad was convinced that what he said would keep secret.

After the end of the Second World War, Caridad repeatedly tried to achieve release of Ramon, even offered to find a wife for him, but Stalin opposed this plan, since Ramon's personality still attracted a lot of attention. Caridad traveled to Mexico, then to Paris, took all measures for early release son.

When the Mercader dossier was brought to Mexico from the Spanish police archives, his identity was established, it became pointless to deny it. In front of face incontrovertible evidence Frank Jackson admitted that he really is Ramon Mercader and comes from a wealthy Spanish family. But he never confessed to killing Trotsky on the orders of Soviet intelligence. In all his open statements, Mercader invariably emphasized the personal motive for this murder.

The conditions of Ramon's detention in prison after the defector divulged his real name immediately improved, and he was even allowed from time to time to make forays into Mexico City, where he could dine at a restaurant with his jailer. The woman who looked after Ramon in prison fell in love with him and now visited him weekly. He later married her and brought her with him to Moscow when he was released from prison on August 20, 1960. He served twenty years in prison. Until 1960, Ramon had never been to Moscow. He lived here in 1939-1942.

bride who died of tuberculosis. In Moscow,

Mercader was received by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who presented him with a Star. Hero of the Soviet Union. However, when, some time later, Mercader requested a meeting with the new chairman of the KGB Semichastny, he was denied. By special decision of the Central Committee party and at the personal request of Dolores Ibarruri (Pasionaria) Mercader was accepted to work as a senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. In addition, he and his wife were given a state dacha in Kratov, near Moscow. Mercader received money from the Central Committee and from the KGB. In sum, this was equal to the pension of a retired major general. However, his relations with the KGB remained rather tense throughout the 60s: he did not cease to demand, first from Shelepin, and then from Semichastny, that Eitingon and I should immediately released from prison. He raised this issue with Dolores Ibarruri and before Suslov. The oldest member of the Politburo, Suslov, was not touched by this intercession; moreover, he was annoyed at the fact that Mercader allowed himself to be addressed personally to him, said to Mercader: "We decided for ourselves the fate of these people once and for all. Not stick your nose in other

people's business." At first, Mercader lived in the Leningradskaya Hotel near the Leningradsky railway station, and then received a four-room apartment without any furnishings near the metro station "Falcon". Of those who were once associated with Mercader at work, the only one not Vasilevsky remained repressed, although he was expelled from the party. He stood up for Mercader - and furniture was provided for his new apartment. Wife

Mercadera Roquel Mendoza worked as an announcer in the Spanish edition of Moscow Radio. IN In 1963 they adopted two children: a boy, Arthur, twelve years old, and a girl, Laura, six months. Their parents were friends of Mercader. Father, Civil War veteran Spain, fled after the defeat of the Republicans to Moscow, and later, returning to his homeland in as an illegal agent, was captured by the Francoists and shot. Mother died in Moscow time of birth.

Mercader was a professional revolutionary and was proud of his role in the fight for communist ideals. He did not repent that he had killed Trotsky, and in a conversation with me said:

"If I had to relive the forties, I would do everything I did, but just not in today's world. No one can choose the time in which you live.

In the mid-70s, Mercader left Moscow for Cuba, where he was an adviser to Castro. He died in 1978. His body was secretly delivered to Moscow. Widow Mercader tried to contact me, but at that time I was not in Moscow. At the funeral ceremony Eitingon was present. Mercader was buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery. There he rests under the name of Ramon Ivanovich Lopez, Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is quite clear to me that today's moral principles are incompatible with cruelty, which is also characteristic of the period of struggle for power that follows the revolutionary coup, and for civil war. Stalin and Trotsky confronted each other, resorting to criminal methods to achieve their goals, but the difference is that in In exile, Trotsky opposed not only Stalin, but the Soviet Union as such. This the confrontation was a war of annihilation. Stalin and we could not relate to Trotsky in exile simply as an author of philosophical writings. He was an active enemy of the Soviet states. Life

has shown that the suspicion and hatred of Stalin and the leaders of the CPSU (b) towards political degenerates and rivals in the struggle for power were under a real soil.

The decisive blow to the CPSU and the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 was dealt precisely a group of former party leaders.

The original selfish interests of the struggle for power masked borrowed from Trotsky with the slogans of "the fight against bureaucracy and the domination party apparatus". The mortal threat to the preservation of the regime of Soviet power has always been concealed in the danger of a split in the ruling party.

Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov, who bore his mother's surname, was under our constant observation. He was the main organizer of the Trotskyist movement in Europe after coming to Paris from Turkey in 1933. We had two in Paris independent from each other undercover exits to it. Played a leading role in one Zborovsky (underground nickname "Etienne", aka "Tulip"). He wrote about it in detail. Volkogonov. The other was headed by Serebryansky. Zborovsky led us to the trail of the archives Trotsky, and Serebryansky, using the information received, seized these archives hidden in Paris and secretly delivered them to Moscow. He did it with the help of his agent "Harry", who was in Paris, and an agent who worked in the French police.

In the book "Trotsky", Volkogonov claims that the archives were taken out by Zborovsky, when in fact he had no idea how the information. Volkogonov also writes that Zborovsky helped kill Sedov, who was in while in a French hospital. Trotsky's son, as you know, really died in February 1938, under very mysterious circumstances, after an appendicitis operation. It is only known for certain that Sedov died in Paris, but neither in his dossier, nor in the materials on I did not find any evidence to the Trotskyist International that it was a murder. If if Sedov were killed, then someone would have to receive a government award or could claim her. At the time in question, there were many accusations against intelligence service, which allegedly attributed non-existent laurels to itself for the elimination of prominent Trotskyists, but no details or examples were given. Accepted consider that Sedov fell victim to an operation carried out by the NKVD. Meanwhile Shpigelglaz,

reporting to Yezhov about the death of Sedov in Paris, he mentioned only the natural cause of his death. Yezhov, however, commented on the message with the words: "Good operation! Not bad work, huh? Shpigelglaz was not going to argue with the people's commissar, who tried to attribute the merit of the "murder" of Sedov to his department and personally reported this to Stalin. This contributed to the fact that the NKVD began to be considered responsible for the death of Sedov.

When Eitingon and I discussed with Beria the plan to liquidate Trotsky, to eliminate him the son was never mentioned. It is easy to assume, of course, that Sedov was killed, but I personally do not inclined to believe it. And the reason is the simplest. Trotsky unconditionally trusted his son, so he was closely monitored on our part, and this made it possible receive information about the plans of the Trotskyists to send agents and propaganda materials to the Soviet Union through Europe. Its destruction would cause us to lose control of information about Trotskyist operations in Europe. After

the liquidation of Trotsky, part of the agents recruited by Eitingon and others the individuals involved in his network operating in the United States and Mexico were mothballed, and their use could only be carried out with the sanction of Beria. This an expanded network of agents subsequently played an important role in reaching the circles of scientists working on the American atomic bomb. Our illegal immigrants with false documents, who did not hold any official positions, settled in the United States in the late 20s and early 30s. Their main task was to enter a job where you can have access to scientific and technical information and military-strategic transportation in case war with Japan.

Documents and reports on the liquidation of Trotsky are still kept in the Presidential archive and in the personal archives of the Andropov and Beria funds. Some of these papers were returned to intelligence only in 1996. In the

late 1920s and early 1930s, Eitingon and Serebryansky were sent to United States to recruit Chinese and Japanese immigrants who could useful in military and sabotage operations against Japan. By this time the Japanese managed to capture the central and northern regions of China and Manchuria, and we feared upcoming war with Japan. At the same time, Eitingon introduced two agents to long-term settlement - Polish Jews, whom he managed to bring to the United States from France.

Eitingon also had to assess the potential capabilities of American communists in the interests of our intelligence. According to his very sensible proposal, it should not have been to recruit agents from members of the Communist Party, but it made sense to focus on those who, not being in its ranks, expressed sympathy for communist ideas. Eitingon acted in parallel

with Akhmerov, who, despite serious Eitingon's objections, he nevertheless married the niece of Earl Browder, the founder of American Communist Party. Operations in the United States and the creation of a network of illegal immigrants there were among the most important goals of the Kremlin, since at that time obtaining intelligence data from the New World did not influence the decisions made by Moscow. Eitingon, however, assigned several of his agents to monitor American policy toward China. He, in particular, managed to find journalists from the magazine "Amereisha", who subsequently formed a lobby that influenced the American line of diplomacy in Asia.

One of the agents recruited by Eitingon was a very famous Japanese painter. Miyagi, who later joined the Richard Sorge group in Japan. Eitingon and my good friend Ivan Vinarov (intelligence adviser under Georgy Dimitrov in the 1940s) came into contact with Sorge in Shanghai in the late 1920s. Sorge's information was seen as quite valuable on throughout the 30s, however, with the proviso that both the Germans and the Japanese consider it a double agent. Our agent "Friend" - a political adviser to Germany at the headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek - often met with Sorge in 1939-1941. He noted his wide awareness of situation in the Far East, unaware of the work of Sorge at the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and emphasized Sorge's strong, solid ties with German military intelligence.

In 1932, Eitingon left California and returned to the Soviet Union through Shanghai. He was appointed deputy Serebryansky, but they did not work together, and Eitingon moved to a leadership position in the Foreign Department of the OGPU.



During the period of aggravation of the international situation on the eve of America's entry into the war intelligence work along the lines of the NKVD on the East Coast of the United States was headed by Heifetz. Previously, he worked in the Comintern. His father was one of the organizers of the American communist parties. Heifetz personally knew many prominent American communists. Considering Comintern experience, he was sent in the early 30s to work in the intelligence of the NKVD. He organized illegal groups in Germany and Italy in the mid-30s, acting as Indian student studying in Europe. In fact, Heifetz was a Jew, but because of his dark skin looked like a real immigrant from Asia, despite his blue eyes. IN In the United States, in left-wing circles, he was known as Mr. Brown. While

previously in Italy, Heifetz met the young Bruno Pontecorvo, then student studying in Rome. Heifetz recommended that Pontecorvo contact Frederick Joliot-Curie, an outstanding French physicist close to the leadership of the Communist Party France. In the future, it was Pontecorvo who became the channel through which we received American Atomic Secrets by Enrico Fermi. Heifetz

was lucky: in the 30s he was not repressed. He was recalled to Moscow, and although in In November 1938, Yezhov ordered his arrest, but it was not carried out. Soon Heifetz sent to the United States, to the West Coast, to activate intelligence work.

Heifetz was tasked with establishing strong ties with agents "deep subsidence" created by Eitingon for use in the event of a war between Soviet Union and Japan. The original plan was to create a network illegal immigrants in American ports following the example of Scandinavia to destroy ships from strategic raw material and fuel for Japan. Unaware of Japanese intentions to attack Southeast Asia or Pearl Harbor, we assumed they would start the military first actions against us.

Assistant to Heifetz at the San Francisco Consulate Lyagin, engineer, alumnus Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, a special task was given to obtain data on technological innovations at West Coast enterprises. The main task assigned to him is to collect materials on the American naval shipbuilding programs. I remember one of his reports. It talked about a big the interest shown by the Americans in the aircraft carrier construction program. Lyagin also managed to recruit an agent in San Francisco, who gave us a description of the devices being developed to protect ships from magnetic mines. In order

not to arouse suspicion, Lyagin refrained from any contact with American pro-communist circles. However, in San Francisco he worked not for long. He was recalled to Moscow and promoted to the position of deputy chief overseas intelligence of the NKVD. He was only thirty-two years old. During the German occupation he was sent by us as an illegal resident to a German naval base in Nikolaev on the Black Sea. He managed to carry out a number of sabotage on the base. Gestapo after all captured him and the radio operator of the group. Lyagin refused to escape from prison, because he could not leave a wounded radio operator arrested with him. They were shot. In 1945 he posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Heifetz, who remained in San Francisco, managed, having received an orientation from Eitingon, to reach the previously introduced two "deep subsidence" agents. Both of them led the usual, inconspicuous life of ordinary Americans: one - a dentist, the other - the owner retail businesses. Both were Jewish emigrants from Poland. A dentist, known personally to Serebryansky, at one time received money from us in order to graduate from a medical college in France and become a certified specialist. Both of these people were introduced in case we needed their services, whether in a year or After ten years. The need for them arose in 1941-1942, when these people unexpectedly were close to the communist-minded members of the family of Robert Oppenheimer, the main creator of the American atomic bomb.

## CHAPTER 5. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

### The background of the massacre with the Tukhachevsky group

In May 1937, Tukhachevsky's group of eight people was arrested. the color of the Soviet military command, they were accused of treason, espionage and secret military conspiracy to overthrow the government. It's only been two weeks and by the verdict of a closed military court, they were all shot. Thus began the massive repression in the army, as a result of which thirty-five thousand commanders suffered.

The most famous of this group of commanders was Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky, who for a long time was Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of General Staff. From the archival materials now published, it is known that the accusations against Tukhachevsky and other military leaders of the country were fabricated on instructions of Stalin and Voroshilov.

Currently, there are three versions of why Stalin went to this massacre. IN according to the first, the fate of these people was decided by the disinformation of the German and Czechoslovak special services, which convinced the suspicious Stalin and his People's Commissar for Defense Voroshilov that Tukhachevsky and a number of other military leaders maintained secret contacts with the German military circles. It was this version that Khrushchev repeated in his speech criticizing Stalin at the XXII Party Congress in 1961.

But contacts with the Germans should be viewed against the backdrop of close German-Soviet military cooperation in 1920-1930. Long period of military cooperation Germany and the Soviet Union was in 1933 suddenly interrupted by Stalin under clearly fabricated pretext that the Germans were secretly sharing with the French information about their connections with us. Meanwhile, a group of Soviet military figures led by Marshal Tukhachevsky noted the usefulness of these contacts with the Germans and hoped to use them we have technological military innovations. On the German side, there was also a well-known interest in continuing ties with the USSR, albeit for completely different reasons. High-ranking military men, immigrants from East Prussia, were followers founder of the Wehrmacht, General Hans von Seeckt. After defeat in World War I General von Seeckt for many years was engaged in the reconstruction of the German military machine and development of a new strategic doctrine. It was he who spoke to the German leadership for improving relations with the USSR, pointing out that the main goal of the German policy in the event of war to prevent hostilities on two fronts. In accordance with the

second version, the victims were those military men who, in their own way, intellectual level significantly surpassed Voroshilov and had their own opinion on questions of military construction. Tukhachevsky and his group allegedly did not agree with Stalin and Voroshilov on the issue of the strategy of military reforms, and therefore Stalin, fearing rivals who can claim power, decided to deal with them.

According to the third version, the military was eliminated due to a long-standing enmity between Tukhachevsky and Stalin, who had different points of view on who was responsible for the mistakes made in the war with the White Poles in 1920. Tukhachevsky believed that the Red The army was defeated on the outskirts of Warsaw, because Stalin and Voroshilov supposedly refused to transfer cavalry units to help Tukhachevsky.

My view of this tragedy is different from all known versions. I remember how in August In 1939, I was pleasantly surprised by reports from Germany, from which it was clear that the German the military leadership highly appreciated the potential of the Red Army. In one of the documents high German command, intercepted by us, the cause of the death of the marshal Tukhachevsky was called his exorbitant ambitions and disagreements with Marshal Voroshilov, who unquestioningly shared all the views of Stalin. Approving

a summary of intelligence materials for Stalin, Beria included a phrase from this document:

"The elimination of Tukhachevsky clearly shows that Stalin is in complete control

state of affairs in the Red Army," perhaps in order to flatter the leader, emphasizing thus his foresight in the timely elimination of Tukhachevsky. I also remember the

commentary of Beria and Abakumov, during the war years the head of the military counterintelligence SMERSH, who was also responsible for the political reliability of the armed forces. AND both spoke of the arrogance of Tukhachevsky and his entourage, who dared to think that Stalin, at their suggestion, would remove Voroshilov. According to Beria, this fact alone clearly showed that the military, grossly violating the established order, put forward proposals that went beyond their competence. Didn't they know, he said, that only

Does the Politburo and no one else have the right to raise the question of replacing the People's Commissar for Defense? Here and there remembered, Abakumov emphasized, that Tukhachevsky and people close to him allowed themselves to call military bands to the dachas for private concerts.

I learned from Marshal Shaposhnikov, who replaced Tukhachevsky, how one should behave strictly according to the rules "at the top". There was a war, in a very difficult period of fighting near Moscow, given the urgency of reports from the German rear, I reported directly to the materials a couple of times him, bypassing the usual channels. And every time he politely pointed out to me: "Dear, important you must necessarily reflect intelligence data first of all in the reports of the NKVD and political leadership of the country. Stalin, Beria and at the same time the people's commissar of defense must be fully aware of our joint work." Another circumstance that

played a role in the fate of Tukhachevsky: he was in bad relations with Shaposhnikov. In the late 1920s, Tukhachevsky, as I was told, was intriguing against Shaposhnikov in order to take his post as chief of the General Staff. By the way, Shaposhnikov was one of the members of the special presence of the Supreme Court, who delivered a mortal Tukhachevsky's verdict. He, Budyonny and the chairman of the court Ulrich were the only ones of its entire composition, who escaped repression and died a natural death. It seems

to me that Tukhachevsky and his group in the struggle for influence on Stalin fell for his bait. During frequent meetings with Stalin, Tukhachevsky criticized Voroshilov, Stalin encouraged this criticism, calling it "constructive", and liked to discuss options for new appointments and shifts. He also liked to consider different approaches to military doctrines. Tukhachevsky allowed himself to freely discuss all this, not only for behind closed doors, but also to spread rumors about supposedly upcoming changes and reshuffle in the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In a word, he and his colleagues went, in the opinion Stalin, too far. After the NKVD reported to the government about those the capital of rumors, it began to worry the country's leadership. Even those historians who burn desire to expose the crimes of Stalin, cannot but admit that the materials of the case Tukhachevsky contain various kinds of documentary evidence regarding plans shuffling in the military leadership of the country.

In the published archives of the Red Army, for example, you can read the letter Voroshilov dated June 5, 1937, signed by the head of the secretariat of the People's Commissariat of Defense Smorodinov. It contains a request to send to the NKVD copies of Tukhachevsky's letters to military leadership. And although there is no resolution on the document, it is clear that in the course of "investigation" Tukhachevsky strongly objected to the accusations, referring to the documents confirming that on military issues between him, Voroshilov and Stalin there were no disagreements.

Tukhachevsky claimed to have maintained contacts with the German military representatives solely on behalf of the government. He did his best to prove that he always saw his duty in the unquestioning execution of orders on all issues. military building.

Khrushchev's version that Stalin "swallowed" German disinformation designed to destroy Tukhachevsky, was based on the fiction of the Soviet defector Krivitsky, author of the book "I was Stalin's agent", published in 1939. Krivitsky worked for the NKVD and military intelligence in Western Europe and wrote in his book that the NKVD received a secret information about the conspiracy from Czech President Eduard Beneš and our top agent Skoblin (code name "Farmer"), a former white general, participant in the Civil War. Krivitsky accused Skoblin of passing German disinformation to the Soviets about

Tukhachevsky's secret contacts with German military circles. Later, General Schellenberg, head of Hitler's foreign intelligence, also wrote in his memoirs that the Germans fabricated documents in which Tukhachevsky appeared as their agent. Before the war, According to him, the documents were planted on the Czechs, and Benes passed on the information received Stalin.

For me, this is a myth. Such documents were never found in the archives of the KGB or archives of Stalin himself.

But if you restore the sequence of events, you can see that about Skoblin as The Gestapo agent was first reported in the Pravda newspaper in 1937. The article was approved by intelligence leadership and published to divert attention from allegations of involvement Soviet intelligence to the abduction of General Miller.

The criminal case against Tukhachevsky was entirely based on his own confessions, and there are absolutely no references to specific incriminating facts obtained from abroad. If such documents existed, then I as the deputy chief of intelligence, who oversaw the German direction on the eve of the war, he would certainly have seen them or knew about their existence. The only mention of "German trace" in the case of Skoblin is a reference to his deceptive maneuver, with the help of who managed to lure General Miller to a safe house in Paris. Skoblin spoke Miller about the "German contacts" that are important for the secret work of the white emigration. Miller met not with the Germans, but with the NKVD resident in Paris Kislov (code name "Finn") and Spiegel Eyes (code name "Douglas").

By the way, contrary to the versions of events in the books popular in the West by Christopher Andrew and Gordievsky, John Dzhizyak and Krivitsky Skoblin did not take part in the elimination Miller's predecessor, General Kutepov. This operation was carried out in 1930 intelligence service of Serebryansky. Kutepov was detained in the center of Paris by three by our agents, dressed in the uniform of the French gendarmerie. They stopped Kutepov on the street under the pretext of checking documents and forcibly put him in car. Kutepov, suspecting something was wrong, resisted. While fighting him had a heart attack and died. He was buried in the suburbs of Paris, in the courtyard of the house one of the agents of the Soviet intelligence.

So, in reality, there is no data on unauthorized contacts.

Tukhachevsky with the Germans. But in the archives there are a lot of materials containing reviews of foreign press and responses of the leaders of Western countries about the Tukhachevsky

conspiracy. In July 1937, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Czechoslovakia Aleksandrovsky reported to Moscow about the reaction of President Benes to the execution of Tukhachevsky. There are the most controversial interpretation of the remarks of Benes, who is portrayed by Soviet historians as a man who "sincerely and with the best intentions betrayed Tukhachevsky to Stalin, not realizing that he was handing over materials falsified by the Germans to the Soviets." The documents, however, tell a very different story. According to Aleksandrovsky, Beneš did

not believe that Tukhachevsky was a spy and saboteur. According to Benes, Tukhachevsky "could count on the overthrow of Stalin, only relying on Yagoda, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Based on information from the Czech ambassador to Berlin, Benes noted: Tukhachevsky simply advocated the continuation Soviet-German cooperation, which was interrupted with the advent of Hitler to power. It is clear that Benes did not take Tukhachevsky's accusations of espionage seriously, but felt that for one reason or another, the marshal fell into disgrace, and contributed to the discredit Tukhachevsky, because he needed Stalin's support. He, like Beria, wanted to show his full approval of Moscow's decision to liquidate Tukhachevsky. In the diary Aleksandrovsky quotes Beneš, in which he speaks of Tukhachevsky as an adventurer and unreliable person. By and large, Beneš supported the massacre of Tukhachevsky, but did not play any role in his removal and arrest. As far as I

remember, in the letter file "Khutor" there are references to the fact that Benes in April 1937, on the eve of the removal of Tukhachevsky, hinted to Plenipotentiary Aleksandrovsky and our resident in Prague Petr Zubov, which does not exclude the possibility of a military agreement between

Germany and the Soviet Union, despite their current differences, partly because of good links between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, established by Tukhachevsky in the 20s and 30s. However, only on July 4, 1937, after the execution of Tukhachevsky, Beneš told Aleksandrovsky about "certain" contacts of the Czech ambassador in Berlin with the German military representatives who allegedly took place in January 1937. According to him, Benes is not told us that the Czechs have information about the presence in Germany of an influential group among the military, who advocated the continuation of secret German-Soviet military ties established back in the 20s.

From his ambassador in Berlin, Benes received a report containing vague hints German generals about their confidential relations with the leadership of the Red Army. The purpose of this German disinformation was to scare the Czechs and make them believe that they cannot count on the support of the Red Army in their confrontation with Germany on the fate of the Sudetenland. It was in July 1937 - a year before the ultimatum Hitler to Beneš demanding that the Sudetenland with their ethnic German population go to Germany. In his diary, the ambassador records that Beneš apologized to him for not shared with the Soviet leadership information about possible secret contacts of the top Wehrmacht with the headquarters of the

Red Army. From the materials of the case mentioned above, the real purpose of the July meeting becomes clear. between Plenipotentiary Aleksandrovsky, resident of the NKVD Zubov and Benesh.

Now the content of the conversation between Beneš and Aleksandrovsky is denied. Hushed up and more the most important circumstance: in 1935 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed a secret intelligence cooperation agreement. To resolve this issue in Moscow visited the head of the Czech intelligence Colonel Moravec. Cooperation between the Soviet and Czech intelligence, the exchange of information was originally coordinated by the Intelligence Industry Red Army, and since 1937 - the NKVD. In 1938, Beneš turned to Stalin with a request to support his actions to overthrow the Stojadinovic government in Belgrade, which was policy hostile to the Czech leadership.

By special order of Stalin to support the coup in Belgrade in 1938, The NKVD was entrusted with the financing of Serbian militant officers - the organizers of this coup. Our resident Zubov, having left for Belgrade to transfer money to the conspirators, made sure that the people selected by the Czech intelligence for this action - adventurers, do not rely on real power, and did not give them 200 thousand dollars. This failed operation sheds light on hitherto unknown connections between Beneš and Stalin. Beneš's goal was to get full support for the Czech policy on the part of Stalin both in the Balkans and in Europe in general. That is why, unlike the English and French, he did not express his disapproval of about the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and the wave of repression among the Soviet military command.

I have heard that there are still top secret case files. Tukhachevsky, kept in the archives of the Stalinist secretariat and containing information received from abroad. I think that these are just reviews of materials from the foreign press, reports of TASS correspondents, Diplomats, heads of trade missions, as well as residencies of the NKVD and the GRU about how the reprisal against Tukhachevsky was assessed abroad.

These were the materials of a special folder of closed foreign correspondence, in which reviews of foreign public opinion and comments of Soviet ambassadors and heads of government delegations. This store has German, French and English recordings of conversations with high-ranking Soviet representatives, received via intelligence channels. They were valuable because they helped to understand thinking of the people with whom the negotiations are being

conducted. The tragedy, however, was that Stalin, and later Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev used closed foreign correspondence to compromise his rivals in a period of intense struggle for power. At normal times, foreign press reviews was not given any serious importance, but during the period of mass repressions it became the rule to resort to these materials, which gave an assessment of the Soviet leaders, in order to accuse them of various kinds of "deviations" from the party line. And this rule was

even enshrined in a special resolution of the Central Committee. In 1989,

Boris Yeltsin during his first visit to the United States accused, referring to the foreign press, of addiction to alcohol. In 1990 these materials played a role in the conflict between Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, ex-Minister foreign affairs. The use of clippings from the foreign press was discontinued only in November 1991 - just before the end of the "Gorbachev era". And Ignatenko, the director general of TASS, did this by banning special reviews of the foreign press containing compromising information on our leaders.

In the 1930s it seemed to us that anyone who opposes the government or the party leadership, primarily against Stalin himself, as well as his colleague People's Commissar Voroshilov is an enemy of the people. Only much later did the full cynicism of Beria's remarks and Abakumov about Tukhachevsky. Top management knew perfectly well that all the accusations invented against him. They preferred the version of an imaginary conspiracy because otherwise case, they would have to admit that the victims of repression are actually rivals in the struggle for power. Such recognition would harm the prestige of the ruling party.

What in 1937 was considered a serious crime - I mean the charge of Voroshilov's incompetence, which Tukhachevsky allowed himself, twenty years later, when he was posthumously rehabilitated, was no longer such. And no one explained the real reasons for the crime. In official reports, only very vague references to "errors that have taken place" in punitive policy, the perpetrators only Yezhov and his henchmen were named.

## **Probing the possibility of a non-aggression pact with Germany through Finland in 1938**

In April 1938, the resident of the NKVD in Finland, Rybkin, was summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin and other members of the Politburo entrusted him with a top secret task ... He received directive to informally propose an agreement to the Finnish government, secret from Soviet ambassador.

The Finns were guaranteed economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, taking into account their interests in Scandinavia and Europe in exchange for the signing of a non-aggression pact, economic and military cooperation in the event of aggression by a third party. The pact promised economic benefits for both parties. Stalin's proposal also included the division spheres of military and economic influence in the Baltic region between Finland and Soviet Union. At Stalin's direction, Rybkin also donated \$100,000 to the creation of a party of petty proprietors, which advocated a neutral Finland.

Rybkin, during a conversation in the Kremlin, expressed doubt that the Finns were then hostile belonging to the eastern neighbor, will agree to the signing of such an agreement, but Stalin emphasized that this is a sounding, so proposals should be made orally, without participating in negotiations of our plenipotentiary, that is, unofficially. Rybkin did as he was ordered, but the offer was rejected. However, it initiated a split in the Finnish leadership, which we later exploited by signing a separate peace treaty with Finland in 1944. By the way, this was done through the mediation of the Swedish Wallenberg family. Not were crowned with success and our attempts to find secret approaches to Mannerheim, through his former colleague in the tsarist army - Count Ignatiev, who joined the Red Army in 1920s.

I am not aware of any such informal proposals by the German side, however, I believe that Marshal of Finland Carl Gustav Mannerheim informed Hitler about our proposals, so that the Führer, sending his Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Moscow in August 1939 to negotiate the signing of the Pact on non-aggression, relied not only on the spontaneous reaction of Molotov and Stalin. He was is aware that we are ready to accept an offer of this kind, since we ourselves tried to conclude a similar treaty with neighboring Finland. Finland's refusal followed in the same month of 1938. The Finns were much more important

remain allies of England, Sweden and Germany. In addition, they did not see any benefits for themselves in the role of a buffer zone between East and West. Later, however, this role was still imposed on them. For the fact that Finland attacked the Soviet Union along with the Germans, she had to pay a heavy price. As a result, the Finns received much less favorable terms for themselves than those originally offered by Rybkin in 1938.

### **Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. eve of war**

In August 1939, the volume of intelligence information increased dramatically. We have received a reliable report that the French and British governments are not eager to support the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany. This was in complete agreement with the data we had received three or four years earlier from the Cambridge group. According to this information, the British Cabinet, more precisely, Neville Chamberlain and Sir John Simon, considered the possibility of a secret agreement with Hitler to support him in a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Particularly noteworthy was the information of three reliable sources from Germany: the leadership of the Wehrmacht strongly objected to a war on two fronts. The directives we received obligated

us to quickly consider possible options for cooperation with countries ready to sign agreements to counteract the outbreak of war. It was not only about England and France, with which consultations had been held since the beginning of 1939, but also about Germany. In Germany, only people from East Prussia advocated for a peaceful settlement of relations with the Soviet Union among the influential military. Considering, in accordance with the directives received, alternative options (either an

agreement with the British and French, or a peaceful settlement with Germany), I could not even imagine that the economic negotiations would end with a pact on cooperation between Berlin and Moscow. When I was informed of the impending arrival of the German Foreign Minister in Moscow on August 23, 1939—just a few hours before it happened—I was surprised. After the arrival of Ribbentrop and the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact thirteen hours later (this event took place in the Kremlin at two in the morning on August 24), it became clear that the decision was not sudden. The strategic goal of the Soviet leadership was to avoid at any cost a war on two fronts - in the Far East and in Europe. This line of diplomatic relations, not tied to ideological considerations, has been established since the 1920s, when the Soviet Union carried out economic cooperation and maintained normal relations with Italy after the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini came to power in 1922. The Kremlin leadership was ready to compromise with any regime, provided that it guaranteed the stability of the Soviet Union. For Stalin and his entourage, the realization of their geopolitical aspirations to transform the Soviet Union into the most powerful power in the world has always been a priority.

The country was able to develop more or less steadily only after the completion of collectivization in 1934. Prior to that, we had consistently experienced civil war, famine, devastation. And only by the mid-30s did industrialization begin to bear fruit. The growing power of the state was demonstrated in the successful military operations against Japan in Mongolia and Manchuria. Although the country established diplomatic relations with all the leading powers of the world, we were nevertheless kept in isolation, which was clearly manifested when the world powers did not allow us to participate in solving cardinal world issues on which their interests depended. All agreements on Europe and Asia were accepted by Western countries and Japan to the detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-German agreement of 1935, which recognized the rearmament of the German naval forces, and subsequent agreements between the leading powers of the world to equip their fleets with modern weapons, did not even mention the Soviet Union. The French and British delegations that arrived in Moscow in the summer of 1939 to probe the ground for a possible alliance against Hitler consisted of

minor figures. Thus, Stalin's policy towards Hitler was based on the correct notion that the hostility of the Western world and Japan towards the Soviet system will make the isolation of the USSR from the international community permanent factor.

Looking back, one cannot but conclude that all three future allies in anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, Britain and France - are to blame for allowing Hitler to unleash the Second World War. Mutual hostility and contradictions - that's what prevented the achievement of a compromise between England and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. A compromise that would allow us to stop together Hitler's aggression against Poland. For some reason, historians of the Second World War miss out on mind that the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in 1939 were actually launched on initiative of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Donald McLean reported that Roosevelt sent a representative to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain with warning: German dominance in Western Europe would be disastrous for interests of both America and Britain. Roosevelt urged Chamberlain to contain Hitler to enter into negotiations with Britain's European allies, including Soviet Union. Our sources say that the British government is reluctant to reacted to the American initiative, so Roosevelt had to turn on the British pressure to force them to still negotiate with the Soviets on the development of military measures to counter Hitler.

Nevertheless, the speed with which the non-aggression pact was signed with Hitler amazed me: after all, just two days before it was signed, I received an order to search for possible ways for a peaceful settlement of our relations with Germany. We still continued to send our strategic proposals to Stalin and Molotov, and the treaty was signed: Stalin conducted the negotiations himself in the strictest secrecy.

I knew nothing about the protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but in general such secret protocols are the most common thing in diplomatic relations involving especially difficult questions. On the eve of the war, the British government signed secret protocols with Poland - they dealt with the provision of military assistance to Poland in case of war with Germany. In 1993, for example, a German weekly published secret minutes and recording of confidential conversations between Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, held on the eve of the reunification of Germany. And now, reading the secret protocols Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, I do not find anything secret in them. Directives based on signed agreements were very clear and definite: they were known not only intelligence leaders, but also military leaders and diplomats. Actually famous map partition of Poland, attached to the protocols on September 28, 1939, appeared on the pages Pravda, of course, without the signatures of Stalin and Ribbentrop, and the whole world could see it. Besides time, however, Poland was occupied.

### **Out-of-band intelligence of the NKVD on the eve of the war**

In October 1939, together with Fitin, the head of intelligence, and Merkulov, Beria's deputy, I took part in a meeting with Molotov in his Kremlin office. There were also the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General

Vasilevsky (in the 1950s Minister of Defense), Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Borisov, Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Isakov, Chief of the Border Troops General Maslennikov and the head of military intelligence, it seems, Major General Panfilov.

There was one issue on the agenda - the protection of strategic interests in the Baltics. Molotov wanted to hear our thoughts. Soviet troops were already there in accordance with agreements signed with the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Opening a meeting. Molotov said: - We

have an agreement with Germany that the Baltic states are considered as a region the most important interests of the Soviet Union. It is clear, however," continued Molotov, "that although the German authorities recognize this in principle, they will never agree to any



"cardinal social transformations" that would change the status of these states, their entry into the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet leadership believes that The best way to protect the interests of the USSR in the Baltics and create a reliable border there is to help the labor movement to overthrow the puppet regimes. From this

statement, it became clear exactly how we interpreted the agreements with Hitler. However, in the late autumn of 1939, a new stimulus appeared to intensify our political, economic, military and intelligence operations in the Baltics. From our residencies in Sweden and Berlin, we received verified and reliable information that the Germans are planning to send high-ranking economic delegations to Riga and Tallinn for the conclusion of long-term agreements. Thus, the Baltic would be under the German political and economic umbrella. Telegrams from Berlin and Sweden were sent for two signatures - the ambassador and the resident, which was extremely rare and meant: the information is of great political importance. Received in Moscow, they Molotov's and Beria's visas were forwarded to Fitin and me through the NKVD with Beria's order immediately submit proposals on this issue. Telegrams of this level, for signed by ambassadors and residents, usually sent to several members of the government.

Fitin introduced the telegram to Gukasov, the head of work with nationalist and emigrant organizations in areas adjacent to our borders. By the way, exactly A year ago, Gukasov demanded that the party bureau investigate my personal case. Now, everything still suspicious of my loyalty and perhaps still holding a grudge against me, he did not gave me Beria's instructions and independently prepared proposals for confronting to the German secret services in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and sent them to Fitin bypassing me. His the plan was to use only the agent network in the three republics Baltic States, consisting of Russian and Jewish emigrants. A scandal erupted.

Having called Fitin and me and after listening to Fitin's message according to Gukasov's note, Beria asked my opinion. I honestly answered that I did not have it, I did not receive any instructions and did not aware of German intentions in Riga; I am currently doing something completely different. affairs. Beria exploded with rage and ordered the telegrams to be urgently brought again. Then he saw that they did not have my signature, and we had a mandatory rule to endorse any secret a document passing through the hands of an official in the intelligence and sent for processing. Gukasov was immediately called to the carpet - and Beria threatened to demolish his head for not following his orders. Gukasov in response, lowering his voice, in a confidential tone (he was a native of Tbilisi) said literally the following. He didn't really show me telegrams, as I received information from the head of the investigative unit Sergienko about the presence of materials that talk about my suspicious contacts with enemies of the people Former Intelligence Directorate. Beria abruptly cut off Gukasov: we must stop the idiotic the habit of interfering with your proposals and once and for all hacking into your nose that orders must be carried out unconditionally and immediately. "Europe

is now in the fire of war, and the tasks of intelligence in the current conditions," stressed Beria, became completely different. - And then he quoted Stalin, who demanded active involvement of intelligence officers in political probes operations using any conflicts in the ruling circles of foreign states.

"This," Beria summed up, "is the key to success in overthrowing the current governments." puppet states that declared their so-called independence in 1918 under the protection of German bayonets. - From this tirade, we immediately understood what he meant. states of the Baltics. "The Germans before and now," continued Beria, "are considering them as their provinces, considering them colonies of the German Empire. Our task is to play on the contradictions between England and Sweden in this region. - With these As he spoke, he turned towards me. "Think things over and call the Moscow Chichaev. Then report your thoughts, taking into account the necessary material funds. The term is three

days. The self-confident, bold posing of the question reflected the new thinking that demonstrated Stalin, Molotov and Beria after the signing of the pact, which clearly added to them

faith in one's own abilities. In regions that are now officially included in the scope of our interests, we started a radically new active policy in order to influence on the internal course of the governments of these states.

## **Accession of the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine to the USSR**

Arriving in Moscow, Chichaev, the NKVD resident in Riga, reported sharp differences and strained relations within the government of Latvia - primarily between the president Ulmanis and War Minister Balodis. This conflict undermined the stability of the existing regime, which was already under double pressure - ours and the Germans. The Germans, quite naturally, relied on their loyal supporters in economic management structures and business circles, while we were counting on the impact among left-wing groups associated with both the Communist Party and trade unions. Be that as it may, Latvia, as well as other Baltic states, was essentially a buffer zone between us and Germany. A plan to build a broad coalition when the government should be represented by both German and Soviet interests, was also discussed at the meeting in Molotov's Kremlin office. Having learned about this option, the President of Latvia Ulmanis strongly opposed, while Foreign Minister Wilhelm Munters unexpectedly approved of this idea. The situation in the republic was tense also because there The strike movement, supported by us, also expanded. The economic crisis caused by the outbreak of war: the region's traditional trade links with Britain and Western Europe were cut off.

Chichaev and Vetrov, an adviser to our embassy in Riga, came to me, and Vetrov offered to play on the personal ambitions of Munters, whose reputation in Berlin was quite stable because of his frequent meetings with Ribbentrop. As for Ulmanis, his the government was not particularly popular as a result of errors in the economic area, on the one hand, the conciliatory position taken by him in relation to chauvinistic German businessmen in Riga, on the other. These merchants bought up all the most valuable that was in the republic, widely using the advantages that opened up to them due to the cessation of trade relations between Latvia and Western Europe. By the way, about seventy percent of all Latvian exports went to Germany - essentially at dumping prices. I informed Beria and Molotov that the government Latvia relies not so much on the support of regular military formations, but on auxiliary police units, made up mainly of the sons of farmers and petty merchants.

In our opinion, Foreign Minister Munters was the ideal figure for in order to head a government acceptable to both German and Soviet interests. When he ordered the leading Latvian newspapers to publish a photograph of Molotov (in honor of his 50th birthday), we took this as a sign of his willingness to establish personal contacts with Molotov. Our reaction was immediate: I was immediately issued a diplomatic passport in the name of Matveev, and Munters was informed that they would like to meet him Matveev, special adviser to Molotov, so that the Latvian minister could through him convey everything important that he could have besides the protocol. These informal the messages would then be handed over to the Soviet leadership. It was June 1940 - and act should have been urgent. That is why I did not get to Riga by train, but on board a high-speed Soviet bomber. In Riga, together with Vetrov, I paid a secret visit to Munters, expressing during our meeting the wish of the Soviet government as soon as possible reshuffle the cabinet of ministers of the republic so that he, Munters, can lead the new coalition government.

My visit was part of a complex operation to seize control of the government. Latvia. It was led by Merkulov, Beria's first deputy, who secretly flew to Riga even before me to coordinate the action plan on the spot. Being in Riga under the guise of an adviser Molotov, I reported everything to Merkulov, who had direct access by telephone to Molotov and Beria. Meanwhile, an ultimatum was presented to the government in Riga. As a result

President Ulmanis was forced to leave his post, our troops occupied Latvia and the ex-president was arrested. The situation has changed the rules of the game. The Germans were too deeply involved in military operations in the West to be interested in the events taking place in Latvia. In this regard, Molotov and Stalin decided to put at the head of the Baltic states not those who would suit both sides (like, for example, the same Munters), but reliable people close to the Communist Party. True, some of the original conditions that implied the creation of coalition governments still remained. So, let's say, the Latvian and Estonian generals were given ranks similar to the ranks in the Red Army, and although Munters was arrested, they did not do it right away.

Together with Vetrov, I went to the residence of Munters, where we took all measures to pack his property and quietly take all family members to Moscow. From there they were transported to Voronezh, where Munters was appointed to the position of professor at Voronezh University. We have officially notified the German side that we still consider Munters a politically significant figure. Under our control, he met in Moscow at dinner with German diplomatic representatives, but his fate was already sealed, and he did not even succeed in becoming a puppet head of government. In 1941, when the war with Germany began, Munters was arrested and sentenced to a long prison term for activities hostile to the Soviet government. By a strange coincidence, I met Munters in Vladimir Prison in late 1958 or early 1959. When he was released, he remained to live in Vladimir. After retiring, he published articles in Izvestia, proving the inevitability of the union of Latvia with the USSR.

The fate of the Baltic states, which was originally determined in the Kremlin and in Berlin, is in many ways similar to the fate of the Eastern European states, which was decided at one time in Yalta. The similarity here is striking: in both cases, the preliminary agreement provided for the creation of coalition governments friendly to both sides. We needed a buffer zone separating us from the spheres of influence of other world powers, and we were ready to go for a tough confrontation in those areas where the Red Army troops were located by the end of the war. Again, the Kremlin saw the task of building communism mainly in strengthening the might of the Soviet state in every possible way. We could play the role of a world power only if the state possessed sufficient military force and was able to subjugate the countries located near our borders to its influence. The idea of propaganda from above for a communist revolution around the world was an ideological smokescreen designed to establish the USSR as a superpower that influences all events in the world. Although initially this concept was ideological, it gradually became a real political course. Such an opportunity opened up before our state for the first time after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. After all, from now on, as the secret protocols confirmed, one of the leading powers of the world recognized the international interests of the Soviet Union and its natural desire to expand its borders.

After the story with Gukasov, which I told about, but even before Latvia was occupied by our troops, Beria unexpectedly called me to his place and offered to accompany him to a football match at the Dynamo stadium. He did not give any explanation - it was an order. Spartak, a team of trade unions, and Dynamo, a team of the NKVD, played: in those years, each meeting of these teams was an event in itself. At first, I decided that Beria wanted me to be present during his conversation with the agent in the restaurant. The restaurant was located at the stadium and was an ideal place for meetings with agents, since the offices there were equipped with listening devices. When we arrived at the stadium and got out of the car, I followed Beria at a respectful distance, since Kobulov, Tsanava, Maslennikov and other deputies immediately approached him, immediately surrounding their boss. Turning around, however, he made me a sign to come closer and walk side by side - so I found myself in the government box. Beria introduced me to Malenkov and other party and government officials. I must say that I felt extremely uncomfortable. All this time I sat in silence, but the very fact of my presence on the government podium made it clear to Kruglov, Serov, Tsanava and others that it was time to stop spreading rumors about my suspicious contacts, connections and some materials compromising me,

available in the investigation department. They had to make sure that from now on I belong to the category of trusted people in the eyes of the country's

leadership. I was lucky that all my meetings with Beria - both at his apartment and at the dacha - were invariably of a purely business nature. This even applies when I'm together attended the wedding of his protégé Vardo Maksimalishvili with him, an attractive a Georgian woman who was trained in the basics of intelligence under the guidance of my wife. Went rumors that she became Beria's mistress back in Tbilisi, as a medical student faculty, and after moving to the capital, he took her to work in his secretariat, then arranged so that she married an ordinary employee of the NKVD, also a Georgian. For my wedding invited me to take a closer look at her and her husband and assess their demeanor (for example, not Are they drinking too much? This need was caused by the fact that the newlyweds were going to be sent to Paris to work in the local community of Georgian emigrants.

After one or two years of work in Paris, Vardo returned to Moscow, where she served in intelligence until 1952. In 1952, she was arrested, accusing that, while in Paris, she participated in a conspiracy against the Soviet state, prepared by the Georgian emigrants under the leadership of an influential anti-Soviet Megrelian organization - here clearly meant Beria, who was a Mingrelian. She was thrown into prison on a direct order. Stalin and she remained there until his death in 1953. She was immediately released order of Beria, but after his overthrow he was again arrested and kept in prison for two years. conclusion. After leaving prison, she returned to her former medical profession. To the list of the troubles that fell on her head, one more must be added. In 1939 or 1940 the Moscow Soviet issued him and her husband a warrant for an apartment that previously belonged to our famous theater directed by Vsevolod Meyerhold, who was repressed by order of Stalin. By the way, this apartment was used by the NKVD as a safe house. During the new campaign de-Stalinization under Gorbachev, they began to put pressure on Vardo in every possible way, demanding that she release apartment. It was very difficult for the Moscow City Council to evict her legally, since she had documents confirming that Vardo herself was a victim of political repression. After television, however, without indicating the name of Vardo, was shown story about the situation with Meyerhold's apartment, this case began to gain publicity. Then the KGB, wanting to avoid a high-profile scandal, managed to find an equivalent for her and her family. living space.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had one more consequence for us - the accession Western Ukraine. After the occupation of Poland by German troops, our army occupied Galicia and Eastern Poland. Galicia has always been a stronghold of Ukrainian nationalist movement supported by such leaders as Hitler and Canaris in Germany, Benes in Czechoslovakia and Federal Chancellor of Austria Engelbert Dollfuss. The capital of Galicia, Lvov, became the center where refugees from Poland fled from the German occupation troops flocked. Polish intelligence and counterintelligence transported to Lviv all their most important prisoners - those who were suspected of double game during the German-Polish confrontation of the 30s. About what happened in Galicia, I learned only in October 1939, when the Red Army occupied Lvov. First Khrushchev, the secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Serov, his People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, went there to carry out a campaign of Sovietization of Western Ukraine on the spot. My wife was sent to Lvov, together with Pavel Zhuravlev, the head of the German direction of our intelligence. To me was alarming: her unit was engaged in German agents and underground organizations of Ukrainian nationalists, and in Lvov the atmosphere was strikingly different on the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine.

In Lvov, the Western capitalist way of life flourished: wholesale and retail trade was in the hands of private traders, who were soon to be liquidated in the course of Sovietization. The Ukrainian Uniate Church enjoyed great influence, local the population supported the organization of Ukrainian nationalists, headed by Bandera people. According to our information, the OUN acted very actively and had significant forces. In addition, she had rich experience in underground activities, which, alas, Serov's "team" did not have. Ukrainian counterintelligence service

nationalists managed to quite quickly track down some safe houses of the NKVD during Lvov. The method of their surveillance was extremely simple; they started it near the building of the city department of the NKVD and accompanied everyone who came out of there in civilian clothes and ... in boots, which betrayed him military: Ukrainian Chekists, hiding their uniforms under their coats, forgot such a "trifle" as shoes. They apparently did not take into account that in Western Ukraine only the military wore boots. However, where they had to know about it when everyone wore boots in the Soviet part of Ukraine, since the other shoes were simply unobtainable.

The failure of safe houses was reported to the Center, and my wife moved to a hotel "Centralnaya", first under the guise of a refugee from Warsaw, and then posing as a journalist from Izvestia. She made extensive use of her experience of working with Polish refugees in Belarus in the 1920s. She spoke Polish fluently, and soon she was able to establish friendly relations with one "family of Polish Jews from Warsaw. She helped them to leave for Moscow, where we met them, gave them money and sent them to the USA to their relatives. We agreed that "friendly relations" would be continued, which meant: in the event necessary, the Soviet intelligence service will be able to count on them. They didn't know that my wife is an operational worker, and agreed to further communication. Later, after my arrest, a tourist from the USA, one of the relatives of this family, arrived in Moscow in 1960, tried to find my wife at the Izvestia publishing house, where, as Emma once said, she works as a translator. They met quite cordially, but for reconnaissance purposes. this person was not designed.

Serov and Khrushchev ignored the warnings of Zhuravlev, who believed that attitude towards local Ukrainian leaders and cultural figures should be shown maximum patience. Many of them were quite widely known in Prague, Vienna and Berlin. So, Serov arrested Kost-Levitsky, who at one time was the head of the former independent Ukrainian People's Republic. Khrushchev immediately reported this arrest to Stalin, emphasizing his merits in neutralizing the potential prime minister of the Ukrainian governments in exile. Kost-Levitsky was transferred from Lvov to Moscow and imprisoned in prison. By that time he was already over eighty, and the arrest of this old man damaged our prestige in the eyes of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put an end to the plans of Ukrainian nationalists to creation of an independent republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, plans actively supported in 1938 by England and France. This idea was torpedoed by Benes, who agreed with Stalin that the Carpathian Ukraine, which also included part of the territory that belonged to Czechoslovakia, would be completely transferred to the Soviet Union. Konovalts, the only Ukrainian leader with access to Hitler and Goering, was reportedly liquidated in 1938 (he had once served as a colonel in the Austrian army and enjoyed some respect in German "Nazi" circles). Other nationalist leaders in Ukraine did not have such high ties with the Germans - they were mainly operatives from the Abwehr or the Gestapo, and the British or French authorities did not give these people of any serious importance and did not stake on them when the war broke out. Therefore, Khrushchev's statements that he allegedly thwarted Western plans for the creation of a Ukrainian of the interim government in exile, having arrested Kost-Levitsky, simply did not correspond reality, and when I was ordered to assess the importance of detention Kost-Levitsky in Moscow, in my report to Beria, which was then sent to Molotov, I emphasized that this detention was not justified from any point of view. On the contrary, it should grant Galicia a special status in order to neutralize the widespread anti-Soviet propaganda, and it is necessary to immediately release Kost-Levitsky, apologize in front of him and send back alive and unharmed, giving the opportunity to live in Lvov with maximum comfort. This must be done, of course, provided that he, in his turn, will support our idea of sending an influential and representative delegation from Western Ukraine to negotiate a special status for Galicia, consisting of Soviet Republic of Ukraine. This would give due respect to the local traditions. Molotov agreed. Kost-Levitsky was released and went back to Lvov in separate special wagon.

This proposal was my first open confrontation with Khrushchev and Serov. In accordance with the secret protocol between Molotov and Ribbentrop, the USSR did not was supposed to prevent German citizens and persons of German nationality living in the territories within the sphere of our interests from moving to their desire to Germany or to territories that were within the sphere of German interests. We decided to take advantage of these conditions.

A group of Captain Adamovich was sent to Chernivtsi. I think it only had that newly recruited after being fired in 1938 for having a connection with a defector Orlov William Fisher. He later took the name Rudolf Abel. Chernivtsi is located near borders - between Bukovina (Galicia), on the one hand, and Polish territory, while occupied by the Germans, on the other. The group was to establish contacts with agents recruited by us from among ethnic Germans, Poles and Ukrainians. They had to settle in these places as refugees from the communist regime, seeking protection on territories controlled by the Germans. Captain Adamovich left Moscow for Chernivtsi, taking with him photographs of our agents in Poland and Germany - he had to show them four agents who were supposed to recognize these people at pre-appointed rendezvous in Warsaw, Danzig (Gdansk), Berlin and Krakow. The photographs were our employees, acting under the guise of diplomatic services, trade representative offices or journalistic activities in these cities. Fisher's (Abel's) task was to teach four agents the basics of radio communications. However, after Adamovich

was received by Serov, possibly in Chernivtsi, and agreed on the material and technical base necessary for the training of agents, he suddenly disappeared. Not finding him, Serov scolded Fischer and reported the disappearance of Adamovich Khrushchev. Fischer, although he was an employee of the group, had no idea about the bureaucratic intrigues and believed that if he reported the two-day absence of Adamovich to the chief local NKVD, then there is no need for him to report to me in Moscow as well. Can you imagine my condition when I was summoned to the office to Beria, who ordered me to report on how undergoing Adamovich's operation. He was furious when I couldn't provide anything new, except for information from a week ago.

The phone rang. It was Khrushchev. He began to indignantly reproach Beria with the fact that he is sent to Ukraine incompetent people and traitors interfering in the work Ukrainian NKVD. According to him, local cadres are able to conduct the entire the necessary work.

"That Adamovich of yours is a scoundrel!" he shouted into the phone. - He, according to our information, fled to the Germans.

The government line made it possible for me to hear his angry words. Beria obviously did not want to answer in my presence in the same rude manner, and he

Opportunity said softly:

- Nikita Sergeevich, here I have Major Sudoplatov, deputy head of our intelligence. He is personally responsible for Adamovich's operation. For any of your questions, you can get an answer from him.

Picking up the phone, I began to explain that Adamovich is a competent worker, knows well Poland. But Khrushchev did not listen to my explanations and cut me off. He was convinced that Adamovich is with the Germans and should be immediately found or stolen. He went on to say that he would break my career, if I persist in covering up thugs and scoundrels like Kost-Levitsky and Adamovich. In his hearts, he hung up the phone without waiting for my answer.

Beria's reaction was reservedly official. "In two days," he rapped out, "Adamovich must be found—alive or dead. If he is alive, he should be immediately delivered to Moscow. In case of failure instructions of a member of the Politburo, you will bear full responsibility for the consequences, taking into account your past connections with the enemies of the people in the former leadership of the intelligence agencies.

I left the office with a heavy feeling. Ten minutes later my phone started ringing incessantly. Counterintelligence, border troops, heads of Ukrainian and regional departments Belarusian NKVD - everyone demanded a photograph of Adamovich. By personal order of Beria

All-Union search began. Two days passed, but no trace of Adamovich could be found. I knew that I was in big trouble. At the last moment, however, I decided call Adamovich's wife, who lived in Moscow. According to the information that I had, in nothing suspicious has been noticed in recent days. As if by the way I inquired when she last spoke to her husband. To my surprise, she thanked me for this call and said that her husband had been at home for the last two days.

- he had a concussion and doctors from the NKVD polyclinic forbade him to get out of bed in for at least a few days. I immediately called General Novikov, head of medical services of the NKVD, and he confirmed that everything is really so. Do I need

to describe the relief I experienced? Reporting to Beria as usual at the end day, I said that Adamovich was in Moscow. - Under arrest?

Beria asked. "No," I replied, and began to explain the situation. We were alone in the office. He is rude cut me off, using words that I did not expect from a member of the Politburo. Enraged, he circled around his huge office, shouting obscenities at me and Adamovich, calling us blockheads, irresponsible suckers, compromising NKVD in the eyes of the party leadership.

- Why are you silent? he stared at me, suddenly breaking off his tirade. I replied that I had a terrible headache. "Then immediately, now," Beria threw in, "go home." Before I left, I filled out an arrest warrant for Adamovich and went to see Merkulov, who

should have signed it. However, when I explained to him what the matter was, he laughed in my face. and tore the paper in front of my eyes. At this point, the headache became quite unbearable, and the medical officer took me home. The next morning, Beria's secretary called, he was extremely brief and businesslike - the people's commissar ordered me to stay at home for three days and be treated, adding that the owner was sending me lemons received from Georgia. The investigation showed: Adamovich, having got drunk in a restaurant at the station in Chernivtsi, got into a fight in the toilet room and received a severe blow to the head, causing a concussion. In this state, he was able take the Moscow train, forgetting to inform Fischer (Abel) about his departure. During fights, the photos he had to show four of our agents turned out to be lost. Later, however, they were discovered at the station by Ukrainian NKVD officers, who believed that Abwehr agents had deliberately started the fight in an attempt to kidnap Adamovich. Case ended with the fact that Adamovich was fired from the NKVD and appointed first deputy minister Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, and then the Minister. I saw him one more time at the theater premiere in Moscow in the early 50s, but we did not say hello to each other. Unfortunately, my conflict with Serov and Khrushchev did not end there. Serov was involved in a love story with the famous Polish opera singer Bandrowska-Turska. IN In Moscow, he announced that he had personally recruited her. Everyone was delighted - after all, the singer enjoyed European fame and often toured Moscow and other cities before the war. European capitals. The euphoria, however, soon passed: with the consent of Serov, she left for Romania, where she flatly refused to meet in Bucharest with our resident adviser plenipotentiaries. Both Khrushchev and Beria then received a letter from employees of the Ukrainian NKVD, who accused Serov of inciting tricks under the guise of carrying out his operational responsibilities.

Serov was urgently summoned to Moscow. I happened to be in Beria's office at the moment when he invited Serov to explain his actions and answer the accusations against him. Serov said that he had received permission from Khrushchev himself to have an affair with Bandrowska-Turska, and this was driven by operational requirements. Beria allowed him to call from his Khrushchev's office, but as soon as he heard where Serov was calling from, he immediately began to swear: "You son of a bitch," he shouted into the phone, "wanted to drag me into his love tricks to get away? Pass the phone to Comrade Beria!

I could hear Khrushchev turning to Beria with the words: - Lavrenty Pavlovich!

Do whatever you want with this yellow-mouthed chick, just now fluttered out of the military academy. He has no experience in serious cases. If

consider it possible, leave him at his former job. No, punish them properly. Just don't involve me in this business and in your games with Ukrainian emigrants.

Beria began to scold Serov how much in vain, threatening to fire him from the organs in disgrace, calling petty womanizer, insulting and humiliating in every possible way. To be honest, I was extremely embarrassed to be in the office during this angry tirade. Then Beria unexpectedly proposed Serov to discuss with me how to get out of this unpleasant story. We came to the conclusion that Serov should not attempt to contact Bandrovskaya-Turska - not operational, or for any other reason. Her departure to Romania was very unfortunate fact, since the singer's performances in Lviv or Moscow could make a favorable impression on public opinion in Poland and Western Europe. At the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, it was important to demonstrate that the situation in Galicia was normal and healthy environment. In this regard, the singer's flight to Romania was a blow to the reputation of Khrushchev, who never ceased to assert that Moscow had nothing to worry, since the Sovietization of Western Ukraine is proceeding satisfactorily, about which testifies, they say, and the support provided to this process by prominent figures of Ukrainian and Polish culture.

Khrushchev's prestige suffered in other incidents as well. For example, in 1939 from Spain returned one of the commanders of our partisan formations, Captain Prokopiuk. An experienced operative, he was quite suitable for appointment to the post of head of the department. Ukrainian NKVD, whose task was to train employees to conduct partisan operations in case of war with Poland or Germany. Hearing about our proposal, Khrushchev immediately called Beria with strong objections. Beria called to his own deputy for personnel Kruglov and me, since it was I who signed the submission for Prokopyuk. Khrushchev's objections were caused, as it turned out, by the fact that in 1938 his brother Prokopyuk, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Education of Ukraine, was shot as a "Polish spy". Khrushchev heard Beria scolding Kruglov and me for sending to Kyiv a person, albeit professionally and competent, but not acceptable to the local party leadership. Here I

would like to talk about who Khrushchev considered "acceptable." This is Ouspensky, whom Khrushchev had previously taken with him to Ukraine as head of the NKVD. In Moscow he headed the NKVD department for the city and region and worked directly under Khrushchev. In Ukraine, Uspensky carried out repressions in 1938, as a result of which

members of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine - more than 100 people - only three were not arrested.

Uspensky, as soon as he arrived in Kyiv, summoned the staff of the apparatus and declared that will not allow liberalism, softness and long arguments, as in a synagogue. Who does not want to work with him, can apply. By the way, some of the wife's friends did just that, taking advantage of this offer. In the presence of a large audience, Ouspensky

signed their applications for transfer to the reserve or appointment with demotion - for outside of Ukraine. Ouspensky is responsible for mass torture and repression, and what As for Khrushchev, he was one of the few members of the Politburo who personally participated together with Uspensky in the interrogations of the arrested.

During the repressions of 1938, when Yezhov lost Stalin's trust and the hunt for Chekists-"traitors". Ouspensky tried to flee abroad. He took with him several clean passports and fled, staging suicide, but the body of the "drowned man" did not discovered. Khrushchev panicked and turned to Stalin and Beria with a request to declare a search for Uspensky. The search was carried out very intensively, and soon we realized that Uspensky's wife knows: he did not drown, but is hiding somewhere. She did not directly betray him by her behavior, but it became clear to us. In the end, he himself surrendered in Siberia after he noticed in Omsk surveillance group.

Since then, as soon as it came to using any of the officers of the Ukrainian NKVD, our leadership immediately referred to Uspensky's allotment, recalling the words spoken in Khrushchev: "None of

the Chekists who worked with him can be trusted. Meanwhile, during interrogation, Uspensky testified that he and Khrushchev were close,



were friends at home, and tried his best to convince everyone that he was just an obedient soldier parties. Ouspensky's behavior played a fatal role in the fate of his wife - she was arrested through three days after he surrendered to the authorities. Sentenced to death for helping her husband in organization of the escape, she filed a petition for pardon, and then, as Kruglov told me, Khrushchev intervened: he recommended the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to reject her request for pardon.

This story made a strong impression on me. Kruglov, who is well acquainted with the practice of the work of the Central Committee (before the NKVD he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee), confirmed that members of the Politburo could personally interfere in the decision of the fate of people, especially members families of enemies of the people. I learned for the first time that the intervention in these cases is not directed at saving the lives of innocent people, but is a way to get rid of unwanted witnesses. In the archives, in the list of wives of prominent figures in the party, the Red Army and the NKVD who were sentenced to death, I also found the name of Uspensky's wife. Her death sentence, like sentences to other wives of repressed leaders, first approved by the highest party institutions.

## **The eve of the fight with Hitler and the inconsistency of intelligence warnings**

After my appointment as Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Service in March 1939, I reminded Beria of the fate of Zubov, who was still in prison for failure to comply with the order to financing the coup in Yugoslavia. This man, I told Beria, is a devoted and experienced intelligence officer. Beria, who had known Zubov for seventeen years, pretended not to have heard anything, although it was Zubov who played a significant role in Beria's ability to reach the heights of power. In 1922, Zubov headed the intelligence department that monitored secret connections of the Georgian Mensheviks and their agents in Turkey. Based on dental information, Beria reported to Dzerzhinsky and Lenin about the impending uprising and about successful suppression of it in the bud. This report was discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the party and actually served as the basis for the appointment of Beria to the post of head of the GPU Transcaucasia. Zubov remained on friendly terms with both Beria himself and his deputy. Bogdan Kobulov: Coming to Moscow from Georgia, Kobulov invariably stopped at Zubov's apartment.

In the autumn of 1939, after the capture of Poland by the Germans, Colonel Stanisław Sosnowski, former head of the Polish secret service in Berlin, and Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, a wealthy Polish aristocrat who had considerable political weight. Both were placed on the Lubyanka to actively develop them as our agents.

For the sake of saving Zubov, I suggested to Beria that he be placed in the same cell with the colonel. Sosnovsky. Zubov spoke French, German and Georgian fluently. Beria agreed, and Zubov was transferred from Lefortovo, where he was mercilessly beaten on the orders of the same Kobulov, who once, coming from Georgia, stayed at his house. His tormentor was the infamous Rhodes, who tried to force a confession through inhuman torture: Zubov's knees were crushed. As a result, Zubov became disabled, but he did not went.

The head of the investigation objected to the transfer of Zubov from Lefortovo to Lubyanka. part of Sergienko, although I explained to him that my interest in Zubov and his fate was caused purely operational considerations and agreed with Beria. In response to this, Sergienko, refusing translate Zubov, said: - I will

personally report this case to the people's commissar. Trash Teeth refuses admit your guilt for not following the direct order of the leadership! In turn,

I reported to Beria that Sergienko was refusing to carry out the order. Beria immediately picked up the phone, called Sergienko and began to scold him, in the end said that if in fifteen minutes he did not comply with his order, he would not bear heads. Sergienko tried to object, but Beria did not listen to his explanations.

Beria was often very rude in dealing with high-ranking officials, but with rank-and-file employees, as a rule, spoke politely. Later I had to

make sure that the leaders of that time allowed themselves to be rude only in relation to the leadership, and the members of the Politburo behaved emphatically with ordinary people

politely.

Zubov, being in the same cell with Sosnovsky, contributed to his recruitment. He convinced him that cooperation with the German or Polish intelligence services did not promise him any prospects for the future, therefore it makes direct sense to cooperate with Russian intelligence. In the 1930s, Sosnowski, being a Polish resident in Berlin, led a very effective network of agents. He acted under the guise of a Polish aristocrat, kept a stable. His agents, mostly attractive young women, he usually installed in the headquarters of the Nazi Party and the secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1935, the Gestapo managed to expose most of his agents, and Sosnovsky himself was arrested for espionage. He showed the investigators at the Lubyanka that the exposed agents were executed in the Plötzensee prison right in front of his eyes. The Poles exchanged him for the head of the German community in Poland, accused of spying for Germany. In 1937, Sosnowski was convicted by a military court in Warsaw of embezzlement of funds allocated for agents, and he served time in Eastern Poland. Two years later, units of

the Red Army released the prisoners from prisons. As for Sosnovsky, he was "transferred" from a Polish prison to an NKVD prison.

We received information from Sosnovsky that two of his agents were still active. In addition, he suggested the idea of using the connections of Prince Radziwill and making him an intermediary between our leadership and Hermann Goering, one of Hitler's deputies. Sosnovsky agreed to cooperate with us after we presented him with the information we had about his intelligence network in Berlin, and he realized that we knew everything about his past. This was a man who knew too much, and it would simply be unwise to let him slip away and not get him to work for us. Control over him helped us to use two of his important sources of information located in Germany - they were useful to us in 1940 and in the first two years of the war. After Zubov was able to assess Sosnovsky's potential for our intelligence and helped recruit him, I suggested using Zubov as a cellmate of Prince Radziwill. Beria agreed with my

proposal. Zubov was transferred to Radziwill's cell and stayed there for a month. By this time, the conditions of Zubov's detention had changed: he was allowed to have lunch and dinner in my office, and we ordered food in our restaurant. While still in custody, he, accompanied by an escort, went to the NKVD polyclinic for medical procedures. In the end, he was released in 1941 shortly after the start of the war, and I took him to my staff as the head of the department. He worked in the authorities until the very end of the war, but in 1946, when Abakumov became the Minister of State Security, Zubov had to urgently resign. At one time, it was Abakumov who was involved in the Zubov case and gave orders to severely beat him. Beria personally dealt with Prince Radziwill. He managed to convince Radziwill that he should act as an intermediary between the Soviet government and Goering to clarify delicate issues in the relationship between the two countries. We kept Radziwill in sight since the mid-30s and knew that the prince received Goering on his estate near Vilnius, where he liked to hunt (later this part of the territory

went to Lithuania, and at that time belonged to Poland). By the way, in his memoirs, Radziwill recalls meetings with Beria, who, when parting with him, once said: "We will always need people like you, prince." Representatives of the noble aristocratic families of Great Britain, Italy and Sweden petitioned for the release of Radziwill. In 1940, after Beria recruited him as our agent of influence, I arranged for Radziwill to leave for Berlin. From Berlin, we received information about him from our residency: he was often seen at diplomatic receptions in Goering's society. In the same year, I was ordered to develop options for contacting him through our agent. In this case, we decided to contact the prince through open channels, since he was a prominent figure in society and could

freely visit the Soviet embassy without arousing suspicion. He, in particular, could

to be interested in the fate of family property that ended up in the occupied territory.

In 1940, Radziwill was received twice by our resident in Berlin, Amayak Kobulov, who reported on these meetings to the Center. However, Kobulov was not given any instructions on operational use of the Polish prince in contacts with the Germans. We didn't really believe into the sincerity of Radziwill and therefore decided not to contact him, especially since his political contacts did not promise us any immediate benefits. Before Germany unleashed a war against us, in fact there were no such problems where it could be used to probe the position of the Germans on this or that delicate issue: after all, all this time, Molotov and our ambassador Dekanozov maintained confidential relations with Ribbentrop and the German ambassador Schullenburg.

It was known that Radziwill had no access to information from the military-strategic character. Our solution was to be as patient as possible and just wait until Radziwill travels to Switzerland or Sweden, where he will be out of German control, and only there to get in touch with him. As far as I know, he never went there. After Hitler's attack on the USSR, Radziwill seemed to go into the shadows, but, according to our information, he remained in Germany and came to Poland, enjoying life as much as it was possible. In 1942, for some time, his traces were lost. Looking back I see that we clearly overestimated both Radziwill's personal connections and his influence on Goering...

The famous actress Olga Chekhova, the ex-wife of the famous writer's nephew, was close to Radziwill and Goering, and through relatives in Transcaucasia connected with Beria. She later was in personal contact in the 1946-1950s with the Minister of State Security who replaced Beria Abakumov. Initially, it was supposed to be used precisely for communication with Radziwill. At we had a plan to assassinate Hitler, according to which Radziwill and Olga Chekhova had to, with the help of their friends among the German aristocracy, provide our people access to Hitler. A group of agents abandoned in Germany and located in Berlin underground, completely subordinate to the militant Igor Miklashevsky, who arrived in Germany at the beginning of

1942. Former boxing champion Miklashevsky, acting as a Soviet defector, acquired in Berlin, considerable popularity after his acquaintance with the German boxing champion Max Schmeling in 1942 or 1943, from whom he received a letter of recommendation. Miklashevsky remained in Berlin until 1944. Uncle Miklashevsky fled

the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war and became one of the active members of the German Anti-Bolshevik Committee for the Liberation of the USSR. He is with proudly received his nephew, giving him every support as a political opponent of the Soviet government. In 1942, Miklashevsky succeeded at one of the receptions meet Olga Chekhova. He conveyed to Moscow that it would be easy to remove Goering, but The Kremlin showed little interest in this. In 1943, Stalin abandoned his original plan to assassinate Hitler, because he was afraid that as soon as Hitler eliminated, Nazi circles and the military will try to conclude a separate peace talk with allies without the participation of the Soviet Union.

Such fears were not unfounded. We have information that in the summer of 1942, the representative of the Vatican in Ankara, on the initiative of Pope Pius XII, spoke with German ambassador Franz von Papen, encouraging him to use his influence to the signing of a separate peace between Great Britain, the United States and Germany. In addition to this message from our station in Ankara, the Soviet station in Rome reported on the Pope's meeting with Myron Taylor, Roosevelt's envoy to the Vatican to discussion of the conversation of Cardinal Roncalli (later he became Pope John XXIII) with the background Papin. Such a separate agreement would also limit our influence in Europe, excluding The Soviet Union from the future European alliance. None of the Kremlin leaders wanted to see such an agreement concluded. Stalin ordered the elimination of von Papen, since he was a key figure around whom the plans of the Americans revolved and the British to create an alternative government in the event of the signing of a separate peace. However, as I mentioned earlier, the assassination attempt failed, as a Bulgarian militant blew up grenade ahead of time and only lightly wounded von Papen.

We also had information, although not particularly detailed, about direct contacts Americans with von Papen in Istanbul.

Miklashevsky fled to France in 1944 after the liquidation of his uncle. In France, he remained for two years after the end of the war, tracking down the Vlasovites who fled to the West are the remnants of the army of the traitor Lieutenant General Vlasov. In 1947, Miklashevsky returned to the Soviet Union, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and resumed his boxing career, which he remained faithful to until his retirement.

Much has been written about the intelligence we had before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, testifying to the imminent attack Germany on our country. Stalin's position of calmly awaiting the invasion instead of alerting troops in time is often declared one of the reasons for those defeats and the heaviest losses suffered by the Red Army in 1941. Generally speaking, I agree that the country's leadership failed to correctly assess the intelligence received channels of information, but we must first deal with the question of what this information.

NKVD intelligence had been reporting the threat of war since November 1940. By this time Zhuravlev and Zoya Rybkina started a letter case under the operational name "Zateya", where they gathered the most important messages about the German military threat. This folder contains very alarming documents that worried the Soviet leadership because they put under doubt the sincerity of the proposals for the division of the world between Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan, made by Hitler to Molotov in November 1940 in Berlin. According to these materials, it was easier for us to track developments and report to the Soviet guide about the main trends of German politics. Letter case materials "Zateya" was often reported to Stalin and Molotov, and they used our information both to cooperate with Hitler and to oppose him. Although the intelligence received exposed Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union, however, many messages contradicted each other. They didn't have ratings. German military potential: tank formations and aviation located on our borders and capable of breaking through the line of defense of the Red Army units. Nobody in service state security did not seriously study the real balance of forces in the Soviet-German border. That is why the force of the Hitler strike was largely unexpected for our military leaders, including Marshal Zhukov, then Chief of the General Staff. In my memoirs he admits that he did not imagine an adversary capable of such large-scale offensive operations, with tank formations operating simultaneously in several directions.

What was missing from the intelligence was a qualitative assessment of the German "blitzkrieg" tactics. By German military strategy games, we knew that a long war would require additional economic resources and believed that if the war did start, then the Germans first of all, they will try to seize Ukraine and regions rich in raw materials for replenishment of food stocks. It was a big mistake: military intelligence and the NKVD failed to correctly inform the General Staff that the goal of the German army in Poland and France was not to seize lands, but to break and destroy the combat power enemy. As

soon as Stalin found out that the German General Staff was conducting exercises on operational-strategic and logistical supply in the event of a protracted war, he immediately gave the order to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with industrial and military power of Siberia. In April 1941 he was allowed to travel to the new military factories that produced tanks of the latest designs and aircraft. Through my residency in Berlin, we spread rumors in the ministries of aviation and the economy that a war with the Soviet Union would turn out to be a tragedy for the Hitlerite leadership, especially if the war will be long and will be fought on two fronts. On

January 10, 1941, Molotov and the German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Wernerfonder Schullenburg signed a secret protocol on the settlement of territorial issues in

Lithuania. Germany gave up its interests in some areas of Lithuania and exchanged for seven with half a million US dollars in gold. At that time I did not know about the existence of this protocol. I was only briefly informed that we managed to reach an agreement with the Germans on territorial surveys in the Baltic states and on economic cooperation for 1941.

Information about the date of the start of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, which came to us, was the most controversial. From the UK and the US, we received messages from trusted sources that the question of the German attack on the USSR depends on a secret agreement with the British government, since it would be too dangerous to fight a war on two fronts at once.

From our plenipotentiary in Washington Umansky and resident in New York Ovakimyan to us there were reports that British intelligence officer Montgomery Hyde, who worked for William Stevenson of the British Empire State Security Coordinating Center building, managed to plant a "duck" at the German embassy in Washington. Disinformation was excellent: if Hitler decides to attack England, the Russians will start a war against Hitler.

Analyzing the information received by the Union from the most reliable sources of military intelligence and the NKVD, you can clearly see that about half of the reports - until May and even June 1941 - were confirmed; Yes, war is inevitable. But the materials also showed that the collision with us it depended on whether Germany would regulate her relations with England. Yes, Philby reported that the British Cabinet was developing plans to escalate tensions and military conflicts between Germany and the USSR, in order to provoke Germany. IN the letter file "Black Bertha" there is a reference to information received from Philby or Cairncross that British agents are busy spreading rumors in the United States about the inevitability of war between Germany and the Soviet Union; she was supposed to we were going to start, and we were going to launch a preemptive strike in southern Poland. folder with these materials day by day became more and more plump. We have received new information about how the British side is inciting fear among German top leaders in connection with preparing the Soviets for war. We also received information about increased contacts the probing nature of the British representatives with the German ones in search of a peaceful resolution of the European military conflict.

Meanwhile, according to Beria, Stalin and Molotov decided at least to delay military conflict and try to improve the situation by applying the plan from which abandoned in 1938. This plan provided for the overthrow of the Yugoslav government, which signed a cooperation agreement with Hitler. And in March 1941, military intelligence and the NKVD, through their residencies, actively supported the conspiracy against the pro-German government in Belgrade. Thus, Molotov and Stalin hoped to strengthen the strategic Soviet positions in the Balkans. The new anti-German government, in their opinion, could delay the Italian and German operations in Greece. Major General

Milstein, deputy chief of military intelligence, was sent to Belgrade to assist in the military overthrow of the pro-German government. With our Alakhverdov participated in this action. By this time, with the help of the Foreign Ministry, in Moscow we managed to recruit the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union, Gavrilovich. Its co developed by Fedotov, the head of counterintelligence, and myself. However, we got the impression that he was playing a double game, as he contacted representatives every week UK in Moscow. A week after the

coup, we signed a mutual assistance pact with the new government in Belgrade. Hitler's reaction to this coup was swift and very effective. On April 6, the day after the signing of the pact, Hitler invaded Yugoslavia - and within two weeks the Yugoslav army was defeated. Moreover, Bulgaria, through which the German troops passed, although it was in the zone of our interests, supported the Germans. Hitler made it clear that he did not consider himself

bound by official and confidential agreements - after all, the secret protocols of the Molotov Pact - Ribbentrop provided for preliminary consultations before accepting any other military moves. And although both sides were actively consulting on the division of spheres of influence

from November 1940 to March 1941, an atmosphere of mutual distrust persisted in their relationship. Hitler was surprised by the events in Belgrade, and we, for our part, are no less surprised by his quick invasion of Yugoslavia. I have to admit

that we did not expect such a total and such a quick defeat of Yugoslavia. During all these events, on April 18, 1941, I signed a special directive in which all our residencies in Europe were ordered to intensify the work of the agent network and communication lines in every possible way, bringing them into line with wartime conditions.

Military intelligence sent a similar directive along its own lines. We also planned to send a group of experienced operatives to Switzerland, including the Bulgarian Afanasyev. They were supposed to be in contact with reliable sources using their cover in neutral Switzerland. With this country there was no direct connection, and our agents had to travel by train through Germany, with a change in Berlin. In this regard, it was decided to strengthen our residencies in Germany and Poland. We sent some operatives to Berlin, having transferred them from Italy and France. By this time, Belgium was already occupied. We have not always kept pace with such a rapid development of events; We were unable to promptly deliver radio equipment, batteries, spare parts to our German agents, and, worse, these people were not sufficiently trained either in terms of the basics of intelligence work or in terms of mastering the art of radio communication. Gradually, we began to pay more attention to political refugees who arrived in Moscow from countries occupied by the

Germans. Prior to his flight to Britain, Beneš ordered the formation of the Czech Legion, which was sent to Poland under the command of the young Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda.

After preliminary contacts with our residency in Warsaw, Svoboda moved with his unit to Western Ukraine. In fact, after the disarmament of his legion, having received the status of an unofficial envoy, he lived in a safe house and at my dacha in the suburbs of Moscow. Maklyarsky maintained regular contact with him. We kept Freedom in reserve. In May and June, just before the start of the war, we began to discuss with him a plan for the formation of Czech units in the Soviet Union, in order to then throw them into the German rear to conduct partisan operations in Czechoslovakia. I remember this man very well - unfailingly polite and unfailingly self-possessed, bearing himself with great dignity.

Meanwhile, Stalin and Molotov ordered the redeployment of large army formations from Siberia to the borders with Germany. They arrived to protect the western borders during April, May and early June. In May, after the arrival of Eitingon and Caridad Mercader from China in Moscow, I signed a directive on the training of Russians and other national émigré groups in Europe to participate in intelligence operations in war conditions.

Today we know that there were secret consultations between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Molotov on a possible strategic agreement between Germany. Japan and the Soviet Union gave Stalin and Molotov the illusory idea that it was possible to negotiate with Hitler. Until the very last moment, they believed that their authority and military power, repeatedly demonstrated to German experts, would delay the warrior for at least a year while Hitler tried to peacefully settle his disputes with Great Britain. Stalin and Molotov were annoyed by other points of view that ran counter to their strategic plans for

prevention of military conflict. This explains Stalin's rude remarks on Merkulov's report of June 16, 1941, which spoke of clear signs of an impending war. The fact that Stalin appointed himself head of government in May 1941 made it clear that he would lead the negotiations with Hitler and was confident that he could convince him not to go to war. The well-known TASS statement of June 14 confirmed that he was ready for negotiations and this time he would conduct them himself. Although large-scale preparations for war were in full swing in Germany, and for a long time, Stalin and Molotov believed that Hitler had not made a final decision to attack our country and that there were serious disagreements within the German military command on this issue. Curiously, the TASS statement came out on the same day that Hitler set the final date for the invasion. It should also be mentioned about

a few obscure moments.

In May 1941, the German Junkers-52 invaded Soviet airspace and, unnoticed, landed safely at the central airfield in Moscow near the stadium.

"Dynamo". This caused a stir in the Kremlin and led to a wave of repression among the military command: began with dismissals, then followed by arrests and execution of the highest air force command. This enchanting landing in the center of Moscow showed Hitler how weak the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces was.

Second fact. The military leadership and Stalin's entourage had the illusion that the power The Red Army is equal to the power of the Wehrmacht forces concentrated at our western borders. Where such a mistake? First, universal military service was introduced only in 1939, and although the Red Army tripled its strength, it did not have enough people with the highest military education, since more than thirty thousand career commanders were subjected to 30 years of repression. The number of military schools and schools opened in 1939, although impressive, but not enough. True, half of the repressed senior army ranks returned from the prisons and camps of the Gulag to the army, but they were clearly not enough to cope with the training of the entire mass of recruits. Zhukov and Stalin overestimated the possibilities our tank formations, ground and air forces. They're not entirely clear imagined what a modern war is in terms of coordinating the actions of all kinds troops - infantry, aviation, tanks and communications services. It seemed to them that the main thing is the quantity divisions and they will be able to contain any offensive and prevent the German advance into Soviet territory. Contrary to the leadership's point of view, the commander The country's Navy Kuznetsov soberly assessed the real capabilities of our naval forces and the superiority of the Germans in the maritime theater of operations. Based on my experience in Spain (he was a naval attache there), in the spring of 1941 Kuznetsov developed and introduced preliminary system of combat readiness: readiness No 3 - are in combat readiness duty fire weapons; readiness No 2 - all preparations are being taken repel a possible enemy attack; readiness #1 - fleet ready immediately start hostilities. That is why our Navy, which was attacked by surprise on The Baltic and the Black Sea, were able to repel the first blow of the enemy almost without loss.

The NKVD and military intelligence should be held responsible for underestimating the powerful potential of the German armed forces. These departments were too busy getting political information and were not sufficiently engaged in the study of the tactics of the Wehrmacht.

I clearly remember the last pre-war days. Just returned from China Eitingon. Together with the mother of Ramon Mercader, the three of us were awarded in the Kremlin by Kalinin for an action against Trotsky in Mexico. The whole atmosphere seemed to exude enthusiasm and confidence. But June 16 Fitin and Merkulov, People's Commissar of State Security, returned from the Kremlin - both alarmed. Fitin immediately called me and Melnikov, his deputy for the Far East, and said that the Boss (as we called Stalin among ourselves) found his report contradictory and ordered a more convincing conclusion to be drawn up on the entire intelligence information concerning the question of a possible outbreak of war with Germany.

Unlike General Ivashutin and other authors of memoirs, I do not remember angry Beria's notes on the memos of the agent "Yastreb": "This is British disinformation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish." I don't remember any agent at all with the codename "Hawk". In addition, there was no tradition in the intelligence and security services write lengthy remarks on the reports.

Just as incredible is the resolution attributed to Beria to recall and punish our ambassador. in Berlin Dekanozov, the former chief of intelligence of the NKVD, for bombarding him "disinformation". The same people claim that Beria wrote to Stalin on June 21, offering recall Dekanozov, but this was generally outside his competence, since Dekanozov moved to work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and reported directly to Molotov.

As mentioned above, intelligence reports about the possible start of a German invasion were contradictory. So, Sorge reported from Tokyo that the invasion was planned for June 1. At that At the same time, our station from Berlin reported that the invasion was planned for June 15th. Before This, on March 11, military intelligence reported that the German invasion was scheduled for the spring. The picture was further confused by the intention of the leadership to start negotiations with the Germans.

At a cocktail party at the German embassy in Moscow a few days before the start of the war, Zoya Rybkina noticed that some decorations and paintings had been removed from the walls. Trying to identify new places to install listening devices, she found that the embassy workers were packing their bags for departure. This made us extremely

worried. At the Metropol Hotel, Yakovlev, Raikhman and Ryasnoy, coordinators of counterintelligence operations against the Germans in Moscow, intercepted two German couriers carrying diplomatic mail. One was locked in an elevator car, while the other was locked in the bathroom of the suite where they lived. When the courier, who was in the elevator, realized that he was blocked, he pressed the button to call the elevator operator. Naturally, he was "rescued" by counterintelligence officers, who, in the five minutes at their disposal, opened his briefcase in the "suite" and photographed the contents. Among the documents was a letter from Ambassador Schullenburg to Ribbentrop, in which he wrote that he could be a mediator in resolving Soviet-German contradictions. At the same time, Schullenburg reported that the instructions to reduce the staff of the embassy had been implemented and the diplomats were leaving for Germany on schedule. Although the signs of an approaching war were obvious, this document, Schullenburg's position and his high reputation confirmed that the door to a peaceful settlement was still not closed.

On the day when Fitin returned from the Kremlin, Beria, having called me to his place, gave the order to organize a special group from among the intelligence officers in his direct subordination. She was supposed to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage actions in case of war. At the moment, our first task was to create a strike force from among experienced saboteurs capable of resisting any attempt to use provocative incidents on the border as a pretext for starting a war. Beria emphasized that our task is to prevent German provocateurs from carrying out actions similar to the one organized against Poland in 1939, when they seized the radio station in Gleiwitz in Germany. German provocateurs went on the air with anti-German statements, and then shot their own criminals, dressed in Polish uniforms, so that from the outside it looked like one of the units of the Polish army had really attacked the radio station. I immediately suggested that Eitingon be appointed as my deputy. Beria agreed, and on the eve of the war, we began

to look for people who could form the backbone of a special group that could be airlifted to the conflict areas on our European and Far Eastern borders. Eitingon's military experience was much greater than mine, and therefore in this matter I relied heavily on his assessments - it was he who acted as a link between our group and the military command. Together with him, we drew up plans for the destruction of the fuel depots that supplied the German motorized tank units, which had already begun to concentrate on our borders.

On June 20, 1941, Eitingon told me that a conversation with General Pavlov, commander of the Belorussian military district, made an unpleasant impression on him. Since he and Eitingon knew each other from Spain, he asked Pavlov for friendly advice on which border areas, in his opinion, should be paid special attention to, where provocations from the Germans are possible. In response, Pavlov said something, according to Eitingon, unintelligible, he seemed to understand nothing at all in matters of coordinating the actions of various services in modern warfare. Pavlov believed that no particular problems would arise even if the enemy managed to seize the initiative at the very beginning on the border, since he had enough forces in reserve to withstand any major breakthrough. In a word, Pavlov did not see the slightest need for subversive operations to disorganize the rear of the enemy troops.

On June 21, I stayed in my office all night, despite the fact that my wife and I had agreed to go to the dacha in the evening. A year before, she decided to leave the operational work at the Center and began teaching at the Higher School of the NKVD as an instructor in operational work with agents. She also left school on Saturday, June 21, at about three o'clock in the afternoon. Fitin that evening met with Gavrilovich, the Yugoslav ambassador, at his dacha. So that fateful night I was the only one from the authorities who was at work. By our rules we could leave



from work only after the secretary of the people's commissar calls and gives the boss's permission to go home. The heads of departments usually left at eight, going home or to safe houses. apartments for meetings with agents, and then returned to work at ten or eleven o'clock in the evening to summarize the reports received from agents, which immediately locked in safes. On Saturdays, however, no one usually goes to work after eight. was returning.

This time I did not receive permission to leave work either from Beria's secretary or from Merkulova and stayed in his office, only called home and warned that I would be late. My wife agreed to wait for me at home and fell asleep peacefully. While waiting for a call from the authorities, I began to look through the documents, but after six no mail or new messages arrived. There was only one call - from the commander of the border troops Maslennikov. He was visibly disappointed when I said that the Special Group would not be ready for action until in ten days. I knew that neither Beria nor Merkulov were there, but the secretariat was waiting for them. at any moment: they were summoned to the Master. I stayed in the office looking through the papers. I was overwhelmed by anxious thoughts, but it could not even occur to me what trouble would soon fall on all of us. Of course, I felt the threat of military provocation or conflict, but not was able to imagine its scale. I thought that no matter what the difficulties, we were able to control events.

At three o'clock in the morning the phone rang - Merkulov demanded that I immediately come to him to his office. There I found the heads of all leading departments. Merkulov officially announced to us that the war had begun: German troops had crossed our border. He is here He also ordered that the entire apparatus be called to work on an alarm signal. By nine in the morning, he declared, each head of the department should propose specific measures in accordance with the plan of action in the conditions of the outbreak of war.

Fitin arrived at about nine. In the conference room of the intelligence department, we held official meeting of employees, where they announced the beginning of

the war. There was no panic, but during the meeting, the remarks of the employees became laconic, and our real wits, especially Eitingon, refrained from their usual jokes.

## CHAPTER 6. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

### Agent and operational capabilities of Soviet intelligence before Hitler's attack

Soviet intelligence also made a significant contribution to the victory over fascism, but it also shares with the military-political leadership of the country the responsibility for miscalculations and mistakes made during the war. I will return to the events on the eve of the war.

What intelligence and operational capabilities did the Soviet special services have in this period? There is a perception that the intelligence and operational groups of the network Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (as the Main intelligence department - GRU) and the Foreign Department (INO) of the NKVD owned a reliable agents who had access to the highest echelons of the military command of the Wehrmacht and political leadership of Germany, and that the Soviet leadership ignored materials received from these sources about the preparation and immediate plans unleashing a war against the Soviet Union by Hitler. How was it in reality? The

intelligence department of the General Staff and the INO NKVD had important sources information with access to the leading circles of the German military command and political leadership, but did not have access to documents. Moreover, the received information from circles close to Hitler reflected hesitation in the German leadership the issue of making a final decision on the attack on the Soviet Union.

In the early and mid-30s, Berzin, Uritsky, Artuzov, Borovich (along the line

Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army), Slutsky, Shpigelglaz, Serebryansky, Kaminsky, Parparov, Eitingon (through the OGPU-NKVD) managed to create in Western Europe and on Far East (China-Japan) a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus, which had more than 300 sources of information. A special role in the creation of this apparatus was played by called illegal special agents: Arnold Deutsch (Lang), an Austrian who attracted to cooperation of the famous five of Kim Philby and others in England; Theodor Mali, a Hungarian former Catholic priest, worked in England and France; Boguslavsky, Pole, former intelligence officer of the Polish General Staff; Sandor Rado, Leopold Trepper, Richard Sorge, Ernst Wollweber. In 1942, contact was restored with a valuable agent under the pseudonym "Friend", who was brought to cooperation ten years ago, being the deputy chief Rem's stormtroopers. He was considered an influential person surrounded by aspiring to power Hitler. After the execution of Rem, "Friend" was kept by the German authorities in custody. Released in 1936, he was appointed political adviser to the chief military adviser to Nazi Germany at the headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek. He is there regularly met with Sorge. disavowing some of the materials transmitted by the latter. Directly the deputy chief of foreign intelligence of the NKVD for the Far East worked with the "Drug" Melnikov and V. Zarubin.

The fate of these people was different. Deutsch died in 1942 on a torpedoed German submarine Soviet transport going to England. Mali and Boguslavsky shot at the direction of Yezhov during the years of terror. Rado and Trepper, spoiling the nerves of the Germans "Red Chapel", ended up in the camps of the NKVD-MGB. Sorge was hanged by the Japanese. Wollweber headed intelligence, then the MGB of the GDR, but became a victim of Ulbricht's

intrigues. Mass repressions in 1937-1938 dealt a severe blow to our intelligence services, but intelligence activities continued. Although we have lost temporary connection with a number of valuable agents, agent networks in Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux countries are lucky. Sources of information in Germany (the Schulze-Boysen group - the headquarters of the Air Force, Harnack - the Ministry of Economics, Kuckhoff and Stebe - in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lehmann - the Gestapo) were attracted to cooperation by the illegal spouses Zarubins, a resident Belkin, illegal Parparov, agent Girshfeld, who escaped repression. Communication with supported by them on a regular basis. In addition to these sources, in 1940 they were added cooperating with us on the basis of trust and recruitment obligations the famous actress Olga Chekhova and Prince Janusz Radziwill, who had direct access to Goering. The NKVD resident Gudimovich, together with his wife Mordzhinskaya, managed to create in Warsaw a powerful group that closely monitored German troop movements and equipment to Poland in 1940-1941. We also had serious intelligence positions in Italy. Resident Rogatnev, "Titu", managed to attract the Count's nephew to cooperation Ciano, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mussolini's government. Among the persistent myths about the work of Soviet intelligence during the war years, especially after sensational TV series "Seventeen Moments of Spring", a widespread version of cooperation of Hitler's deputy for the party Bormann with Soviet intelligence. Not once rumors that Bormann was secretly taken to Moscow and buried on one of the Moscow cemeteries.

As you know, there is no smoke without fire. Although Bormann never collaborated with us, he, as well as Gestapo chief Müller, were constantly in the sphere of our attention.

When Bormann was still an unknown ordinary functionary of the Nazi Party and lived in 1930 in a modest boarding house near Vienna, with him supported "useful Acquaintance" Boris Afanasiev, a major illegal immigrant of our intelligence service.

Afanasiev's messages to the Center provided detailed descriptions and assessments Bormann's personality, proposals were made for its active development. But Afanasiev, to unfortunately, "lit up" in a number of our operations in the second half of the 1930s, and his attempts just before the war to restore useful contacts and former ties in Germany and Switzerland were not successful.

All rumors about Bormann's arrival in the USSR in May 1945 are pure speculation.

After the war, only a relatively short time in Moscow lived on a secret

apartment of the famous actress Olga Chekhova. From Beria, she was transferred directly to connection to Abakumov, who became Minister of State Security in 1946. With Abakumov she maintained a personal correspondence while in Germany until his arrest in July 1951. Back in 1937, our intelligence under the leadership of the deputy head of the INO NKVD Spiegelglaz obtained important documentary information about the operational-strategic games held by the command of the Reichswehr (later the Wehrmacht). These documents are destined was to play a significant role in the development of events and changing the actions of our leadership before the German-Soviet war. After the operational-strategic games conducted by von Seeckt and then by Blomberg, Seeckt's "testament" appeared, in which it was said that Germany could not win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for more than two months, and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, occupying at the same time the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.

I think that the results of the mentioned operational-strategic games were also one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative in 1939 to conclude a pact on non-aggression. It is significant, however, that probing approaches to the Soviet leadership in The Germans preferred to implement this idea not through intelligence, but through through diplomatic channels through his ambassador to Turkey, von Papen, as early as April 1939.

My duties included supervising the German direction of our intelligence, directly headed in 1938-1942 by a major of state security (later Major General) Zhuravlev. The leadership has always attached special importance to the German direction. importance. In 1940-1941, our residency in Berlin, although it was headed by Amayak Kobulov, an inexperienced worker, nevertheless acted actively.

Intelligence materials from Berlin, Rome, Tokyo, which is confirmed by archival documents now made public were regularly reported to the government. However the intelligence leadership was not aware that after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940 began secret negotiations with Germany. So the obvious inevitability military clash, at the same time, was combined with quite serious consideration Hitler's proposals on the delimitation of the spheres of geopolitical interests of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR.

Only now it is obvious to me that the probing conversations of Molotov and Schullenburg, the ambassador Germany in the USSR, in February - March 1941, reflected not only Hitler's attempt to introduce confuse Stalin and take him by surprise with sudden aggression, but also hesitations in German summit on the issue of war with the Soviet Union until the victory over England. received by us information and disinformation from a Latvian collaborating with the Gestapo reflected these hesitations. That is why even reliable sources, reporting on Hitler's decision to attack the USSR (reports of Harnack, Schulze-Boysen, wife of a prominent German diplomat (code name "Yun"), close to Ribbentrop) in September 1940 - May 1941, did not vouch for the reliability of the data obtained and with references to Goering were linked to one degree or another Hitler's impending aggression against the USSR with a possible armistice agreement with the English.

Unfortunately, the correct conclusion about the obvious preparation for war based on We connected the incoming information with the results of supposedly forthcoming German-Soviet negotiations at the highest level on territorial issues, and according to messages from England (Philby, Cairncross and others) and with a possible settlement of the issue to end the Anglo-German war. It's hard for me to judge how much Hitler seriously thought about negotiating with Stalin. It is remembered that there were also data on that Ribbentrop consistently, up to the final decision of Hitler, acted against a war with Russia, at least until the Anglo-German military confrontation.

Although Stalin was irritated with intelligence materials, at the same time he sought to use them to prevent war through secret diplomatic negotiations on territorial issues, and also - this was entrusted

directly to us - to bring to the German military circles information about the inevitability for Germany of a long war with Russia. The emphasis was on what we created a military-industrial base in the Urals, invulnerable to German attack.

Hitler made the final decision to attack on June 14, 1941, the next day after the Germans became aware of the TASS statement about the inconsistency of rumors about German-Soviet war. Interestingly, the TASS statement was first circulated in Germany and only on the second day it was published in Pravda.

Unfortunately, our intelligence, both military and political, having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determining the inevitability of an imminent war, did not predict the rate of the Nazi command on the tactics of blitzkrieg. It was a fatal mistake, because the blitzkrieg stake indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of end of the war with England. A major shortcoming of our intelligence work was weak formulation of the analysis of information received by undercover agents. persuasive proof of such a conclusion can be the fact that only in the course of the war and in the Intelligence Agency, and in NKVD departments were created in the system of intelligence departments for constant evaluation and processing intelligence information from foreign sources.

## **The beginning of the war, the deployment of sabotage work behind enemy lines**

On the very first day of the war, I was instructed to head the entire reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the German army through the Soviet authorities state security. For this, a special unit was formed in the NKVD - Special group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. By order of the People's Commissariat, my appointment as chief group was formalized on July 5, 1941. My deputies were Eitingon, Melnikov, Kakuchaya. Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Gudimovich, Orlov, Kiselev, Massya, Lebedev, Timashkov, Mordvinov became the heads of the leading directions in the fight against the German armed forces that invaded the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. Chiefs of all services and divisions of the NKVD, by order of the people's commissariat, were obliged to provide the Special Group assistance with people, equipment, weapons for the deployment of reconnaissance and sabotage work in the near and far rear of the German troops. The

main tasks of the Special Group were: conducting intelligence operations against Germany and its satellites, the organization of a partisan war, the creation of an agent network in the territories under German occupation, the management of special radio games from the German reconnaissance to misinform the enemy.

We immediately created a military unit of the Special Group - a separate special purpose motorized rifle brigade (OMSBON NKVD USSR), which was commanded in different times Gridnev and Orlov. By decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Comintern, all political emigrants who were in the Soviet Union were invited to join this union Special group of the NKVD. The brigade was formed in the first days of the war at the Dynamo stadium. Under at the beginning, we had more than twenty-five thousand soldiers and commanders, of which two thousand foreigners - Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Romanians. We had at our disposal the best Soviet athletes, including champions in boxing and athletics - they became the basis of sabotage formations sent to the front and thrown behind enemy lines. In October 1941,

the Special Group, due to the expanded scope of work, was reorganized into an independent 2nd department of the NKVD, still in direct subjugation of Beria. I continued to simultaneously remain the deputy chief overseas intelligence of the

NKVD. The war dramatically changed the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards intelligence work and incoming information. In 1942, an urgent reorganization of the intelligence agencies was carried out. The General Staff created two intelligence departments: one (headed by Kuznetsov) - for direct service of the needs of the fronts and Headquarters and other (Ilyichev) - for coordination of overseas intelligence in countries, including the United States, that did not become German occupation zones.

The 1st (intelligence) department of the NKVD was also divided into the 4th (former Special group, and then the 2nd department led by me) - for reconnaissance and sabotage work against the Germans and Japan, both on our territory and in the occupied countries of Europe and Middle East, and 1st (Fitin), the scope of which extended to the United States, England, Latin America, India, Australia. The Navy has its own Intelligence Directorate (Vorontsov) left without structural changes.

Independent department (Selivanovsky) for the deployment of agents and sabotage groups in the rear of the German armed forces was created in 1943 in the military counterintelligence SMERSH. The intelligence department also operated at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.

However, he performed mainly only coordinating functions, without conducting undercover intelligence in the rear of the German troops without interaction with military intelligence and counterintelligence. Some independence was shown only by activists of the party and the Komsomol, who for the most part they carried out propaganda work behind enemy lines. And yet they relied, as a rule, on the secret support of their activities through our military intelligence and the

NKVD. Important information obtained was reported to Stalin, and direct coordination intelligence work was carried out first by Molotov, then by Golikov, and at the end of the war by Beria. In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities, each intelligence agency created departments for processing and analyzing valuable information, which greatly facilitated the task Decision stakes.

At the beginning of the war, we experienced an acute shortage of qualified personnel. Me and Eitingon suggested that former intelligence officers and state security. Beria's cynicism and simplicity in deciding people's destinies were clearly manifested in his reaction to our proposal. Beria was not at all interested in whether they were guilty or those whom we have recommended for work are innocent. He asked one single question: "Are you sure we need them?" "Quite sure,"

I replied. - Then contact Kobulov, let

him release. And use them immediately. I got to view the case of the people I requested.

From them it followed that all were

arrested on the initiative and direct order of the top leadership - Stalin and Molotov. TO unfortunately, Shpigelglaz, Karin, Mali and other scouts by this time were already shot. After

their release, some of my close friends found themselves homeless in Moscow: their families were evicted from the capital. They all settled in my apartment, on Gorky Street, in the house where the Dynamo sports store was located. The floor above was the apartment of Merkulov, Beria's first deputy, who sometimes came down to me if he needed to discuss something urgent. Both of our apartments were also used as safe houses for meetings with foreign diplomats. It so happened that Merkulov called me just at the moment when my guests were sitting in the living room, and since he was about to come in to talk about urgent matters, I had to hide them in the bedroom in order to avoid meeting the people's commissar with recently released former "criminals". Of the four friends who lived in

my apartment, the most experienced employee was

Kaminsky - he stayed with me until he was sent to Zhitomir, behind German lines. In his pince-nez and three-piece suit, Kaminsky looked like a typical French businessman. Seeing him off, my wife could not hold back her tears. Kaminsky himself exuded optimism. According to him According to him, he is truly happy that he was again attracted to work. Interspersing your speech French jokes, in order to calm my wife a little, Kaminsky said that in order to it is a great success for him, even if he is destined to die. He was released immediately after landing in Zhitomir. This was done by a priest, an agent of the local NKVD, who, to this time already collaborated with the Gestapo. Kaminsky immediately felt the ambush set up on safe house, and shot himself. We learned about his fate three or four months later. Everyone who was next to him, were blocked and killed in a shootout. Other Chekists, released from prison and previously dismissed, began to work in the bodies, but with demotion. Most of them were sent at the head of special groups to the rear of

the Germans. Some of them died, but some - Medvedev and Prokopyuk - received the title Hero of the Soviet Union for successful partisan operations in the rear of the Germans.

The repressions of 1938-1939 taught me a lot: I was no longer so naive as to sign documents for the rehabilitation of my friends released from prison in

1941. My reputation had already been "tarnished by association with these people" arrested as public Enemies. In order to make their rehabilitation look objectively justified, I asked Fitin to sign the documents necessary for the return to service of people, especially relatives to me. This turned out to be a far-sighted step: in 1946 and 1953, when I was accused of being contributed to the liberation of my friends who were enemies of the people, I had the opportunity refer to Fitin's signature. In the fate of Serebryansky, my petition for his restoration to party in 1941 played a fatal role: in 1953 he was accused of avoiding capital punishment only thanks to the intercession of a traitor like me. He died in prison during interrogation by the investigator Tsaregradsky in 1956.

On June 26, 1941, I received another appointment to the post of Deputy Chief Headquarters of the NKVD to combat German paratroopers. In 1942, under my command handed over to a select unit of paratroopers. They were given a squadron transport aircraft and long-range bombers. Throughout the war we maintained close cooperation with the commander of long-range aviation Marshal Golovanov, Eitingon's close friend from the military academy.

The situation at the front after the German invasion developed, as you know, tragically. The power of the German tank armada exceeded all our preliminary data. The scale of the defeat of the Red Army in the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine was staggering. Before August, we undertook several sabotage operations to rescue parts of the Red Encircled armies, but our plans failed: these units turned out to be scattered and could no longer be a base for the deployment of guerrilla warfare.

Then, in cooperation with district and local party organizations, we began to send partisan formations to the rear of the Germans, including experienced intelligence officers and radio operators. During the war years, the Special Group - the 4th Directorate of the NKVD and its military formations, as follows from official documents, carried out responsible tasks of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (1941-1945), the Moscow Defense Headquarters (October-December 1941), Commander of the Western Front (1941-1943), Headquarters defense of the Main Caucasian Range (1942-1943), commander of the North Caucasian front (1942-1943), commander of the Transcaucasian Front (1942-1943), commander of the Central Front (1943), commander of the 1st Belorussian Front (1943-1944). In

the years war unit centered became main

reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the State Security agencies behind enemy lines. To him

plays an important role in initiating and deploying mass guerrilla

movement in the rear of the fascist army. In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and government "on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops" and in the first period of the war It was on the basis of the Fourth Departments of the NKVD that the first partisan detachments arose and fighter groups. In connection with the organization in 1942 of the Central Headquarters partisan movement, we placed at its disposal numerous detachments and groups. Our apparatus played a special role in organizing secret security mass partisan movement in Belarus, the Baltic States, Ukraine.

At the same time, as follows from the directive of the NKVD of the USSR of July 13, 1942, the headquarters partisan movement, reconnaissance and sabotage groups were not subject to transfer special forces operating behind enemy lines, intelligence agents, couriers and messengers, residents in the German rear, as well as correspondence on partisan formations (summaries, reports, reports, radiograms, etc.). It is this

enormous combat work, based on continuous slanderous fabrications and falsifications, they seek to distort the Waksbergs, Bobrenevs, Ryazantsevs, Petrovs and other detractors of the heroic struggle of our intelligence officers with fascism.

More than two thousand operational groups with a total number of fifteen thousand people were sent to the rear of the enemy. Twenty-three of our officers received the highest government award - they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. More than eight thousand people were awarded orders and medals. Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky specifically appealed to the NKVD with a request to provide them with detachments from the 4th Directorate of the NKVD to destroy enemy communications and support the offensive operations of the Red Army in Belarus, Poland and the Caucasus. Units of the 4th Directorate and a separate special-purpose motorized rifle brigade destroyed 157 thousand German soldiers and officers, liquidated 87 high-ranking German officials, exposed and neutralized 2045 enemy agent groups. Eitingon and I were entrusted with directing all these operations. In the history of the NKVD, this is perhaps the only chapter that his successors continue to be proud of. At all official events dedicated to the next anniversary of the battle of Moscow or Stalingrad, as well as the liberation of Belarus, the names of partisans and underground fighters who were under our command are always mentioned. Kuznetsov, Medvedev, Prokopyuk, Vaupshasov, Karasev, Mirkovsky, Prudnikov, Shikhov, Kudrya, Lyagindla - our people, heroes of resistance to fascism in the occupied territories.

From 1945 to 1992, we published about five thousand books and articles about the military operations of the Special Group and the 4th Directorate in the Great Patriotic War. During these years I was in active service, then I was arrested, imprisoned, finally released from prison and rehabilitated. And you will not find my name in any of these publications. Where my signature was on the documents, an ellipsis appeared. At first I was not mentioned for reasons of secrecy, and later my name was withdrawn because I was a convicted felon and an unwanted witness. I will not dwell on the well-known exploits of the soldiers

and officers who fought with me during the war years. In the collections under my editorship, published in 1970-1992, more than three thousand names of heroes who fought in a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes are named. And here I would like to dwell on the most important operations of Soviet intelligence, to talk about the heroes of the secret war, about whom little is known, but who played a significant role in the military-political events of that time.

### **Legendary Kuznetsov**

A significant contribution to our reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines was made by a partisan formation under the command of Colonel Medvedev. He was the first to get in touch with Otto Skorzeny, the head of the special operations of the Nazi security service. Medvedev and Kuznetsov established that German sabotage groups were training their people in the foothills of the Carpathians in order to prepare and attack the American and Soviet embassies in Tehran, where the first Big Three conference was to be held in 1943. A group of militants Skorzeny was trained near Vinnitsa, where Medvedev's partisan detachment was operating. It was here, on the territory occupied by the Nazis, that Hitler placed a branch of his Headquarters. Our young employee Nikolai Kuznetsov, under the guise of a senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, established friendly relations with an officer of the German intelligence service, Oster, who was just busy looking for people with experience in fighting Russian partisans. He needed these people for an operation against the Soviet high command. Having owed Kuznetsov, Oster offered to pay him off with Iranian carpets, which he was going to bring to Vinnitsa from a business trip to Tehran. This message, immediately transmitted to Moscow, coincided with information from other sources and helped us prevent actions in Tehran against the Big Three. Kuznetsov (code name "Pukh") personally eliminated several governors

of the German administration in Galicia. These acts of retribution against the organizers of terror against the Soviet people were committed by him with unparalleled courage in broad daylight on the streets of Rovno and Lvov. Dressed in a German military uniform, he boldly approached the enemy, announced the death sentence and fired at point-blank range. Each carefully prepared action of this kind

insured by the combat support group. Once he was received by Hitler's assistant Gauleiter Erich Koch, head of the administration of Poland and Galicia. Kuznetsov was supposed to kill him. But when Koch told Kuznetsov to return to his unit as soon as possible, because a major offensive was to begin near Kursk in the next ten days, Kuznetsov decided not to kill Koch in order to be able to immediately return to Medvedev and transmit an urgent radiogram to Moscow.

On the instructions of the Headquarters, Kuznetsov's information about the preparation by the Germans of a strategic offensive operation was rechecked and confirmed by the scouts Aleksakhin and Vorobyov sent by us to the occupied Orel. Various rumors circulate

around Kuznetsov's personality, casting doubt on the fact that he could have successfully played the role of a German officer for so long. I heard that he was sent to Germany even before the start of the war. Activists of Memorial, an organization that unites Gulag prisoners, tried to associate his name with repressions against Germans deported to Kazakhstan from Siberia and the Volga region. Kuznetsov had nothing to do with this. As I said earlier, he was Russian, originally from Siberia, knew the German language well and spoke it fluently, because he lived among the Germans living there. He was recruited by the local NKVD and in 1939 was sent to Moscow to study. He was trained individually as a special agent for possible use against the German embassy in Moscow. Handsome, blond, he could pass for a German, that is, a Soviet citizen of German origin. He had a network of informers among Moscow artists. As an actor, he was introduced to some foreign diplomats. Gradually, the German embassy workers began to pay attention to an interesting young man of typical Aryan appearance, with a well-established reputation as a connoisseur of ballet. It was led by Raikhman, deputy head of the counterintelligence department, and Ilyin, state security commissar for work with the intelligentsia. Kuznetsov, performing their tasks, always received maximum information not only from diplomatic workers, but also from friends whom he made among artists and writers. The personal file of agent Kuznetsov contains information about him as a lover of most of the Moscow ballet stars, some of them in the interests of the business he

shared with German diplomats.

Kuznetsov participated in operations to intercept German diplomatic mail, since from time to time diplomatic couriers stayed at the Metropol and National hotels, and not at the German embassy. Using his diplomatic connections, Kuznetsov was able to warn us about when the diplomatic couriers were going to arrive and when it would be possible for our agents, stationed in these hotels and equipped with the necessary photographic equipment, to quickly reshoot the documents. In 1942, Kuznetsov was abandoned in the Rivne region. He appeared there in the form of a

German quartermaster officer. According to the legend developed by us, Kuznetsov was allegedly on wounded leave, and he was instructed to organize the delivery of food and warm clothes for his division located near Leningrad. He posed as a German who lived for several years in the Baltic states, where he was mobilized. According to him, he returned to Germany only in 1940 as a repatriate. There was a war going on, the movement of people was very intense, it would take a long time for the Abwehr or the Gestapo to verify his identity. Kuznetsov was handed over to me by Ilyin. Documents for his work in the German rear were prepared by the Austrian Miller and his student Gromushkin. Our operative Okun actively participated in the preparation of Kuznetsov for operations behind German lines. I spent many hours with Kuznetsov preparing for future assignments. I remember him as a man of rare talent to remain calm when performing combat missions, realistic and reasonable in his actions. But gradually he began to believe very much in his luck and made a fatal mistake, trying to cross the front line to meet with units of the Red Army. Kuznetsov and his people were captured by Bandera, who collaborated with the Germans. This happened in 1944 in one of the villages near Lvov. Our investigation showed that Kuznetsov blew himself up with a hand grenade: in the archives of the Gestapo, we found a telegram in which the Bandera people informed the Gestapo about the capture of a group of Red Army officers, one of whom was dressed in a German uniform. Bandera believed that this man, who was killed in a shootout, was



precisely to those whom the German special service had been unsuccessfully looking for all this time. The Germans were handed over some fake documents made by us in the name of the chief lieutenant Paul Siebert (Kuznetsov's pseudonym), and part of Kuznetsov's report to the Center with a message striking details of the destruction of high-ranking German representatives on Ukraine. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Since Kuznetsov unmarried, his brother accepted the award. In 1991, Kuznetsov would have turned eighty years. I spoke at an evening dedicated to his memory at the KGB club.

Operations carried out by guerrilla battle groups sometimes took on a strategic importance and played an important role in the disorganization of rear communications, when in 1944 launched our offensive in Belarus. These operations are known as "Rail War", or "Concert". On the eve of our offensive in Belarus, we disabled the main railway supply lines of the German army.

## Defense of Moscow

The partisans of a separate special-purpose brigade also had a very significant assistance to units of the Red Army during the battle near Moscow. When the Germans approached the capital in the autumn of 1941, our separate brigade was given the task, no matter what, began to protect the center of Moscow and the Kremlin. Our people took positions in the House of Unions, in close proximity to the Kremlin. At this critical moment for the fate of the capital, our the brigade was, perhaps, the only combat formation that had sufficient the number of mines and the people capable of placing them. By direct order of the General Staff and Zhukov personally, we mined the distant and near approaches to Moscow, and our the motorized unit helped eliminate German motorcyclists and armored personnel carriers that broke through to the bridge across the Moscow River near Sheremetyevo Airport. Closer to this place The Germans were no longer able to get to Moscow. Today there stand in memory of those days huge anti-tank gouges are a symbol of the courage of the defenders of the

capital. In case the Germans managed to capture the city, our brigade mined in Moscow, a number of buildings where meetings of the German high command could be held, and also important structures both in the capital and around it. We mined several government dachas near Moscow (among them, however, there was no Stalin's dacha). With our young employee Igor Shchors, who joined the NKVD in 1940, Maklyarsky and I instructed him, provided him with documents and got him a job as chief engineer of water management in the suburbs of Moscow, not far from Stalin's dacha. When occupation of the area by the Germans, he was to use the water supply system and sewers for sabotage and hiding agents. As a result of the bombing water pipes turned out to be damaged, and this interfered with the normal supply of water to the cottage Stalin. Shchors supervised the repair work carried out by the security staff, the accident managed to quickly liquidate in three hours. He was awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor, but to receive he could not get this award, since it was awarded to a person whose documents Shchors used for a job, and at that time it was impossible to reveal his real name. In 1945 Shchors was sent to Bulgaria, where he was supposed to ensure the extraction and shipment of uranium to Soviet Union for our nuclear industry. After my arrest in

1953, I learned that I was also accused of what I planned use mines planted in government dachas to destroy Soviet leaders. Investigators said the mines could be set off remote control on the orders of Beria to destroy Stalin's successors. All this was a crude invention. In

October 1941, Moscow was in serious danger, Beria ordered us organize an intelligence network in the city after its capture by the Germans. Our families were evacuated, as well as most of the apparatus of the NKVD. We moved from Lubyanka to fire school premises in the northern suburbs of Moscow, near the headquarters Comintern. I was sitting in a room with Serov, Chernyshev and Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputies, using this reserve NKVD command post set up by

in case of hostilities in the city, if the Germans broke through our defenses.

In Moscow, we have created three independent intelligence networks. One my old friend from Ukraine, major Drozdov, was in charge (later he received the rank of general). For the purpose of conspiracy, he was made deputy head of the pharmacy department of Moscow. He in the event of the occupation of Moscow, was supposed to supply medicines to the German command and enter him in confidence. In Moscow, he was not known, since he was appointed deputy chief Moscow police just a few months before the start of the war. A lot of work on preparing the Moscow underground and mobilizing our agents to counter German sabotage in Moscow was carried out by Fedoseev, head of the counterintelligence department NKVD administration in Moscow. On our line, Maklyarsky and Massya were responsible for this work. One of the underground workers that Beria chose was Meshik - in 1953 he was shot along with Beria. In addition to these two agent networks, we have created another autonomous group that was supposed to destroy Hitler and his entourage if they appeared in Moscow after its capture. This operation was entrusted to the composer Knipper, brother of Olga Chekhova, and his wife Marina Garikovna. Should have led the underground Fedotov - Head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKVD.

Various books, in particular Khrushchev's memoirs, speak of Stalin's panic in the early days of the war. For my part, I can say that I did not observe anything similar. Stalin did not take refuge in his dacha. Published entries in the Kremlin journal visitors show that he regularly received people and directly followed worsening day by day situation. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin hosted Kremlin Beria and Merkulov two or three times a day. They usually returned to the NKVD late in the evening, and sometimes transmitted their orders directly from the Kremlin. It seemed to me that the mechanism of command and control over the execution of orders worked without any failures. AND Eitingon and I lived with a deep faith in the final victory over the Germans, which in no small measure was explained by the calm, business-like manner in which daily leadership was carried out from above.

I must say that sometimes it was extremely difficult to carry out the orders received. When in October 1941 I was summoned to Beria's office, where Malenkov was, and ordered mine the most important structures in Moscow and on the outskirts of it, such as the main railway stations, defense industry facilities, some residential buildings, some metro stations and the Dynamo stadium, explosives had to be ready in twenty-four hours. We worked around the clock to fulfill the order. A Malenkov and Beria at that time, without rest, calmly, in a businesslike manner, worked in the NKVD on Lubyanka.

On November 6, 1941, I received an invitation to a solemn meeting dedicated to October revolution. Traditionally, these meetings were held at the Bolshoi Theatre, but this once for security reasons - on the platform of the Mayakovskaya metro station. We went down the escalator and out onto the platform. On one side was an electric train with open doors, where there were tables with sandwiches and soft drinks. At the end platform was a platform for members of the Politburo. The

government arrived by train from the other side of the platform. Stalin got out of the car accompanied by Beria and Malenkov. The meeting was opened by the Chairman of the Moscow Council Pronin. Stalin spoke for about half an hour. His speech had a profound effect on me. impression: the firmness and confidence of the leader convinced us of our ability to resist enemy. The next day, the traditional parade took place on Red Square, which took place from great enthusiasm, despite the heavy snowfall. There was a stamp on my pass "Access everywhere", which meant that I could also go to the main tribune of the Mausoleum, where Soviet leaders hosting the parade.

Beria and Merkulov warned me that in case of emergency, I must immediately report to them by ascending the Mausoleum. The situation was actually critical: the advanced units of the Germans were very close to the city. Among operational workers serving the parade were young Fisher, head of the communications department of our service, and a radio operator with all necessary equipment. We kept in constant contact with the headquarters of the brigade defending Moscow. The snowfall was so heavy that the Germans could not

send planes to bomb Red Square. Order to the troops participating in parade, was clear: no matter what happens, remain calm and maintain discipline. This parade further strengthened our faith in the ability to defend Moscow and, in the end, defeat the enemy.

### **Sorge. "Red Chapel" in the rear of the Nazis**

Even during these alarming hours for the country, we were looking for the enemy's weak points in order to turn the tide of events in our favor. We received valuable information from Count Nelidov, a former officer in the tsarist and white armies, a major double agent for the Abwehr and the English intelligence. On the instructions of Canaris, Count Nelidov also took part in strategic military "Games" of the German General Staff in 1936-1937. On the eve of the German invasion of Poland (he was in Warsaw on a reconnaissance mission) she was arrested by the Polish counterintelligence. Capturing Western Ukraine in 1939, we found him in the Lvov prison and brought him to Moscow. Nelidov was developed by Vasily Zarubin, Zoya Rybkina and Pavel Zhuravlev, head German direction of intelligence of the NKVD. In 1941-1942, Nelidov was planned used in counteraction to agents of British intelligence, who settled in Moscow. Then Nelidov's testimony about the main installation of the Abwehr in reconnaissance and sabotage Zhuravlev, Rybkina and I did not give due importance. However, the situation changed dramatically after our defeats in the first days and months of war. It was then that we returned to the first interrogations of Nelidov. His testimony compared with the materials received in 1937 from Shpigelglaz about military-strategic "games" in the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, and the rate of the Germans on the blitzkrieg became obvious for all. Stalin's reaction to our message was immediate. For deployed interrogations of Nelidov and familiarization with all operational documents of the 30s in the NKVD the head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army Golikov and the head of the operational department arrived General Staff Major General Vasilevsky. They were greatly impressed by his awareness, communication and characterization of the mood of the German high command.

Nelidov said that the Germans could defeat us only if the war will go on for two or three months. But if during this time they do not take over Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Donbass, the North Caucasus and, of course, Baku with its oil, the German invasion is doomed to failure. Lots of tanks and motorized formations needed for a blitzkrieg could operate effectively only in a territory with a fairly developed network of roads, and for waging a protracted war, the Germans did not have a reserve of fuel, especially for the ships of the German fleet, and in particular submarine.

In October and November 1941 we received reliable information from Berlin that the German army almost ran out of ammunition, oil and gasoline to continue active offensive operations. Everything pointed to the imminent pause in German offensive. This data was transmitted by Arvid Harnack (codename "Corsican"), an anti-fascist, adviser to the German Ministry of Economics. Member of a prominent family of writers and philosophers, he was recruited during his visit to the Soviet Union in 1932 and from then on supplied information to Soviet intelligence for a decade, until he exposed. In December 1942 he was tried and hanged. His wife, American Mildred Fish Harnack, whom he met while studying at the University of Wisconsin, was also arrested and executed in 1945 for anti-fascist activities. In March 1939,

when I became deputy chief of intelligence for the NKVD, one of my the main tasks were the introduction of illegal immigrants in Western Europe and the creation of an agent network associated with the Germans, who had diplomatic cover. This was especially true Germany, which was the focus of all our work. After the repressions of 1937-1938, new people began to deal with German affairs in intelligence, and our contacts with agents were temporarily interrupted. It was decided to sharply intensify these contacts. The flight of Alexander Orlov in 1938 cast suspicion on the leading cadres foreign department; Shpigelglaz, Mali, Belkin, Serebryansky and others were arrested

employees who controlled our intelligence networks in Western Europe, which is essential made it difficult to obtain intelligence information. When I took over this section, I new and often inexperienced people had to be sent abroad. As a result, from November From 1938 to March 1939, the flow of intelligence from Western Europe dropped sharply. The decision taken by Beria and Stalin in 1939 to open a special intelligence school for training meant that the first specialists we We'll get it no sooner than two years from now. Meanwhile, the need for these personnel was becoming more acute. We desperately needed new people. The situation grew tense every day: Hitler was preparing to seize Poland. Prospects for unleashing war in Europe became more and more clear. Stalin demanded from Beria details about the German combat formations and strategic plans of Berlin. Since the people who used to be in charge of the intelligence network in Western Europe (Orlov in Spain, Krivitsky in Holland, Reiss and Steinberg in Switzerland), or steel defectors, or were subjected to repression, it was extremely difficult to convince Beria and Merkulov to take risks and activate those structures that they used to led. Fortunately, not everyone involved in the selection and recruitment of agents was repressed. Some, such as Lang, Parparov, Fischer-Abel and Girshfeld, were temporarily listed in the active reserve while their future fate was decided at the top. IN Our people were still in Berlin and Paris. Resumed its activity the Cambridge group, contrary to fears that it was exposed by Orlov, who had defected to the West. IN in the end we managed to convince Fitin that we should still take risks and restore their old undercover connections, no matter how dangerous it may be. We reported to him about our Beria's decision - and he supported us. The difficult decision to restore interrupted six months of contacts with our agents were nevertheless accepted, although we feared that for this the time of some may already have been seized and recruited. But it was the end of April 1940, and the specter of war on the horizon grew ever clearer.

I remember that it was then at the Center that the fate of Kim Philby was decided. When from London requested permission for his transfer to the headquarters of British intelligence, I personally agreed on the condition that he himself voluntarily decide on a "double game", taking into account special risk.

Philby's transition to operational work in Soviet intelligence not only put him in difficult position. The question of trusting him, as the most important source of information about the enemy's intentions.

In intelligence, there is a procedure for mandatory rechecking of all reports from sources recruited among the apparatus of the enemy's special services. Philby, in particular, reporting on the data available to British intelligence about the conversations of the British ambassador in Moscow Krips with Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky and about the telegram-oriented English embassies to the British Foreign Office on 15 and 28 March 1941 did not fully conveyed the contents of these documents. Data was not given in the presentation of the telegram about agreed British and American steps to maintain relations with the Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, more extensive information on these issues came from McLean - an employee of the British Foreign Office. Analyst intelligence department of the NKVD lieutenant colonel Mordzhinskaya, later in the 1960-1970s prominent philosopher, professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, in his conclusion suspected Philby of insincerity and participation in the disinformation operation of the English intelligence. Philby walked and worked under the shadow of these suspicions for years. How do I told in the Center, in Moscow, even in the 1960s, he initially passed humiliating loyalty checks.

Vasilevsky was sent to France as the new head of our residency, who was supposed to restore the decayed ties. To Germany, Finland, Poland and Czechoslovakia was assigned a group of officers. It took them about half a year to check the condition and reliability of our intelligence network, which has not been contacted lately. no contact was made.

In 1939-1940 we restored ties and began active work. Created

military intelligence and the NKVD, an underground network known as the "Red Chapel" operated in during most of the Second World War. Agents of the "Red Chapel" broadcast on the radio coded messages to the Center.

A few words about how all this was carried out in practice. military intelligence had its own agent network in Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland and operated regardless of the NKVD. In 1938-1939, before the start of the war, the military found themselves sufficiently far-sighted and sent two employees to France and Belgium - Trepper and Gurevich - together with radio operators to work in wartime conditions. In this period the military also had its own illegal residency in Switzerland, led by a former worker of the Hungarian section of the Comintern Sandor Rado and Ursula Kuczynska (code name "Sonya"), later, in 1941, who became a liaison between us and the German physicist Klaus Fuchs, who worked in England. In

preparation for a resident? to operational activities in Western Europe in the conditions military operations and the transition to an illegal position, serious mistakes were made. The spy network of Trepper, Gurevich and Rado was too closely connected with sources Jewish nationality, which made her vulnerable to the German secret services. The leadership of the Intelligence Agency, as well as the INO NKVD, neglected proper training radio operators to maintain communication in war conditions. On the eve of the war, the NKVD managed to create powerful intelligence network in Germany, led by Amayak Kobulov, Korotkov and Zhuravlev. At military intelligence in Germany also had important agents - Ilse Stebe in the press department Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rudolf Shelia, a high-ranking German diplomat.

In June 1941, when Germany attacked the USSR, our intelligence had no centralized control over all intelligence networks that sent us their messages are independent of each other. The Red Army Intelligence Directorate was better prepared to switch from couriers and diplomatic bags to clandestine radio broadcasts: the agents had the necessary equipment. It was only in April 1941 that we sent to residency in Western Europe, an indication of preparation for work in a close war. Amayak Kobulov and Korotkov, who were in Europe, were ordered to speed up the training of radio operators and provide them with reliable equipment, as well as create duplicate radio apartments.

Schulze-Boysen ("Sergeant Major"), Harnack ("Corsican") and Kukhof ("Old Man") are bad instructed by Kobulov and Korotkov, violated an elementary rule conspiracies: maintained a linear relationship. In addition, all three agents had one

radio operator

In October 1941, having lost contact due to poor-quality equipment and unskilled work of radio operators of our agents in Berlin, military intelligence intelligence and the NKVD made an unforgivable mistake. A resident in Brussels, Gurevich ("Kent"), received a cipher telegram on the radio, according to which he was to leave for Berlin with a radio transmitter. He handed it over to the Corsican and the Petty Officer. Upon return to Brussels "Kent" confirmed by radio the successful completion of the mission and reported to Moscow, information received in Berlin about the difficulties that the Germans are experiencing in supply and replenishment of reserves, on a realistic assessment by the German command the failure of the blitzkrieg, about a possible enemy offensive in the spring and summer of 1942 with the aim of mastery of our oil fields. Such valuable

information, transmitted in November 1941 and confirmed three years later months, were reported to the government, but, unfortunately, did not play their due roles, in view of the fact that on December 13, 1941, the radio operator and cipher "Kent" with the codes were captured by German counterintelligence and the Gestapo was not a big deal in 1942 after brief development to arrest the leaders of the "Red Chapel" in Berlin and other cities Western Europe. On

August 5, 1942, we dropped two of our paratrooper agents into Germany, Arthur Hessler and Albert Barth. But the Germans were already keeping a group under surveillance, in touch with which they were sent, and they were arrested. Hessler died in the Gestapo, and Bartha the Germans recruited, and he began to play a radio game with us, which, by the way, we immediately figured out. In during the interrogation, Bart uncovered our agent Willy Lehman ("Breitenbach"), who

cooperated with us since 1935. Leman was a member of the Gestapo and supplied us with extremely important information. In 1935-1941, he handed over to us the most important materials on the developments of the Gestapo for the introduction of agents among Russian emigrants and in the communist underground. We also learned from Lehmann which sources of Polish counterintelligence were recruited and used by the Germans after the exposure of the Polish resident Sosnowski in Berlin in 1936. In addition, the latter fell into our hands in 1939 and gave a detailed orientation on the capabilities of the Polish agents in Germany.

Leman was arrested on the street and secretly, without trial, executed. The Gestapo informed the wife that her husband had disappeared and was being intensively searched for. After the war, we found only his Registration Card in the archives of the Plötzensee prison in Berlin - there are no other traces of him left. Leman during the war years was the only officer of the Gestapo who collaborated with us.

In the archives of the Gestapo, we found information about the "Red Chapel". And although Bart's name appears there, Leman is not even mentioned. Perhaps this is due to the unwillingness to cast a shadow on the Gestapo, in the ranks of which was a Soviet agent. I do not rule out that the Gestapo was afraid to report this to Hitler. Bart was taken prisoner by the British and handed over to us in 1946. He was taken to Moscow, tried and shot for treason. A few words

about the work of the Sorge ("Ramsay") group in Tokyo. The information coming through this line from the circles of Prime Minister Konoe and the statements of the German Ambassador Ott were treated with some distrust in Moscow. And the point was not only that Sorge was recruited by the subsequently repressed Berzin and Borovich, who led the Red Army Intelligence Department in the 1920s and 1930s. Even before the arrest of Borovich, the direct curator of Sorge, the latter received permission from the top leadership to cooperate with German military intelligence in Japan. He received permission, but at the same time he fell under suspicion, since such special agents are traditionally not trusted and are regularly rechecked in all special services. In 1937, the acting head of the Intelligence Agency Gendin, in his message to Stalin, emphasizing the double game of the valuable agent Sorge, who also obtained information for Ott, a resident of the German Abwehr in Tokyo, concluded that the said agent could not enjoy full confidence as a source of information. The tragedy of Sorge was that his heroic work and the information coming from him were not used by our command. Exceptionally important data about Japan's forthcoming attack on the United States, about

Japan's non-alignment with the German aggression against the USSR in September-October 1941, remained in our archives. And the divisions from the Far East were transferred to Moscow in October 1941 only because Stalin did not have other reserve combat formations ready for battle. If Sorge's information was taken into account, then it did not play a significant role in the decision. From 1941 to 1945, reports that the Japanese did not intend to fight with us regularly came from our trusted agents who held the positions of adviser to the Japanese embassy in Moscow and head of the gendarmerie service of the Kwantung Army, who transmitted to us documentary data on the deployment of Japanese formations in Manchuria. Among other things, we were able to decipher the correspondence between the Japanese embassy in Moscow and Tokyo, from which it followed that the invasion of the USSR in October 1941 by Japan was not planned. Sorge's behavior during the investigation after his arrest by the Japanese authorities caused serious irritation in Moscow. He violated the main directive of Soviet intelligence: never recognize espionage in any form in favor of the Soviet Union. Although the practice of exchanging arrested agents and intelligence officers in the 1930s was very limited, it was nevertheless occasionally used. The

Poles, for example, freed our illegal Fedichkin in 1930, the Americans freed Ovakimyan, the resident of the NKVD in New York, in September 1941. The leadership of the Intelligence Agency, in view of Sorge's confessions, did not raise the question of his possible exchange to anyone. By August 1942, the "Red Chapel" in Berlin, which included agents of military intelligence and the NKVD, was destroyed. But in Germany, a number of important sources of information and agents of influence survived. Some agents of the Hamburg group created by Serebryansky and Eitingon, not associated with the Harnack-Schulze-Boysen group and settled in concerns

"Farben industry" and "Thyssen" in the port of Hamburg survived and went underground. escaped the arrest of the agent "Yuna", who settled in the department of Ribbentrop - the German Foreign Ministry; were not compromised Olga Chekhova and the Polish prince Janusz Radziwill. However, there were no reliable links with them. Our two agents are Swedish entrepreneur Strinberg ("Gustav") and the popular actor Karl Gerhard ("Chansonnier") were only suitable for the role couriers. Strinberg's trips to Germany turned out to be of little effect, and Gerhard soon the Germans revealed, since he did not hide his anti-Hitler sentiments. agent network in France and Switzerland continued to work.

## Double game of British intelligence using the "Red Chapel" in the fascist rear

In early 1941, Vasilevsky created a network of illegal immigrants in France. The main figure on Colonel Schmidt, a senior officer of the Abwehr cipher service, was in contact with them. Vasilevsky learned that Schmidt had been recruited by French intelligence in the early 1930s. The French communists who helped Vasilevsky's people established that Schmidt was also worked for the British intelligence service. The name of the English agent with whom Schmidt supported contact in France, McLean told us back in 1939. From the nature of the materials given by Schmidt to Vasilevsky, we realized that the British regularly intercept and deciphering German radio messages. The Germans tracked down Schmidt's suspicious connections, and he disappeared

without a trace. Hundreds of radiograms to Moscow from the "Red Chapel" from Switzerland for the period from July 1941 to October 1943 contained the most valuable information: the orders of the German Supreme command, information about the movement of troops and a lot of operational details of combat actions. This information was passed on by Rudolf Ressler ("Lucy"), but he stubbornly refused to name its source to the Soviet illegal resident Shandor Rado.

Ressler, a German émigré, met Rado when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. He made it clear that he considered Rado connected with Soviet intelligence, and suggested that he pass information from German military circles. Knowing this, we decided that "Lucy" was just trying to keep secret his source - an agent in the German General Staff.

In fact, Ressler passed on to us the information he received from the British. British intelligence knew about the work of the Rado group, since on the eve of the war they introduced his agent in the "Red Chapel" in Switzerland. Through diplomatic channels in London The British did not transmit this information through the British liaison mission in Moscow, fearing that we would not believe it and demand that we name the source. We did not know then that the British had an analogue of the German Enigma cipher machine, which I assembled in 1938 for British intelligence service, a Polish engineer who previously worked on a German secret the manufacturer of these machines. The British kept it a closely guarded secret. the existence of "Enigma", which gave them the opportunity to decipher German radio messages. Information about her came to us in 1945 from Philby and Cairncross. Stalin did not trust

the British, and there were reasons for this. When we compared intelligence from our agents in Switzerland and London, then saw their striking coincidence. However, the information from London from the Cambridge group was more complete, and from group "Lucy" obviously edited. It was clear that Luci's information was dosed and edited by British intelligence agencies.

Our London residency was periodically supplied with decrypted radiograms John Cairncross, who worked at the British cipher center Bletchley Park. Later, talking with my friend Kukin - he was a resident in London from 1943 to 1947 and led the Cambridge group - we recognized that the contribution of Cairncross to our common cause and the materials received from him were of great value for the disclosure of German operational plans. The decrypted material from Cairncross had no only military value, but also allowed us to trace the penetration of the English special services to the Rado

group. In the spring of 1943, a few weeks before the start of the Battle of Kursk, our residency in

London received information from the Cambridge group on specific targets planned German offensive, codenamed Operation Citadel. IN this message indicated the number of German divisions that were supposed to be used, and emphasized that the operation "Citadel" was aimed at Kursk, and not at Velikie Luki, that is not to the west, but to the south-west of Moscow - there we did not expect a German offensive. NKVD sent this information to the Soviet Supreme High Command on May 7, 1943. The message from London contained more detailed and precise plans for the German offensive than received through military intelligence from "Lucy" from Geneva. It became quite clear to the leaders of military intelligence and the NKVD that the British were passing us dosed information, but at the same time they want us to thwart the German offensive. From this we concluded that they were interested not so much in our victory as in prolonging the fighting, which would lead to the exhaustion of the forces of both sides.

At the beginning of 1943, the head of military intelligence, General Ilyichev, sent a letter to NKVD and to General Selivanovskiy, deputy head of military counterintelligence SMERSH, with the message that the German special services had penetrated the Red Chapel. From agent to Brussels Gurevich (Kent) received an encrypted warning: he works under German control. It was decided to continue these radio games with the Germans. autumn 1943, radio operators of the Red Chapel were arrested in Geneva and Lausanne, but we are still continued to receive information from London from our resident Kukin, who replaced Gorsky.

British intelligence has not yet acknowledged the transfer of our agent network to Switzerland edited transcribed information. In Moscow, however, always with suspicious of the "Red Chapel". Her heroic activity in Germany, France and Switzerland did not bring laurels in the eyes of the authorities to either the NKVD intelligence or Intelligence Agency of the Red Army. No one took her job as a priority because the deciphered orders of the Germans transmitted by the British did not contain indisputable data based on original documents, but based on oral information sources.

The Red Chapel is still regarded in the West as the main source intelligence information that entered the Soviet Union during the war years, on the very same In fact, this information was of secondary importance for us. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that its agents acted with great courage and high professionalism and many of they died heroic deaths. The leaders of the "Red Chapel" Trepper ("Big chief"), Gurevich ("Little Chief", or "Kent") and Rado ("Dora") in the Red Army Intelligence Agency considered traitors. Trepper and Rado tried to hide from the Soviet authorities; their search and sent to Moscow by the British. In Moscow they were arrested and imprisoned for Lubyanka.

Trepper and Rado spent ten years in prison before being released and rehabilitated in the late 1950s. In their memoirs, they presented Gurevich as traitor, but it was he who captured, recruited and delivered to us in Moscow in 1945 Chief Investigator of the Gestapo, involved in the case of the "Red Chapel". When Gurevich was captured by the Gestapo in November 1942, he managed to send a radio message warning that henceforth he is under the control of the Germans, and one of the instructions he received from us obligated him to continue radio games, which he did. As soon as the war was over, Gurevich managed to convince the Gestapo officer Heinz Pannwitz, who was in charge of the Red Chapel case, to make contact with us. According to Gurevich, it will be valuable for Soviet intelligence acquisition because it has information that allows us to identify those who sympathized with us, and those who were our enemy. This, he said, would provide Pannwitz amnesty and work in the Soviet security agencies. Shocked by defeat Germany, Pannwitz accepted Gurevich's proposal for a secret meeting with a Russian representative. He was detained and, together with Gurevich, was immediately taken to Moscow.

Pannwitz's revelations, however, had only limited interest in the eyes of the leadership. intelligence. The wide popularity of Pannwitz in the West ruled out the possibility of using it for our active operations. Because he could report those Gestapo informants,



whom we, together with British intelligence, were still looking for, it was decided not to liquidate him and keep him in prison. Trepper, Rado and Gurevich shared it fate: they survived only because their testimony might be needed in further. After ten years in prison, Pannwitz was repatriated to Germany.

Since 1946, Rado and Trepper have claimed that the failure of the Red Chapel was due to treason. Gurevich. After Stalin's death in 1953, as I was told, the veterans of the Comintern petitioned for the rehabilitation of Rado and Trepper. Their case was reviewed, and in 1955 with they were cleared of the charge of treason, although the Intelligence Department of the General Staff objected, putting forward against them and their accusations - violation of the rules of secrecy and unauthorized spending money. Gurevich was released in 1955 under an amnesty for those accused of cooperation with the Germans, but not rehabilitated.

Gurevich personally turned to Khrushchev with a request to look into his case, but the KGB and the military intelligence stood their ground, deliberately making him the scapegoat for the failure of the "Red chapels". According to a special certificate prepared by the heads of the KGB intelligence Sakharovsky and Korotkov, in 1958 Gurevich was arrested again. Arrest warrant signed Serov, who by that time had become the head of the KGB, and Prosecutor General Rudenko. Gurevich sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, but under the new The Criminal Code reduced this term to fifteen years. Because he has already served almost ten years, he was released five years later.

After serving the full term of imprisonment, Gurevich settled in Leningrad, where he worked translator. Every year he filed for review of his case, but the KGB and military intelligence persisted, still opposing his rehabilitation or a new trial. In the official history of Soviet military intelligence, prepared in the 60s and 70s, Gurevich is presented as a traitor whose actions led to the failure of the Red Chapel in France and Germany. In the West, Gilles Perrault's *The Red Chapel* expresses the same point of view.

In 1990, the military prosecutor's office contacted me in the case of Gurevich, who continued insist on his rehabilitation. The prosecutor's office found a document of exceptional importance - a memo from the General Staff sent to the NKVD with the approval of Gurevich's radio games ("Kent") with the Germans. When the Gurevich case began to be reviewed, it turned out that the only his fault was that he, without the approval of the Center, started a family in the West (in France). However, the leadership of military intelligence continued to stubbornly impede the restoration of his rights. After Gurevich was finally rehabilitated in 1991, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff categorically refused to pay him compensation, award a military pension and granting veteran status.

This person is alive. His wife died in Europe, and his son, along with his wife and children came to St. Petersburg to meet with his father. The history of Gurevich passed through the pages Russian press, but no one asked the question: whose evil will in the intelligence agencies of the USSR are all these continued to place the blame on this man for years.

### **Attempted covert diplomatic probing and disinformation game with Germans through the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR Stamenov**

For us, who knew that the Germans had problems with the supply of the army, the directive Stalin to stand to the end in 1941 and 1942, and at any cost it seemed to stop the enemy natural and reasonable. Looking back, you see that the tragic defeats of the Red Army in Belarus, the loss of millions of human lives killed and captured under Kiev was for the Wehrmacht only a tactical success. Before the Germans stood the prospect of a protracted war, for which they did not have the necessary resources to win.

By mid-July 1941 we received two important messages. One is on the radio Berlin, another - from our diplomats and intelligence officers interned by the Germans in Italy and Berlin at the beginning of the war. After the exchange for German diplomats interned in Moscow, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, Berezhkov, and the NKVD resident Amayak Kobulov, the younger brother of Beria's deputy Bogdan Kobulov, reported that Baron Botman,

accompanying the train with Soviet diplomats expelled from Germany, hinted to them that the time might come when Germany and the USSR would prefer to settle their relations on basis of mutual concessions.

In the grueling battles near Smolensk, the tank army of General Guderian. Disillusionment grew in the German high command, caused by insufficiently fast pace of advancement of German troops in July 1941, about which reported from Berlin by Arvid Harnack ("The Corsican"). On July 25, Beria ordered me to contact our agent Stamenov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow, and inform him of the alleged rumors circulating in diplomatic circles that a peaceful conclusion is possible Soviet-German war on the basis of territorial concessions. Beria warned that my the mission is top secret. It was meant that Stamenov, on his own initiative will bring this information to Tsar Boris. Beria,

with the knowledge of Molotov, categorically forbade me to instruct the ambassador-agent to bring such information to the Bulgarian leadership, since he could guess that he was participating in the disinformation operation we have conceived, calculated to buy time and to strengthen the positions of the German military and diplomatic circles, which did not leave hope for a compromise peaceful end to the war.

As Beria testified during the investigation in August 1953, the content of the conversation with Stamenov was sanctioned by Stalin and Molotov in order to throw misinformation to the enemy and buy time for the concentration of forces and mobilization available reserves.

Stamenov was recruited by our experienced intelligence officer Zhuravlev in 1934 in Rome. He worked as the third secretary of the Bulgarian embassy, sympathized with the Soviet Union and cooperated with us out of purely patriotic considerations. He was convinced of the need a lasting alliance between Bulgaria and the USSR and considered it as the only guarantee protection of Bulgarian interests in the Balkans and in European politics in general.

When Beria ordered me to meet with Stamenov, he immediately got in touch with Molotov, and I heard that Molotov not only approved this meeting, but even promised to get Stamenov's wife a job at the Institute of Biochemistry of the Academy of Sciences. At the same time, Molotov forbade Beria to meet with Stamenov himself, saying that Stalin had ordered a meeting with that NKVD worker with whom he is in touch, so as not to attach the upcoming conversation is too important in the eyes of Stamenov. Because I was the same worker, then met with the ambassador at Eitingon's apartment, and then again in restaurant "Aragvi", where our separate office was equipped with eavesdroppers devices: the entire conversation was recorded on tape. I gave him rumors that frighten the English, oh the possibility of a peaceful settlement in exchange for territorial concessions. By this time it became clear that the battles near Smolensk had become protracted and tank groups The Germans had already suffered heavy losses. Stamenov did not express much surprise at these rumors. They seemed to him quite reliable. According to him, everyone knew that the offensive Germans did not develop in accordance with Hitler's plans and the war is clearly dragging on. He said that he was still confident in our final victory over Germany. In response to his words, I remarked:

"War is war. And maybe it still makes sense to probe the possibilities for negotiations.

"I doubt that anything will come of it," objected Stamenov. In a word, we acted in the same way as the German side did. The conversation was typical probing prelude. I have already mentioned that Botman, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carried out similar conversations with

Berezhkov. Stamenov did not report the rumors I had told to Sofia, which we expected. We were convinced of this, because we completely controlled the entire cipher correspondence of the Bulgarian embassies in Moscow with Sofia, having access to their ciphers, which were called among themselves "Bulgarian verses". Shura Kochergina, Eitingon's wife, our experienced operative, contacted her agents in the Bulgarian diplomatic and emigre circles in Moscow and established that Stamenov did not take any steps to verify and disseminate the rumors we started. But if I gave Stamenov such an order, he, as completely

an agent we control must have done it. This is how the whole story ended in late July - early August 1941.

Now the content of this conversation is distorted. Handwritten copy of my explanation on this issue, for unknown reasons, was destroyed on November 11, 1974 by an instructor General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU E. Khazina. In the documents of the presidential archive, the date of the conversation with Stamenov is listed as June 25, 1941. Partially declassified with the consent of the service foreign intelligence, my explanation lacks references to undercover cooperation Stamenov with the NKVD. And in the photocopy of the document, entire paragraphs are missing. However, in another publication that has been censored by the foreign intelligence service, even the number of the archival Stamenov's undercover file (No 34467, sheet 134), there are direct references to his moods and recognition of his collaboration with the NKVD.

From my now declassified explanation, four questions can be established, posed by Stamenov during the conversation, the answers to which were of interest to the Soviet leadership. All of them were reduced to a probing clarification of the possibility of cessation of hostilities.

In 1953, however, Beria was accused of preparing a plan to overthrow Stalin and the Soviet government. This plan provided for secret negotiations with Hitler's agents, who were offered a treacherous separate peace on the terms of territorial concessions. On interrogation in August 1953, Beria testified that he acted on the orders of Stalin and with full approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov.

Two weeks before the interrogation of Beria, I was summoned to the Kremlin with Stamenov's intelligence file, where I reported the details of our conversation to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov and Malenkov. They attentively, without a single comment, listened to me, but later I was accused of played the role of Beria's liaison in an attempt to use Stamenov to make peace with Hitler. Wanting to present Beria as a German agent and compromise him, Malenkov ordered to send Pegov, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, together with investigators from the prosecutor's office in Sofia. They were supposed to bring testimony to Moscow Stamenov. However, Stamenov refused to give any affidavit.

True, he confirmed verbally that he was an agent of the NKVD and collaborated with the Soviet intelligence in the interests of fighting fascism both in Germany itself and in the allied countries. Attempts to blackmail him, such as threats to deprive him of the pension he received from the Soviet government for his activities during the war, did not lead to anything either. By to the testimony of Sukhanov, Malenkov's assistant, and to the report of my younger brother (his wife worked in the secretariat of Malenkov), Pegov returned from Sofia empty-handed - no evidence or confessions. All this was kept secret, but appeared in the verdict in the case. Beria and my case.

However, in his memoirs, Khrushchev, who knew about all these details, still preferred adhere to the previous version that Beria negotiated a separate peace with Hitler, caused by Stalin's panic. In my opinion, Stalin and the entire leadership felt that an attempt to conclude a separate peace in this unprecedentedly difficult war automatically would take away their power. Not to mention their genuinely patriotic feelings, in which I quite sure; any form of peace agreement was unacceptable to them. How experienced politicians and leaders of a great power, they often used intelligence that came to them for probing actions, as well as for blackmailing competitors and even allies.

So, our agents, who had access to the entourage of the young Romanian king Mihai, sounded the mutual interest of his court and the Soviet leadership in getting out Romania from the pro-Hitler coalition. As in the case of Finland, our diplomats prepared and executed an agreement on the withdrawal of Romania from the war against the USSR, England and the USA and about its entry into the war with Germany. This was preceded by another important event: a group of militants of the Romanian Communist Party, led by our operatives, detained Fascist leader Prime Minister Antonescu when he visited the king. Among the little-known

behind-the-scenes events of the Great Patriotic War, one should to note the exceptionally great work of the deputy head of the 4th department of the NKVD Melnikov and our illegal immigrants in the 1930s by Parparov and Yarikov on the decomposition of troops

enemy. Under the direct supervision of Melnikov to cooperate with the Soviet authorities and to the creation of an anti-fascist committee of prisoners of war were involved generals von Seidlitz and Paulus who ended up in our hands after the battle of Stalingrad. These prominent military leaders were considered as possible candidates for the composition anti-fascist German government in exile, which Beria proposed to organize in Moscow in 1944. Our

historian Leonid Retin writes interestingly about this episode in his publications. He is in particular, notes that the proposals of the NKVD on the creation of a German government in exile were torpedoed by the German communists, who were in Moscow, and the leadership Comintern.

Meanwhile, the rejection of the proposal of the NKVD on this issue was caused by the strongest objections from the American leadership, as well as the heads of emigration governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London. Our residency in London and Washington specially brought to the attention of the USSR the fears of the Poles, Czechs and Americans about intentions in August 1944 of Stalin and Molotov to expand the activities anti-fascist committee. It remains, however, a mystery how our allies learned about these plans. Proposals for the creation of an anti-fascist German government in exile and settled in the affairs of the Fourth Directorate and the developments of the Main Directorate for Affairs prisoners of war and internees of the NKVD of the USSR.

### **Sabotage detachments and groups of the NKVD in the battle for the Caucasus**

During the war years, I had to take part in the development of decisions on military questions. Particularly important in this regard were my contacts with the Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Isakov and officers of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. In

August 1942, Beria and Merkulov (during this conversation was also present Malenkov) instructed me to equip 150 climbers in just twenty-four hours for combat operations in the Caucasus. Once the climbers were ready to perform combat mission, Beria ordered me, along with him and Merkulov, several transport fly by plane from Moscow to the Caucasus. The flight was very long. We flew to Tbilisi through Central Asia on "S-47", aircraft received from America under Lend-Lease. Our operations were supposed to stop the advance of German troops in the Caucasus the day before decisive battle at Stalingrad. We made the first landing in Krasnovodsk, then in Baku, where Colonel Shtemenko, head of the Caucasian direction of the Operational Directorate General Staff, reported on the situation. It was decided that our special unit will try to block the mountain roads and stop the advance of selected units enemy alpine shooters.

Immediately after us, a group of experienced partisan commanders arrived in Tbilisi and paratroopers, led by one of my deputies, Colonel Mikhail Orlov. They prevented the Germans from invading Kabardino-Balkaria and inflicted heavy losses on them before the beginning of the impending offensive. At the same time, the climbers blew up oil tanks and destroyed the motorized units of the German infantry located in the mountains.

Our own losses were also great, because climbers were often insufficiently prepared militarily. Their advantage was professionalism, knowledge of the mountainous area, as well as active support from the highlanders. Only in Chechnya the local population did not help them.

At the staff meetings in Tbilisi, held under the chairmanship of Beria, the chief representative of the Headquarters, I often experienced difficulties and got lost when it came to purely military matters. Once I tried to forward them to Shtemenko and said that incompetent in military strategy and tactics. Beria cut me off. "We must seriously study military questions, Comrade Sudoplatov. You should not say that you are incompetent. You will be sent to study at the military academy after the war." After the war, I actually entered Academy and in 1953, on the eve of his arrest, he graduated

from it. Very heavy fighting took place in the North Caucasus in August and September 1942, when

I was there. Our special unit mined oil wells and drilling rigs in the Mozdok region and blew them up at the moment when German motorcyclists approached them. Merkulov and I made sure that the explosion occurred strictly on order, and joined our sabotage group, retreating to the mountains, at the last moment. Later, we received a message from our decryption group from Sweden: the Germans were unable to use the oil reserves and wells of the North Caucasus, which they counted on very much.

However, the scolding we suffered for successful actions remained in my memory for a long time. When we returned to Tbilisi, Beria reported that Stalin had reprimanded Merkulov, Beria's deputy, for taking an unjustified risk in carrying out a mining operation: he was putting his life in danger and could be captured by the German advance units. Beria attacked me for allowing this. During the German raids, several officers from the Headquarters, who were in the Caucasus, were killed. Politburo member Kaganovich was seriously wounded in the head during the bombing. Admiral Isakov was also wounded, and one of our most experienced Georgian Chekists, Sajaya, was killed during this raid. Fears that Tbilisi and the entire

Caucasus could be captured by the enemy were real. My task was to create an underground intelligence network in case Tbilisi was under the Germans. Professor Konstantin Gamsakhurdia (father of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) was one of the candidates for the post of head of the intelligence network in Georgia. He was the oldest informer of the NKVD. He was also attracted to cooperation by Beria after several arrests in connection with anti-Soviet statements and nationalist separatism that were incriminated to him. Ironically, before the war, he was known for his pro-German sentiments: he made it clear to everyone that the prosperity of Georgia would depend on cooperation with Germany. I wanted to check these rumors, and, having secured the consent of Beria, together with Sajaya, I had a conversation with Professor Gamsakhurdia at the Intourist Hotel. He didn't seem very reliable to me. In addition, all his previous experience as an informant was to inform on people, and not to influence them. And one more thing: he was too busy with his work. (By the way, he wrote a biography of Stalin in Georgian.) On the whole, he was a man prone to intrigues and tried in every possible way to take advantage of Beria's location: both were Mingrelians. After conferring with local workers, we came to the conclusion that Gamsakhurdia would be better used in a different role. The main role

was assigned to Machivariani, a playwright who also enjoyed the reputation of a respectable person in Tbilisi. He was known to be an uncompromisingly honest man, and we calmly entrusted him with large sums of money, as well as gold and silver items, which, if necessary, could be used for the needs of the underground.

Much later, one of my cellmates, Academician Sharia, Beria's assistant, who was in charge of party propaganda in Georgia, told me that Beria subsequently lost all interest in Gamsakhurdia. He, however, remained a very influential figure in Georgia - a kind of icon in the world of culture. It is known that Stalin personally forbade his arrest. In 1954, when Beria had already been shot, the Georgian authorities wanted to get rid of Gamsakhurdia, and the local KGB applied to Moscow for permission to arrest him as an accomplice of Beria, who had made political capital for himself through personal connections with an enemy of the people. As the writer Kirill Stolyarov, who studied the events of 1953-1954, told me, they wanted to accuse Gamsakhurdia of blackmailing representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia on Beria's instructions, forcing them to establish secret ties with the German secret service. It was precisely for this, his accusers argued, that during the war years he received large sums of money from Beria and Mikoyan and the American "jeep".

According to Shariy, in the end Gamsakhurdia was left alone: as far as I know, he died a natural death in Tbilisi in the 70s. His son became the first president of independent Georgia, was overthrown in 1992 and reportedly committed suicide in late 1993. In 1953, Beria was also accused of damaging

our defenses during the battle for the Caucasus. At the same time, Shtemenko was dismissed from the army for his connection with Beria. But unwind

Shtemenko's guilt did not become in the interests of the ruling elite. Marshal Grechko, then Deputy Minister of Defense, fought in the Caucasus under Beria during the war. It is clear that the accusations against Beria would have hit the top military leadership like a boomerang. That is why, in the press release, the sentence against Beria did not include charges of treason during the battle for the Caucasus.

Sajaya died during the bombing, and Shtemenko did not mention good relations with me, so I was not interrogated in connection with the defense of the Caucasus in the Beria case. Later, my investigators generally lost interest in this, although I had to hear them remark that I had undeservedly received the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus", since, together with Beria, I was engaged in deceiving the Soviet government.

### **Strategic radio games "Monastyr" and "Berezino" with German intelligence**

After the defeat of the Germans near Stalingrad, in early 1943, Moscow came to life. Theaters began to open one after another. This indicated that a turn for the better had taken place at the front. My wife with small children, Andrei and Anatoly, returned from Ufa, where she was evacuated and worked as a teacher at the Higher School of the NKVD. We temporarily settled in the Moskva Hotel, since the heating in our house did not work, a few months later we moved into a small, only nine apartments, house in a side street near the Lubyanka.

At the time I am writing about, Moscow was closely following the novel of the famous Soviet poet Konstantin Simonov and the no less famous actress Valentina Serova. Their marriage was not particularly happy, and after the war Simonov divorced Serova. My wife and I met this couple several times in the specialty canteen. Ilyin, the Commissar of State Security, who oversaw the "cultural front", complained: he had few other things to do, so he still had to personally answer for Simonov's safety! Simonov was an extremely dashing driver and, taking advantage of his privileged position, allowed himself everything that his heart desired. In addition, he was on good terms with Vasily Stalin, known for his addiction to alcohol and stormy adventures. Ilyin told me about Stalin's reaction (it is now widely known) to the collection of Simonov's lyrical poems

"With You and Without You", published in 1942 and in the full sense of the word, shocking the reading public, dedicated to Valentina Serova. His popularity was such that it was impossible to get a book.

At that moment, Stalin was seriously worried about his daughter Svetlana's passion for the screenwriter Kapler. His films - "Lenin in October" and "Lenin in 1918" at that time enjoyed great success. Svetlana was only sixteen, and he was already over thirty. Later, Beria was accused of organizing the beating of Kapler on the street. If this really happened, then he could do this only on the orders of Stalin. Before my arrest, I knew nothing about it. As for Kapler himself, in the end he was arrested and sent to the Gulag, according to operational materials, formally condemning him "as an English spy" for seducing minors and distributing

anti-Soviet jokes.

Operations Berezino and Monastery were the most significant radio games. Initially, the operation "Monastery" was developed by our group and the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, and then from July 1941 in close cooperation with the GRU. The purpose of the operation "Monastery" was our penetration into the intelligence network of the Abwehr operating on the territory of the Soviet Union. To this end, we quickly created a pro-German anti-Soviet organization seeking contacts with the German high command. Despite the thorough purges of the 20s and 30s, many representatives of the Russian aristocracy remained alive; however, they were all under surveillance, and some became our important informants and agents.

Analyzing the materials and composition of the agents placed at our disposal by the counterintelligence of the NKVD, we decided to use as a bait a certain Glebov, the former leader of the noble assembly of Nizhny Novgorod. By that time Glebov

was over seventy. This man was famous in the circles of the former aristocracy: it was he who welcomed the royal family in Kostroma in 1915 on the occasion of a solemn celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Glebov's wife was her own man at court the last Russian Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. In a word, of all those remaining in living representatives of the Russian nobility, Glebov seemed to us the best candidate. In July 1941, almost a beggar, he huddled in the Novodevichy Convent.

Of course, he did not know even the most elementary basics of intelligence work. Our plan was that Glebov and the second person, also of a noble family (this was our agent), gained the confidence of the Germans. Our agent, Alexander Demyanov ("Heine"), and his wife, also an NKVD agent, visited the church of the Novodevichy Convent on the pretext of receiving blessing before sending Alexander to the front in the cavalry unit Most. The servants of the monastery were secret informers of the NKVD. While visiting church Demyanov was introduced to Glebov. A cordial relationship developed between them; Demyanov showed an avid interest in the history of Russia, while Glebov had nostalgia for the past times. Glebov valued the company of his new friend, and he began to bring to meetings with him other people who sympathized with Glebov and longed to get to know him better. These were either trusted representatives of the NKVD, or operational officers. Each of these meetings were organized by Maklyarsky, who personally supervised the agent Demyanov.

Alexander Demyanov really belonged to a noble family: his great-grandfather Golovaty was the first ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, and his father, an officer of the tsarist army, died brave in 1915. Demyanov's uncle, his father's younger brother, was the head of counterintelligence. White Guards in the North Caucasus. Captured by the Chekists, he died of typhus on the way to Moscow. Alexander's mother, a graduate of the Bestuzhev courses, a recognized beauty in Petersburg, was widely known in the aristocratic circles of the former capital Cities. She received and turned down several invitations to emigrate to France. Her personally knew General Ulagai, one of the leaders of the White Guard emigration, actively collaborated with the Germans from 1941 to 1945. The childhood of Alexander himself was overshadowed pictures of terror - both white and red - which he had to observe during civil war, when his uncle fought under the command of Ulagai. After their mother

refused to emigrate, they returned to Petrograd, where Demyanov worked as an electrician: he was expelled from the Polytechnic, where he entered, keeping silent about his past (at that time it was impossible for him to get a higher technical education due to non-proletarian origin). In 1929, the GPU of Leningrad, on the denunciation of his friend Ternovsky arrested Alexander for illegal possession of weapons and anti-Soviet propaganda. In fact, the gun was planted. As a result of the action Alexander was forced into tacit cooperation with the GPU. Due to its origin aimed at developing relations between the nobles who remained in the USSR with foreign white emigration and suppression of terrorist attacks. By the way, in 1927, Alexander witnessed the explosion of the House political education by white terrorists in Leningrad. Alexander began to work for us, using family connections. Soon he was transferred to

Moscow, where he got a job as an electrical engineer at Mosfilm. At that time, the cultural life of the capital centered around the film studio. Pleasant appearance and noble manners allowed Demyanov to easily enter the company of film actors, writers, playwrights and poets. He shared his room in a communal apartment in the center of Moscow with one actor of the Moscow Art Theater. We managed to arrange for him a rather rare thing for those times. - from now on, he had his own horse in the Manege! Naturally, this circumstance expanded his contacts with diplomats. Alexander was friends with the famous Soviet director Mikhail Romm and other prominent cultural figures. The NKVD allowed the elite group artistic intelligentsia and representatives of the former aristocracy to lead a secular image life, without limiting them in anything, but some of these people were recruited, and for the rest carefully monitored so as to be used in the future if necessary.

Demyanov was "led" by Ilyin and Maklyarsky. He was not used as a petty informer, in his task was to expand the circle of acquaintances among foreign diplomats and journalists - regulars of the hippodrome and theatrical premieres. The appearance of Demyanov in the society of actors,

writers and directors was so natural that he easily managed to start the necessary connections. He never hid his origin, and this could be easily verified in emigrant circles in Paris, Berlin and Belgrade. In the end, Demyanov became serious to be interested in the employees of the German embassy and

the Abwehr. On the eve of the war, Alexander reported that an employee of the trade mission Germany in Moscow, as if casually mentioned several names of people close to the family Demyanovs before the revolution. Instructed accordingly by Ilyin Demyanov did not show any interest in the words of the German: it was a clear attempt to start him recruitment, and in these cases one should not show excessive interest. Perhaps, from that moment on, he appeared in the operational records of German intelligence under some codename. Later, as can be seen from the memoirs of Gehlen, the chief of intelligence of the General Staff ground forces, he was given the name "Max".

The first contact with German intelligence in Moscow radically changed his fate: from now on, a special mark appeared in his intelligence business, put by Maklyarsky. This meant that in the event of a war with the Germans, Demyanov could become one of the main figures, whom interested in the German secret services. By the beginning of the war, Alexander's agent experience spanned almost ten years. Moreover, it was about serious counterintelligence operations, when he had to contact people who did not think to hide their anti-Soviet beliefs. At the very beginning of the war, Alexander volunteered for the cavalry unit, but he was destined for a different fate: he became one of the most valuable agents transferred to my order to carry out special assignments. In July 1941 Gorlinsky, chief Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, and I turned to Beria for permission use Demyanov together with Glebov to carry out an operation behind enemy lines "Monastery". To give credibility to Operation Monastery, it involved poet Sadovsky, sculptor Sidorov, who at one time studied in Germany and were known to the German secret services, their apartments in Moscow were used for secret connections.

As I already mentioned, our idea was to create an active pro-German underground organization Throne, which could offer the German to the high command their assistance, provided that its leaders receive corresponding posts in the new anti-Bolshevik administration in the occupied territory. We hoped in this way to identify German agents and infiltrate the intelligence network Germans in the Soviet Union. The undercover files of Throne and Monastery quickly swelled, turning into multi-volume ones. Although these operations were initiated and approved by Beria, Merkulov, Bogdan Kobulov and others, subsequently repressed high-ranking employees of the state security agencies, they remain a classic example of the work of a high level of professionalism, are included in textbooks and are taught in special schools, of course, without reference to real names agents and operational workers involved in this operation.

The radio game, originally planned as a means of identifying individuals who collaborated with Germans, actually grew into a confrontation between the NKVD and the Abwehr.

After careful preparation, Demyanov ("Heine") crossed the line in December 1941 front as an emissary of the anti-Soviet and pro-German organization Throne. german the front group of the Abwehr reacted to the defector with obvious distrust. Most of the Germans I wondered how he managed to cross the mined field on skis. Alexander himself is not suspected the danger and miraculously survived. He was interrogated for a long time, demanded to report on deployment of troops on the front line, then staged a shooting to force under fear of death to admit in cooperation with the Soviet intelligence. Having achieved nothing, Alexander was transferred to Smolensk. There he was interrogated by Abwehr officers from the Valli headquarters. Distrust began to dissipate gradually. They believed Demyanov after they pointed him out information among the Russian emigration, and made sure that he was not involved before the war in intelligence operations conducted by the OGPU-NKVD through Russian emigrants. Germans it was known that the Russian emigration was stuffed with agents of the NKVD, who acted very effective: many emigrants willingly cooperated with us for patriotic reasons and



feelings of guilt towards the motherland. This made it possible to nullify all attempts of white emigration carry out terrorist attacks and organize sabotage. In addition, it turned out that before the war Abwehr agents made contact with him, developed him as a source and In the Berlin dossier, he appeared under the code name "Max". Abwehr made a bet on "Max".

Alexander completed a course of study at the Abwehr school. The only difficulty for him it was to hide that he knew how to work on the radio and knew the cipher business. The Germans were Literally delighted to have recruited such a capable agent. This also facilitated our work, since it could be thrown to our rear without a radio operator. Now the Germans

set specific tasks for Demyanov ("Max"): he must was to settle in Moscow and create, using his organization and connections, an agent network with the aim of penetration into the headquarters of the Red Army. His tasks also included the organization of sabotage on railways. In February

1942, the Germans parachuted "Max" into our territory together with two assistants. They chose the wrong time for this: in a snowstorm, all three lost each other and traveled from near Yaroslavl to Moscow one by one. Alexander contacted with us and quickly got used to the duties of a resident of German intelligence. Both assistants were soon arrested. The Germans began to send couriers to contact Max. We made most of these couriers double agents, and some were arrested. In total we detained more than fifty agents of the Abwehr sent to communicate.

Alexander, as a scout, had the full support of his family, which was great for us. good luck. The details of his intelligence activities were known to his wife and father-in-law. Breaking rules, we went for it for a simple and reasonable reason that seemed to us. was she's next. His wife

Tatyana Berezantsova worked at Mosfilm as an assistant director and enjoyed great prestige among the figures of cinema and theater. Father-in-law, professor Berezantsov, was considered a medical god in Moscow academic circles and was the leading consultant in the Kremlin clinics. He, one of the few specialists of this level, was allowed to practice privately. Berezantsov was well known in the diplomatic corps, what was for us very important. He was in his fifties at the time, highly educated, and spoke fluent German (educated in Germany), French and English. His apartment was used as a safe house for the underground organization Throne, and later for contacts with the Germans. The NKVD understood that the Germans could easily check who lived in this apartment, and it seemed natural that the whole family, whose roots went back to the past of tsarist Russia, could be involved in an anti-Soviet conspiracy.

At my suggestion, the first group of German agents were to remain on freedom for ten days so that we can check their appearances and see if they have connection with someone else besides Alexander ("Max"). Beria and Kobulov warned me that if this group staged a sabotage or terrorist attack in Moscow, I would not be able to lose my head.

Alexander's wife dissolved special pills in tea and vodka, treated German agents to themselves in the apartment, and while they were sleeping under the influence of sleeping pills, our experts managed to defuse their hand grenades, ammunition, and poisons. True, some of the ammunition had remote control, but experts believed that in general these agents were disarmed. Such operations at Alexander's apartment were a very risky business: "guests", as as a rule, they were distinguished by excellent physical data and several times, despite the pills, unexpectedly woke up ahead of time.

Some German couriers, especially those from the Baltic states, we allowed to return to the headquarters of the Abwehr, provided that they report on the success of the activity German intelligence network in Moscow.

In accordance with the legend developed by us, we arranged Demyanov for the position junior liaison officer in the General Staff of the Red Army. As we developed fictitious sources of information for the Germans among the former officers of the tsarist army who served with Marshal Shaposhnikov, the whole operation turned into an important channel misinformation. The radio game with the Abwehr became more and more intense. In the middle of 1942

the radio technical support of the game was entrusted to Fischer-Abel.

Meanwhile, Demyanov managed to create the impression that his group had carried out a diversion on the railway near Gorky. To confirm the act of sabotage and strengthen the reputation Alexandra, we organized several press reports about sabotage on railway transport.

In the German archives, Operation Monastery is known as the "Max Affair". In their Memoir "Service" Gehlen highly appreciates the role of the agent "Max" - the main source strategic military information about the plans of the Soviet Supreme High Command for during the most difficult years of the war. He even reproaches the command of the Wehrmacht for the fact that it ignored the timely messages transmitted by "Max" over the radio transmitter from Moscow, about the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. We must pay tribute to the American special services: they did not believe Gehlen and in a number of publications directly indicated that the German intelligence fell for the bait of the NKVD. Gehlen, however, continued to stick to his point view, according to which the work of "Max" was one of the most impressive examples successful activities of the Abwehr during the war years.

Intelligence chief of the German security service, Walter Schellenberg, in his memoirs claims that valuable information came from a source close to Rokossovsky. At that time, "Max" served in Rokossovsky's headquarters as a communications officer, and Marshal commanded the troops of the Belorussian Front. According to Schellenberg, an officer from the environment Rokossovsky was anti-Soviet and hated Stalin for being subjected to repressions in the 30s and spent two years in prison. The

prestige of "Max" in the eyes of the leadership of the Abwehr was really high - he received from the Germans "Iron Cross with Swords". We, in turn, awarded him the Order of the Red Stars.

Alexander's wife and her father for the risk in performing the most important tasks were awarded medals "For Military Merit".

From the materials of the German archives it is known that the command of the Wehrmacht committed several fatal mistakes, partly due to the fact that he relied entirely on information from the Abwehr received from sources from the Soviet Supreme High Command. The disinformation transmitted by "Heine" - "Max" was being prepared in the Operational Directorate of our General Staff with the participation of one of its leaders, Shtemenko, then endorsed in the Intelligence Directorate General Staff and transferred to the NKVD to ensure that it received convincing circumstances. As conceived by Shtemenko, the important operations of the Red Army are indeed were carried out in 1942-1943 where they were "predicted" for the Germans by "Heine" - "Max", but they had a distracting, auxiliary value.

Disinformation was sometimes of strategic importance. So, on November 4, 1942, "Heine" - "Max" reported that the Red Army would strike the Germans on November 15 not near Stalingrad, but on North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were waiting for a blow near Rzhev and repelled it. But the encirclement of the Paulus group near Stalingrad came as a complete surprise to them. Zhukov, unaware of this radio game, paid a heavy price - in the offensive under Rzhev killed thousands and thousands of our soldiers under his command. IN in his memoirs, he admits that the outcome of this offensive operation was unsatisfactory. But he never found out that the Germans had been warned of our offensive in the Rzhev direction, so they threw so many troops there.

The disinformation "Heine" - "Max", as follows from the memoirs of Gehlen, also contributed to the fact that the Germans repeatedly postponed the offensive on Kursk Bulge, and this was in the hands of the Red Army.

Part of the information that went to Berlin came back to us from the Germans. That's how it is was. In 1942-1943, for a short time, until his exposure, with us collaborated with Colonel Schmit, one of the leaders of the Abwehr cipher service. He handed over to our people in France intelligence materials received by the Abwehr from Moscow. We analyzed them, and it turned out that this was our own disinformation, transmitted by "Heine" - "Max".

We received one of the ciphers three times. First time - from France via Schmitt to

February 1943. The second time in March 1943 from Anthony Blunt (Cambridge group), who served in British intelligence: he told our resident in London Gorsky that Germans in Moscow is an important source of information in military circles. The third time - the British, through the communication mission of our intelligence in London, transmitted in April 1943 the same a message allegedly intercepted by British intelligence in Germany. In fact the British obtained this information using the Enigma deciphering machine and presented to us in a greatly truncated form, which they practiced in the future. German the high command used the information transmitted by "Heine" - "Max" for the orientation of the officers of their combat units in the Balkans. British intelligence intercepted these messages sent from Berlin to the Balkans, so we are at the end after all, our data came from Blunt, Cairncross, and Philby. This proved that our disinformation works. In Switzerland, the British intelligence service, as I already mentioned, gave edited texts of the interceptions, decrypted using Enigma, to his agent, who was in contact with Ressler, who in turn passed this information "Red Chapel", from where she came and the Center. And so we had two versions, born originally by our disinformation, transmitted by "Max".

In February 1943 we received a modified version of the message from London. Demyanov to Berlin, along with an indication that German intelligence has in military circles Moscow has its own source of information. Later, through our resident in London, Chichayev British secret service warned us: there is reason to believe that the Germans in Moscow an important source through which military information leaks. We understand that speech is about Alexander.

It should be noted that the operation "Monastery" with the participation of "Heine" - "Max" was conceived as purely counterintelligence. Indeed, when he returned to Moscow in 1942 as a resident of German intelligence, we captured more than 50 agents with his help. enemy. However, the operation later took on the character of a strategic disinformation campaign. radio

games. In addition to Operation Monastery, our service during the war led approximately eighty disinformation radio games with the Abwehr and the Gestapo.

In 1942-1943, we finally succeeded in seizing the initiative in radio games with German intelligence. This was due to the fact that we introduced reliable agents in Abwehr schools of saboteurs-scouts thrown into our rear near Smolensk, on Ukraine and Belarus. Our successful operation to intercept saboteurs was recorded in letter case "School". Having recruited the head of the passport bureau of the training center in Katyn, we received installations on more than 200 German agents abandoned in our rear. All of them were either neutralized or forced to cooperate. According to these a large multi-part film based on the novel by V. Ardamatsky was staged on the basis of materials "Saturn is almost invisible."

In 1943, the "Heir" of the mythical nationalist center in Uzbekistan, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Gestapo, on our instructions, thwarted major sabotage fascists in Central Asia.

Operational workers of the 4th Management Maklyarsky and Garbuz. The last one was thrown across the front line for decomposition "Turkestan Legion" of the Germans of this major agent from the family of the leaders of Uzbekistan repressed in 1937.

### **Intrigues between the leadership of SMERSH and the NKVD, a tragic fate head of the secret political department of the NKVD Ilyin**

Then bureaucratic intrigues began between the military counterintelligence (SMERSH), the NKVD and the leadership of military intelligence. Headed SMERSH Abakumov unexpectedly came to my office and said that, on the instructions of the Soviet Supreme High Command, I must hand over to him the entire manual for radio games: this business should be engaged in military counterintelligence, which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and

not the NKVD. I agreed, but on the condition that there is an order from a higher authority. Through the day such an order appeared, two radio games were left behind us: operation "Monastery" and "Novices" (another radio game to disinform the Germans). Abakumov remained extremely dissatisfied because he knew that the results of these operations were reported directly to Stalin.

Operation "Novices" was carried out under the guise of a seemingly existing in Kuibyshev of the anti-Soviet religious underground, supported by the Russian Orthodox church in Moscow. According to legend, this underground was headed by Bishop Ratmirov. He worked under control of Zoya Rybkina in Kalinin, when the city was in the hands of the Germans. Assisted by Bishop Ratmirov and Metropolitan Sergius, we managed to introduce two young officers NKVD in the circle of churchmen who collaborated with the Germans in the occupied territory. After liberation of the city, the bishop moved to Kuibyshev. On his behalf we sent them from Kuibyshev under the guise of novices to the Pskov Monastery with information to the abbot, who collaborated with the German invaders. Both novices were known to the Germans.

The Germans sent radio operators from among Russian prisoners of war to Kuibyshev, whom we quickly managed to convert. In the meantime, two of our officers - "novices" deployed activity in the monastery is bustling.

Among the church ministers there were many NKVD agents, which made their work easier. The Germans were sure that they had a strong spy base in Kuibyshev. Regularly maintaining radio contact with their intelligence bureau near Pskov, they constantly received from us false information about the transfer of raw materials and ammunition from Siberia to the front. Having reliable information from our agents, we at the same time successfully resisted attempts by the Pskov clergy, who collaborated with the Germans, to appropriate the authority to leadership of parishes of the Orthodox Church in the occupied territory.

The materials prepared by us on the patriotic position of the Russian Orthodox church, its consolidating role in the growing anti-fascist movement of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans and Roosevelt's informal probing requests to improve the political and the legal status of the Orthodox Church, transmitted through Harriman to Stalin, apparently convinced him to meet the allies halfway and lead a less rigid attitude towards the church politics. Stalin took an unexpected step: he allowed the elections of the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. The

position of patriarch was abolished by Peter the Great, as soon as church the hierarchs began to oppose his reforms. This situation continued for almost two hundred years, until 1917. After the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia, the Provisional Government allowed Orthodox Church to hold elections of the patriarch. They became Tikhon. After his death, the Soviet the government did not allow the election of a new patriarch, and only during the Great Patriotic War, when Stalin realized the importance of the church to unite the people, in 1943 the Patriarch of All Rus' was elected. My wife and I attended the enthronement ceremony. By order of Stalin, Bishop

Ratmirov was awarded a gold watch after the war and medal. Directly supervising his work and being with him in German rear under the guise of clergy, our officers Ivanov and Mikheev received military orders.

After Abakumov failed to subdue the radio games "Monastyr" and "Novices," he warned me menacingly, "Remember, I

won't forget this." I have decided not to have anything to do with you in the future! The confrontation between Abakumov and Beria was also difficult at that time. Throughout the war Commissar for Defense was Stalin. Under him, military counterintelligence (SMERSH) was transferred from the NKVD under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and the head of SMERSH, on the recommendation of Beria, approved Abakumov. Thus, while holding this position, Abakumov became Stalin's deputy as People's Commissar of Defense, which significantly increased his status and gave direct access to the Boss. Now he was virtually independent of Beria and turned from a subordinate into his rival. In 1943, without the sanction of Beria, Abakumov arrested the Commissar of State Security Ilyin, an experienced head of the third department of the Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, who was in charge of issues of working with the creative intelligentsia. In accordance with the rules canceled

only under Gorbachev, no one had the right to arrest a high-ranking official without the consent of the authorities. True, there were exceptions, but each time they were considered as State of emergency. The arrest warrant was signed by the prosecutor, but on it in the lower left corner must be there was a sanction from the immediate superior of the person who was being arrested: "Agreed" - and a signature. As I said, there was no Beria's sanction in this case.

Soft, with professorial manners, Ilyin enjoyed great respect in the NKVD. IN for five years, before the operation "Monastyr" began, he "led" Demyanov and also participated in this radio game with the Germans at its initial stage. In 1937-1938 he escaped arrest, although he was a senior operative, since at that time he was responsible for working with Mensheviks, who were no longer of interest to Stalin. At the end of 1938, Beria sent him to Orel and Rostov to investigate the case of the so-called Trotskyist sabotage on the railroads. It was believed that the conspirators had infiltrated the ranks of the local heads of Soviet and party organs. He returned to Moscow, shocked the primitiveness of the false accusations that he had to face, and reported superiors: the Oryol and Rostov NKVD simply fabricated cases in order to strengthen your own position and strengthen your reputation. After his presentation was revised, and Ilyin was appointed to the post of head of the third department Secret Political Directorate of the NKVD, which allowed him to achieve the arrest of two important informants who knowingly supplied us with false information about supposedly anti-Soviet mood among responsible workers.

Ilyin summoned informants to Moscow and ordered them to provide detailed information on cases of two suspects. Having received their information, he was convinced that they had been through years of repression learned well. The informers- art slander on those whom developed. falsifiers were arrested and sentenced to ten years in the camps, and Ilyin received an award - the badge "Honorary Chekist". Considering Ilyin's personal contacts with such writers like Alexei Tolstoy, and famous musicians and composers, he is often received Beria. Ilyin was also on friendly terms with Merkulov.

And in 1943, Ilyin's service in the authorities ended due to a conflict with Abakumov. Even during the civil war, Ilyin became friends with Teplinsky, with whom they served in the cavalry. Later, Ilyin began working in the OGPU, and Teplinskiy moved in aviation and made a good career: in 1943 he was a major general and received appointment to the post of Chief of Inspectorate of the Air Force Staff.

Unexpectedly, Teplinsky's promotion slowed down: it turned out that against authorities object to his new appointment. Then he turned to Ilyin, trying to find out in than the case. Tom managed to quickly find out: the only reason that made the state security to refuse confidence in Teplinsky, consisted in his presence at a party in the Military academy in 1936, before the arrest of Tukhachevsky, where he allegedly allowed himself with praise speak about officers and generals who soon fell victims of repression in the army. Teplinskiy to his misfortune, he was familiar with General Trukhin, who had defected to Vlasov. Ilyin warned Teplinsky to be more careful in his statements and acquaintances, but I made my warning over the phone.

Abakumov immediately found out about their conversation and, indignant, demanded from Beria that he dismissed Ilyin from work. Beria instead instructed Merkulov to limit himself to a simple suggestion, moreover, in a friendly tone. By that time, relations between Abakumov and Beria badly deteriorated. Abakumov decided to use this story to in order to compromise Beria and Merkulov. He reported to Stalin that the commissar state security officer Ilyin disrupts the operational check of the Air Force command staff conducted by SMERSH Red Army in connection with new appointments. All this was of particular importance, since one of the reasons that prompted Stalin to bring SMERSH under his personal control was that he wanted to exclude any intervention of the Beria NKVD in issues of official movement in the army. Stalin ordered Abakumov to immediately arrest Teplinsky. Even during the war years, Stalin still strove for whatever began to personally supervise the work of the departments headed by him. In this case, speech was about a particularly important department - the People's Commissariat of Defense.

During the interrogation, conducted with prejudice (Abakumov knocked out two of his front teeth in the very first night), Teplinskiy admitted that Ilyin advised him on how best to behave in order to not give grounds for accusations of sympathy for the enemies of the people. In addition, he also admitted that he shared with Ilyin his sympathies for a number of senior officers who were arrested in 1938. A week later, Abakumov reported on the confessions of the arrested person personally to Stalin and received from him a sanction for the arrest of Ilyin.

Appearing to Merkulov at Lubyanka, Abakumov demanded that Ilyin be summoned: let me remind you that he was talking about a leading employee of the People's Commissariat, the Commissar of State Security. And so this man is disarmed and imprisoned in the inner prison of Lubyanka. Although the prison belonged to the NKVD, the Chekists were deprived of the right to interrogate Ilyin, since he was under the control of SMERSH. The next day, Abakumov arranged a confrontation Teplinskiy with Ilyin. Teplinskiy, beaten the day before, repeated his "confessions"; Ilyin, outraged, slapped him in the face, calling him a woman. Finding no witnesses to

corroborate Teplinskiy's testimony, Abakumov found himself in difficult situation: after all, it was necessary to enlist the testimony of two witnesses. Since none of Teplinskiy's entourage in the military elite even knew about the existence Ilyin and could not testify against him, find a second witness for the prosecution seemed problematic, and without this it was impossible to refer the case to a hearing in Military College. Ilyin was beaten, deprived of sleep, but he not only refused to admit himself guilty, but did not even sign the interrogation protocols. To formalize their case it was necessary to present it to Stalin so that he would decide the further fate of the person under investigation, and Abakumov was afraid to appear before Stalin without a convincing indictment. Although Abakumov could not prove Ilyin's guilt, he still remained in prison.

Ilyin was summoned for interrogation for four years from 1943 to 1947. He was kept in solitary confinement and periodically beaten to extract confessions. Four years later on they waved him off, but for another five years he remained in prison, where at various times he cellmates were Minister of Aviation Industry Shakhurin, Air Marshal Novikov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. Ilyin did not tell anyone that he security officer. According to him, he worked in the technical department of a documentary film studio. Realizing that he was a victim of the struggle for power, Ilyin promised himself nothing to confess and it is better to die than to tarnish one's honor. He even managed to keep sense of humor. One day he asked his interrogator, who was conducting the interrogation:

- And what does the ribbon on your chest mean? The officer replied that it was an order Lenin. Ilyin remarked: -

That's what an honor was given to me - the case was entrusted to a person who was awarded the order Lenin. So my work is very important!

In July 1951, Ilyin was transferred to Matrosskaya Tishina and placed in a special block of the prison of the Central Committee of the party. The Committee dealt with the persons under investigation there. party control, which investigated the cases of members of the Central Committee and state security officers. The head of the prison warned him of serious consequences if he did not admit his guilt. before the party. The new investigator, who appeared at the next interrogation in the form major general of justice, was the deputy military prosecutor of the Soviet Union Kitaev. TO Ilyin's immense surprise, Kitaev demanded from him testimony about the treacherous activities of Abakumov, in response, Ilyin asked for evidence that this was not provocation. The guard led him out into the corridor and pushed him to the peephole of the cell, where the accursed enemy of Ilyin Abakumov.

Nevertheless, Ilyin refused to testify against Abakumov, far-sighted reasoning that Abakumov at one time reported everything to Stalin, and if he, Ilyin, now tells about the cases fabricated by Abakumov, he may be accused of facilitating these crimes. Ilyin testified that in his work after 1933 he had no Abakumov no contacts, only occasionally met him at the Lubyanka, as well as during inspection trip to Rostov in 1938. Kitaev was dissatisfied with his statement and transferred Ilyin back to the Lubyanka, where the interrogations immediately resumed. However, their tone became completely different. Now he was accused of misunderstanding his

call of duty, maintaining contacts and friendships with suspicious people. Six months later, the head of the Commandant's Office of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), Major General Blokhin announced to him: for official omissions, the Special Meeting sentences Ilyin to nine years in prison. The term of

imprisonment has expired - Ilyin served nine years. Before he was released I was asked to go to the office to complete the necessary paperwork. Ilyin told me that Blokhin was not only the head of the commandant's office, but was also responsible for bringing death sentences to be carried out (in a number of cases he himself carried them out), therefore, when he was called to Blokhin, in one or two seconds, mentally scrolled in front of him his whole life. He was sure that now, this very minute, he would be taken to the commandant's office to be shot. However, he was taken to a regular office, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement. cases and conditions of detention. He received a certificate of release, temporary passport and his old uniform of the commissar of state security, now a major general, without shoulder straps, which over the years has become rather dilapidated.

Released late in the evening, without money, Ilyin decided to take refuge in reception of the MGB on the Kuznetsk bridge. He knew that the war was over, but did not know how it changed the lives of people: he was not aware that a monetary reform had taken place in the country and in circulation is completely different money. He also didn't know where his family was or what happened to them. In the morning it turned out that his wife divorced him, because she had no information about him and believed that he died. She remarried and their daughter lived with her. Ilyin

tried to contact Merkulov, who became Minister of State Control. He came to the ministry, the secretary reported to Merkulov, and then said that the name of Ilyin the minister does not say anything. He had nowhere to go. He again returned to the reception of the MGB and made an attempt to call Shubnyakov, his former deputy.

He didn't know his phone number and he didn't have a coin to call from the machine, so he dialed his old number using the internal phone in the reception MGB. The duty officer answered, who recognized him and spoke to him with obvious sympathy: Ilyin's reputation was still high among the veterans of the NKVD. It turned out that Shubnyakov was arrested in 1951, following Abakumov. The officer from the reception of the MGB lent Ilyin five hundred rubles (then it was quite a large amount) and advised him to immediately leave Moscow. Ilyin

went to Ryazan, where his cousin lived. There he got a job loader at the railway station. He reported his arrival to the city to the local department of state security on the railway, and two months later they helped him get foreman position. True, they demanded that he tell his fellow workers, who was convicted not under a political article, but for embezzlement and other malfeasance, and promised to make an appropriate entry in the work book. But Ilyin refused, fearing that he might be accused of hiding his past. So in

At the age of forty-eight, he began a new life. After Stalin's

death, he applied for rehabilitation. The first request was rejected, but he was allowed to return to Moscow. Ilyin got a job in the transport department of the Moscow City Council. He was rehabilitated in 1954 after the execution of Beria and my arrest. During the year he denied the full pension due to state security officers. Opposed to this Serov, stating that Ilyin was compromised by his relationship with Teplinsky, who was still serving time as an enemy of the people.

Three days after my release from prison in 1968, Ilyin visited me. I found that fate again smiled at him. In 1956, his former curator at the Central Committee became Deputy Head of the Department of Culture of the Central Committee of the Party. He needed an honest and experienced administrator for the post of organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union. Ilyin's previous work experience, former Commissar of State Security for culture, made his candidacy for this post quite suitable. Moreover, he was supported such writers as Fedin and Simonov. The party leadership needed in the Writers' Union a person who would know everyone, including informers. Ilyin matched perfectly his new position and worked in the Writers' Union until 1977. He died in 1990, hitting

under the car.

Turns in the fate of Ilyin, speculation spread by A. Vaksberg that supposedly he, an 86-year-old man, was "removed by the KGB", fearing some kind of revelations, forcing me comment on another story with rumors about the fate of the son of N. S. Khrushchev Leonid, a senior lieutenant, a pilot who went missing in the spring of 1943. From the filing of a row journalists and some veterans of the security agencies, a mythical the operation to capture Leonid Khrushchev in the German rear and his liquidation "for treason." In reality, nothing of the sort took place. Through the NKVD and SMERSH passed orientation about his search. Indeed, the case of the search for the son of N. S. Khrushchev was on special control. However, his search yielded no results. Stalin personally was a decision was made to consider Leonid Khrushchev dead in the performance of a combat mission, and not missing. In those conditions, this was important for the political career of N. S. Khrushchev, excluded the possibility of compromising one of the members of the Soviet leadership this episode. Khrushchev's son, unlike the other missing persons, was soon posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree. After

the war, N. S. Khrushchev paid considerable attention to clarifying the fate of his son. No one saw how his son died, including the pilots who flew with him on a combat mission. The state security agencies interrogated Soviet soldiers who were in the filtration camps. prisoners of war. It is not uninteresting, however, that, as I was told, the protocols of these interrogations in archives are not preserved. From the search file after the "cleansing" of documents in 1953-1954 more than a hundred pages were seized. Who carried out these seizures and the revision of these cases remains unknown. Although it is not difficult to guess where the instructions to clean up the archives and accounting materials for the missing in 1943 in the records of the Ministry

Defense, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

## **Soviet intelligence at the end of the military confrontation**

In 1944, Operation Monastery began to develop in a new direction. the day before summer offensive of the Red Army in Belarus, Stalin called the head of the Intelligence Kuznetsov, head of military counterintelligence SMERSH Abakumov, people's commissar of state security Merkulov and me. My mood was upbeat: our work was going well, and for a month ago, Eitingon and I were awarded the Orders of Suvorov for military operations in the German rear. As a rule, this high award was given only to commanders of front-line units for the battles won, and the fact that this time it was handed over to state security officers, spoke volumes. That is why I went to the meeting with a sense of confidence, and Merkulov was in excellent mood, as one of the curators of the operation "Monastery".

However, Stalin received us very coldly. He reproached for not understanding the realities war and asked how we thought the Monastery and other radio games could be used to assist our army in offensive operations, and proposed to expand the framework of radio games, noting that the old techniques do not fit the new environment. Kuznetsov offered to plant new information through "Heine" - "Max" about the alleged planned offensive in Ukraine. I was not prepared for this turn of the conversation and knew absolutely nothing about the plans of the Soviet Supreme High Command. Besides, I remembered the advice of Marshal Shaposhnikov never to get involved in matters that are outside your competence. That is why I was silent when Abakumov resumed his attempts to subdue operation "Monastery" SMERSH, declaring that his apparatus has closer relations with the General Staff connections than the

NKVD. Stalin summoned General Shtemenko, chief of the operational department of the General Staff, and he read out an order prepared before our conversation. In accordance with the order, we were supposed to mislead the German command, creating the impression of active actions in the rear of the Red Army of the remnants of German troops who were surrounded during our offensive. Stalin's plan was to deceive Germans to use their resources to support these units and "help" them make a serious attempt to break through the encirclement. The scope and boldness of the proposed operation were brought upon us



great impression. I experienced excitement and anxiety at the same time: a new task was coming out beyond the scope of previous radio games in order to misinform the enemy.

On August 19, 1944, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces received a Abwehr message from "Max" that the unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn, numbering 2,500 people, was blocked by the Red Army in the area of the Berezina River. Thus began the operation "Berezino" - the continuation of the operation "Monastery".

The operation "Berezino" was developed by the head of the third department of the 4th Directorate, Colonel Maklyarsky, I supported the idea of the operation. A tempting radio game was planned with the German supreme command. Her plan, in pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters, was reported personally Stalin, Molotov, Beria. The operation was approved.

For the direct management of this operation to Belarus at the scene my deputy Eitingon, Maklyarsky, Fischer, Serebryansky and Mordvinov left.

In reality, the Sherhorn group did not exist in the rear of the Red Army. German unit under the command of this officer numbering 1,500 people, defending crossing on the Berezina River, was defeated and captured by us. Eitingon, Maklyarsky, Fisher, Mordvinov, Gudimovich, T. Ivanova, Garbuz, with the active participation of "Heine" - "Max", recruited Sherhorn and his radio operators. Soldiers and officers were sent to Belarus special purpose brigades, along with them came the German anti-fascist Comintern members. The game also involved German prisoners of war recruited by Soviet intelligence. Thus, the impression was created that there was a real German group in the rear Red Army. So, from August 19, 1944 to May 5, 1945, we played perhaps the most successful radio game with the German high command. However, the operational workers who participated in the Berezino operation were not awarded either then, or in subsequent years, or on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, although they were presented for the award.

German Security Service and General Staff of the German Ground Forces seriously plotted to disrupt the rear communications of the Red Army, using the connection Sherhorn. To this end, Sherhorn, in response to his requests for help, were sent sabotage specialists and equipment. At the same time, we managed to capture the communication aimed at Sherhorn a group of SS militants.

Sherhorn sent reports to Berlin about sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, written by Eitingon, Maklyarsky and Mordvinov. "Max" received an order from Berlin to check the reliability of Sherhorn's reports about actions in the rear of the Red Army - he completely confirmed. Hitler promoted Sherhorn to colonel and awarded him the Knight's Cross, and Guderian sent a personal congratulations. Sherhorn was ordered to break through the front line and advance to Poland, and then to East Prussia. Sherhorn demanded that he to ensure this operation, Polish guides were dropped by parachute, collaborating with the Germans. Berlin agreed, and as a result we captured Polish agents of the German intelligence. Hitler, for his part, planned to send the chief of special operations and sabotage of Skorzeny and his group, but the Germans had to abandon this plan due to the deterioration in April 1945 of the military situation on the Soviet-German front.

On May 5, 1945, shortly before the end of the war, the command of the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr in their the last telegram recommended Sherhorn to act according to the circumstances. "Max" was ordered to mothball sources of information and break contacts with German officers and encircled soldiers who were threatened with capture, return to Moscow, hide and try to maintain their ties. Sherhorn and his group we interned under Moscow, where they stayed until they were released in the early 1950s.

It is noteworthy that Gehlen, who headed German military intelligence after Canaris, in an effort to win the confidence of the Americans, offered "Max" as a reliable source after war. However, US intelligence was distrustful of Gehlen's proposal.

Great merit in the conduct of operations "Monastery" and "Berezino" belongs to the head of the department Massya, who in 1945-1950, together with his wife, actively participated in intelligence work on the atomic problem in the United States.

V. Fischer - R. Abel also distinguished himself, under the guise of a German officer personally who met Skorzeny's saboteurs at the field airfield.

It is impossible not to note the great contribution to the successful conduct of the radio games "Monastery" and "Berezino" by experienced and productive employees of military counterintelligence (SMERSH) Baryshnikov and Utekhin. I

had a plan to use Scherhorn to recruit German Admiral Raeder, Commander of the Naval Forces, suspended by Hitler from his duties. duties in 1943. While in captivity, Raeder was in Moscow. Later, at his request, his wife came to Moscow. It seemed that he was determined to cooperate with us - in exchange for a promise not to charge him as a war criminal at Nuremberg process, although the British side insisted on bringing him to trial for operations German submarines against the British fleet and unarmed merchant ships.

I settled him with his wife at my dacha, but soon became convinced that my plan for influencing admiral through Sherhorn is unrealistic, since they turned out to be incompatible with each other. It had a more beneficial effect on Admiral Serebryansky, who was at my dacha under house arrest as a "prisoner of war" (he played the role of a German businessman). Serebryansky managed to convince the admiral to renew his acquaintances in Germany and connections. Raeder, I remember, really liked walking along the Moscow River on a trophy limousine "horch" - just like he had in Germany. At the end of

1945 we sent Raeder to Germany. The British side continued insist on bringing him to trial as a war criminal. As far as I remember, we have reached agreements with the British and Americans on this issue. Roeder, several other higher officers of the German Navy and another group of officers were transferred to the Allies in exchange for former tsarist general Krasnov, who commanded the Cossack army during the civil war army, and in World War II he served at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, and Soviet officers who fought in the army of Vlasov. Sherhorn was also returned to Germany, and my connections with these people were interrupted.

After the war, we made an attempt to engage Alexander Demyanov ("Heine" - "Max") again, this time in Paris, but it soon became clear that there were no émigré circles there. showed no interest in him, and he and his wife returned to Moscow. No more in what intelligence operations neither he nor his wife participated in. Demyanov worked subsequently an electrical engineer at a research institute. He died in 1975 from a broken heart, riding a boat on the Moscow River. He was sixty four

of the year.

## The role of the NKVD in the Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta conferences

Both military and political intelligence played a large role in the preparation and conduct of our country Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, meetings and meetings Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1943-1945. In execution of the order of the NKVD of the USSR of January 8, 1945 on the eve of the Yalta Conference at I was entrusted with the fastest resolution of issues related to the work of the central apparatus of the NKVD - The NKGB of the USSR in carrying out the necessary events for the conference in Moscow. meeting Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Tehran and Yalta were preceded by informal conversations which Fitin and I participated - on the one hand, and the head of the American military mission in Moscow, General Dean, Rear Admiral Olsen, US Ambassador Harriman, Advisor to the English embassy Roberta - on the other. We discussed possible approaches to resolving disputed issues: the exchange of intelligence information, the mutual extradition of failed agents and captured German military specialists, delicate issues of possible post-war settlement in Eastern Europe. Harriman, in particular, objected to the idea of creating a coalition government in post-war Poland proposed by Stalin and Molotov.

These last meetings with representatives of American and British intelligence, as it were, summed up the results of cooperation between the Allied intelligence services during the war years. Most productive it ended up in Afghanistan, where our intelligence resident Alakhverdov managed to paralyze actions of German agents in the border areas. Together with the British

the agent-sabotage network of German and Japanese intelligence in India and Burma was defeated. Highly appreciating our support for British intelligence operations in India and Burma, the British, in turn, handed over to us many pro-German agents in Afghanistan and

Central Asia, recruited by the Germans for action in our rear. Further general

discussions about joint sabotage operations against the Germans in Western Europe did not go well with the British and American intelligence services. However, we established business contacts with British intelligence officers operating at the headquarters Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. Lieutenant Colonel Kvashnin established good personal relations with Churchill's son Randolph and was of great help to the British officers in getting out of German environment. The information received from Kvashnin was important in assessing intentions of the British ruling circles and in their post-war policy in Yugoslavia.

American business circles showed interest in possible forms of solution Jewish question, offering financial assistance in the restoration of areas of Gomel within the the so-called "Jewish Settlement" and the Crimea, where it was supposed to create a Jewish republic. In informal conversations with Harriman, held at the Aragvi restaurant and recorded on a tape recorder, our agent of influence acted as my interpreter Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, the Harriman family's financial partner in Poland and countries of Eastern Europe. He was again arrested by the NKVD in Poland in January 1945.

On the eve of the Yalta Conference, chaired first by Golikov and then Beria, the longest meeting of intelligence leaders in the entire war took place The People's Commissariat of Defense, the Navy and the NKVD-NKGB. The main issue is evaluation. potential capabilities of the German armed forces to further resistance allies - was considered within two days. Our predictions that the war in Europe will last no more than three months due to the lack of fuel and ammunition among the Germans, it turned out correct. The last, third day of the meeting was devoted to comparing available material on the political goals and intentions of the Americans and the British in Yalta conference. We all agreed that both Roosevelt and Churchill could not counteract the line of our delegation to strengthen the position of the USSR in Eastern Europe. We proceeded from reliable information that the Americans and the British would occupy flexible position and will make concessions due to the interest of the fastest entry Soviet Union at war with Japan. Forecast of the NKVD and military intelligence about low ability the Japanese to resist the powerful blows of our mobile formations, bypassing the fortified areas built by the Japanese along the Soviet border, was confirmed in August 1945. However, we did not foresee, despite the detailed data on the completion of work on the nuclear bomb that the Americans would use nuclear weapons against Japan. On

the eve of the Potsdam Conference, our assessments were even more optimistic. Beria and Golikov did not mention at all the prospects for the socialist development of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The socialist choice as a reality for us in the countries Europe was more or less clear only for Yugoslavia. We proceeded from the fact that Tito is like the leader of the state and the Communist Party relied on real military force. In others countries the situation was different. At the same time, we agreed that our military the presence and sympathy for the Soviet Union of the broad masses of the population will ensure a stable stay in power in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary of governments that will focus on close alliance and cooperation with us. Our military-

political recommendations on Germany were also far from the guidelines for the construction of socialism in the zone occupied by us. It was more about the future neutral Germany disarmed forever to create a powerful, stable, Russia-oriented, progressive group in the German leadership.

The practical result of the decisions of our meeting in the light of the secret protocols signed at the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945 by Molotov, Hull, Eden, was also an instruction to the deputy head of the 1st (intelligence) department of the NKGB

Korotkov to negotiate with representatives of the intelligence services of the United States and England on the extradition to us commanders of the Vlasov army, in particular Zhilenkov, in exchange for the transfer to the British and Americans of German generals and admirals who were interested in them: it was also about

Grand Admiral Reder, who was in captivity with us in Moscow.

I focused only on the main intelligence operations of the German-Soviet war, questions of evaluation of intelligence materials by the military-political leadership of the Soviet Union. It must be admitted that systematic attention to the work of intelligence began to be given under the influence of our serious failures at the beginning of the war. Before the war, Stalin, evaluating the intelligence materials, relied more on his own vision of the development of events and his own intuition. In retrospect, it is clear that the most significant results were achieved by us not on the basis of the implementation of pre-war intelligence positions in Western Europe and Germany, and as a result, prepared and implemented actions already during the war. Wherein the key to success in strategic enemy disinformation operations was close interaction between military intelligence and the NKVD and the involvement of qualified top-level specialists from the General Staff. All this contributed to the intelligence materials about such operations, for example, about the radio game "Monastery", are now used by American and our intelligence agencies as training materials. Of course, it would be

wrong to imagine that we had continuous achievements. The Abwehr and the Gestapo inflicted serious damage on the intelligence agencies of the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of Defense. Apart from the death of valuable agents and operatives in Western Europe in 1941-1943, we lost as a result of the actions of the German counterintelligence leaders of our residents? in Smolensk, Kyiv, Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev, the main largest cities caught in the zone of occupation. Among the dead were prominent members of Soviet intelligence: Kaminsky - one of the founders of the "Red Chapel" in Germany, Kudrya - a resident in Smolensk and Kyiv, Molodtsov - in Odessa, Lyagin (on the eve of the war, deputy head of the intelligence department of the NKVD) - in Kherson and Nikolaev. I wrote about Kaminsky - he shot himself while trying to arrest. In 1942,

Friedgud, the famous recruiter of Grigulevich, died in Afghanistan. He together with Alakhverdov, he carried out an operation to neutralize German agents. Victor Lyagin, abandoned behind enemy lines, was captured by the Germans and shot: without betraying anyone, he refused to run as he would have to abandon his wounded radio operator. Ivan Kudrya (his wife was engaged in the preparation) penetrated the Abwehr intelligence network and handed over an important piece of information to Moscow before he was betrayed. Vladimir Molodtsov was captured by the Romanians. The trial of him and his group received much publicity. The entire Romanian newspaper wrote about this process. The press. When he and the members of the group were sentenced to death, the chairman of the court suggested that they appeal to the King of Romania for a pardon. Molodtsov replied: never will begin to ask for mercy from the enemy and will not apply with a similar request to the head of a foreign state whose soldiers are trampling our land. In my opinion, Lyagin, Molodtsov, Kuznetsov after the war was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Prior to my arrest, I made sure that their families received regular assistance and support from the security agencies.

Operatives Z. Zarubina and A. Kuprin personally took care of the families of the victims of the Chekists in the difficult war and post-war years. We helped them with clothes, food, placement of children for study. Partisan officers Morozov

and Kolesnikov were presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Yu. Kolesnikov received the title of Hero of the Russian Federation 50 years later in connection with the half-century anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany), underground workers Geft, Gordienko and a lot others. The participants of the operation "Berezino" and the dead heroes did not receive their awards for Norwegian resistance. But our sacred duty is to pay tribute to all the dead scouts, partisans and anti-fascists, those who were not properly marked in the war and post-war years.

The end of the war still lives in my memory as a grandiose event, at once it washed away all my doubts about the wisdom of the country's leadership. Heroic and tragic events of the past, human losses and even mass repressions - all this seemed justified in the face of the Great Victory over Hitler. I remember a big reception in the Georgievsky Hall of the Kremlin, where I was honored to sit at the same table with the deputy Chief of the General Staff General Shtemenko, head of the intelligence department of the NKVD

Fitin, head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff General Ilyichev, head Army Intelligence Colonel General Kuznetsov. I remember how Stalin approached our table, welcoming Isakov, who lost his leg during the German bombing in 1942 on Caucasus, and made a toast in his honor. Isakov could not go out in front of such an audience on crutches, and we were all touched to the core by Stalin's gesture. We felt like his children and heirs. Stalin's emphasis on young generals and admirals showed that he connected the future of the country with our generation.

## CHAPTER 7. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND THE ATOMIC PROBLEM

In 1943, the world famous physicist Niels Bohr, who fled from the occupied the Germans of Denmark to Sweden, asked the prominent scientists who were there, Elisabeth Meitner and Alf Vienna to inform Soviet representatives and scientists, in particular Kapitsa, that the German physicist Heisenberg visited him and said: in Germany, the question of creation of atomic weapons. Heisenberg invited the international scientific community refuse to create these weapons, despite the pressure of governments. I don't remember, Meitner or Alfven met in Gothenburg with a TASS correspondent and an employee of our intelligence Oblique and informed him that Bohr was concerned about the possible creation of atomic weapons in Hitler's Germany. Similar information from Bohr, even before his flight from Denmark, was received by British intelligence. Western scientists highly appreciated the scientific potential Soviet physicists, they were well aware of such prominent scientists as Ioffe, Kapitsa, and they sincerely believed that by providing information to the Soviet Union about atomic secrets and, by joining forces, it is possible to overtake the Germans in creating an atomic

bomb. These notes on the role of the NKVD in the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR are based on my personal memoirs, fragmentary archival documents, the role of the Russian emigration. As the curator of emigration work in the NKVD-MGB from 1938 to 1953, I consider it my duty to write about it.

Other episodes are based on what I was involved in, combining as it should from orders for the NKVD-MGB, duties of the head of group "C" - department "C" of the NKVD-MGB from February 2, 1944 to May 31, 1947 and the head of service "K" (counterintelligence provision of the nuclear industry) from November 10, 1945 to March 30, 1947. These units that I headed were independent services and never were part of the intelligence Directorate of the NKVD-MGB.

### Rumors about the scientific development of the "superweapon" are confirmed

Back in 1940, Soviet scientists, having learned about rumors circulating in Western Europe about the work over super-powerful weapons, took the first steps to identify the possibility of creating atomic bomb. However, they believed that the creation of such weapons was theoretically possible, but unlikely to be practicable in the near future. Commission of the Academy of Sciences for studying the problems of atomic energy under the chairmanship of academician Khlopin, a specialist on radiochemistry, nevertheless recommended to the government and scientific institutions track scientific publications of Western experts on this issue. Although the government did not allocate funds for atomic research, the head of the department scientific and technical intelligence of the NKVD Kvasnikov sent an orientation to the residencies in Scandinavia, Germany, England and the USA, obliging them to collect all information on the development "superweapon" - a uranium bomb. This

initiative of Kvasnikov is connected with other dramatic events, when in Physicists in Germany, the USA and England began to study the possibilities of creating nuclear weapons long before the American government organized a special center for building the atomic bomb at Los Alamos.

In the autumn of 1939, leading German physicists under the leadership of E. Schumann

(a close relative of the famous composer) were united in the "Uranium Society" under the control of army weapons, which, in particular, included Werner Heisenberg, Karl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Paul Gratek, Otto Hahn, Wilhelm Groth and others. Scientific

Berlin Physics Institute of the Kaiser Society became the center of atomic research

Wilhelm, and Professor Heisenberg was appointed its rector. To participate in scientific developments, the physicochemical institutes of the Hamburg, Leipzig, Greifswald, Heidelberg and Rostock universities were connected. Within two years, the Heisenberg

group carried out initial theoretical research and experiments needed to create a nuclear reactor using uranium and heavy water. It was also found that the isotope can serve as an explosive uranium-238 - uranium-235 contained in ordinary uranium ore.

The planned research in Germany required sufficient supplies of uranium, the production of heavy water or pure graphite. For laboratory development, there was enough ore supplied from the Jáchymov deposit from Czechoslovakia, but later uranium much more was required. Even more difficult was the situation with heavy water. However problems were soon resolved. After the occupation of Belgium in the spring of 1940, at the enrichment The Germans seized about 1200 tons of uranium concentrate from the factory of the Union Minier concern, which amounted to almost half of the world's available uranium reserve (the other part of the reserve in September of the same year was smuggled from the Congo to New York). With the occupation of Norway in the hands of the German leaders of the atomic project was the Norsk-Hydro plant in Ryukan, at that time the only manufacturer and supplier of heavy water in the world (on the eve Occupation, 185 kilograms of heavy water were exported at the request of Joliot-Curie to Paris, which also ends up in the USA).

In December 1940, under the leadership of Heisenberg, the construction of the first experimental reactor, and the Auergesellschaft company mastered the production of uranium metal in Oranienburg. At the same time, the search for ways began in the secret laboratories of Siemens industrial purification of graphite for use as a neutron moderator in reactor in the absence of heavy water, as well as the design electric power supply of the project.

It is significant that almost at the same time, by the decision of the Special Conference of the NKVD in In April 1940, the famous German physicist F. Houtermans was expelled from the USSR. He for a long time he worked at the Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkov, in particular, with famous physicist Landau, dealt with nuclear physics. Houtermans was arrested in December 1937 "as a suspicious foreigner pretending to an anti-fascist refugee. The greatest physicists of the world spoke in defense of Houtermans: Bohr, Einstein, Joliot-Curie. While in custody, Houtermans agreed to cooperate with the NKVD after his return to Germany. This circumstance was purely formal. Houtermans, as a communist sympathizer, was immediately arrested Gestapo. Nevertheless, at the request of German physicists, he was soon released from prison and engaged in scientific work in Germany.

The turn in the fate of Houtermans, however, led to a sharp intensification of all research on the possibilities of creating atomic weapons in the USA and England in 1941. Houtermans instructed his confidant, the German physicist F. Reich, who left Germany in 1941, to inform physicists about the actual start of work in Nazi Germany on creation of atomic weapons.

Hovakimyan, our intelligence resident in New York, informed us in April 1941 about a meeting between a refugee from Nazi Germany and the most prominent physicists of the Western world who were in the United States, during which a huge potential military significance of the uranium problem. However, on the eve of the war, these materials were not given essential value. Great

success in this priority area of our intelligence activities was achieved after we sent to Washington and as a resident of Zarubin ("Cooper", "Maxim") - under the guise of the post of secretary of the embassy "Zubilina" - together with his wife Lisa, an intelligence veteran.

Stalin received Zarubin on October 12, 1941, on the eve of his departure for Washington. Then The Germans were near Moscow. Stalin told Zarubin that his main task in the future year lies in our political influence on the United States through agents of influence.

Until that time, intelligence work to collect political information in America was minimal because we had no conflict of interest with the US in geopolitical sphere. But at the beginning of the war, the Kremlin was very concerned about the US data that US government circles are considering the issue of the possibility of recognizing the Kerensky government as a legitimate authority in Russia in the event defeat of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany, and the Soviet leadership realized the importance and the need to obtain information about the intentions of the American government, since US participation in the war against Hitler was of great importance.

Zarubin was supposed to create a large-scale and effective undercover intelligence system not only to track events, but also to influence them. However, those admitted to the Center for a year and a half intelligence materials from England, USA, Scandinavia and Germany to develop nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed the direction of our efforts.

Less than a month before Zarubin's departure, the British diplomat MacLean, our trusted an agent from the Cambridge group, working at the time under the pseudonym "List", reported documented evidence that the British government pays serious attention development of a bomb of incredible destructive power based on the action of an atomic energy.

Since 1939, I have been in charge of intelligence operations related to the use of famous Cambridge group, including developments by Philby and McLean. In July 1939 I made the decision to re-establish contact with McLean, Philby, Burges, Cairncross and Blunt, although they could have been discovered by Alexander Orlov, who fled to the West.

When France was defeated in June 1940, McLean, who worked for English embassy in France, returned to London to the Foreign Office. IN London, he acted under the operational leadership of the resident Gorsky (one of his aliases "Vadim").

September 16, 1941 British War Cabinet - this was the name of the Cabinet of Ministers during the war - considered a special report on the creation of a uranium plant within two years bombs. The uranium bomb project was called "Pipe Alloy". For these jobs large British concern "Imperial Chemical Industries" were allocated huge facilities. McLean gave us a sixty-page report from the British War Cabinet discussing this project. Our

other source, an agent from Imperial Chemical Industries, said that the management of the concern considers the issue of the atomic bomb only in theoretical terms. At the same time, we learned that the British Chiefs of Staff also decided to build a plant to create an atomic bomb. Our resident in London Gorsky urgently asked the Center to examine the materials sent to us.

Initially, scientists gave a negative conclusion on these materials. Because the our scientists considered the question of atomic weapons only as a theoretical possibility, we were not surprised that the information on the uranium bomb was controversial character. Our

intelligence activities in the United States at that time were aimed at opposition from Germany and Japan. Heifetz, a San Francisco resident, tried to recruit agents in the United States for its subsequent use in Germany, but did not achieve significant results, since he had connections mainly in the Jewish communities of the American Pacific coast. The tasks of

Kheifets and Zarubin included the neutralization of the anti-Soviet activities of the white emigration to the United States, represented by such figures as Kerensky, former prime minister Provisional Government, and Chernov, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, expelled from Russia by decree Lenin in 1922. The

fact is that we began to receive aid under Lend-Lease, and it was extremely important to create in the eyes of Americans the most favorable impression of our country, especially since

Roosevelt's government reacted very painfully to criticism of his ties with the Soviet Union. Union, distributed in Congress and in the pages of newspapers. We sought to identify which To the extent this criticism is inspired by white emigration.

However, all this faded into the background when Kheifets and our operative Semyonov reported that the American authorities intend to attract outstanding scientists, including number of Nobel Prize winners, to the development of a top secret problem, and for these purposes the government allocates twenty percent of the total expenditure on military-technical research. Heifetz also said that he was associated with the illegal network of the US Communist Party prominent physicist Oppenheimer and his colleagues leave California and go to a new place to carry out work on the creation of an atomic bomb. Until

February 1942, I served as deputy head of foreign intelligence and remember those messages. They contained extremely important information, which contributed to changing our skeptical attitude towards the atomic problem.

The decision of the Americans to allocate such large sums for a nuclear project in this dangerous for the Allies, the period of the war convinced us that it was of vital importance and could be actually performed. The first

meeting between Heifetz and Oppenheimer took place in December 1941 in San Francisco at a gathering to collect donations to help refugees and veterans civil war in Spain. Kheifets attended this meeting as a Soviet vice consul. He spoke English, German and French well and was an extraordinary personality. Back in the 1930s, as a deputy resident in Italy, he noticed and began the primary development of Fermi and his young student Pontecorvo, who stood out for their anti-fascist views and could become sources scientific and technical information.

I met Kheifets in the 1930s, when he came to Moscow, and immediately fell under his charm, which was combined with the high professionalism of a scout. Heifetz some worked as Krupskaya's secretary. His uncle was one of the founders of the US Communist Party when he worked in the Comintern. While illegal in Germany, Heifetz He graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Jena with a degree in engineering. Heifetz as a Jew risked his head in Germany, but his dark skin allowed him to use fake documents of a refugee student from India studying in Germany. Heifetz

moved in various circles in San Francisco, was highly respected communists and leftists (they called him "Mr. Brown"). The secular salon patronized by him Mrs. Bramson was often visited by illegal members of the US Communist Party Robert Oppenheimer and his brother Frank. Kheifetz told me that he met twice with Oppenheimer and his wife at a cocktail party. By that time, Heifetz had already heard rumors about the beginning of work on a superbomb, but Moscow still doubted the importance and urgency atomic problem. At

the same time, Heifetz reported that Oppenheimer had mentioned a secret letter from Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt in 1939, in which he drew his attention to the need for research to create new weapons in connection with the threat of fascism.

Oppenheimer was disappointed that the government's quick response to the letter Einstein did not follow and that work is unfolding slowly. An experienced

professional, Heifetz knew perfectly well how to win over Oppenheimer. There was no question of offering him money, resorting to threats or blackmail. using compromising materials. Through personal charm, he established trusting relationship with Oppenheimer through his brother Frank, discussing the complex the situation in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the threat looming over the world fascism.

In the traditional sense of the word, Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard were never ours. agents. This was also claimed by Kvasnikov, who headed the Soviet Union in 1947-1960. scientific and technical intelligence: "The scientists who worked with our intelligence should be called agents it was impossible."

Heifetz's information was extremely important. The Center instructed Semenov



(codename "Twain") check the messages received from Heifetz. Semenov was supposed to identify the main scientists-specialists involved in the work on the top-secret project, and to determine the specific role of each.

Semyonov came to the state security agencies in 1937. He was one of the few higher technical education, and he was sent to study in the USA, in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in order to further use in the line of scientific and technical intelligence. He acted effectively as an operational officer under the direct supervision of Ovakimyan, who worked under the guise of the Soviet foreign trade company Amtorg in New York. It was Semenov and his assistant Kurnakov who managed to establish strong contacts with physicists close to Oppenheimer from Los Alamos who worked in the 1920s and 1930s years in the Soviet Union and who had connections in the Russian and anti-fascist emigration in the United States. Thus, the main channel for information on the atomic bomb began to operate regularly. It was Semyonov who attracted the Cohens, who acted as couriers, to cooperate. Lona Cohen gave us in 1945 the most important scientific materials on the design of the atomic bomb.

Semyonov, using his connections at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, identified which of the prominent scientists involved in the so-called Manhattan Project to create atomic bomb, and independently of Heifetz reported in the spring of 1942 that not only scientists, but and the US government are taking a serious interest in this issue. Semenov also reported that a well-known specialist in explosives was involved in the project Kistyakovsky, Ukrainian by nationality.

We immediately instructed to use agents among the Russian émigrés to providing approaches to Kistyakovsky. However, two of our important agents in the United States - a former General of the tsarist army Yakhontov, married to the sister of the wife of the Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulova, who emigrated to the United States after the Civil War, and Sergei Kurnakov, a veteran operations of the GPU for emigration to the United States, failed to attract

Kistyakovsky. For some time, Semenov was in touch with the spouses Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, attracted to cooperation with our intelligence service by Ovakimyan back in the 30s. The scientific and technical information of the Rosenbergs was not significant - they their relatives were a safety net, far from the main operations. Later, their arrest and trial attracted worldwide attention.

Semenov probably plays the main role in creating a channel for intelligence information on the atomic bomb, through which in 1941-1945 we received, as Terletsky writes in his memoirs, American secret reports, and also English materials describing the main experiments to determine parameters of nuclear reactions, reactors, various types of uranium boilers, diffusion separation plants, diary entries on the testing of the atomic bomb and the similar. In

March 1942, McLean provided us with documentary data on intensive work on the atomic problem in England. In the same year, Soviet military intelligence attracted Fuchs cooperation.

Flerov's warning about possible work on the atomic bomb, signals about interest of the Germans in the atomic problem from the underground group of the NKVD from the occupied Kharkov

Important events have also taken place in our country. In May 1942, Stalin received a letter from a young physicist, a specialist in nuclear reactions, the future academician Flerov, who drew attention to the suspicious absence in the foreign press since 1940 open scientific publications on the uranium problem, and this, in his opinion, testified about the beginning of work on the creation of atomic weapons in Germany and other countries. Flerov warned that the Germans could be the first to create an atomic bomb. In

time, the receipt of this letter coincided with the information of our residency, from German-occupied Kharkov. We were informed that the former political emigrant in the USSR F. Houtermans arrived in Kharkov with a special mission sent to the military command of Germany in order to obtain additional data in the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology on the use for military purposes of Soviet research on

uranium problem. Houtermans during the German occupation of Kharkov actually became one of leaders of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology. In agency messages it was stated that Houtermans arrived in Kharkov "in SS uniform."

With the approval of the leadership, I immediately informed Kapitsa about the appearance of Houtermans in Kharkov and Kyiv as part of the German military mission to dismantle scientific equipment. Kapitsa attached great importance to this message, pointing out that it confirms the development work in Germany on the creation of a uranium bomb.

And to me (at that time I was organizing the partisan movement and collecting intelligence information on Germany and Japan) were instructed to find out everything about nuclear developments in Germany.

Information from agents received in business and industrial circles in Sweden was controversial. Rumors about the work of the Germans stubbornly circulated in Germany and Scandinavia on the "superweapon", but we did not know any details about these works. Only after war, it became clear that the "superweapon" meant a two-stage missile based on V-2 model that could reach the coast of the United States.

Information on the atomic bomb, received from the United States and England, coincided. She was confirmed when we received a message about the possibility of creating an atomic bomb from the words prominent nuclear physicist Elisabeth Meitner. Meitner was in the field of view of our intelligence from when, in 1938, the question arose of the possibility of her coming to the Soviet Union for work. Then she had to flee from Nazi Germany to Sweden, where Niels Bohr helped her to get a job at the Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences. female agents who went out on Meitner, instructed, at the direction of Beria, the deputy resident of the NKVD in Stockholm Zoya Rybkina.

In March 1942, Beria sent Stalin all the information received from the United States, England, Scandinavia and occupied Kharkov. In the letter, he indicated that scientific work

was underway in America and England to create atomic weapons.

In February 1943, when the British secret services carried out a sabotage operation in Vemork (Norway), where there was a heavy water plant needed for a nuclear reactor, Stalin believed that the atomic project was acquiring real content. About the details of the sabotage to us reported our sources in Norway, Philby and the Cambridge group from London. I didn't give of particular importance to these messages, because the damage from it seemed to me insignificant, and I was surprised when Beria ordered me to take note of this operation. Naturally, he was alerted that, despite the agreement with the British on a joint using our intelligence teams in Scandinavia, Western Europe and Afghanistan to conducting major operations of sabotage and sabotage, the British did not ask us about supporting his raid in Vemork. This indicated that the sabotage operation in The British attached special importance to Norway.

Until the beginning of 1943, we have no practical work in the field of creating an atomic bomb was not done. Even before the German attack, the State Commission for Military-Industrial research rejected the proposals of young nuclear physicists of the Institute physical and technical research in Kharkov and the German scientist emigrant Lange to begin work on the creation of a super-powerful explosive device. The proposal was sent to department of inventions of the People's Commissariat of Defense, but it was considered premature and was not supported.

In March 1942, Beria proposed to Stalin to create under the State Committee Defense scientific advisory group of eminent scientists and senior officials for coordination of the work of scientific organizations on the study of atomic energy. He also requested Stalin to be allowed to acquaint our prominent scientists with information on the atomic problem, obtained through intelligence, for its assessment. Stalin agreed and suggested that several scholars have independently reached an opinion on this issue.

On the problem of creating an atomic bomb in the near future, they spoke out, on the one hand side, Academician Ioffe and his young student Professor Kurchatov, who were introduced to intelligence materials, on the other - Academician Kapitsa (he was informed orally about the work on the atomic bomb in the USA, England and Germany).

Ioffe was involved in research on atomic energy on the advice of Academician Vernadsky. He was known to Western scientists because in the 1920s and 1930s he made study trips to the laboratories of Western Europe and the USA. In 1934, while in Belgium, Ioffe turned down an offer to go to work in the USA, although at that time the contradictions between physicists in our scientific circles sharply escalated. Moscow and Leningrad scientists clashed especially sharply. An irreconcilable position towards the Ioffe school was taken, in particular, by some influential professors of Moscow University. This went on for over a year. (I remember how a Moscow professor said to me: "Pavel Anatolyevich, why are you consulting with these figures from the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology? This is a gang!") Ioffe appreciated the enormous importance of information about atomic research in America and supported the need to start work on creating Soviet atomic bomb. Subsequently, Ioffe played a prominent role in settling conflicts between scientists at Moscow University and the Academy of Sciences, and he was one of the initiators of the creation of the three main Centers for Atomic Research shortly after the war. Kapitsa believed that the problem of creating an atomic

bomb posed a challenge to modern physics and its solution was possible only through the joint efforts of our scientists and scientists from the USA and England, where fundamental research on atomic energy is being carried out.

I was told that in October 1942, at his dacha in Kuntsevo, Stalin received only Vernadsky and Ioffe. Vernadsky, referring to an informal agreement between the world's leading physicists on joint work, suggested that Stalin turn to Niels Bohr and other scientists who emigrated to the United States, as well as to the American and British governments, with a request to share information with us and work together on atomic energy. To this, Stalin replied that scientists are politically naive if they think that Western governments will provide us with information on weapons that will make it possible in the future to dominate the world. However, Stalin agreed that an informal probing approach to Western experts on behalf of our scientists could be useful.

After this meeting, as Vannikov, People's Commissar of Ammunition, one of the leaders of the atomic program, later told me, for the first time the country's leadership finally became convinced of the real possibility of creating atomic weapons, and Stalin was so fascinated by the powerful destructive potential of the atomic bomb that at the end of October 1942 he offered to give the code name for our counter-offensive at Stalingrad was Operation Uranus. In all his ideas and proposals, he always had this inner motive, incomprehensible to his interlocutors.

On the basis of information from London from a source in the Imperial Chemical Industries concern, which played an important role in the English Pipe Alloy project, Stalin ordered Pervukhin, the People's Commissar for the chemical industry, to give the most serious support to scientists in the work on creating atomic weapons.

### **Kapitsa and Kurchatov: it is possible to solve the problems of creating an atomic bomb**

A year has passed. Kapitsa, informed by the NKVD in 1942-1943 about the Houtermans mission in occupied Kharkov and about the beginning of work in the USA and Germany on atomic weapons, several times turned to Stalin and Beria with proposals to invite Bohr to head our atomic program. In agreement with Molotov, he wrote a letter to Bohr, in which he asked him to come to the Soviet Union, where he was guaranteed the best conditions for work. When Bohr was in England, he was invited to the Soviet embassy, where he met Gorsky, a resident of the NKVD, who acted under the guise of an adviser to the embassy, but during the conversation Bohr avoided discussing issues of atomic research. At the end of January 1943, information was received from

Semenov ("Twain") that in December 1942 in Chicago, Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction. Our source, as far as I remember, the young Pontecorvo, reported the phenomenal success of Fermi with the conditional phrase: "The Italian navigator reached the New World." However, this information was of the most general nature, and a few months later Kurchatov requested additional information.

materials about the first nuclear reaction.

At the same time, Barkovsky handed over from London closed scientific works of Western scientists on atomic energy for 1940-1942. These first scientific materials confirmed that Western scientists had made great progress in building the atomic bomb.

Thus, we had not only oral communications, but also protocols discussions at the meetings of the British military cabinet of the prospects for the use of atomic energy to create super-powerful weapons.

In 1943, Vasilevsky was appointed resident in Mexico City. He was well suited for this work: he had experience of the war in Spain, where he commanded a sabotage partisan detachment; he successfully completed undercover operations in 1939-1941 in Paris; he adapted to life in the West, was always well dressed, smart, owned French and Spanish, had an extraordinary ability to win over people and engage in cooperation under a convenient pretext. Vasilevsky succeeded restore ties with agents in the United States and Mexico, attracted by Eitingon and Grigulevich for the operation to eliminate Trotsky. In 1939-1941,

during his stay in the United States, Eitingon was granted the extraordinary right to recruit and engage people for cooperation without the sanction of the Center, using family ties. Vasilevsky knew this agency, since he was one of the of the active participants in the operation in Mexico. Before leaving for Mexico, he received special permission to use these people. Through these canned for some time, Vasilevsky's channels established contact with Pontecorvo in Canada and some Fermi Labs in Chicago, bypassing our residency in New York. Pontecorvo told Vasilevsky that Fermi was positive about the idea of sharing information on atomic energy with scientists from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

On February 11, 1943, Stalin signed a government decree on the organization work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Molotov headed this business. Then However, it was decided, in view of the importance of the atomic problem, to make it a priority in intelligence activities of the NKVD. Beria initially acted as Molotov's deputy and was responsible for providing the military and scientists with intelligence information. I I remember how he ordered me to acquaint Ioffe, Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov with scientific materials obtained undercover, without disclosing the sources of information.

Kikoin, after reading the report on the first nuclear chain reaction, was unusually excited and although I didn't tell him who did it, I immediately responded: "This is Fermi's work. He the only scientist in the world who can create such a miracle." I had to show them some materials in the original in English. In order not to disclose specific sources of information, I covered with my palm that part of the document where there were signatures and sources were listed. The scientists said excitedly: "Listen, Pavel Anatolyevich, you too naive. We know who in the world of physics is capable of what. You give us your materials, and we will tell you who their authors are". Ioffe immediately named the author Frisch based on other materials. I immediately reported this to Beria and received permission to disclose to Ioffe, Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov the sources of information. In April 1943, a

special laboratory No. 2 on the atomic problem was created at the USSR Academy of Sciences, with Kurchatov appointed its head. He barely turned Forty years. It was a bold decision. But we knew that the American nuclear project headed by 44-year-old Oppenheimer, who did not have the title of Nobel Prize winner. Our physicists of the older generation could not believe that Bohr and Fermi were working under Oppenheimer. Already in December 1943, on the direct orders of Stalin, Kurchatov was elected full member of the Academy of Sciences.

## Group "C"

Having received from the NKVD a report on the first nuclear chain reaction carried out by Fermi, Kurchatov turned to Pervukhin with a request to instruct the intelligence agencies to find out a number of important questions about the state of atomic research in the United States. In connection with this, there was

the activities of the intelligence services of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the NKVD were reorganized. During five years, in 1940-1945, scientific and technical intelligence was carried out by special subdivisions and departments of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and the 1st Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB, of which I was deputy head until February 1942. In 1944 it was accepted the decision that the NKVD would coordinate intelligence activities on the atomic problem. IN In connection with this, under my leadership, a group "C" (Sudoplatov's group) was created, which later, in 1945, it became an independent department "C". In addition to coordinating activities The intelligence department and the NKVD for collecting information on the atomic problem, the group, and later the department, were entrusted with the functions of implementing the data received within the country. Great work on processing of incoming scientific and technical information on the atomic bomb was carried out employees of department "C" Zoya Zarubina, Zemskov, Massya, Groznova, Pokrovsky. Zarubina and Zemskov, as far as I remember, under the leadership of Terletsky translated the most important materials on the design of nuclear reactors and the atomic bomb itself. By the time Zoya Zarubina had extensive experience in operational and translation work, participated in events of the Yalta and Potsdam Allied Conferences in 1945. According to By decision of the government, Department "C" became the working apparatus of Bureau No. 2 of the Special Committee government of the USSR on "Problem No. 1". Qualified specialists and scientists who worked in the department regularly reported on the intelligence materials they received on meetings of the committee and the scientific and technical council, which was headed by the People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov.

Kurchatov and the scientists of his group often visited Beria, discussing issues of organizing works in accordance with the information received from the NKVD. In fact, Kurchatov and Ioffe put before Stalin the question of replacing Molotov with Beria as the head of all work on the atomic problem.

Usually, after visiting Beria's office at the Lubyanka, Kurchatov, Kikoin, Alikhanov and Ioffe went up to me, where we dined in the rest room, after which they went deeper into work on documents received from abroad. Our scientists, in

order to speed up scientific work on atomic energy, were very

We are interested in regular acquaintance with the progress of these works in the USA. In a letter dated March 7 1943 to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Pervukhin Kurchatov wrote:

"Obtaining this material is of tremendous, invaluable significance for our state and science. Now we have important guidelines for the subsequent scientific research, they enable us to bypass many, very laborious phases development of the uranium problem and learn about new scientific and technical ways to solve it. Kurchatov emphasized that "the totality of information ... indicates a technical the possibility of solving the whole problem in a much shorter time than our scientists who are not yet familiar with the progress of work on this problem abroad.

In another letter dated March 22, 1943, Kurchatov reported that he had carefully considered the latest work of the Americans on transuranium elements and established a new direction in solution to the whole uranium problem. "Until now," writes Kurchatov, "work on transuranic elements in our country were not carried out. In this regard, I ask you to give an instruction to the intelligence agencies to find out what has been done in the direction in question in America."

Our sources of information and agents in England and the USA obtained 286 secret scientific documents and classified publications on atomic energy. In his notes in March— In April 1943, Kurchatov named the seven most important scientific centers and 26 specialists in United States, from which information was of great importance, From the point of view of intelligence activities, this meant the operational development of American scientists as sources of important information.

In February 1944, the first meeting of the leaders of military intelligence and NKVD on the atomic problem in Beria's office on the Lubyanka. From the military were present Ilyichev and Milshtein, from the NKVD - Fitin and Ovakimyan. I was officially introduced as leader of the "C" group, who coordinated efforts in this area. Since then, intelligence

The People's Commissariat of Defense regularly sent us all the information that came in on the nuclear problem. I

must confess that I was not pleased with Beria's order. Leading the work of the "C" group in coordinating the production and implementation of intelligence on the atomic bomb, I experienced difficulties, since I did not have a technical education, not to mention knowledge in the field of physics. At the same time, I led the actions of sabotage partisan detachments in the rear of the German armies, and that was my main responsibility.

In the fall of 1944, Beria, as deputy chairman of the government, who oversaw the production of weapons and ammunition, officially led the work on creation of atomic weapons. It was initiated by Kurchatov. His letter is extremely important character and deserves to be published without cuts:

"Deputy Chairman  
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR  
Comrade L.P. Beria

In a letter from Comrade M. G. Pervukhin and mine addressed to you, we reported on the status of work on problem of uranium and their colossal development abroad.

During the last month I have been engaged in a preliminary study of new very extensive (3000 pages of text) materials relating to the problem of uranium.

This study once again showed that a concentration of scientific and

engineering and technical forces, which have already achieved the most valuable results. We have, in spite of a big shift in the development of work on uranium in 1943-1944, the state of affairs remains completely unsatisfactory. Especially

unfavorable is the situation with raw materials and separation issues. Job laboratory No 2 is not sufficiently provided with material and technical base. Works of many related organizations do not receive the necessary development due to the lack of a unified leadership and underestimation in these organizations of the significance of the problem.

Knowing your extremely busy schedule, I nevertheless, in view of the historical significance problems of uranium, I decided to disturb you and ask you to give instructions on such an organization work that would correspond to the capabilities and significance of our Great State in world culture. I.

Kurchatov  
Moscow  
29 Sept. 1944"

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In 1944, Kheifets returned to Moscow and reported to me and Beria his impressions of meetings with Oppenheimer and other famous scientists involved in the atomic project. He said that Oppenheimer and his entourage were deeply concerned that the Germans might get ahead of America in building the atomic bomb.

After listening to Heifetz's report, Beria said that the time had come for a closer cooperation between security agencies and scientists. To improve relationships, remove suspiciousness and critical attitude of specialists towards the NKVD bodies, Beria suggested to establish more trusting, personal relations with Kurchatov, Kikoin and Alikhanov. I invited the scientists to my house for dinner. However, this was not only a hospitable gesture: order of Beria, I and my deputies - Generals Eitingon and Sazykin - as operational workers had to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Kurchatov, Alikhanov and Kikoin. We behaved with them as friends, confidants to whom they could turn with their daily worries and requests. One evening,

after working on the next material, we had dinner in the room recreation. There was a bottle of the best Armenian cognac on the table. I don't at all tolerate alcohol, even a small dose has always caused me a severe headache, and I

it seemed that our leading scientists, in their temperament and intense mental work, also do not consume alcoholic beverages. So I offered them a teaspoon of brandy in tea. They looked at me in amazement, laughed and poured themselves full glasses, drinking for the success of our common

cause. At the beginning of 1944, Beria ordered me to send all intelligence materials, developments and signals affecting people involved in the atomic problem and their relatives. Soon I received a special message that Kikoin's younger brother naively shared his doubts about the wisdom of leadership with a colleague, and he immediately reported this operational worker who was in touch. When I informed

Beria about this, he ordered me to call Kikoin and say him to influence his brother. I decided not to call Kikoin, so I went to see him in laboratory and told about the "pranks" of his younger brother. Kikoin promised to talk to him. Their explanation was recorded by the operational listening technique established in apartments of leading atomic scientists.

I was surprised that the next day Beria showed up at Kikoin's laboratory to finally dispel his fears about his brother. He gathered the whole trio - Kurchatov, Alikhanov, Kikoin - and said in my presence that General Sudoplatov had been attached to them for in order to provide full cooperation and assistance in the work; that they enjoy absolute trust of Comrade Stalin and his personal. All the information that is provided to them should help in fulfilling the task of the Soviet government. Beria repeated: there are no reasons to worry about the fate of their relatives or people they trust - they absolute security guaranteed. Scientists will be created such living conditions that will make it possible to concentrate only on solving issues that have strategic importance for the state.

At the direction of Beria, all scientists involved in the Soviet atomic project were provided with decent housing, dachas, used special shops, where they could, on a par with government leaders to buy goods on special cards; all personnel of the nuclear the project was provided with special nutrition and highly qualified medical help. At the same time, all the personal files of scientists, specialists and operatives directly involved in the project or in obtaining intelligence information through atomic problem, were transferred from the personnel department to the secretariat of Beria. Then in Beria's secretariat from the American department handed over the most important operational materials on atomic energy, obtained by intelligence. From the case of the operational development of "Enommoz" on atomic bomb, still kept in the archives of the foreign intelligence service, about two hundred pages. In order to strengthen the security regime, without the sanction of Beria, no one had access to these materials. I remember the conflict with Beria's deputy Zavenyagin, who demanded to familiarize him with the documents. I refused him, and we had a strong quarrel; he received access to intelligence materials only after Beria's permission.

The great administrative abilities of Beria in solving the atomic problem are recognized and participants in our atomic program, for example, Academician Khariton in his interview about creation of the atomic bomb in the Ogonyok magazine (1993).

When we received information that the American authorities are paying special attention to secrecy of their atomic project, Eitingon and I suggested using groups illegal immigrants as couriers and to work with sources of information: we understood that American counterintelligence will pay attention to the connections of Heifetz with pro-communist circles that have access to the Manhattan Project specialists. Having received directive from Moscow, Zarubin ordered Kheifetz to immediately stop intelligence operations using Communist Party activists.

However, a number of Communist Party activists continued to act on their own initiative. IN 1943, violating the instructions received from Zarubin, they, not knowing about our visits to the family Oppenheimer, turned to him with a request to provide information to the Soviet Union for work at Los Alamos. Oppenheimer, who was afraid of revealing ties through his wife and brother with our people, was forced to inform the American intelligence services about this request of a familiar physicist associated with the Communist Party. This led to the fact that all communications with

prominent physicists who participated in the work on the atomic bomb were switched to the channel of illegal intelligence and the use of special couriers who had impeccable cover in the eyes of American counterintelligence.

### **Agents target circles close to Oppenheimer, the Communist Party, Jewish and Russian emigration to the USA**

In 1943-1944 we used various channels of approach to American atomic secrets. Our main targets were the Los Alamos laboratories, factories Oak Ridge and the Berkeley Nuclear Research Laboratory. We also tried to infiltrate to industrial firms that carried out orders related to the creation of atomic weapons.

In 1943, the famous actor, head of the Moscow Jewish Theater Mikhoels, together with the Jewish poet, our trusted agent, Fefer, made a long trip to the USA as head of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Operational ensuring the visit of Mikhoels and the development of his connections in the Jewish communities was carried out by Heifetz.

Beria received Mikhoels and Fefer on the eve of his departure and instructed them to spend in the USA widespread propaganda of the great importance of the contribution of the Jewish people to the development of science and culture of the Soviet Union and convince American public opinion that anti-Semitism in The USSR was completely liquidated as a result of Stalin's national policy.

Zarubin and Kheifets, through proxies, informed Oppenheimer and Einstein about position of the Jews in the USSR. According to them, Oppenheimer and Einstein were deeply moved by the fact that in the USSR Jews are guaranteed a safe and happy life. At the same time before Oppenheimer and Einstein heard rumors about Stalin's plan to create a Jewish Autonomous republic in the Crimea after the victory in the war against

fascism. Oppenheimer and Fermi did not know that already at that time they figured in our operational materials as sources of information under the code names "Director reservations", "Promissory note", "Ernst". The pseudonym "Promissory note" was sometimes used for the source of generalized materials received from physicists participating in the American atomic project. As far as I remember, under the common pseudonym "Star" sometimes appeared Oppenheimer and Fermi. I repeat once again - none of them have ever been ours recruited intelligence agent.

The wife of the famous sculptor Konenkov, our trusted agent, who acted under leadership of Lisa Zarubina, became close to the leading physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein at Princeton. She managed to charm Oppenheimer's inner circle. After Oppenheimer cut off ties with the American Communist Party, Konenkov, under the leadership of Lisa Zarubina and Pastelnyak ("Luka"), an employee of our residency in New York, constantly influenced Oppenheimer and even earlier persuaded him to hire specialists known for their leftist beliefs, the development of which our illegal immigrants and Semenov's agents.

Liza Zarubina, wife of Vasily Zarubin, a US resident, was an outstanding personality. Charming and sociable, she easily established friendships in the widest circles. An elegant woman with features of classical beauty, a refined nature, she is like a magnet attracted people to herself. Lisa was one of the most highly qualified agency recruiters. She recruited refugees from Poland and one of the assistants Szilard. She found a way to Szilard through one of his relatives in Moscow, who worked in a special NKVD laboratory for aviation technology. Lisa is great at speaking English, German, French and Romanian. She looked typical representative of Central Europe, but could unrecognizably change her appearance and demeanor. Lisa was related to Anna Pauker, a prominent member of the Romanian Communist Party. Lisa's older brother led the military organization of Romanian communists, and when he was tried by a military tribunal, he managed to escape twice from the hall of court. In 1922, he died in a shootout.

Lisa became an intelligence officer as early as 1919. At one time she



worked in the secretariat of Dzerzhinsky. Her first husband was Blumkin, who shot Moscow and 1918 by the German ambassador Count Mirbach. Blumkin was a key figure in SR conspiracy against Lenin in July 1918. When the Social Revolutionary rebellion failed, Blumkin turned himself in, was forgiven and continued to work in the Cheka-GPU, performing tasks Dzerzhinsky and sometimes Trotsky, with whom he also knew. In 1929,

Blumkin created an illegal residency in Turkey under the guise of a trade firms, using funds received from the sale of Hasidic Hebrew manuscripts transferred to him from the special funds of the State Library. V. I. Lenin. This money was intended to create a military sabotage organization against the British in Turkey and the Middle East. However, Blumkin transferred part of the funds to Trotsky, who after being expelled from the USSR, he lived in Turkey. In addition, he brought to Moscow a letter from Trotsky addressed to

Radek. Lisa was shocked by this. She reported this to Management. Blumkin was arrested, and later shot. A few

years later, Lisa married Vasily Zarubin, who returned from China. They were sent to work illegally in Europe on false documents - matrimonial a couple of businessmen from Czechoslovakia. Zarubins spent seven years in various countries Western Europe, successfully conducted a number of necessary intelligence operations, including recruitment of a Gestapo officer Lehman ("Breitenbach") and the wife of an assistant minister Foreign Affairs of Germany ("Yuna"), with which Lisa kept in touch until May 1941.

In 1941, Liza Zarubina was awarded the rank of captain of state security. IN THE USA she often traveled to California, where Heifetz introduced her to the circle of people close to the family Oppenheimer. Thanks to Heifetz's connections, Lisa received all the installation data on the members Oppenheimer's family and relatives, who were distinguished by leftist views. Heifetz organized Lisa's meeting with Oppenheimer's wife Katherine, who sympathized with the Soviet Union and communist ideals. As far as I remember, Katherine Oppenheimer did not appear in operational documents as a source of information, but we worked through a woman close to Oppenheimer, and it seems to me that this woman was his wife. CIA veterans

who worked with us in the spring of 1992 on the archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU came across on the materials of the Comintern on Oppenheimer's connections with members of a conspiratorial cell US Communist Party. They also discovered a request from our intelligence to Dimitrov, the chairman Comintern, in June 1943 with a request to provide data for the use of these connections. Lisa Zarubina

and Heifetz, through Oppenheimer's wife Katherine, convinced Oppenheimer to refrain from openly expressing views in support of the communists and left circles, so as not to attract the attention of American intelligence agencies. They also persuaded Oppenheimer share information with scientists who fled Nazi persecution. Oppenheimer agreed to do this, and also to admit these people to scientific work in the atomic project, if he received confirmation of their anti-fascist views. Thus, Oppenheimer,

Fermi and Szilard helped us to introduce reliable undercover sources of information in Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and the Chicago laboratory. As far as I remember, there were four important sources of information in the United States that transmitted laboratory data to our residencies in New York and Washington. They also kept in touch with our illegal residency, which used a pharmacy as a front in Santa Fe. The materials that Semyonov and later Yatskov received in New York came from fuchs and one of our deep cover agents via couriers.

One of these couriers was Lona Cohen. Her husband, Maurice Cohen, was attracted to cooperation with Semenov. In 1939, Maurice married Lona and also attracted her to intelligence work. At first, Lona was uncooperative, seeing him as treason, but Maurice convinced her that they were acting in the name of higher justice and what cooperation is not betrayal at all. The Center agreed to her work, having in mind that in illegal operations married couples operate most effectively.

When Maurice was called up for military service in July 1942, it was decided as courier to use his wife. Yatskov ("Johnny"), an employee of the Soviet consulate in New York, received Lona Cohen for communication from Semenov. To cover your trips to the state

New Mexico Lona attended a tuberculosis sanitarium under the pretense of prophylaxis. A fictitious certificate of her illness was prepared by our illegal immigrants in Santa Fe. In 1992, Yatskov remembered her as a beautiful young woman. Soon after in August

1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities, Lona made a risky trip to the small town of Albuquerque. Lona met with the Mlad agents and "Ernst". "Mlad", he is a young physicist T. Hall, whose father worked as a furrier for factory of relatives of Eitingon in the USA, was attracted to cooperation by a major agent NKVD in white emigration S. Kurnakov (pseudonyms "Beck", "Cavalryman"). There she should were to hand over extremely important documents for the Moscow Center. Having received documents, Lona arrived at the station by the very departure of the train with a small suitcase, a bag and reticule. Under the conditions of the special regime introduced in this town, the service security checked the documents and luggage of all passengers. And here Lona showed high level of professional training. She placed the suitcase in front of the inspectors and nervously went through the contents of her bag in search of a lost ticket. She handed over her reticule, where under the napkins lay a bundle with drawings and a detailed description of the world's first atomic bombs, the conductor of the car, who held it while she was looking for a ticket. Lona got on the train confident that the conductor would definitely return her reticule. And so it happened. When Yatskov met her in New York, she told him that everything was fine, but the police almost kept these materials in your hands. This episode was first told by intelligence historian Chikov.

After the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1950, the Coens managed to elude American authorities. In Moscow, they received special training as illegal agents. Having received from our service New Zealand passports in the name of Peter and Helen Kroger, the Coens settled in London. They owned a second-hand bookstore and in their small house in the suburbs of London provided significant assistance in radio communications to KGB resident Konon Young, acting under the name of Gordon Lonsdale. The Cohens were arrested along with him in 1961 and sentenced by an English court to twenty years in prison, spent six years in prison, then they were exchanged. After their release, they lived in Moscow. Lona died in 1992, Maurice outlived her by three years.

Among the most prominent scientists we actively developed using their related connections and anti-fascist sentiments, was Georgy Gamov, a Russian physicist who fled to the United States in 1933 from Brussels, where an international congress of physicists was taking place. Opportunity use of Gamow and approaches to him through his relatives in the USSR, who in fact were our hostages, Academician Ioffe suggested to us. Gamow had extensive connections with American physicists and maintained friendly relations with Niels Bohr. We instructed Liza Zarubina to achieve his cooperation with us. Lisa contacted Gamow through his wife, also a physicist. Gamow taught at Georgetown University in Washington and that most importantly, he led the annual seminars on theoretical physics in Washington. Thus, he could discuss with the leading physicists of the world the latest, most promising development.

We managed to take advantage of the wide acquaintances that Gamow had. Lisa Zarubina forced Gamow's wife to cooperate in exchange for guarantees that relatives in The Union will be supported in difficult war years. I remember that

in some cases, American specialists violated the rules work with secret documents and showed Gamow reports on experiments, consulted him. Violation of the mode of work with documents was done by common agreement of scientists. An FBI audit in 1948 found over 1,500 pages missing from the report. documentation on the creation of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos. However, the Gamows succeeded receive orally the general characteristics of scientists, find out their moods, assessments real possibility of creating an atomic bomb. It seems to me that there was an informal agreement between Bohr, Fermi, Oppenheimer and Szilard to share secret developments on atomic weapons with a circle of left-wing anti-fascist scientists.

Another source in Tennessee who received information from Fermi and Pontecorvo was connected to an illegal group that also used a pharmacy in Santa Fe as a front, from where materials were couriered to Mexico. As far as I remember, three people -

researchers and clerks - copied the most important documents, getting to them accessed from Oppenheimer, Fermi and Weiskopf.

The pharmacy in Santa Fe, New Mexico was for an illegal residency set up in USA by Eitingon and Grigulevich in the operation against Trotsky, emergency turnout in 1940. As I already wrote, Eitingon and Grigulevich then received wide powers from Beria recruit agents without the authorization of the Center. By 1940, Grigulevich had a large intelligence work experience. In the 30s in Lithuania, he took part in the liquidation provocateurs of the Okhrana who infiltrated the Lithuanian Komsomol, then participated in operations against Trotskyists abroad, fought in Spain. For actions in Latin America, Grigulevich there was a reliable cover - a chain of pharmacies in Argentina, which was owned by his father.

In the chapter on Trotsky, I wrote that Eitingon and Grigulevich created a parallel illegal network that could be used in the United States and Mexico outside of contacts with Spanish emigration in these countries. Leaving America in 1941, Eitingon and Grigulevich the pharmacy was registered to one of the agents of their group. Now this network has helped to reach sources of information on the atomic problem that interest us.

## **The unspoken solidarity of the world's leading physicists. Scientists in the nuclear age**

Oppenheimer suggested that General Groves, director of the project, invite him to work in America the most prominent scientists of Europe. Among them was Niels Bohr. Bohr was by no means our agent, but he rendered us invaluable services. After a conversation with Meitner in 1943 in Sweden, he actively advocated sharing atomic secrets with the international anti-fascist community of scientists. In shaping the position of Bohr and Meitner, a huge the role was played by the famous Finnish writer Vuolijoki, a prominent agent of our intelligence. Vuolijoki was sentenced to death in Finland for spying for the USSR, but her released under public pressure (one of her sons-in-law was a deputy minister Foreign Affairs of Sweden, the other - one of the leaders of the Communist Party of England - Palm Dutt), and she ended up in Sweden.

Subsequently, through Vuolijoki and Meitner, we managed to find approaches to Bor and arrange with him a meeting of our employees Vasilevsky and Terletsky in November 1945 in Copenhagen.

In 1943, as one of the participants in the operation of our intelligence on atomic problem of the Feklisov, Oppenheimer proposed to include Klaus Fuchs in the group British specialists who arrived in Los Alamos to participate in work on the atomic bomb.

In 1933, the German communist Fuchs was forced to seek refuge in England. After graduating from the University of Bristol, he continued to work there as a physicist. IN In 1941, Fuchs reported his participation in atomic research to a prominent figure communist and labor movement to Jürgen Kuczynski. Kuchinsky informed our ambassador to England Maisky. Maisky was in a strained relationship with the NKVD resident in London Gorsky and therefore instructed the military attache Kremer to get in touch with Fuchs. Fuchs first met Ursula Kuczynski ("Sonya"), a military intelligence agent, one of organizers of the Red Chapel network.

Fuchs, before leaving for the United States, was instructed on the conditions for resuming communication with him. In the USA, Fuchs had to emphasize in communication with his American colleagues that he the only person in the group of British specialists who was threatened by German concentration camp. For this reason, Fuchs enjoyed Oppenheimer's absolute confidence and, according to his instructions, he gained access to materials to which he had no formal relation. Oppenheimer had to come into sharp conflict with General Groves, who categorically objected to the generalized information on the results of research and experiments (we were informed about this by Fuchs). By the way, the British authorities and intelligence also set before their specialists the task of collecting all the information on the atomic bomb, since the Americans were not going to share atomic secrets with them.

Perhaps there was another reason why Oppenheimer invited Fuchs to Los Alamos, and later to the Center for Scientific Research at Princeton. Maybe Oppenheimer knew that Fuchs would not stay in America after the war. I remember that in undercover materials recorded his words: information should be transmitted by those who, on personal circumstances will leave Los Alamos and the country after the end of work on the atomic bomb. In addition, Oppenheimer had reason to believe that Fuchs was associated with the Communists, and this could also play a role.

Liza Zarubina re-established contact with two deeply undercover agents, Polish Jews, on the west coast. They were legalized by Eitingon in the early 30s years during his brief illegal business trip to the United States. It was originally planned that these agents would settle in California in order to organize sabotage on transport ships exporting strategic raw materials (coal, oil, metal) to Japan in the event of a military conflict. between the USSR and Japan. For more than ten years, these agents have not been involved in active operations.

One of them was a dentist (codename "Chess Player") who received a French medical degree in the late 20s. His education was paid by the GPU. Dentist's wife managed to establish friendly relations with the Oppenheimer family. That's how it was created secret connection with the Oppenheimer family and his inner circle, which fell out of field of view of American counterintelligence. As far as I remember, the FBI did not know about secret contacts Zarubina. Only in 1946 in connection with other revelations The FBI firmly established that Zarubina was a member of Soviet intelligence, but she was in Moscow. Thus,

Semenov and Liza Zarubina created a system of reliable connections, and Kvasnikov and Yatskov, under the leadership of Ovakimyan, ensured the uninterrupted transmission of information over atomic weapons at the final stage of work at Los Alamos in 1945.

### **Secret reports at a meeting of the Special Committee of the USSR Government on nuclear problem**

It should be noted that familiarization of our scientists with the scientific works of developers American atomic weapons - Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard - was of great importance for the wide development of work on the atomic bomb in our country. I want to emphasize that this information came to us in a secret way with their knowledge. As far as I remember, so through "Robert" and "Director of the Reservation," as Los Alamos was called in our correspondence, we received five secret generalized progress reports on the development of the atomic bomb. Similar material was sent not only to us, but also to Swedish scientists. According to our intelligence, as far as I remember, the Swedish government had a detailed information on the atomic bomb in 1945-1946. The Swedes refused to create own nuclear weapons due to the colossal costs. But the fact that they had enough data to make a decision on this issue, leads to the conclusion that the Swedes received, like us, information on the atomic bomb, in particular from Bohr, after he left Los Alamos. The

USSR Defense Committee, by GKO resolution No. 7357, set deadlines for construction of a cyclotron laboratory at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology - by January 1, 1946. Responsibility for completing the task rested with two academicians - A. Ioffe, director of the Physicotechnical Institute, and A. Alikhanov, head of the facility. And through month, February 21, Stalin signs GKO Decree No. 7572 "On the preparation specialists in nuclear physics" for Laboratory No. 2 and related institutions.

The resolution contained 16 paragraphs setting out detailed responsibilities for arrangement and financing of the educational and material base, allocation of laboratory premises, provision of maintenance personnel and construction of a cyclotron for Moscow University. The increase in the number of trainees was envisaged additional staffing of senior courses in the specialty "Physics of the Atomic Nucleus" by transfer of excellent students from other universities.

Planned tasks for the training of specialists in the fields of chemistry of radioactive and rare

elements, compressor machines and molecular physics were determined for the Leningrad University and the Polytechnic Institute, the Moscow Institute of Fine Chemical Technology. In addition, the Central Statistical Office, within a month, carried out a record and registration of physicists who worked in all sectors of the national economy, research and other institutions, after which Kurchatov was offered to select the specialists he needed.

We knew that military and explosives experts were playing a leading role in the development of atomic bomb work in America. In turn, we also decided, taking into account the American experience, to appoint a prominent specialist in the production of explosives, a prominent organizer of the military industry, Vannikov, responsible for the engineering and administrative support of our atomic project. Vannikov played the same role in the work on the atomic bomb in the USSR that General Groves played in the USA.

We were not only informed about the technical developments of the American atomic program, but also knew about the internal purely human conflicts and rivalry between scientists and specialists working at Los Alamos, about the tense relations between scientists and General Groves, the director of the project. In particular, we noted the information about serious disagreements between General Groves and Szilard. Groves was furious at Szilard's academic style of scientific work and his refusal to submit to the regime of secrecy and military discipline. The fight with the general became a kind of hobby for Szilard. Groves did not trust him and considered his participation in the project risky. He even tried to remove him from work, despite Szilard's enormous contribution to the implementation of the world's first uranium nuclear chain reaction.

Oppenheimer, according to Heifetz, was a broad-minded man who foresaw both the enormous possibilities and the dangers of the use of atomic energy for peaceful and military purposes. We knew that he would remain an influential figure in America after the war, and therefore we had to carefully hide contacts with him and his inner circle. We understood that the approach to Oppenheimer and other prominent scientists should be based on the establishment of friendly relations, and not on undercover cooperation, and our task was to use the fact that Oppenheimer, Bohr and Fermi were staunch opponents of violence. They believed that a nuclear war could be prevented by creating a balance of power in the world based on equal access of the parties to the secrets of atomic energy, which, in their opinion, could fundamentally affect world politics and change the course of history.

In intelligence work, the distinction between useful connections, acquaintances, and trusting relationships is very arbitrary. Official documents use a special term - undercover intelligence, which means obtaining materials based on the work of agents and intelligence officers acting under the guise of some official position. However, the most valuable information often comes from a source that is not an agent who has assumed formal obligations to cooperate with intelligence and receives money for this. In operational documents, this source of information is still considered as undercover, since access to it is based on contacts and connections with agents or trusted persons from an environment close to him. I was amazed that the outlook of many of the most prominent Western physicists and our scientists

coincides. As I already wrote, Vernadsky in 1943 quite sincerely suggested to Stalin that he ask the American and British governments to share with us information about atomic research and work together with Western scientists on the creation of an atomic bomb. Ioffe, Kapitsa, Niels Bohr adhered to the same views. Bohr, after conversations with Oppenheimer, who apparently knew about the leakage of information to Soviet and

Swedish scientists, met with President Roosevelt and tried to convince him of the need to share the secrets of the Manhattan Project with the Russians in order to speed up work on building a bomb. Our sources in England reported that Bohr not only made this proposal to President Roosevelt, but, allegedly on his behalf, returned to England and tried to convince the British government of the need for such a step. Churchill was horrified by this proposal and ordered that steps be taken to prevent contact.

Bora with the Russians.

Spouses Zarubina, despite the results achieved in the work, did not live long in Washington. And it happened not through their fault and not because of the activity of the FBI. One of Zarubin's subordinates, an employee of the NKVD residency at the embassy, Lieutenant Colonel Mironov, sent a letter to Stalin, in which he accused Zarubin of collaborating with American intelligence services. Mironov in the letter indicated - he followed Zarubin - the dates and hours of Zarubin's meetings with agents and sources of information, calling them contacts with representatives of the FBI. To check the charges against him, the Zarubins were recalled to Moscow. The review took almost six months. It was established that all meetings were authorized by the Center and the valuable information received by Zarubin did not cast a shadow of suspicion on him in cooperation with the FBI. Mironov was recalled from Washington and arrested on charges of defamation. However, when he appeared before the court, it turned out that he had schizophrenia. He was fired from the service and placed in the hospital.

In 1943, the Center decided to build contacts with atomic scientists using illegal channels. Vasilevsky, our resident in Mexico, was entrusted with direct control over the actions of illegal immigrants. After the departure of the Zarubins, Vasilevsky led a network of agents from Mexico City, sometimes visiting Washington, but did not stay there for a long time so as not to attract the attention of American counterintelligence. It was decided to minimize the use of station strongholds in Washington.

I recall that Vasilevsky told me how in 1944 he arrived in Washington and, in particular, had to transfer to the Center the materials received (from Fermi, but, to his horror, found out that the cipher was missing. The next day, the American police delivered the cipher clerk to the embassy, picking him up in one of the bars, where he drank himself unconscious. Vasilevsky immediately decided not to use the embassy in Washington to transmit particularly important messages. In 1945, for his successful work in developing the Fermi line in the United States, Vasilevsky was appointed my deputy for almost two years he headed the department of scientific and technical intelligence in the NKVD, and then in the Information Committee - our central intelligence agency, which existed from 1947 to 1951. Vasilevsky was dismissed from the security agencies in 1947 - he became one of the first victims of the anti-Semitic campaign that had begun. In April-July 1953, he began to work again in the apparatus, but he was fired again - now to reduce staff as a "suspicious" person. Vasilevsky died in 1979.

The description of the design of the first atomic bomb became known to us in January 1945. Our residency in the US has reported that it will take the Americans a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years to develop a substantial arsenal of atomic weapons. This report also stated that the first two bombs might be detonated in 2-3 months.

At this time, our exploration intensified, and we received significant information about the Manhattan project and about plans to exploit uranium ore deposits in the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovakia, Australia and the island of Madagascar. Military intelligence agents managed to infiltrate a Canadian firm that had created a special corporation for the development of uranium ore. The resident of military intelligence "Molière", who is also vice-consul in New York Mikhailov, reported on the work of the laboratory in Berkeley, near San Francisco, to analyze uranium ores. Around the same time, Moravec, the chief of intelligence of the Czechoslovak government in London, who was collaborating with us, informed us that the British and American secret services had shown great interest in the development of uranium deposits in the Sudetenland. He got access to the materials of the Anglo-Czech negotiations on the exploitation of uranium deposits in the post-war period.

As the end of the war approached, the first steps in the geological search for uranium ore began to be taken in the Soviet Union. In February 1945,

we received information and captured German documents on high-quality uranium reserves in the Bukhovo region - in the Rhodope Mountains. We turned to Dimitrov, at that time already the head of the Bulgarian government, and the Bulgarian authorities provided us

assistance in the development of uranium deposits.

GKO Decree No 7408 of January 27, 1945, signed by Stalin, was addressed to only Molotov and Beria. I will quote it in full. "Top secret, top secret"

1. To organize in Bulgaria the prospecting, exploration and extraction of uranium ores at the uranium the Goten deposit and its area, as well as the geological study of other known or possible open deposits of uranium ores and minerals.

2. Instruct the NKID of the USSR (comrade Molotov) to negotiate with the government of Bulgaria on the creation of a mixed Bulgarian-Soviet joint-stock company with a predominance Soviet capital for the production of prospecting, exploration and production of uranium ores at the uranium the Goten deposit and in its area, as well as the production of geological studies of other deposits of uranium ores known or likely to be discovered in Bulgaria and minerals.

Negotiations with the Bulgarian authorities and all documentation for the creation and execution joint-stock company to carry out, calling the deposit radium".

The created Soviet-Bulgarian mining society was headed by Shchors, an employee of our intelligence, mining engineer by education.

Uranium ore from Bukhovo was used by us during the start-up of the first nuclear reactor. In the Sudetenland mountains in Czechoslovakia, uranium ore turned out to be of lower quality, but also was used by us. We hid these works from the Americans and the British. For coordination of our intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Czechoslovakia was sent an experienced intelligence worker, a former resident in Italy Rogatnev.

The supply of Bulgarian uranium, in view of its higher quality, was given exceptional attention. Dimitrov personally oversaw uranium developments. We sent more than three hundred mining engineers to Bulgaria, urgently recalling them from the army: Bukhovo district guarded by internal troops of the NKVD. However, it soon became known through agents that American intelligence agencies are preparing acts of sabotage in order to disrupt the supply of uranium to Soviet Union and at the same time reveal the true scope of work in order to determine the timing creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR. The Americans even tried to organize a kidnapping Shchors. We took countermeasures: Eitingon began to recruit American intelligence officers and their wives, detained with the assistance of our agents from local Turks near uranium deposits, but did not achieve success.

About one and a half tons of uranium ore per week came from Bukhovo. Our Intelligence provided those working in uranium mines with American instructions and methods for technology of uranium mining and its accounting. In 1946, they were opened in the USSR and immediately became to develop large deposits of higher quality uranium. However, intense work continued in Bukhovo: we wanted to give the Americans the impression that the Bulgarian We desperately need uranium. Signed by Zavenyagin, Beria's deputy, an agreement with by the Bulgarian government about the development and supply of uranium, the disinformation activities organized by Eitingon and a group of officers confirmed the importance for us of these uranium developments.

In March 1945, we sent a generalized report on the successful development of work in the United States to create an atomic bomb. This report details American centers, in particular the laboratory at Los Alamos, factories at Oak Ridge, were given a detailed description of the activities of the American company Kellogg, a subsidiary of "Kellogg" in New York, noted the work on the atomic bomb, carried out by the largest US firms Jones Construction, DuPont, Union Carbide, Chemical Company and others. The report indicated that the US government spent \$2 billion dollars for the development and production of atomic weapons and that in total the project employed more than one hundred and thirty thousand people.

In addition, the agents reported on a strictly limited circle of people who knew assignment of work to be carried out; on access to such data of government officials only with the personal permission of the President of the United States; on the creation within the framework of the project of its own

counterintelligence, police and other services; on the removal from US libraries of all previously opened publications on research in the field of atomic energy; about changing real names of scientists and specialists who were directly related to work in such nuclear centers like Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Hanford, aliases; on physical security of responsible persons, as well as other similar events.

In April 1945, Kurchatov received from us very valuable material on the characteristics of a nuclear explosive device, atomic bomb activation method and electromagnetic uranium isotope separation method. This material was so important that the very next day the intelligence agencies received his assessment.

Kurchatov sent Stalin a report built on the basis of intelligence about prospects for the use of atomic energy and the need for extensive activities to build the atomic bomb.

12 days after the assembly of the first atomic bomb at Los Alamos, we received a description of her devices from Washington and New York. The first telegram arrived at the Center on June 13, the second on July 4, 1945. By the way, five years later these telegrams may have been deciphered by the Americans and served as the basis for pressure on Fuchs so that he confessed to espionage. I, however, cannot fully believe this, although I confirm that the sources indicated in the telegrams, "Charles" and "Mlad" are Fuchs and Pontecorvo.

We reported to Beria that two sources, unrelated to each other, reported on an upcoming nuclear test.

After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, our work on the creation of an atomic bomb was on a wide scale. At this time, we received from the USA especially valuable materials.

A detailed report by Fuchs ("Charles") was delivered by diplomatic post after he met on 19 September with his courier Harry Gold. The report contained thirty-three pages of text describing the design of the atomic bomb. We later received an additional message on the device of the atomic bomb through the communication channels from Hall ("Young"), which was transmitted by Lona Cohen. I don't remember whose description of the bomb was more detailed. But the resemblance was striking. It seems to me that the materials contained a detailed statement of the head of the report to the government and the US Congress on the device of the atomic bomb, which, for reasons of secrecy, was omitted in the official publication - the report of the Smith Commission, published August 12, 1945. We knew that Oppenheimer and General Groves edited this report. Fuchs reported that Oppenheimer refused to sign before a hoard published by the commission because he believed it contained disinformation intended to delay atomic research in other countries.

Among the materials we received in September-October 1945 were some sections of the report that were not included in the report of the Smith commission and photographs of the premises of factories in Oak Ridge. They were especially valuable as we also started building enterprises and accelerated work on the creation of the first nuclear reactor. I recall that the twelve-page memorandum-report compiled by Semyonov on the design of the atomic bomb was signed by Vasilevsky and sent to Beria and Stalin. This document is actually formed the basis of the program of all works for the next 3-4 years.

The quality and volume of information received from sources in the United States and England was very important for the organization and development of our nuclear program. Detailed reports containing data on the operation of the first nuclear reactors, specifications for production of the uranium and plutonium bomb played an important role in accelerating our work. Valuable were data on the design of the system of focusing explosive lenses and the dimensions of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium for the explosion of a nuclear device; about the formulated by Fuchs on the principle of implosion - a focused explosion inwards; data on plutonium-240, detonator device, time and sequence of operations for production and assembly of the bomb and the method of actuating the initiator contained in it. We received data on the construction of plants for the purification and separation of uranium isotopes, which significantly reduced the time for processing uranium ore, as well as diary entries about the first atomic bomb test explosion in the United States in July 1945.



After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans, the Politburo and State Defense Committee (State Defense Committee) August 20, 1945 decided on a cardinal reorganization of work on atomic energy - problem No. 1. For this, a Special government committee with emergency powers. Beria as a member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the GKO was appointed its chairman, Pervukhin - deputy, General Makhnev - secretary.

The committee included members of the Politburo - Malenkov (secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for personnel), Voznesensky (chairman of the State Planning Commission); Academicians Kurchatov and Kapitsa; People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Zavenyagin. The working apparatus of the committee was specially created 1st Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Vannikov was appointed head of the department, Zavenyagin became his first deputy. The Special Committee had a scientific and technical council, its chairman - Vannikov, deputy Chairman - Joffe. Department "C", which I headed in the NKVD-NKGB, was a working apparatus of the so-called 2nd bureau of the committee.

Stalin proposed that Ioffe and Kapitsa become members of the Special Committee on Problem No. 1. However, Ioffe refused, citing his advanced age. He said there will be more useful in the scientific and technical council. It was Ioffe who recommended appointing a professor Kurchatov to the post of scientific director of the atomic program. Participating in the meetings of the Special Committee, I realized for the first time how important personal relations of members of the government, their ambitions in the adoption of important state solutions. The people's commissars, members of this committee, strove at all costs to approve their position and positions. Very often there were heated arguments and hard-hitting explanations. Beria acted as an arbitrator and sought unconditional strict compliance all directives of the manual. I

maintained friendly relations with both Ioffe and Kapitsa. At the suggestion of Beria, I gave Kapitsa a hunting rifle. Kapitsa once complained that he had kept in a bad only one copy of a book about Russian engineers, written by his father-in-law, academician Krylov, a major shipbuilding engineer, is in condition. I resorted to the services special government printing house - the book was printed in two copies on excellent paper. Kapitsa sent one copy to Stalin, hoping to get an appointment with him.

I had to observe the growing rivalry between Kapitsa and Kurchatov on meetings of the Special Committee. Kapitsa was an outstanding personality, an excellent tactician and strategist, the largest organizer of science. Often he commented on scientific speeches with great sense of humor. I remember that one meeting of the Special Committee in 1945 was held in hours of broadcast from London of a football match between our team and the English. Members The Politburo and the governments were shocked when Kapitsa suggested that the meeting be adjourned and listen to the match. There was an awkward pause, but Beria, who appreciated humor, to everyone's amazement, announced a break. The tension subsided. And then the mood of those present rose, because our team won.

Kapitsa, who played an important role in initiating our work on the atomic problem and establishing contacts with Western scientists, in particular Terletsky with Bor, naturally claimed an independent and leading position in the implementation of the atomic project.

But soon relations between Kapitsa, Beria and Voznesensky deteriorated. Kapitsa suggested that Kurchatov consult with him on evaluating the results of the work and conclusions before reporting to the meetings of the Special Committee. Pervukhin supported Kapitsa, but Beria and Voznesensky did not agree. Beria demanded that Kapitsa and Kurchatov contribute to government alternative proposals. Moreover, Beria proposed to Kapitsa on the basis his institute to duplicate a number of Kurchatov's experiments.

Kapitsa was outraged and argued that such a reorientation of his institute would mean the actual curtailment of work on theoretical physics in the Soviet Union. Exactly I don't remember, but, in my opinion, a month later, in November 1945, Kapitsa turned to Beria and Voznesensky for an explanation why he was not consulted when they took decision to establish new educational institutes for the training of specialists in the field of nuclear physicists outside the Academy of Sciences - Engineering Physics (MEPhI) and Physics and Technology

(MIPT).

Kapitsa wrote to Stalin that Beria and Voznesensky did not listen to the opinion of scientists that only scientists can be trusted with the leadership of an atomic project. After unsuccessful attempts to get support from Stalin in this conflict, Kapitsa was soon removed from membership of the Special Committee. He was left alone, but deprived of access to atomic development.

However, in a number of publications in England and the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, Kapitsa appeared as "coordinator of work and intelligence on atomic weapons." In 1946 he turned to Einstein with a proposal to come to the USSR to work in the field of physics "in the freest for creativity of the

country. This caused a stir in the US intelligence agencies and the US embassy in Moscow. The FBI began to actively develop Einstein, considering him bound by some unspoken agreements with Kapitsa, whose role in the Soviet atomic project in 1946 Americans were not aware.

The Special Committee on the Atomic Problem had emergency powers to mobilization of forces of any resources and reserves for the creation of an atomic bomb. In practice this meant that when uranium ore processing plants began to be built in Siberia, severely limit the power supply to a number of enterprises. I remember violent arguments and obscene language of committee members Pervukhin and Voznesensky when the issue of for which enterprises to retain full electricity consumption. For I was completely unexpected that Pervukhin, defending the enterprises of the chemical industry, attacked Voznesensky, a member of the Politburo, a senior position.

In the first post-war year, intelligence operations on the atomic problem enjoyed special priority. In December 1945, Beria left the post of people's commissar. Internal Affairs and moved from Lubyanka to the Kremlin, to the office of the Deputy Chairman of the Council People's Commissars. Meetings of the Special Committee on the Atomic Problem also began to be held in Kremlin, not the NKVD. As head of the 2nd bureau of the committee, an employee of the government apparatus, I received a permanent pass to enter the Kremlin at any time.

On December 27, 1945, we sent to Beria for consideration by a special committee Government materials translated from English on the design of the atomic bomb, samples of the bomb detonator case received through the line of agents of the security agencies and military intelligence.

Meetings of the Special Committee usually took place in Beria's office. These were hot discussions. In addition to heated disputes over the distribution of electricity, Pervukhin continued his attacks on Voznesensky, demanding an increase in non-ferrous metal funds for the needs of enterprises chemical industry engaged in the production of nuclear fuel. I was surprised mutual claims of government members. Beria intervened in these disputes, urging Pervukhin and Voznesensky to order. And for the first time I saw that everything is in this special government body considered themselves equal in official position, regardless of which of them was a member of the Central Committee or the Politburo.

Right up to my arrest, I maintained good relations with Vannikov and the secretary Committee General Makhnev. They were brilliant connoisseurs of our industry, they could accurately indicate which plant could be entrusted with fulfilling orders for nuclear project. I

often went to Makhnev's office. For some reason, he is considered an NKVD general, but this is not so. An excellent organizer of the production of ammunition and work on the atomic bomb, he never did not serve in the state security agencies. Makhnev was very interested in information about the work American industrial enterprises and firms involved in the atomic program. Often we received this information from open sources, through TASS and regularly produced reviews of economic performance and technological potential gleaned from from scientific and technical journals about American firms engaged in individual orders government in connection with the creation of the atomic

bomb. Only then did I realize what great interest and attention to economic issues and Beria showed the development of industry. I learned that Beria, as deputy chairman

The GKO during the war years was responsible not only for the activities of the special services, but also for the production of weapons and ammunition, the operation of the fuel and energy complex. In particular, he was interested in the issues of oil production and refining. There were models of oil refineries in Beria's office. On his initiative, Vannikov, Ustinov and Baibakov (they were not yet 40 years old) were nominated to the high posts of people's commissars for the production of ammunition, weapons and the oil industry.

Participation in meetings chaired by Beria opened up a new world unknown to me. I knew that intelligence was of great importance in foreign policy, in ensuring the security of the country, but the restoration of the national economy and the creation of the atomic bomb were no less important. Until now, I remember our talented industrial organizers and plant directors who participated in solving the most complex organizational and technical issues. The development of these decisions turned out to be much more interesting than the management of the agent network in peacetime. Economic activity allowed people to show talents and abilities in solving such problems as overcoming the lack of resources, disruptions in the supply of equipment and materials. To organize the coordinated work of many industrial branches of industry for the implementation of the atomic program was no less difficult than the successful conduct of reconnaissance and sabotage operations during the war years. Beria, rude and cruel in dealing with subordinates, could be attentive, courteous and

provide daily support to people engaged in important work, he protected these people from all sorts of intrigues of the NKVD or party authorities. He always alerted plant managers to their personal responsibility for doing the job right, and he had a unique ability to both instill a sense of fear in people and inspire them to work. Naturally, for the directors of industrial enterprises, his personality was largely identified with the power of the state security agencies. It seems to me that in the beginning fear prevailed among people. But gradually, those who worked with him for several years, the feeling of fear disappeared and confidence came that Beria would support them if they successfully completed the most important national economic tasks. Beria often encouraged, in the interests of business, the freedom of action of large business executives in resolving complex issues. It seems to me that he took these qualities from Stalin - tight control, exceptionally high demands and, at the same time, the ability to create an atmosphere of confidence in the leader that, if the task was successfully completed, support would be provided to him.

### **Help from Niels Bohr**

In the autumn of 1945, a critical moment came in our program of work on the atomic bomb. It was necessary to start building the first Soviet nuclear reactor. However, scientists were not unanimous in assessing the materials presented by intelligence, as the information was contradictory. The Americans used two types of reactors: graphite and heavy water. There was a huge risk in the use of samples of uranium-235 obtained by military intelligence. It was necessary to make a decision which way to go in the construction of the first reactor. How to solve a problem? A fantastic idea was put forward - to send a group of scientists to the USA for a secret meeting with Oppenheimer, but Oppenheimer's position in society changed dramatically. Our attempt to restore the interrupted direct contacts with him through mutual acquaintances in Chicago in 1945 was unsuccessful. Another proposal was put forward - to send Kapitsa to Niels Bohr. Kapitsa was well known in the West and enjoyed great prestige in the scientific world. There is no doubt that his letter to Bohr in 1943 contributed to the establishment, through the mediation of intelligence, informal contact with Western scientists working in the field of atomic research. However, Kapitsa behaved independently, and the leadership did not like it, and the hostile attitude of Beria and Voznesensky towards him excluded the possibility of his trip abroad.

Kurchatov and Kikoin proposed that a highly qualified specialist, Professor Zeldovich, who worked for Kurchatov, should go to Denmark to meet Bohr, accompanied by intelligence officers. But Zeldovich was not suitable for this role, since he was not

intelligence officer and we could not disclose to him if necessary during business trips undercover communications abroad. These circumstances forced us to rely on those scientists who worked in the apparatus of intelligence agencies. The choice was small. In the staff of the department "C" was two officers - researchers, physicists by education, who owned some degrees in English. After they were hired by the NKVD, both attended the seminar of Kapitza and Landau. One of them, Rylov, being a scientist, showed great propensity for analytical and intelligence work. Another, Terletsky, just now defended his Ph.D. thesis, subsequently laureate of the State Prize, not was connected by his scientific interests with the group of Kurchatov, Ioffe, Alikhanov and Kikoin and could give his own assessment of scientific materials. In 1943 he turned down the offer Kurchatov to work for him. Terletsky and Rylov translated and edited the materials on atomic work, reported at meetings of the scientific and technical council Special Committee.

Working in intelligence, Terletsky continued to be a creative person. Along with evaluation and processing of information on the American atomic bomb, he often offered scientific and technical board of our own conclusions, this created problems because we had to submit twice a day to the top management all received information, and Terletsky was sometimes late with the assessment, and I listened from the management unpleasant remarks. However, we decided to stop our choice on Terletsky - he could to make the right impression on Niels with his wide erudition and awareness Bora.

Beria approved my proposal to send Terletsky to Copenhagen. It couldn't be speech, in order to carry out such an important task to send Terletsky to a meeting alone. He had no idea at all about operational work, so it was decided the decision that Colonel Vasilevsky, who directly oversaw the Fermi line, should go out with him. It was assumed that Vasilevsky would start a conversation with Bor, and Terletsky moving on to technical discussions. They also had an interpreter with them, our employee, unfortunately, I do not remember his last name. Vasilevsky left for Denmark under the surname Grebetsky, Terletsky - under their own.

In his memoirs, Terletsky writes that on the eve of his trip to Copenhagen he received Kapitsa and advised not to ask Bor a lot of questions, "but just introduce yourself, convey a letter and gifts from him, tell about Soviet physicists, and Bohr himself will report a lot that we are interested in".

The preliminary arrangement for a meeting with Bohr was reached thanks to the Finnish the writer Vuolijoki, whom I have already written about, and the Danish writer Martin Andersen Nekse. Nekse was not our agent, but in the 40s he provided great assistance to Rybkina in establishing useful contacts and acquaintances with influential people in countries Scandinavia.

In July 1943, during a conversation with Terletsky, we recalled some details this story. On the eve of the meeting, Bohr informed the Soviet embassy that he would accept our delegation. At the beginning of the meeting, Bor was nervous, recalled Terletsky, and he was trembling slightly. hands. Apparently, Bohr realized that for the first time he was dealing directly with representatives of the Soviet government and the time has come to fulfill the decision made by him and other physicists to share the secrets of the atomic bomb with the international community of scientists and Soviet physicists.

After the first meeting with Vasilevsky at a reception at our embassy on November 6, 1945 Bohr preferred to talk on scientific issues only with Terletsky. There was no choice and I had to sanction a meeting between Terletsky and Bor alone with the participation of an interpreter. The questions for the conversation with Bor were prepared in advance by Kurchatov and Kikoin.

Of course, only Vasilevsky can write about an attempt to allegedly recruit Bohr from the side of Vasilevsky. completely incompetent people - Chikov, Gevorkyan and others. It was, as can be seen from published documents, on the rechecking of previously assigned intelligence information from the most prominent scientist who sympathized with the Soviet Union.

Terletsky told Bor that he was warmly remembered at Moscow University,

him a letter of recommendation and gifts from Kapitsa, greetings from Ioffe and other Soviet scientists, thanked them for their willingness to advise Soviet specialists on nuclear program.

Bohr answered questions about the methods of obtaining uranium in the United States, diffusion and mass spectrographic, about the combination of these methods, how a large performance in the mass spectrographic method. He reported that in the USA all boilers work with graphite moderators, since the production of heavy water requires colossal amount of electricity. Terletsky received answers to a number of fundamentally important issues, including plutonium-240, about it in the official report Smith, which we received from Bohr and from the USA, there was not a word. The meeting, according to Kurchatov, was important for the verification by our specialists of the information available to intelligence several hundred reports and works by Fermi, Szilard, Bethe, Oppenheimer and other foreign scientists. It was considered, as Kvasnikov recalls, 690 scientific materials. According to John Hassard, a well-known English nuclear physicist from London's Imperial College, Bohr verbally gave essential information to the Russians about the design American atomic bomb. Jack Sarfatti, theoretical physicist, student of one of the founders of the atomic bomb, H. Bethe, also believes that Bohr's answers contained an important strategic information on the development of nuclear weapons.

It is significant that Bohr formally informed the British intelligence service about meeting and conversation with Soviet experts on the atomic program, transfer to Russian report of the Smith Commission, but at the same time he kept silent about the nature of the questions put to him. Thus, the Western intelligence services before the arrest of Fuchs had no idea that We already know the fundamentally important questions of creating atomic weapons.

By the way, Szilard immediately after the atomic explosions in Japan predicted that The Soviet Union will create its own nuclear weapons in 2-3 years. And Bohr then spoke for establishment of international control over the use of atomic energy.

After Terletsky's successful trip, I developed friendly relations with Kurchatov, Alikhanov and Kikoin. My wife and I spent a few weekends with them and their wives in a government rest home. In our apartment near the Lubyanka, we arranged several dinners for scientists. In a

number of publications on the history of the creation of atomic weapons in our country, participation in solving this problem, our state security organs, as well as the work of department "C" are distorted. For example, V. Barkovsky, a veteran of our foreign intelligence who participated under leadership of Resident Gorsky in undercover operations in England in 1941-1945, claims that Department "C" did not perform any useful work at all, both domestically and abroad. Meanwhile, our apparatus, even before the testing of atomic weapons by the Americans in June 1945 brought prominent German scientists with their families from Germany: Nobel laureate G. Hertz, professors R. Dopel, M. Volmer, G. Pose, P. Thyssen - only about two hundred specialists, including 33 doctors of science and 77 engineers.

Such aces worked with the most prominent German physicists for several years Soviet intelligence, as an illegal Parparov, an exceptionally effective intelligence officer in the rear Germans Colonel Mikheev.

Near Moscow, in Maloyaroslavets-10 - now Obninsk - was under our control a secret center staffed by German specialists was created for the development, production and enrichment of uranium ore and uranium metallurgy. Our

operatives delivered to the north of the Chelyabinsk region German internationally renowned nuclear physicists: G. Born, R. Rompe, K. Zimmer and others.

Important work was carried out by the Nobel laureate G. Hertz and his group in Sukhumi on technologies for the separation of uranium-235 and

uranium-238 isotopes. Employees of department "C" helped the search group of Y. Khariton in Germany to find and deliver one hundred tons of uranium oxide to the Soviet Union right under the noses of American occupation authorities in Germany. At

the suggestion of the Second Bureau of the Special Committee on Nuclear

problem, all German physicists exported to the Union were divided into groups to work on all three variants of uranium enrichment technology developed by the Americans: gas diffusion, electromagnetic and centrifuge. German Professor Steinbeck became the head of research on centrifuge technology for the separation of uranium isotopes. Of course, Academician Kikoin, who controlled the Germans, made a huge contribution to that work.

Of great importance to Kurchatov were the special consultations we organized with exported from Germany by our intelligence by Nobel laureate Nichols Riehl. The latter was engaged in obtaining thorium in Germany, and during the war he mastered the technology obtaining pure metallic uranium.

For merits in the creation of Soviet atomic weapons, N. Riehl was awarded the highest award - the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, which was handed to him personally by Beria.

Section "C" also worked closely with other special intelligence services of the Soviet leadership, which were not part of the system of organs security and military intelligence. We are talking about a special group of undercover intelligence under Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers of the USSR) I. V. Stalin, which existed in 1945—1953. These contacts of department "C" are formally fixed in the following paragraph.

Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No 9887 ss / op dated August 20, 1945: "instruct Comrade Beria take measures to organize intelligence work carried out by the intelligence agencies of the NKGB, the Red Army and other departments. I

was aware of this interaction between department "C" and the head of government deputy department and at the same time head of scientific and technical intelligence of the NKGB Colonel Vasilevsky.

Whatever they write and say in TV programs about Vasilevsky, Kheifetz and Semenov ill-wishers Barkovsky and Chikov, they were the only officers at that time Soviet intelligence, who themselves were able to attract the most prominent and authoritative scientists and politicians of Western countries. Yatskov, Feklisov, Kvasnikov (the latter spoke foreign languages) only used the lines of work laid by them. They belonged to a small cohort of Soviet intelligence officers, not of an armchair type, but those who, according to their level, could independently work with agents from among prominent foreigners and emigrants. In

general, a disrespectful attitude towards people who have become victims of persecution and repression, part of those who have lived their lives in intelligence as officials and journalists is not surprising. Chikov, having consulted with me on episodes unknown to him, appropriated a unique copy of the report of the Smith Commission on the atomic problem and still does not want return this bibliographic rarity.

Together with Vasilevsky, I had to select nuclear physicists for trips to the USA, England and Canada in order to attract Western specialists from nuclear centers to work in Soviet Union.

During the same period, Vasilevsky traveled several times to Switzerland and Italy to meet with Bruno Pontecorvo. To cover these trips, he used the visits of the Soviet delegation cultural figures headed by the famous film director Grigory Alexandrov and movie star Lyubov Orlova. Operational support for his meetings with Pontecorvo carried out by Gorshkov and Yatskov, who at various times worked in Italy and the USA.

Vasilevsky also met with Joliot-Curie. However, Beria and Stalin decided not to involve Joliot-Curie in nuclear developments in the USSR, although he wanted to come to us. Staying in the West, Joliot-Curie was more useful because he influenced the formation advantageous for us pacifist position of prominent atomic scientists. For

successful actions in Denmark. Switzerland and Italy Vasilevsky was encouraged by a solid at that time, a cash prize of a thousand dollars and a separate apartment in the center Moscow, which was then a rarity.

Our active operations in Western Europe coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. We were aware that American counterintelligence had gotten pretty close to our sources of information and agents serving them. The operational situation complicated. When our first reactor was launched in 1946, Beria ordered to stop

all contacts with American sources. At a meeting with me, he suggested that we consider how you can use the authority of Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard and others close to them scientists in the anti-war movement. We believed that the anti-war campaign and the struggle for nuclear disarmament can prevent the Americans from blackmailing us with an atomic bomb, and began a massive political campaign against US nuclear superiority. We wanted to bind the American establishment with political restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons - we have not yet had an atomic bomb. Beria categorically ordered not to allow prominent Western scientists to be compromised by connections with our intelligence: for us it was important that Western scientists represent an independent, authoritative and influential political force friendly to the Soviet Union. Through Fuchs, the idea of the role

and political responsibility of scientists in the nuclear age was brought to Fermi, Oppenheimer and Szilard, who strongly opposed building the hydrogen bomb. In their arguments they were completely sincere and not they suspected that Fuchs, under our influence, logically led them to this decision. Acting as anti-fascists, they objectively turned into political allies of the USSR.

Beria's directive was based on information received from Fuchs in 1946 about serious disagreement among American physicists on the improvement of atomic weapons and the development of the hydrogen bomb. At a meeting held at the end of 1945 or in early 1946, scientists, together with Fuchs, opposed the development of a "superbomb" and met with strong objections from Teller.

Klaus Fuchs declined Oppenheimer's offer to continue with him at Princeton, returned to England, and continued to provide us with vital information. WITH in the fall of 1947 to May 1949, Fuchs handed over to our operational worker Feklisov the main theoretical developments on the creation of a hydrogen bomb and plans for the start of work, to implementation of which began in the USA and England in 1948.

The information received from Fuchs about the test results was especially valuable. plutonium and uranium atomic bombs on Eniwetok Atoll. Fuchs met with Feklisov in London once every 3-4 months. Each meeting was carefully prepared and lasted no more than forty minutes. Feklisov was accompanied by three operatives to rule out the possibility of fixing the meeting by the surveillance service of British counterintelligence. Fuchs and Feklisov were never recorded by British counterintelligence. Fuchs himself involuntarily contributed to his failure by informing the security service that oversaw the British atomic developments, that his father received a position as a teacher of theology at the Leipzig university in East Germany. At this time, American intelligence agencies exposed our agent, Fuchs' courier, Gold, he identified Fuchs in the photograph, and the Americans reported this to British counterintelligence. Fuchs was arrested in 1950. After intense interrogation, Fuchs admitted that he had passed secret information to the Soviet Union. He was tried, and the indictment in his case mentioned only one meeting with Soviet agent in 1947, and then entirely on the basis of his personal confession. ABOUT Fuchs's cooperation with our intelligence and the circumstances of his arrest was told by Feklisov in the essay I mentioned "The Heroic Feat of Klaus Fuchs" and in his book "Across the Ocean and on the island.

Information about the development of atomic research in England and the real stocks of nuclear weapons to the United States, handed over by Fuchs in 1948, coincided with an extremely important information from Washington, received from McLean, who from 1944 held the position secretary of the British embassy in the United States and controlled the entire office of this department. He said that the potential of US nuclear weapons is insufficient to wage war with Soviet Union.

In the scientific circles of the USA and the USSR, an important role was played by leading scientists with independent political opinions.

So, for example, Oppenheimer reminds me to a large extent of our scientists academic type - Vernadsky, Kapitsa, Sakharov. They have always tried to keep own face, strove to live in a world created by their imagination, with the illusion independence. But the independence of a scientist involved in the work of a huge state

importance, always remains an illusion.

And for Kurchatov, the interests of the state have always been the main thing in scientific work. He was less stubborn and more dependent on the authorities than Kapitsa and Ioffe. Beria, Pervukhin and Stalin at once caught that he represents a new generation of Soviet scientific intelligentsia, less associated with the old traditions of Russian scientists. They got it right that he was ambitious and is determined to subordinate all scientific work to the interests of the state. Government sought to speed up the testing of the first atomic bomb at any cost, and Kurchatov went along ways to copy the American nuclear device. However, it did not stop parallel work on the creation of a Soviet-designed bomb. It was blown up in 1951. In the United States, a similar position was taken by Teller, who sought to establish a monopoly. US for nuclear weapons.

Being real scientists, Kurchatov and Oppenheimer were at the same time executive heads of the most important projects that had a life-changing significance for the world. Conflict of personal beliefs, scientific interests and administrative duties in this case is inevitable. We can't be their judges, these people's work on the bomb ushered in a new era in science. However, it is not only a matter of discovery, the crux of the problem is that for the first time the greatest scientists of the world acted not only as carriers of scientific ideas, but also as statesmen.

It should be noted that initially neither Kurchatov nor Oppenheimer were surrounded in such a way. called "scientific bureaucracy" by science officials who appeared in on a significant scale in the second half of the 1950s. In the

1940s, no government in the world could effectively completely control scientific and technological progress. The paradox was that both the American and Soviet governments were forced, in the interests of a successful solution to the nuclear problems of relying on joint work with scientists of different worldviews, perhaps even hostile to the authorities, and adapting to their requests, needs, extravagant behavior. The most prominent scientists of the world, sharing anti-fascist and pacifist views, full of illusions about the possible leading role of scientists in the world government after the discovery of atomic energy, were inclined to share achievements in this area with like-minded scientists from friendly countries.

In defending their ideals, Bohr and Oppenheimer played essentially the same role. dissident scientists of the capitalist world, like Academician Sakharov in the 1960s, openly opposed the creation of super-powerful, new thermonuclear weapons and how political opponent of the Soviet regime.

With the onset of the Cold War, the mood of scientists changed dramatically. That is why American physicists rejected in 1948 an attempt by our illegal Fischer (Abel) to resume cooperation with them. They realized that this was not cooperation, but espionage.

## **The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb**

Intelligence materials on the atomic bomb played an invaluable role not only in military policy, but also in the diplomatic sphere. When Fuchs told us the unpublished in the report of the Smith Commission on the design of the atomic bomb, he also provided us with exceptionally valuable information about the scale of production of uranium-235. This Fuchs information made it possible to calculate how much uranium and plutonium the Americans produced every month, and helped to determine the actual number of atomic bombs they had in their possession.

The information received from Fuchs and McLean made it possible to conclude that the American side was not ready to wage a nuclear war in the late 40s and even in the early 50s years. In terms of value, this information can be equated with Penkovsky's information about real Soviet nuclear missile potential, which in the early 60s he handed over Americans. Like Fuchs, Penkovsky reported that Khrushchev was bluffing and not ready for confrontation with the United States, just like the Americans were not ready for a full-scale nuclear war with the USSR in the late 1940s.

When the Cold War began, Stalin firmly pursued a line of confrontation with



USA. He knew that the threat of an American nuclear attack until the end of the 40s was unlikely. According to our data, it was only by 1955 that the United States and Britain were to create stockpiles of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union.

Fuchs and McLean's information played a big role in the strategic decision Soviet leadership to support the Chinese Communists in the civil war in 1947-1948. We have information that President Truman is considering the use of atomic weapons to prevent the victory of the communists in China. Then Stalin deliberately went to aggravate the situation in Germany, and in 1948 the Berlin a crisis. Reports appeared in the Western press that President Truman and Prime Minister England Atley ready to use atomic weapons to prevent the passage of the Western Berlin under our control. However, we knew that the Americans did not have the right amount atomic bombs to confront us simultaneously in Germany and the Far East, where decided the fate of the civil war in China. The American leadership overestimated our threat in Germany and missed the opportunity to use its nuclear arsenal to support Chinese nationalists. In

1951, when we were developing a plan for military sabotage operations against American bases. Molotov, commenting on our proposals, noted that such operations should be carried out in accordance not only with military considerations, but above all with political decisions. He said that our position and decisive action on the blockade Berlin greatly helped the Chinese Communists. Victory for Stalin Communists in China meant huge support for his line in the confrontation with the United States. I remember well that Stalin's strategy was to create a support axis for the USSR-China in opposition to the Western world.

In August 1949, we tested our first atomic bomb. This event summed up incredible intense seven years of work. There are no reports of this in our press. appeared - we feared a preventive nuclear strike by the United States. At least that's how it is for me said Beria's assistant on atomic issues, General Sazykin. Therefore, a message about this in the American press on September 25, 1949, shocked Stalin, the leadership of the atomic project, and especially those responsible for ensuring the secrecy of nuclear developments. Our the first reaction was that American agents managed to obtain data on the test. If we infiltrated the Manhattan Project, then similar actions cannot be ruled out. American intelligence. To everyone's relief, about a week later, our scientists reported that scientific instruments installed on aircraft, with regular sampling air can detect traces of an atomic explosion in the atmosphere. The scientists' explanation allowed security agencies to avoid accusations that American intelligence managed to infiltrate his agent in the circles of the creators of domestic atomic weapons.

Kurchatov and Beria for outstanding services in strengthening the power of our country were awarded with the highest awards, large cash prizes and special certificates of lifelong status of honorary citizens of the Soviet Union. All members of the Soviet nuclear programs received privileges: free travel in transport, state dachas, the right to enroll children in higher educational institutions without entrance exams. The last privilege was maintained until 1991 for the children of intelligence officers - illegal immigrants who are on duty abroad. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of October 29, 1949, she was

awarded

awards to a large group of intelligence officers who took part in operations to atomic weapons, Gorsky, Kvasnikov and Feklisov received the Order of Lenin; Barkovsky, Semyonov, Yatskov - Order of the Red Banner of Labor. In 1996, Kvasnikov (posthumously), Yatskov (posthumously) received the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Feklisov and Barkovsky received this highest honor during their lifetime.

When evaluating materials on the atomic problem that have passed through department "C", it follows, according to in my opinion, take into account the statements of Academicians Khariton and Alexandrov on meeting dedicated to the 85th anniversary of the birth of Kurchatov. They noted his genius in the design of the atomic bomb and in the most important decision to start building factories for the production of uranium and plutonium, while we had only a meager

quantities of these materials obtained in the laboratory. The atomic bomb was created in the USSR for four years. Intelligence materials have certainly accelerated the creation of our atomic weapons.

For me, Kurchatov remains one of the great scientists who played the same role as Oppenheimer, although, of course, he is not such a scientific giant as Niels was Bohr and Enrico Fermi. Kurchatov's talent, his organizational skills and perseverance The Berias played an important role in the successful solution of the atomic problem in the Soviet Union.

When Niels Bohr visited Moscow State University in 1961 and took part in a student holiday "Physicist's Day", the KGB advised Terletsky, professor at Moscow State University, laureate of the State awards in science and technology, out of his sight. However, Terletsky came to the meeting, but Bor, fixing his gaze on him, pretended not to recognize him. In those years, I was in prison, and Vasilevsky went around with the stigma of a dangerous person, expelled from the party "for treacherous anti-Party activities in Paris and Mexico. The KGB, however, acted wisely, not reminding Bohr of his meetings with our intelligence agents in Denmark. Only shortly before Bohr's death he was visited in Copenhagen by our intelligence officer Rylov, an employee of the International Atomic Energy Agency, formerly a young researcher in Section C, and Bohr recalled his meeting with Soviet specialists in 1945. Vasilevsky calculated

that the Western intelligence services would sooner or later fix our contacts with Pontecorvo in Italy and Switzerland, and even then it was decided to routes of his possible flight to the USSR. In 1950, immediately after the arrest of Fuchs, Pontecorvo fled to the USSR through Finland. This operation of our intelligence is successful blocked all efforts by the FBI and British counterintelligence to reveal other sources information on the atomic problem, in addition to Fuchs. Upon arrival at the Union, Pontecorvo began scientific work at the nuclear center near Moscow, in Dubna. He wrote a wonderful autobiographical book, in which he told a lot of interesting things about Fermi, but about his contacts with Soviet intelligence remained silent.

Although Vasilevsky was in disgrace for about seven years - until 1961, he met with Pontecorvo in the 60-70s, invited him to dinner at the restaurant of the House of Writers. In 1968, when I was released from prison, Vasilevsky invited me to meet and dine with Pontecorvo. But since the restaurant was in the sphere of constant attention of the KGB, and intelligence leaders were categorically against Vasilevsky's meetings with Pontecorvo, I refused.

In 1970 I became a member of the Moscow association of writers and regularly visited writers club. There, in a restaurant, Vasilevsky and I met Ramon for lunch. Mercader. I don't like drawing attention to myself, so I asked Ramon not to put on the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. But Mercader and Vasilevsky, on the contrary, received pleasure in challenging the authorities with their rewards. Vasilevsky until the last days of his life continued to write letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU, exposing the then head of intelligence KGB General Sakharovsky, his failures and mistakes in working with agents.

## **The truth about the Rosenberg case, FBI tricks**

The Rosenbergs were recruited to cooperate with our intelligence service in 1938. Ovakimyan and Semenov. Ironically, the Rosenbergs are featured in the press Americans and us as key figures in atomic espionage in favor of the USSR. IN in reality, their role was not so significant. They acted completely out of touch with the main sources of information on the atomic bomb, which were coordinated special reconnaissance unit.

In 1943-1945, the New York residency was headed by Kvasnikov and Pastelnyak, and then for a short time Apresyan (pseudonym "May"), under whose leadership Semyonov, Feklisov, Yatskov worked. By the way, Kvasnikov in an interview with the American television in 1990 admitted that the Rosenbergs, helping our intelligence in obtaining information on aviation, chemistry and radio engineering, nothing to do with serious materials on the atomic bomb did not have.

In the summer of 1945, Rosenberg's son-in-law, US Army senior sergeant Greenglas ("Caliber"), who worked in the workshops of Los Alamos, on the eve of the first test of the atomic bomb, prepared for us a short message about the operation of checkpoints. The courier could not go to meet him, so Kvasnikov, with the approval of the Center, instructed agent Gold ("Raymond"), after a scheduled meeting with Fuchs in Santa Fe, to go to Albuquerque and take a message from Rosenberg's son-in-law. With its directive, the Center violated the basic rule of intelligence - in no case should an agent or courier of one intelligence group receive contact and access to another intelligence network that is not connected with it. Gringlas' information on the atomic problem was insignificant and minimal, for this reason our intelligence did not resume contact with him after this meeting with Gold. When Gold was arrested in 1950, he pointed to Gringlas and the latter to the Rosenbergs. A fatal role in the fate of the Rosenbergs was played by the instruction of the MGB intelligence resident in Washington, Panyushkin, and the head of scientific and technical intelligence, Raina, to Kamenev, the officer in charge, to renew contact with Gold in 1948, when he was already on the radar of the FBI. At the same time, Barkov also worked in the scientific and technical residency in the United States.

For the first time I learned about the arrest of the Rozenbergs from a TASS report and was not at all concerned about this news. This may seem strange to some, but it should be noted that, being responsible for the activities of several thousand saboteurs and agents behind German lines and for hundreds of sources of intelligence information in the United States, including operations of illegal immigrants, I did not feel worried about the fate of our main intelligence operations. Having worked in my time as the head of department "C", I certainly knew the main sources of information and I cannot recall that among them, at least according to intelligence materials on the atomic bomb, the Rosenbergs figured as important sources. It occurred to me then that the Rosenbergs might have been involved in our intelligence operations, but in no case did they play any independent role. In general, their arrest did not seem to me an event deserving special attention.

A year passed, and at the end of the summer of the following year, I was genuinely surprised when Lieutenant General Savchenko, at that time deputy head of the intelligence department of the MGB, came to my office and said that the newly appointed Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, ordered me to report to him about all the materials on failures of our intelligence operations in the USA and England in connection with the Rosenberg affair. He also said that a special commission had been set up in the Central Committee of the party to consider possible consequences in connection with the arrests of Gold, Gringlas and the Rosenbergs. As far as I understood, it was about violations of the rules of operational intelligence work by employees of state security agencies.

I knew Savchenko since the 1920s, when he headed the operational department of the headquarters of the border troops on the Romanian border. In 1946, he became Minister of State Security in Ukraine, and later, in 1948, under the patronage of Khrushchev, he went to work in the Information Committee, then became deputy head of the intelligence department of the MGB. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, he personally approved the conduct of major intelligence operations in the United States and England. However, Savchenko told me that he could not be sure of the conclusion of his apparatus in the Rosenberg case, since their cooperation with us began even before the war and continued during the war. By that time, our former residents in the United States and Mexico, Gorsky and Vasilevsky, known in these countries as Gromov and Tarasov, had already been dismissed from the intelligence agencies. The fate of the Zarubins, who knew the circumstances of the operational work of our agents in the United States in the mid-40s, was similar. By this time, Kheifets had been in prison for two years as a member of the "Zionist conspiracy." Therefore, Savchenko could not ask them to comment on archived operational materials for a report to the Central Committee. The most important witnesses Ovakimyan and Zarubin, who headed the American direction in intelligence during the war years, did not hide their disrespectful attitude towards Savchenko for his incompetence in intelligence matters and openly called him a "son of a bitch." They refused to talk with him, declaring that they would give their explanations only to the Central Committee. Yatskov, Sokolov and Semyonov, who were involved in these cases, were abroad at the time, but Savchenko did not want to rely on their explanations or on the conclusions of Kvasnikov, who headed scientific and technical intelligence, as interested parties.

Savchenko and I were summoned to the Central Committee on a single question: who was responsible for the ill-fated telegram authorizing Gold's fatal meeting with Gringlas in Albuquerque. A

certificate was presented to the Central Committee of the party on the results of the work of the commission, in preparation which was attended by Savchenko and employees of the American direction of intelligence agencies security. As far as I remember, it claimed that the failures were the result of mistakes allegedly made by Semenov in recruiting and instructing Gold. The memo also stated that Greenglass's secret meeting with Gold had been authorized by the Center. The reference was it is said that Hovakimyan, the head of the American direction in the 40s, was dismissed from the authorities state security. Of course, there was not a word about his enormous merits.

I objected categorically to these conclusions, since Semenov and Ovakimyan, in specific cases have shown themselves to be highly qualified operatives. In fact, it was they who created at the end of the 30s a very significant network of undercover sources of scientific and technical information in the USA. However, in the Central Committee and the personnel department of the MGB my considerations were rejected, they were blamed for the failure, and they were fired from the authorities intelligence was largely on the wave of anti-Semitism, since Semyonov was a Jew. I remember how we collected money to support Semyonov until he got a job consultant and translator at the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences.

The following year, this scandalous story unexpectedly received a continuation. I was again summoned to the Central Committee to Kiselyov, Malenkov's assistant. Quite unexpectedly, I saw Savchenko at his place. Kiselev was categorical and rude. From his lips I heard familiar to me in 1938 - 1939 accusations: the Central Committee exposed the attempts of individual employees and a number of leaders of the MGB to deceive the party by downplaying the role of the Rosenbergs in intelligence work. In an anonymous letter from an employee of the MGB, received by the Central Committee, he said Kiselev, noted the significant role of the Rosenbergs in obtaining information on the nuclear problem. In conclusion, Kiselyov stressed that the Party Control Committee would consider these signals are about attempts to mislead the Central Committee on the substance of the Rosenberg case.

Savchenko and I categorically objected to Kiselyov with one voice, explained that our intelligence operations in the United States on the atomic problem were actually stopped in 1946 and we were forced to rely on sources in England. We have referred to the In 1946, Beria's instructions to save sources of information for the implementation of benefits for us political campaign to promote nuclear disarmament among the scientific community and intellectuals of the Western

countries. Kiselev accused us of insincerity and of trying to belittle the importance of our contacts. intelligence with the Rosenbergs. I told him that I was fully responsible for the work on penetration of our agents into US nuclear facilities in 1944-1946. At the same time I stressed that, of course, the value of undercover penetration and approach to those of interest us objects varied dramatically depending on the official position of the sources information. The Rosenbergs were only an insignificant part of our peripheral activities at American nuclear facilities. Materials of the Rosenbergs and their relative Gringlas cannot be categorized as important information. The Rosenbergs were naive, but at the same time devoted to us, by virtue of their communist convictions, matrimonial couple, ready to cooperate with us in everything, but their activity had no fundamental importance in obtaining American atomic secrets. Kiselev

announced in an official tone that he would bring to the attention of the Central Committee and personally Malenkov our explanations, and the Party Control Committee will determine who exactly is responsible for failure of intelligence operations in the United States.

The Rosenbergs behaved heroically during the investigation and at the trial. By this that is why our authorities have stopped looking for scapegoats.

Casting a retrospective look at events, it becomes obvious that the Rosenberg case from the very beginning acquired a pronounced political coloring, which eclipsed the insignificance of the scientific and technical information provided by their group in the field atomic weapons. They gave information on chemistry and radar. Much more important for the American authorities and for the Soviet leadership turned out to be their communist

worldview and ideals, so necessary for the Soviet Union during the period of aggravation of the Cold War and anti-communist hysteria. In exceptionally difficult conditions, they proved themselves to be firm supporters and friends of the Soviet Union.

The quick arrest of the Rosenbergs immediately after the Greenglass confessions, in my opinion, indicates that the FBI acted in the same way as the NKVD, following political guidelines and instructions, instead of approaching the matter professionally. The FBI neglected to identify all individuals associated with the Rosenbergs. This would require not only outdoor surveillance, but also undercover development of the Rosenbergs in order to identify the operative worker or illegal - a special agent with whom they were in contact. This was the only way to determine the degree of their participation in Soviet intelligence operations. The haste shown by the FBI prevented American counterintelligence from reaching out to Fisher (Colonel Abel), a Soviet illegal immigrant who settled in the United States in 1948 and was arrested only in 1957. A photograph codenamed Helen Sobell, the wife of Morton Sobell, a member of the Rosenberg group, was discovered by FBI agents only during Fisher's arrest, in his wallet.

When I was read excerpts from Lamfer and Shachtman's book on the FBI's work against Soviet agents in the 1950s, I was struck by how the FBI and the NKVD used the same methods when investigating politically motivated espionage cases. In fact, the entire Rosenberg case was built on the basis of the confessions of the accused. I was particularly struck by the arguments of the Rosenbergs' defense that the FBI had previously coached and instructed Gold and Greenglass for their future testimony at the trial. Of course, the actions of the FBI were quite logical, because it failed in its main task: to reveal the real role of the Rosenberg spouses in obtaining and transferring classified information to the Soviet Union. The so-called "sketches and diagrams" of Gringlas appearing in the case could in no way be the basis for drawing conclusions about the nature of the intelligence work and the information provided to us.

The Rosenbergs became victims of the Cold War. The Americans and we wanted to make the most of the political gain from the lawsuit. It is significant that during the period of rampant anti-Semitism in our country and the exposure of the so-called "Zionist conspiracy", our propaganda attributed to the American authorities the conduct of an anti-Semitic campaign and the persecution of Jews in connection with the

Rosenberg trial. However, it seems to me that in the USA the Rosenberg trial caused an increase in anti-Semitic sentiment. We have used this; quickly translated into Russian plays and pamphlets by an American writer, then a communist, Howard Fast about anti-Semitism in the United States. The Rosenberg case has become one of the powerful factors in our propaganda and the activities of the World Peace Council, created with our active support in the late 1940s. As far as I

remember, in the USA in the 1940s, four of our agent networks successfully operated independently of each other: in San Francisco, where there was a consulate; in Washington, where there was an embassy; in New York - on the basis of the Amtorg trade representative office and the consulate; and, finally, in Washington, which was headed by illegal resident Akhmerov. He supervised the activities of Golos, one of the main organizers of our intelligence work, closely associated with the Communist Party in the 1930s. In addition to this, an independent intelligence group under the leadership of Vasilevsky was actively operating in Mexico.

I remember that the escape in Canada in 1945 of Gouzenko, a cipher clerk from the military attache's office, had far-reaching consequences. Gouzenko provided the American and Canadian counterintelligence services with data that allowed them to get to our intelligence network, which was active in the United States during the war years. Moreover, he provided them with a list of codenames for American and Canadian atomic scientists that our intelligence and the military intelligence agency were actively developing. These atomic scientists were not our agents, but they were sources of important information on the atomic bomb. The

information received from Gouzenko, as well as the confessions of our military intelligence agent Bentley, who was recruited by the FBI, allowed the American counterintelligence to infiltrate our intelligence network. However, any orientation given to Gouzenko by the FBI required

careful check, and this turned into years of painstaking work. When the American counterintelligence after a long development came to our sources of information, we are already received the most important information for us on the atomic bomb and mothballed ties with agents. The FBI claimed that Gouzenko helped decipher our special telegrams, and this made it possible to expose our agents Gold, Nan and Fuchs.

However, I do not believe that the decryption of the telegrams played a decisive role in the disclosure of our intelligence operations. Back in December 1941, agent Schulze-Boysen A ("Sergeant") from Berlin informed us that the Germans had captured one of the our cipher books. Naturally, we changed our code books. I remember that in 1944, within the framework of cooperation between Stalin and Tito, the question arose of teaching technology decryption of the Yugoslav state security officers sent to us. At that time, Hovakimyan, deputy head of the NKVD intelligence department and head of the American direction, categorically objected to the training of the Yugoslavs. I also remember him saying: "We drastically changed their encryption codes after the failure of our underground groups in Germany. Why should we share experience with Tito's messengers, we have enough reason suspect them of a double game - in cooperation with British intelligence. objections Hovakimyan were accepted.

Back in 1944, when Zarubin returned from the United States, Ovakimyan expressed fears that The FBI managed to infiltrate our agents into our undercover teams. When Zarubin was explaining about the unfounded accusations brought against him, we are still from precautions again changed the codes of cipher correspondence. So I don't think the FBI got out to our intelligence network based on the decryption of the code book captured in Petsamo.

The FBI never made it public and avoided discussing its methods in every possible way. work and sources of information used. Lampher, former employee of the American counterintelligence, in his book "The FBI-KGB War" talks about the complex process restoration of our code book: it was partially burned. Perhaps that is how it was. I don't I can completely deny that decryption did not play a role in the output of counterintelligence USA and Canada to our sources of undercover information. Nevertheless, I believe that the FBI, in an effort to hide its own undercover source, specifically insisted on deciphering our correspondence.

It had at its disposal professional military intelligence cryptographers.

- Gouzenko and the Petrovs, who worked in the encryption system of the Soviet authorities security for over ten years.

The Americans and the British managed to decipher the correspondence of our residencies in Washington, San Francisco, New York, London, Mexico City, Stockholm, Istanbul, Sofia, Canberra with Moscow. We facilitated

this work for the American side by handing over the full text of the received NKVD lines of cipher telegrams addressed to the

Comintern. In view of the constant surveillance by American intelligence services since 1940 of our they managed to establish on the air, as our press reported, more than two hundred agents Soviet intelligence, involved in the extraction of materials on the atomic bomb and secret documentation of American government agencies, including intelligence agencies. But a number key codenames remain undisclosed.

In May 1995, the FBI denied my version that our intelligence received data on atomic bomb. The FBI noted that Fermi, Oppenheimer, Szilard and Bohr, according to their information, did not were spies. But I didn't claim it.

In September 1992, at the KGB military hospital, I met with a retired colonel, an intelligence veteran, Yatskov, who was in contact in 1945-1946 with Gold. We recalled the whole story, told in Lampher's book, about an intercepted telegram from our New York consulate to Moscow, which allegedly served as the basis for the exit American counterintelligence on Fuchs, including a decrypted telegram from our consulates to the Center about the meeting of Gold and Fuchs in January 1945 at the house of Fuchs's sister Christelle. As Feklisov wrote in his book, as evidence against Fuks was used map of Santa Fe in New Mexico near Los Alamos, where the place was marked

meetings between Gold and Fuchs. It was alleged that on a map found during a search of the apartment Gold, there were Fuchs's fingerprints. For

me, an intelligence professional, the circumstances that prevented the FBI from infiltrating our agent network are quite understandable. Personnel and technical personnel of the Manhattan projects were completed by the American administration in a great hurry - there were many foreigners involved in the project. The FBI just didn't have time for for a year and a half to organize and put into action a powerful counterintelligence agent network among the scientists of the project. Meanwhile, absolutely essential a prerequisite for the opening of deeply conspiratorial contacts of nuclear scientists with agents and couriers of Soviet intelligence was effective undercover surveillance and work with nuclear project personnel. In the USSR, our counterintelligence had much more the possibilities of comprehensive verification of all personnel, both scientific and auxiliary, involved in nuclear development. It relied on a highly developed system operational accounting materials.

We must bear in mind the historical circumstances as well. At the beginning of the war The main task of the FBI was to prevent the leakage of information on atomic weapons to the Germans. My guess is that initially in 1942-1943 the FBI actively developed access to "German" connections and contacts of scientists who began to work at the Los Alamos Laboratories. Pro-Soviet sympathies were taken into account and recorded, but they acquired significant significance only at the final stage in early 1945. As far as I know, the directive on increased identification of links with pro-communist circles began to be implemented by the administration of the project only at the end of 1944, after after the FBI recorded our strong interest in the radiation lab in Berkeley.

Although we managed to penetrate into the environment of Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard through Fuchs, Pontecorvo and others, we never stopped our efforts to receive materials from the Berkeley laboratory, since its developments were closely related to research at Los Alamos. The FBI recorded our interest in this lab, but it re-evaluated it and focused on opposing our work. Meanwhile, this direction played a subordinate role.

We received extremely valuable information on the atomic bomb at the last stage work, on the eve of the first experimental explosion and the production of the first bombs. At a time when American counterintelligence had significantly intensified its work, we interrupted all contacts with agents embedded in the project, associated with the Communist Party and other "leftist" organizations. As a result, none of the people who collaborated with us were detained. by American counterintelligence red-handed and directly at the time of transfer to us information.

Influenced by the release in 1994 of the original version of my "Memoirs" in America launched a broad campaign to "rehabilitate" the names of prominent American scientists and Niels Bohr, allegedly deliberately slandered in this book. At the same time, the main efforts were concentrated on proving that the most prominent scientific minds of the West were not agents, Soviet intelligence. Under pressure from the public, American intelligence agencies made a decision to declassify in 1995 the decryption materials of the telegrams of the Soviet intelligence intercepted in 1941-1945. Publication in the United States of the materials of this operation under the name "Venona" is certainly a significant event. However, multi-volume editions "Venony" confirm what is written in the book. "Director of the Reservation" Oppenheimer presumably, but accurately named in the cipher telegrams published by the Americans of March 23, 1945 and December 2, 1944 as a source of information. In wrong In the telegram cited by the Russian historian, laureate of the USSR State Prize V. Malkov, the courier agent Huron (aka Ernst), as follows from the text of the telegram, is ordered not to establish, but to restore contact with the Veksel source, that is Oppenheimer, during an upcoming trip to Chicago. Another question is that this trip is not took place.

In 1944-1945, American counterintelligence, using an employee of our

Andrey Rainu, who worked in the Soviet Lend-Lease Procurement Commission, through her dummy agent, gave us a lot of disinformation materials on atomic bomb. This "misinformation" in 1945-1949 was revealed by our prominent physicists, including Kurchatov, Ioffe, Alikhanov, Kikoin, with the assistance of specialists who worked in our scientific and technical intelligence - Rylov, Terletsky and others.

However, the positive significance of this disinformation should also be emphasized, since it once again confirmed the true scope of the nuclear race in the United States. After all, the misinformation containing distorted calculated data did not obscure the general direction of efforts American physicists working on the Manhattan Project.

In conclusion, I want to say: Soviet intelligence initiated the deployment large-scale work on the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR and had a significant help our scientists in this matter. However, atomic weapons were created by colossal by the efforts of our leading nuclear scientists and industry workers.

## CHAPTER 8. "COLD WAR"

### The road to Yalta and the beginning of a peaceful confrontation

It is generally accepted that the Cold War began with the famous speech of Winston Churchill in Fulton on March 6, 1946, when he first mentioned the existence of the Iron Curtain. However, for us, the confrontation with the Western allies began as soon as the Red The army entered the territory of Eastern Europe. There was a conflict of interest. The principle of holding multi-party elections in the liberated lands and the formation coalition governments (with an actual focus on the West), as suggested in Yalta President Roosevelt, could only be acceptable to us for a transitional period after the defeat Hitler's Germany. I remember the remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov and Beria: coalition governments in Eastern Europe will not last long. Later, in 1947, at meetings of the Information Committee headed by Molotov, these words have taken on a new meaning. I note that from 1947 to 1951 the Committee was the main intelligence agency, where almost all information from abroad on military and political questions.

The Yalta Agreement, where the post-war division of the world was officially recorded between the USA, England, the USSR, was due, paradoxically, to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In this treaty of 1939, as they say now, there were no highly moral principles, but for the first time he recognized the USSR as a great world power. After Yalta, Russia became one of the centers of world politics, on which the future of all mankind depended and the fate of the

world. Today, many analysts point to the closeness of Stalin and Hitler in their approach to division of the world, Stalin is fiercely criticized for betraying the principles and norms human morality by signing a pact with Hitler. However, it is overlooked that he signed secret agreements and protocols on the division of Europe, extradition to the Soviet Union emigrants and displaced persons who sought asylum in the West from the Soviet regime, with Roosevelt, Churchill and Truman (Yalta, Potsdam).

Ideological principles are by no means always decisive for secret deals between superpowers: this is one of the realities of our life. In December 1941 in Beria's office, I met our ambassador to the United States, Umansky, who had just returned from Washington after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He told me that Harry Hopkins, a close friend of Roosevelt and his personal envoy for special cases, on behalf of the President put before us the question of the dissolution of the Comintern and of reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox church. According to him, this is necessary in order to remove obstacles from the opposition in lend-lease assistance and ensure political cooperation with the United States in the years war. These unofficial recommendations were accepted by Stalin as early as 1943 and created



additional favorable conditions for a meeting in Tehran, and then in Yalta. This showed the Americans that it is possible to agree with Stalin on the most delicate issues taking into account his

interests. By the way, both we and the Americans stubbornly do not publish all the recordings of Hopkins' conversations with Soviet leaders. The reason is simple - confidential discussions of delicate questions refute many stereotypes and show that the conspiracy of the West with Stalin on the division of spheres of influence in the world after the war was quite real. The leaders of the Western countries put up with the communist presence in the world politics, and, moreover, they did not consider the communist regime an obstacle to achieving agreements on questions of the post-war order of the world.

At the end of 1944, preparing for the Yalta Conference, which opened, as is known, in February 1945, we held a meeting of the leaders of the NKVD-NKGB, the People's Commissariat of Defense and Navy, which was chaired by Molotov. The purpose of this meeting was to find out whether Germany could continue the war and to analyze information on possible areas agreements with our allies America and England on the post-war order of the world. ABOUT We were not told the exact date of the opening of the conference: Molotov simply said that she will take place in Crimea not later than in two months.

After this meeting, Beria appointed me head of a special group on preparation and verification of materials for the Yalta Conference. I had to regularly inform Molotov and Stalin. Beria himself went to Yalta, but did not participate in the conference. accepted. While preparing for the meeting in Crimea, we collected data on the leaders allied powers, made their psychological portraits, so that our delegation would know with what it may collide during negotiations. We knew that neither the Americans nor the The British do not have a clear policy regarding the post-war future of the countries of Eastern Europe. The allies did not have any agreement on this issue, nor a special program. All they wanted was to return to power in Poland and Czechoslovakia the governments that were in exile in London. Military intelligence data and our own indicated that the

Americans were open for a compromise, so that the flexibility of our position could provide an acceptable for the Soviet parties to the division of spheres of influence in post-war Europe and the Far East. We agreed that the Polish government-in-exile should receive in the new coalition several important positions in the Polish government. The demands of Roosevelt and Churchill, put forward at Yalta, seemed to us extremely naive: from our point of view, the composition of the Polish post-war government will determine those structures that received support from side of the Red Army. In

the period preceding the Yalta Conference, the Red Army conducted active fighting against the Germans and was able to liberate a significant part of the Polish territory. Favorable for us turn of the political situation in all Eastern European countries it was very easy to predict - especially where the Communist parties played an active role in Committees of National Salvation, which were de facto provisional governments under our influence and some control.

We could well have been flexible and agreed to hold democratic elections, since the governments in exile could not oppose our influence. Benes, for example, fled from Czechoslovakia to England, with the money of the NKVD took out the necessary him people and was under our strong influence. Later became president Czechoslovakia Ludwik Svoboda always focused on the Soviet Union. Supervisor Czechoslovak intelligence Colonel Moravec, later a general, from 1935 collaborated with Soviet intelligence agencies, first with military intelligence, then with the NKVD, which did not prevent him adhere to anti-Soviet beliefs, was in close contact with our resident in London Chichayev. The young Romanian king Mihai needed support deeply conspiratorial our groups associated with the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party, in order to arrest General Antonescu, break the alliance with Hitler and enter into anti-Hitler coalition. The situation in Bulgaria was developing quite favorably for us, given the presence and great influence of the legendary Georgy Dimitrov, a former

Chairman of the Comintern. During the Yalta Conference, we were already preparing to secretly export uranium ore mined in the Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria (uranium was needed for our atomic program).

## Harriman Mission

In 1945 I met Harriman, the United States ambassador to the Soviet Union. The first meeting was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: I was introduced as Pavel Matveev, an employee of the Molotov secretariat responsible for technical training Yalta conference. After the first official meeting, I invited Harriman to dinner at "Aragvi", a restaurant then known for its exquisite Georgian cuisine. Harriman s He accepted my invitation with obvious pleasure. I took with me to lunch as my translator of Prince Janusz Radziwill, presented to Harriman as a Polish a patriot living in exile in Moscow (at that time he was our agent, who was in personal contact with Beria).

For Harriman and Radziwill it was a meeting of old acquaintances. Harriman owned a chemical factory, a porcelain factory, two coal and zinc mines in Poland. More importantly, Radziwill and Harriman jointly owned coal and metallurgical complex, which employed up to forty thousand workers. On my own home Janusz Radziwill was a very prominent political figure, being a senator and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Seimas. In the 1930s he assisted Harriman in acquisition of shares of some Polish companies in a highly competitive environment by French and Belgian entrepreneurs.

I have already written that since the mid-1930s we have become actively interested in Radziwill. After the Red Army entered the eastern regions of Poland on September 17, 1939, he fell into our hands, and Beria recruited him as a so-called agent of influence. Then I organized his return to Berlin, where for some time our residency followed him observation and regularly reported to Moscow. He was often seen at that time on diplomatic receptions in the company of Goering, with whom he used to hunt and often came to his estate near Vilnius (then this territory belonged to Poland).

At the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945, I was informed: Radziwill was detained and taken to Moscow; Beria ordered to use it in probe contacts with the Americans the day before. Yalta conference. At that time our relations with Poland were strained. The Pro-Communist Provisional Committee in Lublin declared itself the country's government in a counterweight to the Polish government in exile based in London. We were going actively use Radziwill to calm the pro-English-minded Poles. British and American authorities, meanwhile, as we know, began to direct information regarding the whereabouts of Radziwill, who disappeared from their field of vision.

A routine check of his pre-war connections showed us: Radziwill had business relationship with Harriman. Upon learning of this, Beria immediately ordered the transfer of Radziwill from Lubyanka, where by that time he had managed to sit for about a month, to a safe house in suburb of Moscow under house arrest. Beria decided to use Radziwill as intermediary in communication with Harriman.

At dinner at Aragvi with Harriman and Radziwill, I was going to talk about our tolerance towards Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox clergy, even those who during the war years collaborated with the German authorities on occupied territories (I personally received Archbishop Slipyi, one of the hierarchs Ukrainian Uniate Church; despite the fact that he worked closely with the Nazis, he allowed to return to Lviv, but after the Yalta Conference he was arrested and sent to the Gulag on the orders of Khrushchev). I was also going to discuss over lunch at "Aragvi" the fate of the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church and assure Harriman that the Soviet government does not persecute Orthodox hierarchs.

As I spoke about this, Harriman remarked that the recent election of a Russian patriarch Orthodox Church made a very favorable impression on the American

public opinion. No other questions prepared by me in advance could be discussed - Harriman felt that Radziwill was not at all an official translator, and began to discuss with him possible business prospects regarding creation of joint ventures in the Soviet Union after the war. According to Harriman, the defeat of Germany could logically lead to the fact that the Soviet-American economic cooperation becomes real. We need economic help, so let's American capital to raise the war-ravaged national economy. Harriman expected that the American side could derive large profits by participating in rebuilding our economy. He mentioned the establishment of joint ventures in coal and mining and metallurgical industry as a form of economic cooperation. I was not prepared for this turn of events. I

told the American Ambassador that we are grateful for the diplomatic channels, information about the contacts of American agents with authorized faces of Goerdeler and General Beck in Switzerland. Americans frankly told us about plans to withdraw Germany from the war. I also mentioned that we informed The US State Department on its secret contacts with the Finns for the purpose of signing peace agreement, in which the Wallenberg family played the role of mediators.

In the end, I asked Harriman what the Americans expected from the Yalta Conference. My purpose in doing so was to prepare in advance our position on the most sensitive issues that will affect the Americans. For example, the future of Poland, the post-war borders in Europe or the fate of Yugoslavia, Greece and Austria. Harriman, however, was not prepared for such a conversation. I realized that he needed instructions for this, which he not yet received. He was more interested in how long Radziwill was going to stay in Moscow. I assured that Radziwill was free to go to London, but he preferred to go straight to Poland as soon as the country is liberated from the Germans.

Harriman, unexpectedly for me, raised the question of attracting Jewish capital for rebuilding our war-ravaged economy. In particular, he made it clear that American business circles support the idea of using Jewish capital for revival of the Gomel region in Belarus - a traditional place for a compact Jewish residence. I

did my best to translate the conversation into topical topics. So, I advised Harriman pay attention to the behavior of his daughter, whose adventures with young people in Moscow can cause her great harm: there is a lot of hooliganism in the city, which is not surprising, given the difficulties of wartime. I expressed my remarks in a soft, friendly manner.

and specifically stressed that, of course, our government will try to prevent any actions compromising both Harriman himself and his family. At the same time I especially noted that Harriman enjoys the respect of the head of our state. These the warnings were neither a threat nor an attempt at any kind of blackmail. On the contrary, our goal was to show him that there could be no question of any provocations against him. The fact that we discussed with him not only diplomatic, but also purely personal issues, moreover rather scrupulous nature, showed only the degree of our trust. But Harriman doesn't did not respond to my warnings, showing much more concern for the delivery vodka and black caviar for the participants of the forthcoming conference in

the Crimea. Speaking with Radziwill, Harriman noted that Yalta should give the green light promising business ventures in post-war Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Continuing the conversation, I said that the meaning of Radziwill's secret stay in Moscow is to exclude all sorts of rumors that Goering's friend is about to appear in Sweden or England as a courier from Hitler with peace proposals. Radziwill not only immediately translated my words, but also, for his part, supported me, confirming his intention to appear in Europe only after the end of the war. Since I spoke at the meeting as a high-ranking government official, on behalf of our leadership presented Harriman's gift is a tea set. My

conversation with Harriman at the Aragvi, and then at the Sovetskaya Hotel (at that time Western delegations who came to Moscow usually stopped) was recorded on tape.

Then we listened to the recording, trying to find in it any additional touches for creating a psychological portrait of the members of the American delegation at the conference in Yalta. These psychological nuances were more important for Stalin than intelligence data: the possibility of establishing personal contacts with the heads of Western delegations, Roosevelt and Churchill seemed to him decisive. Indeed, the personal relations of the world leaders played a colossal role in the discussion and adoption of documents at the Yalta conferences.

In November 1945, when Stalin was on vacation in the Crimea, Harriman unsuccessfully tried to meet with him to discuss plans for economic and political cooperation. I was told how he came to Molotov and convinced him that he was our friend, who for several years had invariably discussed the most sensitive issues with Soviet officials and personally with Stalin. However, this time Molotov remained indifferent and purely official. This meant that from now on Harriman would no longer be of interest to our side and access to the highest echelons of power is ordered to him. Harriman left Moscow at the end of January 1946.

### **Roosevelt's envoys and emissaries**

In the summer of 1941, Harry Hopkins, adviser to President Roosevelt, suggested to our Ambassador to Washington Umansky to establish confidential relations. How is that Umansky told me, it was done on the direct orders of the president. In December 1941, Stalin appointed Litvinov as ambassador to the United States instead of Umansky - and Hopkins immediately established a close relationship with him. So close that Litvinov often visited Hopkins Houses. Litvinov himself told me how once, when an adviser to the American president was sick, he sat by his bed and discussed current problems with him. Both Umansky and Litvinov, whom I met in Moscow, also, according to them, installed unofficial relationships with State Department and White House officials. Our residents Zarubin, and Gorsky, who later replaced him, expanded these contacts during allied relations with America during World War II.

Before any official visit, a list of future negotiators in obligatorily handed over to the NKVD (or NKGB). In this case, such a list of all members of the American delegation at the Yalta Conference I received. In it, for each participants contained detailed attitudinal data, including contacts with us and attitude to our country. The materials I received for compiling a psychological characteristics contained information about personal qualities and top secret an appendix on the possibility of their undercover cooperation with Soviet intelligence.

One US official with whom we had confidential relations, was a member of the official members of the American delegation to the Yalta negotiations. The man's name was Alger Hiss, and he was a confidant of Hopkins. In conversations with Umansky and then with Litvinov, Hiss revealed Washington's plans. In addition, he was very close to some "sources" who collaborated with the Soviet military intelligence, and with our active agents in the United States. Through special channels exchange of information with the military, we knew that we had received a message from Hiss: the Americans were ready to come to an agreement with us about the future

of Europe. In our list, against the name of Hiss, it was indicated that he was very sympathetic belongs to the Soviet Union and is a supporter of post-war cooperation between American and Soviet governments. However, nothing was said about the fact that Hiss, a State Department official, is an agent of our intelligence.

In June 1993, I was talking to one of my former colleagues, at one time he was military intelligence resident in London and New York. According to him, Hiss became the source information for our group in Washington in the early and mid 30s. In this group, headed by the Russian-born economist Nathan Silvermaster, included as our agents, and those who were the source of confidential information, but whose activities was not recorded in any recruitment documents, since none of them

signed a partnership agreement. In the 1930s, registration and recruitment obligations in contacts with influential people in the West who sympathize with us are of no particular importance had. In the 40s, a strict procedure for documenting cooperation with Soviet intelligence.

Undercover reports translated into Russian, as a rule, we reported to Stalin or Molotov without any comments. The only appendix to the document could be a statement that the agent or source is trustworthy or untrustworthy or that We do not vouch for the accuracy of the data in the special message. As far as I remember, although I can wrong, Hiss figured as the source of "Mars", but he did not have the slightest idea about this concepts.

When Hiss was accused of spying for the USSR in the late 1940s, no Convincing evidence of his guilt was not presented, and there could not be any. Hiss was close to people who collaborated with Soviet military intelligence, possibly source of information passed on to our intelligence agencies, but he was never our agent in the full sense of the word. The same point of view was held by one of my old acquaintances, a veteran of our military intelligence. He told me that on the eve of Yalta for contacts with Soviet representatives of Hiss were pushed by Hopkins and Hull, the US Secretary of State, Roosevelt's order, knowing about his sympathies for the Soviet Union. The American authorities were it is important to have Hiss as an intermediate person who can episodically convey important unofficial information to the Soviet ruling circles.

A friend of mine, a retired military intelligence officer, recalls that in Roosevelt administration, we had a very important source of information. It was an assistant Roosevelt for Intelligence, who was on bad terms with William Donovan and Edgar Hoover, heads respectively of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and FBI. My friend is inclined to think that Roosevelt and Hopkins, for their part, also distrusted completely OSS and FBI. Roosevelt in those years created his own unofficial intelligence network, which he used to carry out sensitive missions. Hiss, like Hopkins and Harriman, was part of this narrow circle of confidants.

This, perhaps, explains why Truman, who replaced Roosevelt, did not immediately dismissed Hiss. The lenient sentence he received, the unintelligible accusations leveled against him, and, finally, the neutral position taken in this case by the American government, show that Hiss knew too much, which could affect the reputation of both Roosevelt and Truman. My friend, a veteran military intelligence officer, believes that in The FBI archives contain far more material on Hiss than was presented at trial, it is possible that there was a tacit agreement between Truman and Hoover to limit the charge against Hiss only by perjury.

It should be borne in mind that 80 percent of intelligence information on political questions come not from agents, but from confidential sources. Usually these sources are detected by counterintelligence, but it is always problematic to prove the fact of espionage. Line Soviet intelligence has always been that members of the Communist Party should not be involved in our intelligence activities. If the source of information represented for us too great importance, then such a person was ordered to leave the party in order to show their disillusionment with communism. It is

interesting to follow how diplomatic contacts between American and Soviet representatives. During the war years, Hopkins and Harriman maintained personal, informal and diplomatic relations with the Soviet leadership - I believe that they acted at the behest of Roosevelt himself. As for Stalin, he resorted to unofficial diplomacy only in the first period of the war, using Umansky and Litvinov. As soon as he established a personal relationship with Roosevelt in Tehran, his the need to keep Litvinov in America, an experienced diplomat who spoke fluent English, French and German. Appointment as Ambassador to America Gromyko in 1944 testified that personal contact had been established between Stalin and Roosevelt. To him strong intermediaries were no longer needed - such as Litvinov or Umansky.

Later, Stalin parted ways with everyone who maintained unofficial contacts with

Roosevelt's envoys. The message that Roosevelt's personal interpreter is the son of one of leaders of the White Guard terrorist organization "League of Aubert", who participated in the assassination of the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, Voikov, we received just two days before the start of the Yalta conference. I urgently reported this to Bogdan Kobulov, the Beria who was in Yalta, and on his orders Kruglov, who was officially responsible for the protection of delegations and maintained regular contacts with the American and British intelligence services, informed the head of the American security service. The translator was immediately delivered from Yalta to an American ship, which was stationed off the coast of Crimea.

## **Marshall plan. Events in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in 1946-1948**

Initially, the Soviet leadership seriously considered the participation of the USSR in the "plan Marshall." I remember my meeting with Molotov's assistant Vetrov before he left for Paris together with Molotov to participate in negotiations on the future of Europe. It was in June 1947. Vetrov, my old friend from work in Riga in 1940, told me that our policy is based on cooperation with the Western allies in the implementation of the "plan Marshall", referring primarily to the revival of war-torn industry in Ukraine, Belarus and Leningrad. Suddenly,

our political course has changed dramatically. I was invited to the Committee information. Vyshinsky, who acted as chairman in the absence of Molotov committee, and his deputy Fedotov reported that important information had been received from the agent under the code name "Stuart" (it was Donald McLean). As First Secretary British Embassy in Washington and Acting Chief of Staff embassy, McLean had access to important secret correspondence. The report stated that the purpose of the "Marshall Plan" was to establish the American economic dominance in Europe. New International Economic Recovery Organization European industry will be controlled by American capital. The source of this information was none other than the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. This plan predetermined the difference in the economic development of countries in the future. Eastern and Western Europe.

In general, the significance of D. McLean in the acceptance by the Soviet leadership foreign policy decisions was immeasurably higher than the materials coming from K. Philby. The latter was of particular value for the operations of the state security agencies, because his data made it possible to thwart a number of major actions of British and American intelligence in Albania and Western Ukraine in 1951.

Vyshinsky wanted to immediately report this message to Stalin. However, before to do this, he had to make sure once again of the reliability of the agent from whom he received information, and not only in McLean himself, but also in other agents who were part of the Cambridge group, Philby, Burgess, Cairncross and Blunt. Vyshinsky feared that these people are compromised by their past connections with Orlov. Don't they lead now double play?

In 1939, after Orlov defected to the West, it was I who gave the order to renewed contact with Philby and McLean. Since the McLean file contained this telegram with my signature, Vyshinsky asked me the question whether it is possible to trust an agent like McLean. I replied that I was responsible for the signed by me directives, but I have information about MacLean's work only up to 1939, and since 1942 I have there are no messages about him at all, while I added: "Each source of important information must be reviewed and reassessed on a regular basis. that the Cambridge group cannot be an exception." At the end

of the conversation, I reminded Vyshinsky that Stalin personally ordered that The NKVD did not search for Orlov abroad and did not persecute members of his family.

After my reminder, Vyshinsky seemed convinced that there were no grounds for distrusting there is no reliability of our agent, which means that the message should be reported to Stalin. If McLean's information was, so to speak, stifling, then Vyshinsky understood that he could wash

hands, citing Stalin's order to leave Orlov alone. In addition, our conversation with Vyshinsky took place in the presence of Fedotov, who could be used as a witness against me if McLean's information turned out to be false. McLean's message also stated that the "Marshall Plan" provided for stopping the payment of reparations by Germany. This immediately alerted the Soviet leadership, since at that time reparations were, in fact, the only source of external funds to restore the national economy destroyed by the war.

At Yalta and Potsdam, the parties agreed that Germany would pay reparations in the form of equipment, industrial machines and machines, cars, trucks and building materials regularly - for five years. These are especially important supplies were for our chemical and engineering industries, which needed in modernization. Moreover, the use of supplies in the Soviet Union was not subject to international control, which meant that we could use them for any purpose we saw fit.

According to the Marshall Plan, the implementation of all projects of foreign economic assistance was supposed to be under international, actually American control. This plan could be acceptable if it were in addition to the regular flow of reparations from Germany and Finland. The message received from McLean, however, made it clear that The British and American governments wanted, with the help of the Marshall Plan, to suspend reparations to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and to provide international assistance based not on bilateral agreements, but on international control.

Such a situation was absolutely unacceptable for us, it would interfere with our control over Eastern Europe. And this meant that the communist parties, already established in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be deprived economic levers of power. It is significant that six months after the "plan Marshall" was rejected by us, the multi-party system in Eastern Europe was liquidated with our active participation.

On Stalin's instructions, Vyshinsky sent Molotov, who was in Paris, cipher, which briefly summarized McLean's message. Based on this information, Stalin invited Molotov to oppose the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" in Eastern Europe.

This plan was opposed in various ways. For example, Vyshinsky personally negotiated with the Romanian king Mihai about his abdication in exchange for guaranteed living conditions in Mexico. We also awarded him the Order of Victory, the Romanian government gave him a high life allowance.

Intense for the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union developed in 1946—1947 events in Poland. The trump card of the leadership close to the Soviet Union Poland was the question of a new border, of the lands that had ceded to Poland from Germany in the light of agreements between the USSR, England and the USA in Potsdam in 1946. We have provided the most serious organizational and technical support to the Bierut government during the election campaign. Deputy Minister of State Security Selivanovsky traveled to Poland several times with a large group of our employees of operational and technical services, headed by the chief department of operational equipment Palkin.

Through the intelligence and sabotage service, a task force was sent to Poland in led by Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Mirkovsky. She provided significant assistance to the Polish security service in the fight against partisan formations of the remnants Home Army and in organizing a disinformation operation against the British and American intelligence, which continued until 1952. In its course, it was possible, having effectively paralyzed the actions of the agents of emigrant circles in Poland, to capture and re-recruit British and American intelligence couriers.

A unique situation has developed in Bulgaria. During the war I often had to meet with Georgy Dimitrov, who headed the Comintern before it was dissolved

in 1943. During the year he was the head of the international department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

When Dimitrov returned to Bulgaria in 1944, he allowed the Tsaritsa and her son, heir to the throne, to leave the country, taking all family valuables with them. Knowing what a threat the monarchical circles in exile could pose, Dimitrov decided to destroy all political opposition inside the country: key figures of the former parliament and the tsarist government of Bulgaria were repressed and liquidated. As a result of this action, Dimitrov became the only communist leader in Eastern Europe who did not have an organized opposition among the emigration that really claimed power. Dimitrov's successors enjoyed the fruits of this position for more than thirty years. General Ivan Vinarov, one of the leaders of intelligence in Bulgaria, who worked under me in the 4th directorate during the war years, later, when we met with him in Moscow in the 70s, said: we used your experience and destroyed all dissidents before how they could escape to the West. Nevertheless, the situation in Bulgaria was sometimes exceptionally tense. In the critical days of the

aggravation of the political crisis in 1947, we sent a large group of employees of our service headed by Colonel Studnikov to Dimitrov's disposal. The task of our people was to provide all possible assistance to the Bulgarian security service and neutralize and, if necessary, eliminate Dimitrov's political opponents. The direct coordination of the actions of our special service with the Bulgarian, if necessary, was to be headed by a member of the Bulgarian leadership Chervenkov, who was also a relative of Dimitrov. The situation in Czechoslovakia was different. Our resident in Prague, Boris Rybkin, by the end of 1947, created an illegal residency operating under the guise of an export-import company for

the production of costume jewelry, using it as a base for possible sabotage operations in Western Europe and the Middle East. Czech costume jewelry is known all over the world, and this made it easier for Rybkin to create subsidiaries "distributors" in the most important capitals of Western Europe and the Middle East. Rybkin's tasks included using the Kurdish movement against the Shah of Iran and the rulers of Iraq, King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri Said. At the end of 1947, Rybkin died in a car accident in Prague, but by this time his organization had already begun to actively operate. In 1948, on the eve of the transfer of power from Edvard Beneš to Klement Gottwald, Molotov summoned me to his Kremlin office and ordered me to go to Prague and, having arranged a secret meeting with Beneš, invite him to leave his post with dignity, transferring power to

Gottwald, the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. To remind Benes of his close unofficial ties to the Kremlin, I had to show him a receipt for ten thousand dollars, signed by his secretary in 1938, when Benes and his people needed the money to move to the UK. Otherwise, I was instructed to tell him that we would find a way to organize a leak of rumors about the circumstances of his flight from the country and the financial assistance provided to him for this, a secret agreement on cooperation between Czech and Soviet intelligence, signed in 1935 in Moscow, a secret agreement on the transfer to us Carpathian Ukraine and about the participation of Benes himself in the preparation of a political coup in 1938 and an assassination attempt on the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia. Molotov emphasized that I was not authorized to conduct any negotiations on questions of Czech policy: my task was only to convey our conditions, leaving Benes the right to decide how he would fulfill them. Molotov repeated his instructions very clearly, gazing at me through his pince-nez. I replied that

I considered such a delicate task more suitable for a person who personally knew Benes and was directly connected with him through his previous work. Such a person was Zubov, our resident in Prague in the pre-war years, whom Stalin and Molotov once imprisoned because in 1938 he reported the failure of Beneš's plan to rely on dubious people in Belgrade and. Moreover, he did not give them any money. Molotov said to this that I personally carried out the assignment with the involvement of the necessary people, but how - this is already at my discretion. It was clear that he did not want to take responsibility for what methods I would use: he was only interested in the result. I had to leave Prague twelve hours after



conversation with Benes, without waiting for an answer.

Together with Zubov (since September 1946, Zubov was retired; after systematic beatings in prison, which were subjected to him by the investigator Rhodes, he became actually an invalid: quite noticeably limped and walked, leaning on a stick) we arrived in Prague by train in January 1948, but did not stay at the embassy, but at a modest hotel, where they introduced themselves as members of the Soviet trade mission. Our special team appointment - 400 people dressed in civilian clothes - was already in Prague. This group is hidden forwarded to support and protect Gottwald. The

official Soviet representatives already had a very strong pressure, and then we also had to contribute. Zubov and I spent a whole day in Prague week, and during this time Zubov, who before the war met with Benes in the presence of our Ambassador Alexandrovsky, succeeded, using all his skill and past connections, on fifteen minutes to meet Benes at his residence, located in the very center of Prague. He conveyed the meaning of our message to the president, saying that there would be fundamental changes, whether the current leadership is retained or not, but, according to his opinion, Benes was the only one who could provide a smooth and bloodless transfer of authorities.

In accordance with the instructions, Zubov told Benes that he did not expect an answer from him, but just giving him an informal message. According to Zubov, Benes seemed a broken, sick man who will try his best to avoid an explosion of violence and unrest in Czechoslovakia.

Having completed our mission, we boarded the Prague-Moscow train. As soon as the train crossed the border, I immediately, using the communication channels of the local regional party committee, sent, as I ordered, a code to Molotov and a copy of it to Abakumov, the then minister of state security: "Leo received an audience and conveyed a message" ("Leo" is a code name for Zubov). A month later, Benes peacefully ceded the reins of government to Gottwald.

## **Reorganization of state security and intelligence agencies in 1946-1947**

At the end of the war, my official position was further strengthened: the 4th Directorate, which I led, made a generally recognized contribution to our victory. Among twenty-eight Chekists awarded the highest award of the country - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, twenty-three were officers and employees of my department. In December 1945, I was given a rare honor to be the official speaker at the annual staff meeting of the apparatus of the NKGB-NKVD, dedicated to the next anniversary of the formation of the Cheka. Soon I was elected a member of the party committee of the Ministry of State Security (MGB): in the spring of 1946 The People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) became known as a ministry.

Back in July 1945, immediately after the end of the war, on the eve of the Potsdam conference, Stalin signed a government decree on the introduction for officers and senior staff of state security and internal affairs similar to the Red Army military ranks (senior major - colonel, commissar of state security - major general; commissar of state security of the 3rd rank - lieutenant general, 2nd rank - colonel general, 1st rank - general of the army; general commissar - marshal). Beria received the rank of Marshal in July 1945. Fitin and I were awarded the title of lieutenant general, and Eitingon - major general. So for the first time my name and Eitingon were mentioned in the pages of our press among the leaders of the NKVD, who were given the rank of general.

Meanwhile, the "cold war" took on a fierce character, that at the end of 1947 led to an important reorganization of the structures of our intelligence agencies. The war showed that political and military intelligence did not always competently cope with the assessment and analysis of all the information they received through their channels. And then Molotov, who chaired several meetings before the Yalta Conference heads of intelligence services, proposed to unite them into one centralized organization. Stalin agreed to this proposal - this is how the Committee of Information was born, where

included the 1st Directorate of the MGB and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). What concerns the Ministry of State Security, it was also decided to keep in its composition a special intelligence and sabotage service - in case of a possible war or local military conflicts in the Middle East, Europe, the Balkans or the Far East. A similar special unit was retained in the Ministry of Defense.

Looking back on the past, I see that it is quite a sensible idea to create a single analytical center for processing intelligence information was implemented on practice is not the way it should be. Operational management of intelligence operations had to be handed over to the wrong hands. As for the new Information Committee, its tasks had to be limited to the analysis of intelligence materials.

The efficiency and sophistication of foreign intelligence operations of the security and The General Staff of the Armed Forces largely depended on the interaction of these services. The intelligence service of the MGB cooperated with counterintelligence, and the GRU contacted the relevant departments of the General Staff. Neither the GRU, nor the intelligence of the MGB, distinguished by their high professionalism in the performance of tasks of a military or political nature, do not themselves determined the priorities and goals of their activities regarding the penetration of our special services and the introduction of our agents on enemy targets. Under the new system, any requests for assistance from the highest military command or the Ministry of State Security first came to Stalin, and then to Molotov as the head of the Committee of Information, and this, of course, increased the flow of bureaucratic papers and the inevitable coordination, making it difficult to make decisions. The former intelligence

department of the NKVD - the NKGB, which was the main tool ensuring the interests of state security abroad, in essence, has become an appendage Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose main activity is diplomacy, not intelligence. Like the Information Committee, the ministry was under the control of Molotov. As a result such operations, previously successfully carried out by the NKVD-NKGB, as penetration into emigrant organizations, the infiltration of our agents into the British and American intelligence services and cooperation with counterintelligence agencies in the suppression of nationalist movements in The Baltic States and Western Ukraine began to noticeably lose their importance. Information Committee was established simultaneously with the formation of the CIA in the United States. It was an attempt — profoundly mistaken! - respond in the same way to changes in America.

Even now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am still convinced that effective The functioning of the special services in Russia depends on their close cooperation with the authorities security. We do not have a solid operational independent base for the work of, say, the tax police, the customs service, etc. In the West, all these services have serious levers of control over important areas of society. In Russia, these services are just being born. However, the intelligence analysis and assessment body should act independently, directly serve the leadership of the country, and not be in subordination to bureaucrats and certain influential politicians or leaders special

services. The need for such an apparatus is felt especially acutely now in view of the fact that table to the president, as they tell me, conflicting information often comes from actually competing with each other in guiding the country's leadership special services: SVR, FSB, FAPSI and other departments.

This conclusion was not reached immediately, but gradually, by 1951, more precisely, by 1952, when Stalin ordered that all operational intelligence work be again concentrated in the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the new 1st Chief management (foreign intelligence) of the Ministry of State Security. Committee information began to play the role of an analytical center for the processing of military and political intelligence. Burges and McLean started working there when they managed to escape to Soviet Union.

Perhaps for this reason, in the 1960s, Khrushchev created the Department of International information at the Central Committee of the CPSU for the analysis and processing of materials on foreign economic and

foreign policy issues. After the events of August 1991, Gorbachev and Yeltsin made the same mistake: instead of working out a mechanism public-democratic and parliamentary control over the activities of special services, they combined analytical and operational work and created a foreign intelligence service, which in its foreign activities cannot but rely on counterintelligence materials. The lack of effective coordination of actions with internal security agencies, tax police and customs remains a weak point in its work. The Information Committee mentioned above was headed first by Molotov,

then by three

month Vyshinsky, and after him Zorin, later our representative in United Nations. I have attended several meetings

under Vyshinsky: until the last day of his tenure as chairman of the committee, he managed not to personally sign a single important document, shifting the entire responsibility for their deputies. At the same time, he invariably repeated: "In such a serious

In fact, I'm completely incompetent."

According to him, he twice told Comrade Stalin about his incompetence in intelligence matters. Every time he visited Stalin, Vyshinsky took himself and his deputy. He quite frankly wanted someone else to share with him.

responsibility for decisions: this gave him the opportunity, in case of failure, to shift the blame to another. By the way, Vyshinsky was much more competent than he tried to imagine. Somehow in an informal setting, he admitted that intelligence, as a rule, is associated with trouble, and not with success in work. He was right: in our business it is really impossible to count only success - the risk is always quite high. In the end, he convinced Stalin that he should be freed from this burden of cares. Vyshinsky's request was granted, appointing Zorin as chairman of the Information Committee.

Even before these changes, in June 1946, unexpectedly for me from the post of Minister State Security was replaced by Merkulov. There were vague hints that the special services, they say, did not cope with their duties, having made mistakes in carrying out the traditional May Day demonstration. It was about the traffic jams that arose during the celebration of May Day on the streets of the capital. It soon became quite clear to me that this was just an excuse to remove Merkulov.

After the end of the war, the problem of reorganization came to the fore. Armed Forces. Following this, Stalin invited the Politburo to consider the activities security agencies and set new tasks for them. Later Mamulov and Ludwigov told me that Merkulov was required to submit a reorganization plan to the Politburo Ministry of State Security. At the meeting, Beria, according to them (both of them, as I mentioned, headed the secretariat of Beria), fell upon Merkulov for failing to determine directions in the work of counterintelligence in the post-war period. Stalin joined him, accusing Merkulov of complete incompetence.

At the meeting, where Merkulov's deputies were present, they were supposed to discuss new tasks of the Ministry of State Security. Military counterintelligence (SMERSH), which in the years war was under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, headed by Abakumov and controlled by Stalin, returned to the Ministry of State Security, since Stalin ceased to head the People's Commissariat of Defense. appointed Minister of Defense Bulganin, a purely civilian man who did not have a military education - he was urgently promoted to marshal, after which this appointment followed.

Then, at the meeting, an interesting scene occurred. Stalin asked why the chief military counterintelligence cannot be simultaneously deputy minister of state security. Merkulov immediately agreed with him that Abakumov be appointed first deputy minister. At the same time, Stalin sarcastically remarked that Merkulov behaves at the Politburo as double-dealer and it is advisable to replace him as Minister of State Security. It seems that Merkulov made a mistake by agreeing so easily with Stalin's proposal, but in fact In fact, Stalin was simply looking for a suitable pretext to remove him. Stalin was already ready and candidate - Ogoltsov, an honest man, but a provincial who never worked in the Center; only six months since he was transferred from the Kuibyshev State Security Department to Moscow.

Ogoltsov begged Stalin not to appoint him to this position. As an honest communist, he declared he is in the Politburo, I am absolutely not suitable for such a high post, because I have lack of necessary knowledge and experience for such responsible work. Then Stalin immediately proposed to appoint Abakumov as minister. Beria and Molotov were silent, but a member Politburo Zhdanov warmly supported this idea.

A week later, Eitingon and I were summoned to see Abakumov. "Almost two years ago," he began. he—I have made up my mind never to work with you. But Comrade Stalin, when I suggested release you from your duties, said that you must continue work in your current position. So, - concluded the new minister, - let's work out.

At first, Eitingon and I felt relieved—his sincerity won us over. However, subsequent events showed that we should not have been too indulgent complacency. A few days later, we were summoned to a meeting of a special commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was chaired by the new curator of the security agencies, Secretary of the Central

Committee A. Kuznetsov. The commission considered "criminal mistakes" and cases of negligence committed by the former leadership of the Ministry of State Security. It was normal practice: whenever there is a change of leadership in the ministries (defence, security or Foreign Affairs) The Central Committee appointed a commission to review the activities old leadership and handover. Among

the issues that the Kuznetsov commission studied was the following: suspension Merkulov of the criminal prosecution of Trotsky's supporters in 1941-1945. Unexpectedly, my and Eitingon's suspicious connections with well-known "enemies of the people" surfaced - the heads of intelligence of the OGPU-NKVD in the 30s. Abakumov directly accused me and Eitingon in "criminal fraud": we rescued our "buddies" from prison in 1941 and helped them escape the punishment they deserved. What was said outraged me to the core: it was about slandering the heroes of the war, people devoted to our cause. Filled with rage, I cut him off abruptly.

"I won't let you trample on the memory of the heroes who died in the war, those who showed courage and devotion to their Motherland in the fight against fascism. In the presence of a representative I will prove to the Central Committee that the cases of these Chekists were fabricated as a result of Yezhov's criminal activities," I declared in a fit of temper.

Kuznetsov (he knew me personally - we met at a neighboring dacha, at the widow of Emelyan Yaroslavsky), intervening, hastened to say that the matter was closed. Discussion on this ended and I left.

Returning to my office, I immediately summoned Serebryansky, Zubov, Prokopyuk, Medvedev and other employees who were arrested and dismissed in the 1930s to the office, and asked them to resign immediately. Particularly vulnerable was the position of Zubov and Serebryansky, whose affairs were conducted at one time by Abakumov.

In July 1946, for the first time in eight years, I took a vacation and went with my wife and children near Riga, to the Baltic resort of Majori. At first we lived in a military sanatorium, but famous Latvian writer Vilis Latsis, who was at one time a people's commissar of the Interior of Latvia, and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, invited us to his residence. When I returned to Moscow after my vacation, the head of the secretariat of the Ministry State Security Officer Chernov informed me that the 4th Directorate, which I led, was disbanded. Since our division no longer existed, I received an instruction from the minister to submit to him his proposals for the use of personnel. At I actually had no room for maneuver: on the one hand, Molotov, a deliberate create an Information Committee, and on the other hand, Abakumov, the Minister of State Security.

I was still head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Government's Select Committee on the atomic issue. I learned from Ogoltsov: Abakumov was annoyed that I was still this post and have direct access to the Kremlin. There was nothing he could do about it because the atomic problem did not belong to his competence.

The new Committee of Information was supposed to unite the military and

political intelligence, which could not but affect the work of the Special Intelligence bureau on the atomic problem, which coordinated the activities of the GRU and the MGB on collection of intelligence related to nuclear weapons. What was this supposed to do? division now? At the end of 1946, this question was an edge, but I still couldn't managed to talk with Beria, who was deputy head of government and a member Politburo. Finally I called him and asked what the status should be and to whom the intelligence bureau of the Government's Special Committee on "Problem No. one" in connection with the organization of the Information

Committee. Beria's answer puzzled

me. "You have your own minister to deal with such issues," he snapped sharply and hung up handset.

I understood that if I still have a minister - Abakumov, then he will never support me.

That is why I immediately suggested that the functions of the 2nd Intelligence Bureau should be submitted to the Information Committee. Given the importance of the atomic problem, these questions was supposed to deal with an independent department of scientific and technical intelligence. For the position I recommended the appointment of Vasilevsky as the head of the department of scientific and technical intelligence. Fedotov, who first replaced Fitin as head of intelligence at the MGB and then became Deputy Molotov in the Information Committee, agreed, but Vasilevsky worked only a few months. He was removed from the Committee of Information during the anti-Semitic campaign that began in the country, although he was allowed to retire in 1948 with the rank of colonel in length of service.

## Creation of peacetime special forces

My official position was determined only in the autumn of 1946, when by decision of the Central Committee and the government, a special intelligence and sabotage service was created under the Minister of State Security USSR (since 1950 it was called the Bureau of the MGB No 1 for sabotage work abroad), and I was appointed chief, and Eitingon my deputy.

In 1950, for about two months, along with Eitingon, Korotkov was my deputy. From October 1951 to March 1953, the duties of my Bureau Deputy were performed by one of prominent partisan commanders during the war years, Hero of the Soviet Union Prudnikov, while time Colonel. My task was to organize an independent service that could, in the event of war, be transformed in the shortest possible time into a body directing combat work. It was also about actions in case of outbreaks.

tensions within the Soviet Union that could escalate into armed conflicts in connection with rampant banditry in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine. I

can't help but stop in this connection on a little-known tense page work of our intelligence in the late 1940s. Stalin's special order on my deputy, Eitingon, was tasked with conducting the relief operation security organs of the Chinese Communist Party in the suppression of the separatist movement of the Uyghurs in so called East Turkestan, more commonly known as the Xinjiang region of China.

Back in 1937, the Red Army and our special services used Xinjiang as border area of China to provide substantial assistance to the armed struggle Chinese Army. The situation in this area in 1940-1944 sharply worsened due to actions of the Uighurs and Kazakhs provoked by Japanese agents, under the leadership of Osman Batyr against the Soviet and Chinese troops. The rebels, armed by the Japanese, committed a number of sabotage actions against Soviet aviation enterprises that were at that time in Xinjiang. A prominent figure of the Uighurs spoke out against Mao Zedong in 1944 Ali Khan Tere, who proclaimed the independence of East Turkestan with a silent the consent of Chiang Kai-shek, who was interested in destabilizing the rear of the Chinese communists.

Eitingon and a prominent commander of our partisan movement, Hero of the Soviet Union Prokopyuk organized an effective counteraction to the actions of the Chiang Kai-shek special services.

Uighur nationalists in violent clashes in 1946-1949 suffered complete defeat.

However, it deserves special attention that Eitingon coordinated actions with employees of the so-called special services under the chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The assignment was so secret that I was informed of it as the immediate superior of Eitingon only in the most general terms, in view of his long business trips to Xinjiang. Later, in his statements to Khrushchev about the rehabilitation Eitingon mentioned the fulfillment of this order of the Council of Ministers. From his stories to In prison, I learned that an employee of Stalin's apparatus assigned to coordinate actions with him under the surname Vasiliev had at his disposal agent connections in China from among silent members of the Communist Party.

The history of operations of this independent intelligence unit, which existed under the leadership of the Soviet government in the 1930s-1950s, remains a kind of "blank spot" in our history. However, individual facts and references in a number of evidence of the existence of intelligence agencies other than military intelligence and NKVD-NKGB confirm its existence. I retained my position

as the head of an independent unit in the system Ministry of State Security. Abakumov showed enough tact not to deprive me of those privileges that I received during the war years: they kept my state dacha, I continued to include in the list of persons who received a monthly salary in excess of their official salary monetary reward, as well as those who had the right to special services and meals in Kremlin canteen. My position has changed in only one respect: I am no longer invited to regular meetings of heads of departments chaired by minister, as it was during the war years. It is interesting that the collegium in the MGB under Stalin did not was created. We practically did not communicate with Abakumov, until one fine day I unexpectedly did not hear a demanding and confident voice as usual on the phone Abakumova:

I have heard rumors that your sons are planning an assassination attempt on Comrade Stalin. - What do you have in mind? "What

I said," Abakumov replied. - Do you know

how old they are? I asked. "What difference does it make?" the Minister replied. "Comrade

Minister, I don't know who reported this to you, but such accusations are simply incredible. After all, my youngest son is five years old, and the eldest is eight.

Abakumov hung up. And during the year I did not hear a single word from him on topics that did not concern work. He never met me even though I was in his direct subordination. All issues were resolved only by phone.

In late 1946 - early 1947, a serious reorganization of the administration continued. intelligence: in July 1946, the 4th Directorate was liquidated; in late 1946 - early 1947, the intelligence department of the MGB was transferred to the Information Committee, created only in March 1947 - half a year there was a "section of the intelligence apparatus." Served in the 4th command under me throughout the war, Fischer, who was in charge of the radio intelligence service, was transferred to the Information Committee. With the help of Ogoltsov, Abakumov's first deputy, I managed to convince Fedotov, Molotov's deputy, that my service needed its own radio center. Decided that the committee and the bureau should use the services of the same the same radio center, did not please me. In the committee, the head of the department for work with Korotkov was appointed illegal immigrants - it was he who developed the plan to use Fischer (later who gained fame under the pseudonym "Rudolf Abel") as the head of the network illegal immigrants in the USA and Western

Europe. Korotkov's plan had to get my approval first, since one of the main his tasks were to penetrate military bases and installations in Bergen (Norway), Le Havre and Cherbourg (France). I spoke out categorically against it, because I thought that it would be much more useful will be if Fischer, working abroad, improves our radio communication system, instead of in order to take unnecessary risks by running a network of illegals. Illegal radio operators and

Illegal agents must be either husband and wife or work separately from each other, communicating through a liaison to minimize the risk of being captured together and thus fail the entire network. It was the non-compliance with this rule that led to the tragic losses in the "Red Chapel" during the war years. Korotkov, in essence, insisted that Fischer combine the management of the agent network and control over the radio operators.

### **Undercover operations of Abel-Fischer and others in Western Europe and the American continent**

The decision to send Fischer abroad was made only at the end of 1947. I invited Fedotov to send him to Western Europe and North America in order to check on the spot with our network of agents in France, Norway, the United States and Canada. It was supposed to provide access to military installations, warehouses and ammunition depots. We desperately needed to know how quickly the Americans could transfer reinforcements to Europe in case the "cold war" develops into a hot one.

Eitingon, in turn, suggested that Fischer obtain US citizenship and establish own radio communication system with Moscow and personally maintain it. According to legend, he was to lead a free lifestyle and not make himself dependent on the radio operator. He himself was very highly qualified radio operator. I agreed with Eitingon, emphasizing that Fischer never rely on old sources of information. He must establish new confidential contacts, and then check those people we used in the 30s and 40s: in each individual case, he himself will decide whether to go out with contact them or not, that is, we will not tell them anything about the appearance of their new curator in the West.

The priority in the United States was the West Coast for us - it was there, on Long Beach, that military installations were located. Fischer was instructed to inform us of American military supplies to the Chinese Nationalists, who at the time were still battles with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Fisher

managed to create a new agent network that united agents in California and illegal immigrants hiding under the guise of Czechoslovak emigrants in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. His people reported on the movement of military equipment and ammunition, which shipped from American ports on the Pacific coast to ports in the Far East. Illegals quite often came from Latin America to the United States on business related to their business, which was an excellent cover for them. They were all real specialists in sabotage operations, who gained extensive experience during partisan war against the Germans. This Latin American group included Grinchenko, Filonenko, and Trotsky's former secretary Maria de Las Heras (code name "Patria"). Having received the corresponding order from the Center, they could attract for sabotage operations and California agents.

Colonel Filonenko and his wife, an intelligence major, lived with their three children in Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, posing as Czech businessmen who fled Shanghai from the Chinese Communists. If necessary, the Filonenko spouses could use Chinese living in California to smuggle explosives onto American ships carrying military supplies to the Far East. To minimize the risk, Filonenko preferred regular visits to the United States over permanent residence there. TO Fortunately, the order to carry out sabotage on American ships never came.

Fisher's other spy network is German immigrants on the East Coast of the United States. In particular, Kurt Wiesel, former assistant to Ernst Wollweber, specialist in conducting sabotage in pre-war Europe. In America, he managed to advance in the service and take the position of lead engineer of a shipbuilding company that gave access to a closed information. His company was either near Norfolk, or near Philadelphia, and he had extensive connections in the German colony there. With the help of dockers and service personnel who needed additional funds, Wiesel created a reliable group for carrying out acts of sabotage. In 1949-1950 he had

several safe houses located in close proximity to port facilities. In the late 1940s, there was no small

temptation for some to supply Wiesel and Filonenko with explosive devices, but I strongly objected to this proposal, believing that there was no need to expose our people to unjustified risks. When the crisis in the Korean War reached its climax in the autumn of 1950, our specialists came from Latin America to the United States, who could assemble explosive devices on the spot. They spent two months in the United States, but they never had a chance to use their abilities in practice, since the order from the Center did not follow, and our officers safely returned to Argentina, and from there through Vienna to Moscow.

Perhaps this saved our illegal immigrants in Latin America from death. As follows from a number of documents that came to us, in the 1950s and 1960s, American intelligence, working closely with the intelligence services of Latin American states, actively searched for and groped for some approaches to our illegal immigrants. In particular, the Americans definitely knew that the illegal Soviet intelligence officer "Arthur", aka "Yuzik" (as Grigulevich was called in operational correspondence documents), created a reconnaissance and sabotage group in Argentina during the war years. Fortunately, Grigulevich was taken out of the attack in 1944. Arrived in the USSR, underwent an in-depth operational training course with Colonel Maklyarsky. After that, he was transferred to Western Europe. But the Americans persistently acted to develop a number of contacts at that time of the mythical "Arthur" for them. They were also looking for "Zina" - the wife of Colonel Filonenko, whose description they knew, since she worked in the legal apparatus of our intelligence in 1945 in a trade mission in Montevideo.

The leaders of our illegal service of the Committee of Information, and later the 1st Directorate of the KGB, took a completely unjustified risk, calling Filonenko to secret meetings in Uruguay, in Montevideo. Although the trip from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo was relatively easy, from the point of view of the border regime, the illegal resident "Firin" (Filonenko) entered the country and took unreasonable risks, since the local counterintelligence had installation data on his wife, including, which is extremely rare, knew her real name.

During Fischer's stay in Moscow, who came on vacation, Abakumov or, it seems, Molotov raised the question of searching for Orlov. I strongly objected, recalling that the Central Committee forbade us to persecute him. In addition, Orlov will immediately notice surveillance or any attempts by our agents to find approaches to his relatives. The idea of using Fischer to search for Orlov was submitted by Korotkov (code name "Long") - at one time it was assumed that he would be Orlov's assistant in managing the intelligence network in France, and he was aware of plans to use Fischer as a radio operator with Orlov, and not implemented in the 30s.

Later, it was Korotkov who was responsible for Fischer's failure. In 1955, he sent an agent, Reino Heihanen, a Finn by origin, to Fischer as an assistant. He liked to drink and, having wasted operational funds, violated the rules of conspiracy, and when they decided to recall him to Moscow, he remained in America and gave Fischer "Rudolf Abel". Because

we never carried out plans for sabotage in the United States during the Korean War. Fischer was transferred to the Illegal Intelligence Directorate of the Committee of Information, although I still had certain views on him. In 1951 or 1952, the new Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, ordered that my bureau, together with the GRU, prepare a plan for sabotage operations on American military installations and bases in the event of war or a possible limited military conflict near our borders. We identified one hundred targets, breaking them down into three categories: military bases hosting strategic air forces with nuclear weapons; military installations with depots of ammunition and military equipment intended to supply the American army in Europe and the Far East; and, finally, oil pipelines and fuel storage facilities to support American and NATO military units stationed in Europe, as well as their troops stationed in the Middle and Far East near our borders. By the early 1950s we had agents at our disposal who could infiltrate



to military bases and facilities in Norway, France, Austria, Germany, United States and Canada. The plan was to establish constant surveillance and control of NATO strategic installations, recording any of their activity. Fisher, our chief illegal resident in the United States, was to establish permanent, reliable radio contact with our combat teams, which we held in reserve in Latin America. If necessary, all these people were ready to cross the Mexican border to the United States under the guise of seasonal workers. In Europe, meanwhile, Prince Gagarin, our longtime agent, who posed as an

anti-Soviet emigrant and served in Vlasov's army during the Second World War, moved from Germany to France. Its task was to create a base for sabotage operations in seaports and military airfields, as well as groups of militants who, in the event of war or increased tension along our borders, would be able to disable the communication system and communications of the NATO headquarters located in Fontainebleau - a suburb of Paris. An important role in the network of agents we created was also played by one of the politicians of France, who was recruited in the 1930s by Serebryansky when he worked in the

office of the then Prime Minister Deladier. In Moscow, I was given a group of specialists in oil, oil refining and fuel storage, with whom we discussed the technical characteristics and location of the main oil pipelines in Western Europe. Then we gave our officers the task of recruiting agents-saboteurs from among the service personnel of oil refineries and oil pipelines.

In 1952, I received a message that Fischer had received US citizenship and thus gained a reliable "roof". Now he could engage, quite officially, in one of his professions, which he indicated - an artist or a free artist. He managed to equip three radio apartments: between New York and Norfolk, near the Great Lakes and on the West Coast. This is the last thing I heard about him before my arrest and until the moment when he was exchanged for the American military pilot Powers, who was serving his sentence in the Vladimir prison, where I was at that time.

Ignatiev, who replaced Abakumov as Minister of State Security, and Minister of Defense Marshal Vasilevsky in 1952 approved a plan of action directed against American and NATO strategic military bases in the event of war or local conflicts that got out of control. The plan provided that the first action in the event of a military conflict in Europe should be the destruction of the communications of the NATO headquarters. This plan was signed by me and the then head of the GRU, General Zakharov. However, my proposal to expand the base of operations of our agents in Paris, quite unexpectedly, ran into serious difficulties. Khokhlov (code name "Svistun"), one of our veteran agents

who actively worked during the war years, suddenly turned out to be "exposed" by enemy counterintelligence, he later fled to the West. Khokhlov was a professional actor, had a pleasant appearance (blond with blue eyes) and also spoke fluent German, which made him a very valuable intelligence agent for Maklyarsky and Ilyin. Before the war, Khokhlov basically "worked" among the Moscow intelligentsia. We planned to use him as a liaison for the intelligence network that was being created in Moscow in case the Germans occupied it. Later, in Minsk, he acted as a German officer on leave. He managed to make acquaintance with the female servants in the house of the German Gauleiter of Belarus. In 1943, a mine with a clockwork was planted under the mattress in the master's bedroom, and Gauleiter Kube died during the explosion. I took Khokhlov with me to Romania, so that after living there for some time he would adapt to life in the West. Returning to Moscow,

Khokhlov was in the reserve of the MGB in a group of secret agents who were planned to be used for "deep penetration" into the West. For everyone, he led the life of an ordinary Soviet student, actually receiving a salary in my bureau, where he worked in the secret staff as a junior intelligence officer. His studies at the institute were interrupted by the war, and without entrance exams I got him a job at the philological faculty of Moscow State University. True, I could not help him get a good apartment, and, having married, he

continued to live in the old place, where it became especially crowded after his son was born. Since 1950, Khokhlov began to travel regularly to the West. We provided him with false documents in the name of Hofbauer. In my bureau, Khokhlova was supervised by Tamara Ivanova, head departments for the training of illegal immigrants. She successfully worked in Hungary and Austria, in 1945 participated in the recruitment of the Germans in the Berezino operation, but was recalled in 1948 according to the directive on the cessation of work and the return of all illegal immigrants from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Khokhlov traveled several times to Germany, Austria and Switzerland. I wanted him, using his external data, as well as his artistry, to get acquainted with a ballerina of Georgian origin, who danced in the Parisian opera, which was often seen in company with American officers and staff of NATO headquarters. Its good manners and sociability helped him create an information gathering group and, what was more more importantly, organize a combat reserve for emergencies.

Khokhlov himself knew nothing about these plans. To my regret and indignation, he made an unforgivable mistake, which he himself did not take seriously at first. In my eyes, however, it canceled out his entire illegal career. And here was the

thing. Khokhlov tried to smuggle to Austria what he had bought in Swiss accordion. The customs officers detained him, carefully checked the documents and a few hours they took the passport. As soon as Khokhlov reported what had happened to the Center, I it became clear: the legend of Herr Hofbauer came to an end. As a result of a slight the first glance of the incident at the Khokhlov border attracted the attention of the authorities and certainly entered the list of suspicious persons. From now on, Western intelligence services, even with the usual check will not leave him alone. It is clear that in order to prepare military operations for this the legend no longer fits. Hallov himself asked to be released from his duties. duties, and I granted his request. His personal file must contain a signed me a report on his expulsion from the bureau.

Unfortunately, a little later he was sent as an operative and translator to our representative office in Germany, and in 1954, after my arrest, they instructed lead a group of militants to eliminate Okolovich, the leader of the Russian the nationalist organization NTS, which actively cooperated with the Germans during the war years. Khokhlov was detained, after which he was recruited by the CIA and became a "celebrity": the Americans used him as a "star" in an anti-Soviet propaganda show, made him play the role assigned to him. In the press, he was presented as an ardent supporter of the West, who decided to open up to Okolovich and tell the Americans about the impending murder. The scandal erupted at a press conference in Frankfurt hosted by the CIA, where Khokhlov made his revelations publicly. Particularly striking was the assertion that his wife begged him not to carry out the task he had received. She was immediately arrested in Moscow, and she spent a year in prison with her son, after which she was exiled to Siberia for five years. Khokhlov described her as an anti-Soviet woman, who, they say, inspired him to escape. He said also that she is a deeply religious person. All this was not true. IN In 1957, he claimed that the KGB had made an attempt to poison him by slipping radioactive waist, from which Khokhlov was saved by doctors from the CIA.

In May 1992, Khokhlov briefly appeared in Moscow after Yeltsin signed a decree pardoning him, but soon left for the United States again. Lord Batel of the European Parliament asked to speak to me about the case Khokhlova, and after the permission of the prosecutor's office, which reopened the investigation into the escape Khokhlov to the West, our conversation took place. His article appeared in the Daily Telegraph and in The Novoye Vremya magazine, but a number of very important details are missing there.

One of Khokhlov's last bosses, Hero of the Soviet Union Mirkovsky, my former deputy. told me that his ward did not want to go on the last assignment. They sent him not to liquidate Okolovich, but to prepare this murder, to carry out which was supposed to be a group of German agents. Khokhlov also did not want to take his wife with him and son in Austria. This meant that he had no intention of fleeing to the West at all. On press conference held at the CIA, he, however, said that he and his wife were the only

dreamed of escaping. He gained notoriety in the Western press for his appeals to the governments of the "free world" to get his wife and son to go to him. Mirkovsky believes that it was a mistake on our part to allow Khokhlov to appear in the West with a passport, which once already attracted the attention of the special services. We assume that he fell into the hands of the CIA, and he was forced to cooperate, but in this desperate situation he still managed to send a conditional postcard to his wife. Although it was reviewed by the CIA, it still contained a warning signal that he was operating under "hostile control." He was not lucky - this signal was not noticed in time. Two other agents sent by us to work with Khokhlov were captured by the Americans: they forced him to

issue.

In his book *In the Name of Conscience* (1957), Khokhlov speaks of himself as a specialist in conducting partisan operations during the war years, but does not at all refer to an unsuccessful career in intelligence. By the way, while working for the CIA under special contracts (he taught the tactics of anti-guerrilla operations in Taiwan and South Vietnam), he also failed, because he had only the experience of an illegal agent, a recruiter of attractive women and informants, and not a specialist in combat operations. In my opinion, Khokhlov did exactly the right thing, subsequently choosing a scientific career and saying goodbye forever to the life of a scout. His family suffered from Khokhlov's transition to the West, his wife had a particularly hard time. She never said anything to her son about his father, who had defected to the West. The Khokhlovs' son became a professor of biology at Moscow University and traveled to the United States as a scientific expert. However, he met his father for the first time only when he appeared in their Moscow apartment in May 1992.

## **The defeat of the armed nationalist underground in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states**

The origin of the Cold War is closely linked to the West's support for armed nationalist uprisings in the Baltic countries and Western Ukraine. Basically, the fight against them was carried out by local security agencies, but Moscow kept these operations under its control, providing weapons and advisers to help local authorities. I was involved in the maelstrom of events in Western Ukraine - my experience in the fight against Ukrainian nationalists was taken into account.

One day in the summer of 1946, I was summoned together with Abakumov to the Central Committee of the Party on Staraya Square. There, in the office of the Secretary of the Central Committee Kuznetsov, who, despite our formal acquaintance, was unusually official, I saw Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Kuznetsov informed me that the Central Committee agreed with the proposal of Kaganovich and Khrushchev to secretly liquidate the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, Shumsky. According to the Ministry of State Security of Ukraine, Shumsky established contacts with emigrant circles in the West, conducted behind-the-scenes intrigues in order to become part of the interim government being formed in exile - the Ukrainian Head Rada. It was also known that in conversations with his friends, he showed disrespect towards Stalin, allowed Stalin to challenge Stalin's opinion of himself and put forward his own version of the discussion with Stalin on the composition of the Ukrainian government in the late 20s and early 30s. Shumsky was famous in nationalist circles as a man who was subjected to repression in the early 1930s in the course of the intra-party struggle. His name was anathematized at all party congresses and the republic, and he was released only because he was partially paralyzed and had to be released from prison for health reasons. Shumsky was foolish, while in exile in Saratov, to make contact with Ukrainian cultural figures in Kyiv and abroad. According to Kuznetsov, he clearly overestimated his authority among Ukrainian emigrants and wrote a defiant letter to Stalin, threatening to commit suicide if he was not allowed to return to Ukraine. Khrushchev, for

his part, added that, according to his information, Shumsky had already bought a train ticket and intended to return to Ukraine to organize an armed nationalist movement or

flee abroad and join the Ukrainian government in exile.

To this, Abakumov remarked that, since I am an expert on Ukrainian affairs, I should trace Shumsky's connections with the nationalist underground and Ukrainian emigrants. Abakumov also said that he would send a special group to Saratov to eliminate Shumsky, and it is my task to arrange so that his supporters do not guessed that it was liquidated. Mairanovsky, at that time the head of the toxicological laboratory of the MGB, was urgently summoned to Saratov, where Shumsky was in the hospital. poison from it laboratory did its job: it was officially believed that Shumsky died of a heart insufficiency. By the way, we did not manage to establish his foreign connections. In Moscow this operation was given unprecedented importance, Deputy Minister of the MGB went to Saratov Ogoltsov, to whom Mairanovsky was subordinate, and Kaganovich, who personally knew Shumsky.

Our assurances to Roosevelt on the eve of Yalta that Soviet citizens enjoy freedom of religion, did not mean the end of the confrontation with the Ukrainian Catholics or Uniates. Grigulevich, our agent in Rome, who received a Costa Rican citizenship and became Costa Rica's ambassador to the Vatican and Yugoslavia after the war, informed us that the Vatican intended to take a firm stand against Moscow because of the persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

As for the Uniate Church itself, it was in a very peculiar position: obeying the Vatican, the Uniates held services in the Ukrainian language. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, a Polish count and former officer, headed the church. Austrian army. He was appointed head of the Ukrainian Uniates by the pope even before the first world war and sacrificed his military career for the sake of the church. During the first world war, he collaborated with Austrian intelligence, was arrested by the tsarist military counterintelligence and exiled, and in 1917 he was released by the Provisional Government and returned to Lviv, where a Ukrainian military nationalist organization was created, headed by Colonel Konovalts. In 1941,

when the war began and the Germans occupied Lvov, Sheptytsky sent congratulations from the Uniate Church to Hitler, hoping for the liberation of Ukraine from Bolsheviks. He went so far as to give his blessing to the November 1943 division of her "Galicia", a special Ukrainian formation, which was under command of the German Gestapo officers. The division swore allegiance to Hitler and was used for punitive actions against civilians and Jews, whom destroyed in Ukraine, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. Sheptytsky appointed chaplain of the division Archbishop Joseph Slipy.

Separate units of this division were captured by the British in Italy and Austria, and in May 1947 the commanders of these units were sent to England. In 1951 "Intelligence Service" used them as saboteurs and threw them into the Western Ukraine by parachute, where they were supposed to lead the resistance movement.

In 1944, Sheptytsky was already old and near death. Caring about fate Ukrainian Uniate Church, he, having shown wisdom, sent a mission to Moscow, which included his younger brother, Archbishop Joseph Slipyi and Archbishop Gabriel Kostelnik. They, through the Presidium of the Supreme Council, asked to receive their Patriarch of the Russian the Orthodox Church, which has never been on good terms with the Uniates. Presidium The Supreme Soviet, however, sent a delegation to the NKVD to clarify the issue of cooperation of the leadership of the Uniate Church with the Germans. General Mamulov, head of the secretariat of the NKVD, and I were ordered to receive the Ukrainian church delegation. TO to their surprise, I presented to them data on cooperation in the Western Ukrainian dialect leadership of the Uniate Church with the Germans and, as I was ordered, assured them that if they repent and it turns out that the hierarchs of the church themselves did not personally commit war crimes, they will not be

prosecuted. Subsequent events developed tragically. After the death of Metropolitan Alexander Sheptytsky in 1945, a fierce conflict. The fact is that within the Uniate Church there has long been a strong movement for association with the Orthodox Church. Those priests surrounded by Alexander Sheptytsky,

who opposed such an alliance found themselves seriously compromised by their collaboration with the Germans. Archbishop Gavriil Kostelnik, who for nearly three decades had spoken out in favor of unification with the Orthodox Church, took the lead in this movement. We often heard that he was an agent of the NKVD, but this statement has no basis. In fact, two of his sons were involved in the Bandera movement and both died in battles with NKVD units. In 1946, Kostelnik assembled a congregation of Uniate clergy who voted for reunification with the Orthodox Church. Archbishop Joseph Slipy was arrested and exiled. The reunification dealt a decisive blow to the Ukrainian partisan nationalist movement under the leadership of Bandera - after all, most of their commanders were from the families of the Uniate priests. With all his might, in an effort to preserve the nationalist movement, Bandera resorted to terror, which has become a daily occurrence in the life of

Western Ukraine. Local authorities have essentially lost control over the countryside. Nationalist leaders forbade young people to go to recruiting stations for service in the Red Army; Bandera's people slaughtered the families of conscripts and burned their houses in an attempt to establish OUN authority over rural areas. The murder of Kostelnik on the steps of the Lvov Cathedral, when he was leaving after the service, was the culmination of a campaign of terror. The killer was surrounded by a crowd of believers and shot himself; he was identified as a member of a terrorist group led by Bandera's deputy Shukhevych, who had led the Ukrainian underground for seven years. During the war, Shukhevych had the rank of Hauptsturmführer and was one of the commanders of the Nachtigal punitive battalion. The battalion was commanded mainly by the Germans, and it consisted of Bandera. After the mass execution in July 1941 in Lvov of Jews and many representatives of the Polish intelligentsia, Bandera proclaimed the creation of a government of independent Ukraine headed by Stetsko.

However, the German authorities immediately disbanded this government. A number of OUN politicians were interned, including Bandera. Hitler considered the OUN movement only as a police force in establishing German domination on Slavic territory. The Germans supported Ukrainian nationalism only in the creation of local governments under their control and until 1944 categorically did not recognize the OUN as a political force. Later, in 1945, part of the Nachtigal battalion joined the elite

punitive

division of the armed forces of Nazi Germany - the division "Galicia".

The information we received from abroad in 1947 that the Vatican was seeking the support of the American and British authorities to assist the Uniate Church and the Bandera formations closely related to it was transmitted not only to Stalin and Molotov, but also to Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Ukraine. Khrushchev turned to Stalin with a request to allow him to secretly liquidate the entire Uniate church elite in the former Hungarian city of Uzhgorod. In a letter sent to two addresses - Stalin and Abakumov - Khrushchev and Savchenko, the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, claimed that the archbishop of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, Romzha, actively cooperates with the leaders of the bandit movement and maintains contact with the secret emissaries of the Vatican, who are actively fighting the Soviet regime. and provide all possible assistance to Bandera. They also wrote that Romzha and his group posed a serious threat to political stability in the region that had recently become part of the Soviet Union.

In addition, Khrushchev knew that Romzha had information about the situation in the leading circles of Ukraine and the planned measures to suppress the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Information came from Uniate nuns who were in close contact with the wife of Turenitsa, the first secretary of the regional party committee and the chairman of the regional executive committee. He held both positions at the same time and enjoyed great respect and love of the population. On the slogans and banners hung in Uzhgorod for the November holidays, it was written: "Long live the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution and Ivan Ivanovich Turenitsa!" Information about the situation in

the Ukrainian leadership through Romzha seeped through

border, and from there boomerang to Moscow. All this created a real danger for Khrushchev. Unable to cope with the situation, Khrushchev initiated a secret physical reprisal against Romzhey.

USSR State Security Minister Abakumov showed me a letter from Khrushchev and Savchenko and warned: not to provide any assistance to the Ukrainian security agencies in this actions until receiving a direct order from Stalin.

Stalin agreed with Khrushchev's proposal that the time had come to destroy "terrorist nest" of the Vatican in Uzhgorod. However, the

attack on Romzha was poorly prepared: as a result of an automobile accident organized by Savchenko and his people, Romzha was only wounded and taken to one of hospitals in Uzhhorod. Khrushchev panicked and again turned to Stalin for help. He claimed that Romzha was preparing for a meeting with high-ranking contacts from the Vatican.

I went to Uzhgorod with my group to find out the connections and contacts of Romzha, because that he personally knew the entire leadership of Ukrainian nationalists from the time when he was introduced into OUN headquarters. I

spent almost two weeks in Uzhgorod. At that time, Abakumov called me and said that a week later, Savchenko and Mairanovsky, the head of the toxicology department, arrive in Uzhhorod. laboratory, with an order to liquidate Romzha. Savchenko and Mairanovsky told me that in Kyiv at the station, in his railway car, Khrushchev received them, gave clear instructions and wished success. Two days later, Savchenko reported to Khrushchev by telephone that the the operation is ready, and Khrushchev gave the order to carry out the action. Mairanovsky conveyed an ampoule with curare poison to an agent of local security agencies - it was a nurse in the hospital where Romzha was lying. She made the fatal injection. As a result of

this operation, Savchenko received a promotion, a year later he was transferred to Moscow and was appointed Molotov's deputy in the Information Committee ... In

November 1949, the Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Galan, who furiously exposed connections of the Ukrainian hierarchs of the Uniate Church with the Nazis and the Vatican, was hacked to death Hutsul hatchet in his apartment in Lviv. After the liquidation

of Romzha, for about a year, I had no contact with Abakumov, but one day at about four in the morning the phone rang.

At ten, be ready for an urgent task. Departure from Vnukovo. I arrived at the airport with Eitingon, who accompanied me. Already waiting here Lieutenant General Selivanovsky, Abakumov's deputy. Only when we flew up to Kyiv, he said: the ultimate goal of our journey is Lvov. However, thick fog prevented the plane from land in Lvov, and he returned to Kyiv, from where we had already left by train for Lvov. By On the way, Selivanovsky spoke about the villainous murder of Galan by Bandera. Comrade Stalin, according to him, is extremely dissatisfied with the work of the security agencies in combating banditry in Western Ukraine. As such, I have been ordered to focus on finding leaders of the Bandera underground and their liquidation. It was said in an unquestioning tone. It became clear to me that my future depended on the fulfillment of this task.

In Lvov, we immediately got to the party activist, which was conducted by Khrushchev, specially arrived from Kyiv to take personal control of the search for the murderers of Galan. At a meeting at I had a dispute with Khrushchev. He was clearly out of sorts: the threat of Stalin's disgrace hung over him due to the fact that it was not possible to put an end to rampant banditry in Western Ukraine. I still pissed him off more when he objected to the proposal to introduce for the inhabitants of the Western Ukraine special passports. Khrushchev also proposed to mobilize young people to work in Donbass and to study at the factory schools of Eastern Ukraine and such a peculiar method to deprive Bandera formations of replenishment. I firmly stated that the introduction special passports and the actual resettlement of young people, in order to cut off all connection with nationalist parents and friends - obvious discrimination; it may aggravate the local population even more. As for the youth, avoiding forced expulsion, she will certainly go into the forests and join the ranks of the armed bandit formations. Khrushchev said irritably that it was none of my business, since my the task boils down to one thing - to decapitate the leadership of the armed underground, and others

questions will be decided by those who are supposed to.

My intervention, however, turned out to be very timely, and the idea of special passports was buried, and plans for the mobilization of young people were partially realized - only to study at the FZU. An amnesty soon announced extended to those who agreed voluntarily surrender weapons to the police station or local security authorities: this step turned out to be especially effective, and already in the first week of the new, 1950, the weapons were handed over eight thousand people. The vast majority of them were not really persecuted. By the way, as we managed to find out, out of these eight thousand, about five were young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty who ran away from home into gangs after heard about forced labor in the mines of Donbass.

According to our information, the armed resistance was also coordinated by Shukhevych. From 1943 to 1950, he led the Bandera underground in Ukraine. This man had outstanding courage and had experience of conspiratorial work, which allowed him also through seven years after the departure of the Germans to engage in active subversive activities. While we were looking for him in the vicinity of Lvov, he was in a cardiological sanatorium on coast of the Black Sea near Odessa. Then, as we learned, he showed up in Lvov, where met with several prominent cultural figures and even sent a wreath on his behalf at the funeral of one of them. His risky gesture caused talk in the city, and our agent, a former actress of the Berezhil Theater in Kharkov, who wrote for Izvestia, confirmed Shukhevych's presence in the Lvov area. We, in turn, managed to identify four of his female bodyguards who were also his mistresses.

At that time, the armed resistance of the Soviet authorities enjoyed the support of population living in the region of Lviv. Together with Lebed, in the past a major figure OUN, we went to a remote village in the Lviv region. They found Lebed's relatives there — two of his nephews led a local bandit group. Formerly cousin Lebed was shot dead by Bandera for agreeing to become the chairman of the collective farm, although he it was well known that his daughter and two sons were active participants in the anti-Soviet underground. Lebed wanted to convince them to give up armed struggle. Daughter of the shot chairman of the collective farm, despite the shock, considered the death of her father a retribution for the fact that he went to cooperate with the Soviet government.

I stayed in Lviv for half a year - although the denouement was inevitable, but, as is often the case, Sometimes, it still comes as a surprise. Shukhevych relied too much on his old wartime ties and relaxed vigilance. Meanwhile, we contacted the family of Gorbovoy, a lawyer and an influential member of the Bandera movement. As it turned out, Gorbovoy and his family wanted to compromise with the Soviet government and did not want to personally participate in murders. I managed to find an approach to Gorbovoy and his friends and proposed on behalf of the Soviet guides: the war must end as soon as possible and return people to normal life. I promised to work on the release of Gorbovoy's niece from a camp in Russia, where she sent only because she was his relative. I kept my promise - after my call personally to Abakumov, Gorbovoy's niece was immediately released and on a plane delivered to Lviv. In

response, Gorbovoy pointed out to us the places where Shukhevych could be hiding. By that time we managed to win over to his side and connected Shukhevych, a player of the local football Dynamo team. Gorbovoy and his like-minded academician Kripyakevich, whose son actively participated in the Bandera movement, repented and publicly declared the fallacy their political views; they were not repressed.

Shukhevych, meanwhile, made another fatal mistake. When in the house where he lived with one of his bodyguards, Daria Gusyak, a policeman appeared for a routine check documents, his nerves passed. Shukhevych shot the policeman, and all three - himself, Daria and her mother fled. Our search led to a remote village, where we found only Daria's mother. Shukhevych was not there, but the presence of this woman indicated that he could not have gone far. Later, when Darya was arrested, she testified that she had begged Shukhevych not to kill her mother: she had a wooden prosthesis, and he was afraid that it would be difficult to run with her. Then they and left her in the village.

Our group to capture Shukhevych settled down in the house where Daria's mother lived. Enough soon there appeared a young pretty medical student from Lvov, Darya's niece. She came to see her relatives and speak, as she said, on behalf of the institute Committee of the Komsomol with talks about the dangers of nationalism. During our friendly conversation (I introduced myself as the new deputy chairman of the district executive committee), answering my cautious question where her aunt is now, the girl replied that she lives in her hostel institute and from time to time visits the Forest Academy), where he is going soon act.

Surveillance group quickly established which "academy" Daria goes to: she made regular trips to a village near Lvov, where she stayed for hours in a cooperative shop. This led us to assume that Shukhevych was there at that time. Unfortunately, the young officers conducting surveillance in March 1950 were inexperienced and cover-ups were trying to woo her. When Lieutenant Revenko held out his hand to Daria and said in Ukrainian that I would like to get to know such a charming woman, she felt the trap and, without thinking twice, shot him point-blank. She was immediately grabbed, but not mine. people, but local residents who witnessed the murder committed before their eyes.

My people managed to recapture her from the crowd and take her to the local branch of the MGB. Through half an hour the head of the group, my closest assistant, was already there, he immediately ordered spread a rumor in the bazaar that a woman killed a lieutenant and shot herself on love grounds. Daria was securely isolated, and I, General Drozdov and twenty operatives surrounded general store to block Shukhevych's possible escape routes. Drozdov demanded from Shukhevych to lay down his arms - in this case, he was guaranteed life.

In response, an automatic burst sounded. Shukhevych, trying to break through the encirclement, threw two hand grenades from hiding. A shootout ensued, as a result of which Shukhevych was killed.

After the death of Shukhevych, the resistance movement in Western Ukraine began to wane and soon quieted down. We managed to find out that Shukhevych created a very dangerous agent network. Six months before the events described, in June 1949, Daria, as it turned out, lived in Moscow at the Metropol Hotel on a passport in a false name. She kept in her room explosive devices. During these two weeks she repeatedly visited the Red area in search of a suitable "target". This explosion was supposed to produce impression in the West and the OUN will receive financial support.

Archival materials of the Bandera movement were secretly taken out by nationalists from Lvov to Leningrad and hidden in the department of rare manuscripts of the Public Library named after M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin.

The collapse of the Ukrainian "epopee" came a year later. The Chekist authorities and personally Khamazyuk, an operative from my group, managed to send an agent to the Bandera detachment that still survived, which by that time had moved from Ukraine to Czechoslovakia, and from there to Germany. british intelligence, reaching out to these people, transported them to England for training in subversive activities. Our man was introduced to Bandera as one of the activists close to Shukhevych. While in Munich, he kept in touch with us, but as soon as the group moved to England, we decided not to risk it and not get in touch with him for the time being. OUN leaders for abroad, they were greatly worried due to the lack of radio communication with Shukhevych. They are supported British, decided to send the head of the OUN security service to Ukraine Matvieyko. He was instructed to find out about the fate of the silent Shukhevych and to activate underground movement. We have instructed our agent to send an encrypted postcard to Germany at the specified address with a message about the route of the Matvieyko group. It was assumed that Bandera's emissaries would land in the area of the city of Rovno. Our Service air defense was instructed not to shoot down a British aircraft, which was supposed to, taking Matvieyko's group, fly from Malta, and then parachute everyone under Smooth. This was done not only to protect our agent, who was in the groups of saboteurs, but also because we intended to capture everyone alive.

The members of the group were warmly welcomed at the safe house by the people of Reichman, Deputy



chief of counterintelligence, skillfully playing the role of underground workers, whom Matvieyko hoped to catch there. After drinking - sleeping pills were mixed into alcohol - the "guests" fell asleep peacefully and woke up already in the inner prison of the regional department of the MGB.

All this happened in May 1951. At three o'clock in the morning the phone rang in my apartment. Abakumov's secretary called: I had to urgently appear in the minister's office. Abakumov was interrogated by Matvieyko, which was conducted by the minister himself and his deputy Pitovranov. At first, I acted as an interpreter, since Matvieyko spoke only in the Western Ukrainian dialect. The interrogation lasted two hours. Then Abakumov ordered me to take care of Matvieyko myself. I worked with him for about a month. These were not interrogations, but conversations, that is, no protocols were kept. Our conversations took place in the office of the head of the inner prison, Mironov, where Matvieyko even had the opportunity to watch TV. I remember how he was struck by the opera "Bogdan Khmelnytsky" in Ukrainian. This performance was part of the decade of Ukrainian art in Moscow. Neither in Poland, nor in Western Ukraine, Matvieyko has ever been to opera performances performed in his native language. It seemed unbelievable to him, and in order to finally convince him of the authenticity of what he saw, I took Matvieyko with me to the theater for the Ukrainian decade, however, accompanied by an "escort".

After talking with me, he was convinced that, apart from, perhaps, the names of a few secondary agents, we, in fact, knew everything about the Ukrainian emigre organization and the Bandera movement. He was shocked when I began to present the biographies of all the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists known to him, to give details of their personal lives, to talk about their mutual strife. After assuring Matvieyko that I was not going to recruit him, I explained: the most important thing for us is to stop the armed struggle in Western Ukraine. With the permission of Abakumov, I called Melnikov, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who replaced Khrushchev in this post, and asked him to receive Matviyiko in Kiev and show him that Ukraine, and Western Ukraine in particular, is not a territory occupied by Russians, but free lands where people live free people. I never met Matvieyko again. In Kyiv, he was

placed in a safe house under house arrest, while being given the opportunity to move freely around the city. Then he was transferred to Lviv, where he lived in a mansion. From there he escaped. What a commotion arose in Kyiv and Moscow! An all-Union search was announced. The Minister of State Security of Ukraine immediately ordered the arrest of everyone who was responsible for protecting Matvieyko. It turned out that he left quite simply: he left the gates of the mansion, said goodbye to the guard, who over the past ten days had gotten used to the fact that Matvieyko freely came and went (albeit accompanied by state security officers), and did not stop him, although there was no escort on this time it wasn't. These days he lived in the apartment of his old acquaintance,

not connected with Bandera. Matvieyko told him that he had come from Moscow on business and would not stay long with him. During this time, he bypassed the Bandera appearances and checked the Lvov connections, about which he did not give any evidence in Moscow. To his horror, he discovered that their spy network did not exist: two addresses turned out to be incorrect, and people associated with the underground were fictitious. All this was the fantasy of the compilers of reports about the exaggerated successes of the Bandera movement, sent to the headquarters of the OUN in London and Munich. Matvieyko was an experienced intelligence officer enough to understand that the remaining turnouts were probably under the supervision of Soviet counterintelligence, they were kept only to be used as traps for unlucky visitors from abroad. Three days later, Matvieyko surrendered

himself to the security forces in Lvov. At a press conference hosted by the Ukrainian leadership, he condemned the Bandera movement. Using his authority, Matvieyko called on the emigration and the OUN, who fought in bandit detachments, to reconcile. Subsequently, he began a new life - he worked as an accountant, married, raised three children and died peacefully in 1974. The story with Matviyiko acquires a new meaning in the light of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. In the West, they never realized that after the revolution of 1917

Ukraine for the first time in its history gained statehood as part of the Soviet Union. A real flourishing came in the national art, literature, education system in native language, which was absolutely impossible to imagine either under tsarism or under Austrian and Polish rule in Galicia.

Ukrainian party leaders, unlike their counterparts from other allied republics in Moscow have always been greeted with special honor, and they have provided a significant influence on the formation of the domestic and foreign policy of the Kremlin leadership. Ukraine was a constant reserve for the promotion of personnel for leadership work in Moscow. Ukrainian the Communist Party had its own Politburo, which was not in any republic, was a member United Nations. Yes, until 1992 Ukraine was not fully independent state, but I still consider myself a Ukrainian - one of those who to some extent contributed to the creation of the position that it acquired within the framework of Soviet Union. The weight that Ukraine had, strengthening its prestige in the USSR and abroad became a prelude to its acquisition of a completely new status of an independent state after collapse of the Soviet Union.

### **Soviet leadership and the Kurdish question in the Middle East in 1947—1953**

In 1947, armed groups of Kurds under the command of Mullah Mustafa Barzani entered into battle with the Shah's troops, crossed our border with Iran and ended up on territory of Azerbaijan. Kurds

living in Iraq, Iran and Turkey experienced all sorts of harassment, and representatives of the British authorities who flirted with the Kurds during the period of revival pro-German sentiments in the leading circles of Tehran in 1939-1941, after the introduction British and Soviet troops in Iran denied them support.

The combat detachments of Barzani that broke through the border numbered up to two thousand fighters, with them there were the same number of members of their families. Soviet authorities first interned Kurds and placed in a camp, and in 1947 Abakumov ordered me to negotiate with Barzani and offer him and the people who arrived with him political asylum, followed by temporary resettlement in rural areas of Uzbekistan near Tashkent.

Barzani I was introduced as Matveev, deputy general director of TASS and official representative of the Soviet government. For the first time in my life I met a true feudal lord. At the same time, Barzani impressed me very much. shrewd politician and experienced military leader. He said that in the last hundred years, the Kurds raised eighty uprisings against the Persians, Iraqis, Turks and the British and more than in sixty cases they turned to Russia for help and, as a rule, received it. Therefore, according to him, it is quite natural for them to turn to us for help in a difficult time for them, when the Iranian authorities liquidated the Kurdish Republic.

Shortly before these events, the leaders of the Iranian Kurdish rebels fell into trap set by the Shah: they were invited to Tehran for negotiations, captured there and hanged. Only Barzani escaped this fate. When the shah invited himself to the negotiations Barzani, he replied that he would come only if the shah sent members of his family to as hostages to his headquarters. While preliminary negotiations with Shah, Barzani transferred most of his forces to the northern regions of Iran, closer to Soviet border. We, for our part, were interested in using the Kurds in the line we are pursuing to weaken British and American influence in the countries Middle East bordering the Soviet Union. I announced to Barzani that the Soviet the party agreed that Barzani and some of his officers would undergo special training in our military schools and academies. I also assured him that resettlement in Central Asia would temporary until conditions are ripe for their return to Kurdistan.

Abakumov forbade me to inform the leader of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Bagirov about the content of the negotiations with Barzani, and especially about Stalin's agreement to provide an opportunity Kurdish officers to be trained in our military schools.

The fact is that Baghirov sought to use Barzani and his people to destabilize situation in Iranian Azerbaijan. However, Moscow believed that Barzani would be able to play more important role in overthrowing the pro-British regime in Iraq. And besides, what is especially importantly, with the help of the Kurds, we could disable the oil fields in Iraq for a long time (Mosul), which were then of exceptional importance in the supply of petroleum products to the entire Anglo-American military grouping in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

After negotiations with Barzani, I flew to Tashkent and briefed the Uzbek guide about his upcoming arrival. Then he returned to Moscow. Barzani,

along with his disarmed detachments and members of their families, was sent to Uzbekistan. Five years later, in March 1952, I was sent to Uzbekistan to meet with Barzani near Tashkent to resolve the problems. Barzani was not satisfied position of passive expectation and the attitude of local authorities. He turned to Stalin for help and demanded the fulfillment of earlier promises made to him. He insisted on formation of Kurdish combat units. Barzani also wanted to keep his influence on tribesmen settled on collective farms around Tashkent, and control over them.

The meeting with Barzani took place at a government dacha. Major was my interpreter Zemskov, he, like Barzani, spoke English fluently. Barzani told me how the Americans and the British wanted to bribe him to put pressure on the Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish governments.

The plan I developed on behalf of the new Minister of State Security Ignatiev was to form a special brigade from the Kurds - one and a half thousand people - for sabotage operations in the Middle East. It could also be used for the planned overthrow of the Nuri Said government in Baghdad, which would seriously undermine British influence throughout the Middle East. (With the help of the Kurds, this was possible in 1958, when I was already in prison.) The Kurds also had to play a certain role in our plans related to the decommissioning of oil pipelines in the territories of Iraq, Iran and Syria in the event of an outbreak of hostilities or a direct threat nuclear attack on the USSR.

Barzani agreed to sign a cooperation agreement with the Soviet government in exchange for our guarantees of assistance in the creation of the Kurdish Republic, which Barzani saw primarily in the area densely populated by Kurds at the junction borders of Northern Iraq, Iran and Turkey.

After listening to Barzani, I replied that I did not have the authority to discuss an agreement on such kind. However, we did not object to the establishment of a Kurdish government in exile. The responsible officer of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Manchukuo Party who accompanied me, who participated in the negotiations, proposed the creation of a democratic party of Kurdistan in led by Barzani. According to the Manchukuo, the party was supposed to coordinate the activities representatives of the Barzani government in all areas inhabited by the Kurdish population. The headquarters of the party could, according to him, be located in the board of the collective farm, located fifteen kilometers from Tashkent. I did not intervene in this

conversation, but listened attentively. When the conversation ended, Barzani invited me to a meeting with the officers of his headquarters. When we appear, a person the thirty who were in the room stood at attention. Then, as if on command they fell on their knees and crawled towards Barzani, begging to be allowed to kiss the hem of his garment and boots. Naturally, all the illusions about a democratic Kurdistan that I since he could feed, they immediately evaporated. It became quite clear to me that this is another ideological initiative that arose in the bowels of the Central Committee on

Staraya Square. In April 1952, Barzani, surrounded by members of his family and fellow tribesmen, settled in a large collective farm near Tashkent. In Moscow, it was decided that the Kurds granted the status of an autonomous region. The Ministry of State Security was instructed organize military training for the Kurds and assist in establishing links with foreign compatriots. Our attempts to introduce our own people into Barzani's entourage and recruit any of the Kurds were successfully blocked by their security service. True, Zemskov, who had considerable experience in dealing with the Kurds, managed to recruit one

junior officer who studied at our military academy, but after returning to Tashkent, he soon disappeared without a trace. We could not find him and came to the conclusion that his liquidated by order of Barzani. Thanks

to the Kurdish question, I was first introduced to the bureaucratic preparing documents for the Politburo. Ignatiev ordered me to stay in the Manchu office until the document was agreed upon by our proposals on the Kurdish problem. Ignatiev was always invariably polite and correct, but when I said that I had in Moscow the hotel had an appointment with Barzani, he scolded me sharply for not understanding the political importance of the matter and ordered me to cancel the meeting: first of all, we need to rather get a Politburo decision on the Kurdish issue. Together with me and Manchu Ignatiev visited Molotov and Vyshinsky to obtain their visas for the draft decision. By the way, then for the first time Molotov and Vyshinsky seemed to me aged, weak-willed and extremely tired. However, they were persistent enough to delete from the draft document the same paragraph, which contained an instruction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hold talks and consultations on the Kurdish problem. They also insisted that this issue should be considered by the Politburo on the proposal of the Ministry state security, and not as a joint proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ours. When we left, accompanied by a security officer who had a project in his briefcase document, I suggested that Manche go to my Lubyanka and print the final the text of the document, taking into account the comments of Molotov and Vyshinsky. Ignatiev agreed.

And then something completely incomprehensible began for me. We have submitted the final text Ignatiev's decision, and he approved it. But for the minister it was no less important cover letter - an explanatory note to the text of the decision sent to the members Politburo. Ignatiev forced three times to change the order in the list of members of the Politburo, who our document was supposed to arrive. He even asked Manchu if the mailing should match alphabetical order or list members of the Politburo commission first on foreign policy. In this case, Khrushchev should have been on the list before Bulganin. A what about Beria? Should he be ahead of Malenkov? These nuances that I didn't have I had no idea, they just blew my mind. But Manchha turned out to be a real expert in terms of compiling cover letters and gave appropriate advice to Ignatiev. The typists wondered why they should reprint the document, in which everything remained the same, except for the order in which the members of the Central Committee and the government

were listed. In the spring of 1953, a curious incident happened to me that violated the rules conspiracies. Barzani attended lectures at the military academy where I studied. One day he saw me there in the uniform of a lieutenant general. With a sly wink at me, he through his translator, a young lieutenant, said:

- I am glad to deal with a representative of the Soviet government in such a high military rank.

For my part, in response, I wished him success in mastering military disciplines. The last time I accidentally met Barzani on the eve of my arrest was on Gorky Street. I was in civilian clothes. He noticed me and apparently wanted to come up, but this meeting my situation was useless, and I preferred to pretend that I did not see him, and quickly lost in the crowd.

Barzani was smart enough to understand that the future of the Kurds depended on how play on the contradictions between superpowers that have their own interests in the Middle East. In hindsight, one sees that the superpowers did not at all seek to fair solution to the Kurdish problem. The fate of Kurdistan in terms of its interests never considered in the Kremlin, as, indeed, in London and Washington. Both the West and us one thing was of interest - access to oil fields in the countries of the Middle East, no matter how it looks cynical. Suslov, who was later assigned to deal with the Kurdish issue, promised Barzani all-round support in the struggle for autonomy only in order to help the Kurds to overthrow Nuri Said in Iraq. Americans, for their part, also promised Barzani support to overthrow the pro-British leadership in

Iraq and replace him with his henchmen, but at a critical moment they took a waiting position, agreeing with the British. In a word, they played with the fate of the Kurds as best they could.

In the 40s and 50s, our goal was to use the Kurdish movement in confrontation with the West during the Cold War. The idea of creating a Kurdish republic allowed us to pursue a policy aimed at weakening the British and American positions in the Middle East, but broad sections of the Kurdish population were indifferent to actions directed against the British and Americans in the region. Until the second half of the 50s, the Kurds were our only allies on Middle East. When the Nuri Said regime was overthrown in a military coup (with our support), we have acquired such allies as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, which, with the points of view of the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union were much more important than the Kurds. Iraq and Syria have come to play a major role in our Middle East policy and confronting the West in this troubled region. The tragedy

of Barzani himself and his people was that in the interests of the USSR and the West (to a certain extent also the Arab states and Iran) the Kurds were considered as their a kind of intimidating force in the region or a bargaining chip in conflict clashes Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi rulers.

A reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem would be to provide international guarantees of autonomy, however limited it may be. Essentially, no one in the West or in the countries of the Arab East did not want the oil fields of Mosul to be on territory of an independent Kurdish state and under its control.

In 1963, when we had complications with the Qasem government and the successors by Iraqi nationalists, I, while in prison, sent from there my proposals for possible contacts with Barzani and was informed that my proposals were accepted. Kurds sent help - weapons and ammunition - so that they would protect their lands from punitive expeditions of the Iraqi army. However, our attempts to make the Kurds our own strategic allies in order to be able to influence events in Iraq without were crowned with success.

## CHAPTER 9

### POLITICS OF THE KREMLIN

#### Raoul Wallenberg and secret diplomacy during World War II

The mystery surrounding the name of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat widely known in world through its work to save Jews during the Second World War and who disappeared in 1945 has not yet been identified. Wallenberg was detained by the military counterintelligence SMERSH in 1945 in Budapest and secretly liquidated, as I assume, during internal prison of the MGB in 1947. Nearly half a century has passed in fruitless investigations conducted by both official KGB liars and journalists, but investigative and Wallenberg's prison files have never been found.

Recently, a letter was found from the head of the intelligence department of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin to SMERSH, who arrested Wallenberg in 1945, with a request to transfer him to the disposal of intelligence for operational purposes. However, Abakumov rejected this idea, apparently trying to ascribe the "laurels" of successful work with Wallenberg to his apparatus.

Raoul Wallenberg belonged to a well-known family of financial magnates who maintained since the beginning of 1944 secret contacts with representatives of the Soviet government. Although I was not instructed to develop Wallenberg and his connections with German and American intelligence agencies, I knew about the contribution that his family made during the conclusion separate peace with Finland. The nature of military counterintelligence reports about Raoul Wallenberg and about the contacts of the whole family said that a diplomat is a suitable object for recruitment or hostage roles. Wallenberg's arrest, interrogations, circumstances of death - everything

confirms that there was an attempt to recruit him, but he refused to cooperate with us. Perhaps the fear that a failed recruitment attempt would become known if released Wallenberg, forced him to be liquidated.

During the war years, our residency in Stockholm was instructed to find influential people in Swedish society who could be intermediaries in the negotiations with the Finns on the conclusion of a separate peace. That's when we established contacts with the Wallenberg family. Stalin

was concerned that Finland, an ally of Germany since 1941, might sign a peace treaty with the Americans, not taking into account our interests in the Baltics. The Americans, in turn, feared that we would occupy Finland. However, such we had no need: the neutrality of the nearest neighboring country was important to us in order to use it to your advantage through agents of influence in major political parties Finland. These people agreed to cooperate with us if we ensured neutrality. Finnish state. In addition, they wanted to play the role of an intermediary between the East and West. It

is significant that in the 1970s and 1980s there were attempts to follow the Finnish example. influential political circles in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and also in the Baltic republics, who advocated the revival of their state independence. These attempts by both sides - those who made and prevented them - called finlandization. I remember how in 1938, a

year before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, Stalin ordered transfer of two hundred thousand dollars for the political support of the Finnish smallholders' party, so that it plays a certain role in shaping the government's position on settlement of border issues. The money was handed over to the Finns by Colonel Rybkin, my friend, who was then the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland and known there as surname Yartsev. Stalin personally instructed him how to talk to political figures who received money from us, as well as on the preparation of secret negotiations with representatives of the Finnish government with a view to concluding a pact on non-aggression and cooperation, planned with the participation of a confidant of the Soviet government, personally known to the head of the Finnish state Mannerheim. It was the Count Ignatiev, author of the book "Fifty years in the ranks". The proposals transmitted by Yartsev to the Finnish Mannerheim rejected the government, but informed Hitler of an unusual Soviet proposal. Thus, the German leadership, when deciding on the beginning of negotiations with us on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, knew perfectly well that their the proposal cannot be regarded by Moscow as completely unexpected and unacceptable. It is significant that all these negotiations were conducted in strict secrecy from the USSR Ambassador to Finland Derevianko.

During the war years, Rybkin and his wife led our residency in Stockholm. One of their task was to maintain contacts with the agent network of the "Red Chapel" in Germany through Swedish channels. Rybkin's wife is known to many as a children's writer on books "Mother's Heart", "Through the icy mist", "Bonfires", etc. - she was printed under her own maiden name Resurrection. In the diplomatic circles of Stockholm and Moscow, this the Russian beauty was known as Zoya Yartseva, who shone not only with beauty, but also with beautiful knowledge of German and Finnish. Rybkin, tall, well-built, charming man, had a subtle sense of humor and was a great storyteller. Spouses enjoyed great popularity among diplomats in the Swedish capital, which allowed them to be aware of the probing attempts of the Germans to find out the possibilities of a separate peaceful agreements with the United States of America and Great Britain without the participation of the Soviet Union. By the way, German intelligence, for provocative purposes, distributed in Stockholm in 1943-1944 rumors about possible secret negotiations between the USSR and Germany on separate world without the participation of the Americans

and the British. The Rybkins took an active part in the preparation and execution of secret economic agreements. In 1942, with the help of our agent, a well-known Swedish actor and satirist Karl Gerhard, they managed to conclude a barter deal: we received

high-quality Swedish steel, essential for aircraft construction, in exchange for platinum. Sweden's neutrality was grossly violated, but the bank that made the deal made a handsome profit. The Wallenberg family owned a controlling stake in the bank.

Karl Gerhard maintained friendly relations with Raoul's uncle Markus Wallenberg and, according to the plan approved in Moscow, presented him with Zoya Rybkina at the reception.

Zoya charmed Marcus Wallenberg. They met again on a weekend in a luxurious hotel owned by the Wallenberg family near Stockholm. The conversation was about how it is possible to arrange a meeting of diplomats of two countries - the USSR and Finland - located in state of war, in which they could discuss the conclusion of a separate peace contracts. Zoya Rybkina told Wallenberg that it was necessary to bring to the attention of the Finns: the Soviet side guarantees full state independence after the end of the war, but in view of the continuation of hostilities in the Baltic theater, it expects to receive the right to a limited military presence in Finnish ports and limited deployment naval and air bases on its territory. The Wallenberg family, in turn, had financial interests in Finland and was very interested in a peaceful settlement of Soviet-Finnish relations.

It only took Marcus Wallenberg a week to organize a meeting between Zoe and Representative of the Finnish government Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who later became president, replacing Carl Gustav Mannerheim in this post. the Soviet side in the negotiations represented by Alexandra Kollontai, our ambassador to Sweden, who for a long time remained the first and the only woman with the rank of ambassador. Only in the 1970s did she return to the rank of ambassador. woman - Zoya Mironova, who headed the Soviet mission to international organizations accredited in Geneva.

#### **Possible reasons for detention and unsuccessful attempts to force cooperation with the Soviet authorities**

Consultations continued throughout the summer, and finally, on September 4, 1944, peace treaty between the USSR and Finland.

After Raoul Wallenberg fell into our hands as a hostage or possible recruitment object, Stalin and Molotov probably expected to use position of the Wallenberg family to obtain favorable loans in the West.

In 1945, the Soviet leadership spread rumors that there would be a Jewish Autonomous Republic was created, where Jews from all over the world can come, especially from Europe, victims of fascism. Stalin bluffed, pursuing several goals. First, with this bait - the Jewish Republic - he hoped to appease the British allies who feared that a Jewish state would be established in Palestine, which was under their protection. Secondly, Stalin sought to find out the possibilities attracting Western capital to restore the war-ravaged people's economy.

I received instructions from Beria to probe the Americans on this issue during conversations with their ambassador in Moscow Harriman (in 1945 I met him under the surname Matveev).

By the time of his arrest by military counterintelligence, Raoul Wallenberg was known for his activities to rescue and export Jews from Germany and Hungary to Palestine. We knew about high reputation of Wallenberg among the leaders of the international Zionist organizations. Arrest him, like any Western diplomat, without a direct order from Moscow was unthinkable. Even if we assume that he was detained by accident (at the same time detained more than thirty diplomats of some European countries, almost all were released a few months later in exchange for prisoners of war and servicemen of the Soviet Army who remained in the West), then the leaders of military counterintelligence in Budapest had to be sure to report this to Moscow. It is now known that the arrest order for Wallenberg signed Bulganin, Stalin's deputy for the People's Commissariat of Defense, and the order was immediately completed.

My former colleague, Lieutenant General Belkin, at one time deputy chief SMERSH, was familiar with the Wallenberg case. He told me that in 1945 the front SMERSH authorities received from Moscow an orientation on Wallenberg, which indicated that he was suspected of collaborating with German, American and British intelligence, and it was ordered to establish constant monitoring of him, track and study his contacts, primarily with the German secret services.

Wallenberg's work, as I recall, was reported by our agent Kutuzov (he belonged to family of the great commander), an emigrant involved in cooperation with Soviet intelligence back in the early 30s. Kutuzov worked in the Red Cross mission in Budapest and participated developed by Wallenberg. According to Kutuzov, Raoul Wallenberg actively collaborated with German intelligence. Kutuzov interpreted his behavior as a double or even a triple play. Of course, in such a risky business - the salvation of the Jews - it is necessary was to maintain close contacts with officials and German intelligence agencies. I remember that Belkin told me about several recorded meetings between Wallenberg and chief of German intelligence Schellenberg.

Circumstances were such that Wallenberg came under increased scrutiny. our intelligence agencies. Perhaps through him the Soviet leadership hoped to achieve closer cooperation between the Wallenberg family and our representatives in Scandinavian countries to gain the trust of international capital to obtain loans. I

recall that Raoul Wallenberg went through the operational intelligence materials and as a confidant in the secret separate negotiations that began in 1945 on armistice between representatives of Germany, England and the United States behind the back of the Soviet Union. Not it is possible that the plan to recruit or use him as a hostage in a possible political game arose because Wallenberg was seen as an important witness behind-the-scenes connections between the business circles of America and Nazi Germany, as well as the secret services of these countries during the war. When the allies reached a secret agreement on the range of charges that would be brought against the leaders of the Third Reich at the Nuremberg trials, the need for Wallenberg disappeared - he was destroyed. Raoul Wallenberg was

detained (in fact, it was an arrest) in his apartment: they came to him counterintelligence officers and offered to go to the headquarters of a group of Soviet troops. Wallenberg Then he said to one of his friends: I don't know who I will be - a guest or a prisoner.

He was taken to Moscow under guard, but in a sleeping car, treated like a "guest", food brought from the dining car. Kutuzov was also taken to Moscow, separately from Wallenberg. Soon Kutuzov, unlike Wallenberg, was released from prison and allowed to leave. to the West, of course, on the condition of continuing active cooperation with Soviet intelligence. He eventually settled in Ireland, where he died in 1967.

### **The special block of the internal prison and the special laboratory of the NKVD - MGB in 1940-1950**

In Moscow, Wallenberg was placed in a special block of the internal prison on Lubyanka, where especially important persons were detained, who were persuaded to cooperate; If they refused - they were eliminated.

Interrogation protocols were regularly sent to the German department of our intelligence Wallenberg. Perhaps the investigators intimidated him, accusing him of having links with the Gestapo.

It is clear from the materials published in the press that Wallenberg was held in Moscow in two prisons - in the inner on Lubyanka and in Lefortovskaya. Employees of the MGB-KGB recall that after interrogations "with passion" in Lefortovo, Wallenberg was again transferred to a special block of the inner prison on Lubyanka. The

special block of the inner prison, rather, resembled a hotel. The premises where prisoners were kept, could only be called cells conditionally: high ceilings, normal furniture. Food was brought from the canteen and restaurant of the NKVD, in quality it, of course, was very different from the prison. However, this place under Stalin was sinister. In this building



was the commandant's office of the NKVD-MGB, where in 1937-1950 they carried out sentences against persons sentenced to death, as well as those whom the government considered it necessary to liquidate in a special, that is, non-judicial, procedure.

In Varsonofevsky Lane, behind the Lubyanka prison, it was located directly a toxicological laboratory subordinate to the minister and the commandant's office and a special chamber attached to it. The toxicological laboratory was called "Laboratory-X" in official documents. The head of the laboratory, colonel of the medical service, professor Mairanovsky was engaged in studies of the effect of deadly gases and poisons on malignant tumors. professors highly regarded in medical circles. In 1937,

Mairanovsky's research group from the Institute of Biochemistry, headed by Academician Bach, was transferred to the NKVD and reported directly to head of the special department of operational equipment at the commandant's office of the NKVD-MGB. commandant's office was responsible for guarding the building of the NKVD, maintaining the regime of secrecy and security and for execution of death sentences.

All the work of the laboratory, the involvement of its employees in the operations of special services, as well as access to the laboratory, strictly limited even for the leadership of the NKVD-MGB, was regulated by the Regulation approved by the government, and orders from the NKVD-MGB. Neither I nor my deputy Eitingon had access to the "Laboratory-X" and the special cell. The work of the laboratory was directly supervised by the Minister of State Security or his first deputy. There are still a lot of monstrous rumors about this laboratory.

The verification carried out under Stalin, after the arrest of Mairanovsky, and then during Khrushchev in 1960, for the purpose of anti-Stalinist revelations, showed that Mairanovsky and members of his group were involved in the execution of death sentences and elimination of objectionable persons by direct decision of the government in 1937-1947 and in 1950, using poisons for this. I know that such actions were carried out by our intelligence abroad also in the 1960s and 1970s. Major General of the KGB spoke and wrote about this Oleg Kalugin.

Intelligence and counterintelligence officers worked with Wallenberg, under the direction of one of its leaders Utekhin. Interrogations were conducted by the investigative unit on criminal charges. More often than others, Lieutenant Colonel Kopelyansky interrogated him. He was fired from the authorities in 1951 due to Jewish origin. Although the participation of Kopelyansky in interrogations is confirmed documented - his name is listed in the prison call log prisoner for interrogation to the investigator - he denied this and said that he did not remember under investigation with that name. However, these journal entries show that it is Kopelyansky summoned Wallenberg from his cell for interrogation the day before his death.

The Wallenberg case reached a dead end by early July 1947. He refused to cooperate with Soviet intelligence and was no longer needed either as a witness to secret political games, or as hostage - the Nuremberg trials are over.

It seems that Wallenberg was transferred to the special cell of "Laboratory-X", where he was made lethal injection under the guise of treatment (at the same time, the country's leadership continued assure the Swedes that he knows nothing about the whereabouts and fate of Wallenberg). medical service prison had no idea about this, and his death was ascertained in the usual way. However, Minister of State Security Abakumov, apparently aware of the real cause of Wallenberg's death, forbade the autopsy and ordered him to be cremated.

There was a special practice of cremation of those who were destroyed in a special way. government decision: no autopsy was performed, the ashes were to be buried as unclaimed in a common grave. Later, the authorities were very reluctant to admit that the ashes such famous people as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Meyerhold, and others are buried in this common grave. The crematorium of the Donskoy Monastery was then the only one, therefore, perhaps, the ashes of my boss, friend and mentor lie in the same grave. Spiegelglaz and one of the leaders of intelligence Serebryansky. It is very likely that the ashes Wallenberg and Beria is buried there. As

follows from the memoirs of former employees of the MGB-KGB, the journal of special records of all liquidations with references to the relevant decisions of higher authorities in

sealed envelope with the inscription "do not open without the permission of the Minister" and the stamp "top secret" after the arrest of Beria was sent to Sukhanov, Malenkov's assistant, head of the special sector of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1966, Colonel Studnikov, who immediately after my arrest succeeded me as head of reconnaissance and sabotage work abroad, his deputy Gudimovich and Colonel Vasilevsky confirmed in the Central Committee that this package was seized from the safe at Lubyanka and handed over to special sector of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Since then, it has been in the bowels of the archives or destroyed by direction of senior management, as it contains evidence of direct responsibility for actions carried out by "Laboratory-X", not only Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov, Merkulov, but and the top leadership of the country - Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

In June 1993, Izvestia published Maksimova's article Wallenberg is dead. TO unfortunately, there is enough evidence", and the newspaper "Segodnya" - Abarinov's article "They do not launder only money, but also versions. Both articles contain excerpts from documents relating to the fate of Wallenberg.

From Vyshinsky's memo to Molotov (1947) it is clear that at the end of 1944 the Swedes turned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR "with a request to take under defense of the first secretary of the Swedish legation in Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg.

In 1945, at the beginning of January, the Swedes were informed that Wallenberg had been discovered and taken. under the protection of Soviet military units (in fact, Wallenberg was arrested by the military counterintelligence in Budapest).

After some time, the Swedes notified the Foreign Ministry that Wallenberg was not among the members of their mission who had left Budapest, and asked to be found. On this issue they sent eight notes to the Soviet authorities and made five oral requests. Ambassador of Sweden to In Moscow, Söderblom in 1946 turned to Stalin (he was received by him) with a personal request - to find out the fate of Wallenberg.

In turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also asked SMERSH about Wallenberg several times and Ministry of State Security. Finally, in February 1947, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed by P. Fedotov, then head of the intelligence department, that Wallenberg was at the disposal of the

MGB. In the memo mentioned above, Vyshinsky wrote: "Since the Wallenberg case until now continues to remain without movement, I ask you to oblige comrade. Abakumov to submit a statement on the merits of the case and proposals for its liquidation.

For me there is no doubt about the ominous meaning of Vyshinsky's last words. He is not offers to close the case (then there would be a different wording - "stop the case"), but almost "demands" that Abakumov submit proposals for the destruction of Wallenberg as unwanted person for the Soviet leadership. And so,

Vyshinsky made this request—this is extremely important—being Molotov's deputy and for intelligence work that was carried out in those years Information Committee. Fedotov, who informed Vyshinsky that Wallenberg is in prison and at that time was one of the leaders of the Information Committee.

Molotov's resolution on Vyshinsky's note is also of great importance: "Comrade. Abakumov. Please report to me, 18.V.47.

In fact, it was an order of the Deputy Head of Government and Head intelligence to submit proposals on how to eliminate Wallenberg. Such was common practice of those years. (Recently published and shown on television is a document sent to Stalin and Molotov in 1947, concerning an American citizen, NKVD agent Isaac Oggins, who was suspected of a double game. This document contains the same wording.) After the

proposal was considered, Stalin or Molotov gave their verbal and sometimes written consent. If verbally, then Abakumov, as it was established during the inspections and investigation of his case, made a note on such documents: "Consent of comr. Stalin, Molotov received" and put down the date.

From official documents it appears that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947. However, on August 18 of the same year, Vyshinsky informed the Swedish ambassador that the Soviet

the government has no information about Wallenberg and that he could not have been detained Soviet authorities, and, most likely, became an accidental victim of street fighting in Budapest (in January 1945, we informed the Swedes that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Soviet military units).

In March - May 1956, during the Soviet-Swedish negotiations held in Moscow, the Swedish side provided our government with materials related to Raoul Wallenberg. At the same time, the Central Committee of the party decided to check and clarify the circumstances death of a Swedish diplomat. This decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU has not yet been published.

In 1957, the Central Committee of the CPSU approved a draft memorandum of the Soviet government on the fate of Wallenberg, trained at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister Shepilov) and the KGB (Chairman Serov). The

Soviet government informed the Swedish that the competent authorities had studied and checked the materials submitted by the Swedes about Raoul Wallenberg. Careful searches in archives of the internal prison at Lubyanka, Lefortovskaya, as well as Vladimirskaya and other prisons they didn't give anything: they didn't find any information about Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union (there was in 1947: we informed the Foreign Ministry that Wallenberg was at the disposal of the MGB). The competent authorities then carried out an examination of all archival documents auxiliary services, and as a result, in the documents of the medical service of the inner prison in the Lubyanka, a report was found by the head of this service, Smoltsov, addressed to the former Minister of State Security Abakumov. The report said that personally known to the minister Wallenberg, a prisoner, died unexpectedly in his cell on the evening of July 17, 1947. The cause of death is a heart attack. The memorandum ended,

as expected, with sincere regrets and deep condolences on the death of Raoul Wallenberg. An important detail

is noteworthy: on Smoltsov's report of July 17, 1947, an addition was made that Wallenberg's death was reported personally to the minister and the body was ordered cremate without opening. I

believe that the destruction of archival investigative materials in the Wallenberg case began during the preparation of the memorandum. This was apparently due to the fact that the immediate initiators of his arrest and murder - Molotov and Bulganin - are still were in power and occupied a leading position in the leadership of the country. Bulganin, who signed the order for the arrest of Wallenberg, was the head of the government, and Molotov, who gave the order to liquidate the Swedish diplomat was part of the top leadership of the state.

However, in my opinion, in the archives of the foreign intelligence service there are extensive materials for this case. In particular, immediately after the arrest of Wallenberg, as far as I remember, in February 1945, the contents of a secret secret were reported to Stalin through the NKVD memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany Ribbentrop on possible conditions of a separate peace between Germany, the USA and England. It was noted that Raoul Wallenberg mediated in establishing contacts on this issue between US and German intelligence agencies.

Our government has officially recognized the fact of Wallenberg's arrest, his imprisonment in prison and death from a "heart attack" ten years after his death. It also stated that Raoul Wallenberg was illegally arrested on the orders of Abakumov, who, for the crimes he committed crimes, including the arrest of Wallenberg, suffered the most severe punishment.

It was a cynical lie. During the trial and investigation, Abakumov charges were not brought. Until

now, the note of Abakumov to Molotov, which, probably, should have outlined the essence of the Wallenberg case and, apparently, contained fatal for him, has not been found in the KGB archives. fate proposals initiated by Vyshinsky. Although the note has not been found, traces of it, apparently, can be found in the correspondence of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the chairman of the KGB with leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government during the specified period of time. In the registration The journal of the Molotov secretariat has a code number that can be traced passage of this document.

But in the KGB archives, as my son was told in the fall of 1994, they managed to find a document

from which it follows that the chairman of the KGB, Serov, asked Molotov to receive him on the case Wallenberg in February 1957, when a draft memorandum to the Swedish government with recognition of Wallenberg's arrest and death.

Serov's note, in which he, before he was prepared official memorandum of the Soviet government, was supposed to inform Khrushchev and Bulganin, respectively, the first secretary of the Central Committee and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, about what really happened to Wallenberg.

Knowing Khrushchev's habits, I affirm that he kept Serov's note in his archive, which certainly contained serious compromising evidence on Molotov. For Khrushchev, this note had essential in the context of the intensified struggle for power in early 1957, which ended, as you know, with the defeat of the so-called anti-party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov who joined them. However, due to unclear to me reasons Khrushchev did not use the Wallenberg case against Molotov. I remember how investigators very persistently sought from me information about the participation of Molotov in secret deals with Western industrialists and diplomats, and I understood that their questions were far from random. However, Wallenberg's name did not appear then.

Serov had to apply to Khrushchev for permission to destroy materials on the Wallenberg case. It is likely that after that they were destroyed. The reason is clear: Molotov in February 1957 was still in power and remained very influential figure in the guide. He, like other statesmen who had a direct relationship to scandalous and criminal actions, was interested in documentary evidence disappeared.

Serov's other letter must also be preserved, in which he was obliged to report Khrushchev that the Wallenberg case was destroyed.

The last time the Wallenberg case was investigated on the orders of Gorbachev under supervision Bakatin, chairman of the KGB. A new investigation has confirmed that Wallenberg did indeed die in prison. It was also found that his investigative and archival and prison files destroyed.

Probably, some details of the search for material in the Wallenberg case are known to the grandson Molotov Professor Nikonov, Chairman of the Politika Foundation, who was then an assistant Bakatin.

Unfortunately, archives, as well as manuscripts, alas, burn and are destroyed. But traces remain. Some finds are completely random and unexpected. So, the tech in the archives The KGB, which had nothing to do with the Wallenberg investigation, found him diplomatic passport and personal belongings in a bag that fell out of a heavy pack unparsed documents. After

the loud scandal caused by the publication of my book in the West, I wrote to May 1994, at the request of the Russian-Swedish commission in the Wallenberg case, an explanation in accounting and archival department of the Federal Security Service. My son was talking to Swedish representatives: finding out the truth about the case of Raoul Wallenberg depends to a large extent on Swedish side, which stubbornly refuses to make public the data of its reports on contacts with German and American intelligence services in 1941-1945.

As the Finnish historian Seppo Isotalo told me, currently available Swedish authorities have hidden documents about Wallenberg's performance of the task American intelligence, as well as his participation on behalf of his uncle, a financial magnate Marcus Wallenberg, in the "laundering" by the Nazis of the wealth of the Jewish population.

I think that someday researchers will still get to our and foreign archival materials, as happened with the Katyn case, and put an end to the confusing and the tragic history of Wallenberg.

An attempt by our authorities, it must be said, not unsuccessful, to hide the truth about Wallenberg recalls the case of the execution in 1940 of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest under Smolensk and other places. It was not until 1992 that archives were published in the press. materials of this case, in particular the report of the former chairman of the KGB Shelepin about

destruction of documents related to the criminal act (Shelepin in 1959 turned to Khrushchev to get permission to destroy them). All this gives rise to to assume that they did the same with the Wallenberg case.

Although Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin gave Lech Walesa the documents and the case of the Polish prisoners of war seem to have already been closed, the veil of secrecy has not yet been completely thrown off. IN documents extracted from the KGB archives do not contain information on how this project was planned and carried out. promotion. Even those who were actively involved in the recruitment of Polish officers had no idea what fate awaits prisoners of war who refused to cooperate with the NKVD. I guess about Reichman, who was involved in Polish affairs, knew this. An

official government report stated that the Polish prisoners of war in the camps fell into the hands of the Germans and were shot. Indeed, some Polish officers were killed by German weapons. Then many, including myself, believed this versions.

For the first time I heard that we shot Polish prisoners of war from Major General KGB Kevorkov, Deputy General Director of TASS in the 80s. He said that Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the 70s received a reprimand from Andropov for his interest in the Katyn case and the proposal to start a new investigation. I was struck by the fact that, according to Kevorkov, the Central Committee was most concerned about in order to lay all responsibility for this matter only on the NKVD and to hide the fact that the destruction of Polish officers was carried out by decision of the Politburo.

Speaking about the criminal mass destruction of Polish prisoners of war and attempts Khrushchev and Gorbachev to hide this tragedy, it should also be noted that, perhaps, the execution of the Poles in 1940 was a kind of revenge, settling scores with ardent anti-Soviet, Polish officers, for the destruction of forty thousand (according to various sources different numbers) of our prisoners of war in Polish concentration camps after the defeat Red Army in 1920 near Warsaw.

In 1953, Eitingon and I were accused of organizing the liquidation people objectionable to Beria with the help of poisons in special safe houses, in country residences and these murders were presented as death from accidents. Abakumov was also accused of killing people he didn't like. Contrary to the requirements of the law, neither the indictment nor the verdict in our cases included the names "our victims". And it was not an accident or the result of careless work of investigators. - they knew their business. There were simply no casualties, there were none. In settling personal accounts Beria and Abakumov with their opponents, neither I nor Eitingon took part.

All secret liquidations of double agents and political opponents of Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev in 1930-1950 were carried out by order of the government. Exactly therefore, specific combat operations conducted by my subordinates in conjunction with employees of "Laboratory-X" against enemies that are really dangerous for the Soviet the state, as it seemed then, was not blamed on either me or Eitingon. Abakumov, who personally gave orders on behalf of the government to conduct operations, they also did not were blamed. Beria, in 1945-1953, had nothing to do with these matters and didn't even know about them.

All the work of "Laboratory-X", not only scientific. was well known to those who was engaged in the investigation of the case of Beria and Abakumov, and to the government and the Central Committee of the party, which observed and directed the course of the investigation in these cases and determined its content.

In the indictment in my case, it was stated that it was I who watched the the work of a top-secret toxicology lab that experimented with poisons on prisoners sentenced to death between 1942 and 1946. This accusation was filmed during my rehabilitation, because in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB they found an approved by the government The regulation that regulated all the activities of this laboratory and the procedure for reporting on her work. "Laboratory-X" was not under my control. I couldn't give orders to her boss Mairanovsky not to use poisons against anyone, much less experiment with them on humans. And now they are trying to

speculate to discredit me and Eitingon. And this is done by Vaksberg, Bobrenov - professional lawyers and Petrov from Memorial, who are aware that the use of testimonies and protocols that have lost their legal significance is not signed by the accused and defendants, against rehabilitated people, exposes them in the most unattractive light, turns them into accomplices in the falsification of criminal cases.

In the current view of these events, one cannot but keep in mind another important circumstance. The practice of covert elimination of political opponents and doppelgänger agents was an unpleasant but inevitable attribute of the Cold War and authoritarian rule. It was regulated by a special decision not of party bodies, but of the government, announced in orders both through the state security agencies and military intelligence. IN

Regulations on the tasks of the service of reconnaissance and sabotage operations, subject to strict and unquestioning execution, it was expressly written that "the service carries out surveillance and supply of agents to individuals conducting enemy work, the suppression of which, in necessary cases and with special permission from the government, can be carried out in special ways: through compromise, secret seizure, physical impact or elimination.

In 1951, Mairanovsky, together with Eitingon, Reikhsman, Matusov and A. Sverdlov, were arrested and charged with illegal possession of poisons, and also with the fact that they are participants in the Zionist conspiracy, the purpose of which is to seize power and destroy top leaders of the state, including Stalin. Ryumin, who led the investigation on this case, managed to knock out fantastic confessions from Mairanovsky (he refused them in 1958) and Deputy Head of the Secretariat Abakumov Broverman. When at the end of 1952 Ryumin, being Deputy Minister of State Security Ignatiev, was removed from positions, the investigative unit could not submit an indictment against Mairanovsky as prepared by Ryumin. Head's testimony of the toxicological laboratory were not supported by the confessions of the doctors arrested in the case of Abakumov, who had no idea about this laboratory.

None of the arrested doctors knew anything about Mairanovsky's secret activities: he himself conducted experiments with poisons on those sentenced to death in accordance with the order established by the government and the Ministry of State Security. Locking Mairanovsky's full confession was too risky, since he referred to instructions from higher authorities and awards received by him. That is why his case went to consideration to an extrajudicial body - Special meeting under the Minister of State Security. Apparently, there were some plans to use Mairanovsky in the future as a witness against someone in senior management. He was allowed to live and in February 1953 was sentenced to ten years in prison for illegal possession of poisons and abuse of office.

Mairanovsky was convicted shortly before Stalin's death. When Beria again headed security agencies, Mairanovsky sent him a huge number of applications, requests for release, wrote about his innocence and referred to work under his direct leadership in 1938-1945. Beria, apparently, was going to release him, but soon he himself was arrested. The prosecutor's office immediately used Mairanovsky's statements against him himself, against Beria, Abakumov and Merkulov. Mairanovsky was now presented as Beria's accomplice in his mythical plans to eliminate the Soviet leadership with the help of poisons.

I am aware of four facts of the liquidation of dangerous enemies of the Soviet state, as then it was unequivocally understood that they were carried out with the participation of Mairanovsky in 1946-1947. I mean the well-known Ukrainian nationalists, whom I have already talked about, and also foreigners - Samet and Oggins.

Samet, a Polish engineer of Jewish nationality, interned by us in 1939, was engaged in top secret work on the use of captured German equipment on our submarines, which gave a great advantage in the duration of stay under water. Samet contacted the British: he was going to leave for Palestine.

In order to infiltrate an agent in Samet's environment and control his connections with foreigners, in Ulyanovsk, where everything happened, sent Eitingon. Mairanovsky, who arrived later together with an agent, a doctor at the factory polyclinic, made Sameta during a prophylactic examining the injection of poison curare.

General Volkogonov in 1992 submitted to the US Congress a list of Americans who died in the Soviet Union during the Second World War, as well as the "cold" one, and expressed his named after President Yeltsin regret their deaths. Oggins was also on that list. Eliminated Oggins, according to Volkogonov, so that he could not tell the truth about Soviet prisons and concentration camps.

In the West, by that time, it was quite well known about the Gulag. and the reason for which Oggins was destroyed, is not as simple as they wrote in our newspapers. Judging by the publications, Oggins was illegally arrested by the NKVD and sentenced by the Special Conference to eight years. imprisonment allegedly for anti-Soviet propaganda. In fact, Oggins came to the Soviet Union on a fake Czechoslovak passport - there was not a word about this in the press. He really sympathized with communist ideas and was an unspoken member US Communist Party. Oggins was also an old agent of the Comintern and the NKVD in China, in the Far East and USA. His wife Nora was part of the NKVD intelligence network in America and Western Europe and was responsible for the maintenance of our safe houses in France and the USA in 1938-1941. Oggins was arrested in 1938 on suspicion of a double game. His wife returned to the US in 1939. At first, she believed that her husband was in the Soviet Union for operational considerations, but then I realized that he was arrested. We had grounds suggest that Nora began to cooperate with the FBI and other American and Japanese special services. She tried, perhaps on the instructions of American counterintelligence, to restore ties with our agents in America that had been interrupted since 1942. At the end of the war Nora Oggins turned to the American authorities to help find her husband. hoping to secure his release. During the period of our good relations with America an employee of the American embassy in Moscow was allowed to meet with Oggins in Butyrka prison, pursuing its goals - to reveal what the Americans know about his activities.

After the failure of our intelligence network in the US and Canada in 1946-1947 Molotov feared that if Oggins was also released, the Americans might draw him into Un-American Activities Commission and used as a witness against the US Communist Party. In addition, according to our intelligence services, Nora Oggins' contacts with by the American authorities and cooperation with the FBI have already caused serious damage to our undercover positions in the United States and France.

Abakumov, knowing this, proposed to eliminate Oggins, the decision was made by Stalin and Molotov. In 1947, Mairanovsky, during a medical examination, made Oggins, who was in prison, is given a fatal injection. Eitingon and I were instructed organize his funeral at the Jewish cemetery in Penza and issue the date of burial as 1944 or 1945.

Now, remembering this man, I feel regret. But then, in the years of "cold war," neither we nor the Americans thought about the moral aspects of eliminating dangerous opponents, doppelgänger agents.

### **Kalugin's testimony on the use of poisons and toxicological drugs in KGB special operations abroad in the 1970s**

In the 60-70s and in 1990, the prosecutor's office, the KGB and the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee The CPSU investigated cases of the use of poisons in the operations of special services. It was found that Mairanovsky was involved in the use of poisons by special services in 1937-1947. Since 1952, the use of poisons resumed without the participation of Mairanovsky and, as always, was regulated by the relevant government orders. None of the real who directed all actions for the use of poisons, neither from the service of the commandant's office of the KGB, nor from

operational and technical management was not involved even in the administrative responsibility.

The toxicological laboratory was established in 1921 under the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. I. Lenin, long before Beria, and was called the "Special Cabinet". It is possible that Lenin asked Stalin to get him poison from the stocks of this laboratory - the "office".

The first head of the laboratory in the 30s was Professor Kazakov, he was shot in 1938 under the trial of Bukharin.

Research work on the subject of the laboratory was carried out by specialists Institute of Biochemistry under the direction of Mairanovsky. In 1937, the laboratory-"office" and Mairanovsky's research group were transferred to the NKVD. In the 60s and 70s she was named Special Laboratory No 12 of the Institute of Special and New Technologies of the KGB.

The gloomy fame of the laboratory continued to excite the imagination of the Soviet leaders. In 1988, KGB Major General Shadrin told me that the highest instance, that is, Gorbachev, is showing interest in the practice of eliminating political rivals in the past. Then rumors spread that the chairman KGB Semichastny in 1964 allegedly refused to carry out Brezhnev's hint-instruction on tacit liquidation of Khrushchev. However, Semichastny, according to Shadrin, refused submit a written explanation on the matter in 1988 or 1989.

In 1990, Oleg Kalugin and I were summoned to the prosecutor's office. I was interrogated on the case Oggins, Kalugin - in the case of Markov, a Bulgarian dissident who was killed in London, where he In 1978 he worked for the BBC. Kalugin confirmed to the prosecutor what he had said in his press appearances. He,

holding the post of head of the foreign counterintelligence service of the KGB, advised Bulgarian intelligence in carrying out an operation to eliminate Markov with the help of poison obtained from the Special Laboratory, which was previously headed by Mairanovsky. Markov died from pricked with an umbrella made in this laboratory. Kalugin's

participation in the operation carried out by the Bulgarian intelligence corresponded to his official duties: he was responsible for measures to combat the agents of Western special services abroad and was supposed to assist the special services of the socialist countries. Markov was considered at that time a prominent agent of British intelligence. How do I they said that the Bulgarian government awarded Kalugin an order for this operation and browning. Not so long ago, Kalugin said that he received the Order of the Red Banner for another liquidation - the abduction in Vienna of a Soviet defector, an officer of the Navy Artamonov, carried out using toxicological drugs, from which Artamonov died at him in his arms.

Kalugin's explanation of his participation in the liquidation and abduction of those objectionable to the Soviet the government of the people was similar to mine. Another question: for our so-called "democratic public" Kalugin is a fighter for justice and human rights, and I, to put it mildly, am an odious person. Kalugin and the press that

supported him rightly raised the question of control over the work of the toxicological units of special services. However, in my opinion, it is not only control. Toxicological laboratories will always be part of the technical ensuring the activities of state security and intelligence agencies.

Criminal abuses in this area have also been established in CIA operations. In 1977, Ogorodnik, a Foreign Ministry official who was a CIA agent, committed suicide by swallowing a vial of poison at the time of his arrest. However, before that he with the authorization of the CIA, eliminated with the help of a US-made poison of hidden action in nothing an innocent woman, a Soviet citizen, who had some reason to suspect him

in espionage.

## **The problem of control over the activity of toxicological groups of organs security and home affairs in peacetime**



The question arises: is it justified to use drugs or poisons in the fight against terrorism? Of course, the death sentence or the destruction of a terrorist must be carried out in strict accordance with the requirements of the law. Unfortunately, legal aspects of the actions of special services in a combat situation, for example, during forced liquidation of dangerous terrorists have not been developed either in our country or abroad.

However, the danger lies in the fact that such a powerful weapon can be used by a ruling regime to destroy unwanted people, political opponents and rivals, as has happened in our history. Of course, the toxicological service is obliged to obey strict rules and control. But, I repeat, it's not just about control.

- the status of the staff is important.

I think that employees of the toxicological units of the special services should not be in active military service. This will allow you to control their actions in real prosecutorial supervision. As non-military members, they will not have to obey in their actions the requirements of the disciplinary Charter of the Armed Forces, according to which the order of the chief is the law for the subordinate, and the criminal Responsibility for an illegally issued military order lies with the highest official, his given away. Maybe this will be some kind of guarantee against abuse in the use of toxicological services in political struggle.

What I have told will seem schematic to some, an attempt to hide from public work of "Laboratory X". Examination of the laboratory gave orders to her boss, showed that I, like the leaders of other independent services and departments of the MGB-KGB, had the most general idea of the work of the laboratory and did not take any part in the activities of the toxicological unit.

For the first time this material, but, of course, in a different form, I presented to the Central Committee of the CPSU in the 60s years, in their statements, seeking first release from prison, then rehabilitation. In vain do the so-called democratic journalists try to accuse me of being I conceal unfavorable circumstances for myself, but at the same time they use facts from my book published in the West, without reference to it.

## CHAPTER 10. "CALIFORNIA IN CRIMEA"

### The Jewish Question in the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Kremlin in 1930-1940

In 1942-1945, the so-called Jewish question in the light of relations with the Allies acquired significant importance in the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet state.

The Kremlin expected to receive significant funds for the restoration of the national economy under the guise of providing assistance to the Jewish population of the USSR, affected by Hitler's invasion. The government, continuing the old line of flirting with Zionist circles, sought to use the "Palestinian question" as a bargaining chip cards in negotiations with the British, who feared for their positions in the Middle East and preventing the mass resettlement of Jews in Palestine and the formation of a Jewish states. In the

early 1920s, when the Soviet Union was getting on its feet, among the leaders of all levels there were many people with Jewish surnames. Note that at that time there was no passports, so no one officially divided people along ethnic lines.

In 1922-1923, many Jewish and other nationalist organizations and their leaders arrested. One of the most active groups of this kind was, for example, "Poalei Zion" in Odessa. Members of this underground organizations, having managed to neutralize the surveillance service, lured several

operatives to an abandoned cemetery and beat them severely. Another underground group, the Haganah, originated in Zhytomyr, but, ironically, it was the GPU-Jews who worked in this city who were assigned to lead the operation against this Jewish nationalist group. Among the defeated Jewish organizations was the Bund, which was part of the socialist international. The Jewish Communist Party, which had previously broken away from the Bund, was also dissolved: this was in line with our policy of liquidating any factions of communist parties built on a national basis, both within the CPSU (b) and outside it. By the way, the so-called Ukrainian Communist Party was dissolved at the same time. The Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) became the only ruling party in the republic and the only one, apart from the VKP(b)-CPSU, to have its own Politburo.

The leaders of these Jewish organizations were either expelled or went abroad. They were allowed to do this: until 1928, there were virtually no obstacles to traveling abroad in the country, and the procedure was very simple. The Soviet Jews no longer had their own nationalist organizations, and gradually there was what can be called an intense process of assimilation. If we talk about the Jewish intelligentsia, then it has completely lost its political significance. In 1933, in connection with collectivization, a passport system was introduced to strictly control residence in cities and simplify accounting. population movements. The Jews were singled out as a separate national group, although they did not have their own state education.

In all major departments, Jews at that time occupied an influential position. I recall that in 1939 we received a verbal directive obliging us - this happened already after the mass repressions - to monitor what percentage of people of one nationality or another is in the leadership of the most responsible, from the point of view of security, departments. But this directive turned out to be much deeper in its design than I expected. For the first time, the quota system came into effect. Fortunately, most of my comrades-in-arms had by this time achieved great success, proved their loyalty to the Party, and were not subject to this new directive.

The formation of the Jewish Autonomous Region with the center of Birobidzhan was undertaken by Stalin to strengthen the border regime in the Far East by creating a kind of barrier there, and not at all as a step towards the creation of a Jewish state. The border in these places was often violated by Chinese and White Guard terrorist groups. Stalin's idea was to put a barrier in their path in the form of settlements, whose inhabitants are hostile to the white emigrants, and especially to the Cossacks. The status of the region was far-sightedly defined as an autonomous region, and not a republic, which meant: there would be neither its own legislative body, nor the supreme court, nor the administrative structures of the ministerial level. Although the region had autonomy, it was only a border special territory, and not a political center. Before the war, the leadership of the underground Jewish nationalist organizations operating in the Baltics, Western Belarus and Bessarabia was beheaded. It was at this time that undercover cases were opened against the Zionist organizations Beitar. Irgun - Zevey - Leumi. Zhabotins". "Nomads", these developments were later used to infiltrate the Zionist organizations in order to decompose them. After the start of the war at the top, the idea arose to use the leaders of the Jewish socialist Bund - Henrik Erlich and Viktor Alter for foreign policy purposes. Former deputy head of the 2nd of the counterintelligence department, General Reichman told me in 1970 that these Bund leaders were arrested by us in Eastern Poland in September-October 1939. When the war with Germany began, they were released in September 1941. At a meeting with Beria, they were asked to create a Jewish anti-Hitler committee : initially, that Erlich will be the chairman of the committee, Mikhoels will be his deputy, and Alter will be the executive secretary. The plan had to be abandoned because Erlich and Alter knew too much about Stalin's intentions to use them to extort money from the West. In December 1941, Alter and Ehrlich were again arrested, although no charges were brought against them. On December 27, 1941, Erlich addressed the Chairman of the Presidium

of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Kalinin, protesting against the arrest and proving that he is supporter of the Soviet government and is ready to cooperate with the NKVD.

From this letter it was clear that it was the NKVD that sought to initiate through Erlich creation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC). The main task of the committee, it was said in letter, should consist in intensive propaganda among the Jewish communities of the United States and England of the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union, in order to obtain the maximum help needed by the USSR in the fight against Hitler's aggression. All JAC offers received the full approval of the leadership, and the NKVD was instructed to select a suitable place for the headquarters of the committee. At the head of the JAC were: Mikhoels, chief director and wonderful actor of the Jewish State Theatre, Fefer, a popular poet, and Epstein, publicist and literary critic.

Ehrlich never received a reply to his letter. Archives show that in December Beria ordered that Erlich and Alter be transferred to solitary cells. These prisoners were known under numbers 41 and 42, interrogate them or fill out registration papers on them cards in the Kuibyshev prison of the NKVD, where they were kept, was prohibited. General Reichman later told me that there was a special order, in accordance with whom even the prison staff had no right to know their real names. These instructions came from Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

In 1942, the American politician Wendell Wilkie and William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, sent an inquiry about the fate of Ehrlich and Alter through Soviet Ambassador to America Litvinov. A similar request was made to us by the Polish Ambassador to Moscow Stanislav Kot. Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky in his response, Kotu hinted that Erlich and Alter were pardoned by mistake: both of them, as found to have secretly colluded with the Germans. At the end of 1942 Willkie approached us with new request, but until February 1943 did not receive any answer. Molotov meanwhile instructed Litvinov to announce that on December 23, 1941, Erlich and Alter were shot, since in October and November of that year they systematically engaged in treacherous activities, attempted to spread in the Soviet Union hostile information aimed at the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreements with Nazi Germany.

It was a deliberate lie. Erlich committed suicide on May 14, 1942. hanged himself in the cell. Alter remained in solitary confinement until 17 February 1943 and was secretly executed by order of Beria. At the time of the events described, I knew nothing about them. fate. Everything I write about them took place before Mikhoels' visit to the United States.

Only in September 1992, from the publication in the weekly newspaper of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Shield and Sword" became the true fate of Erlich and Alter is known. They were destroyed to hide the secret unofficial contacts of the Soviet leadership with influential representatives foreign Jewish communities. Erlich and Alter were eliminated also because Stalin was afraid their political influence outside the Soviet Union.

## **Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee**

Immediately after the formation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Soviet intelligence decided to use the connections of the Jewish intelligentsia to find out the possibilities to get additional economic assistance in the fight against fascist Germany through the Zionist circles. Since 1925, on the directive of Dzerzhinsky, we have been actively developing and penetrating into Zionist organizations in the USA, Western Europe and Palestine. especially branched in the early 1930s, Serebryansky managed to create an agent network in the Zionist movement. Now the JAK could be a cover for the restoration of undercover positions in the Zionist movement, lost in 1938 due to the arrest of almost the entire operational staff of the group Serebryansky.

## **Mikhoels' secret mission to attract American capital to**

## Soviet Union in 1943

To this end, Mikhoels and Fefer, our verified agent, were instructed to probe the reaction of influential foreign Zionist organizations to the creation Jewish Republic in Crimea. This task of special reconnaissance sounding is to establish contacts with the American

Zionist movement in 1943-1944 - was successfully carried out. I also recall that during this period the Soviet leadership really thought about the possibility of creating Jewish Republic in the Crimea on the basis of the three national Jewish areas. At the suggestion of Molotov, the leadership of the JAC prepared a letter addressed to Stalin with a proposal to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea.

Mikhoels himself was in the undercover development of the NKVD since 1935. And one of the main tasks of working with him was to create a cover for entering the leading circles American Zionist organization "Joint". The letter, in

particular, stated that the creation of the Jewish Soviet Republic in accordance with Bolshevik principles and in the spirit of the Leninist-Stalinist national politics will once and for all solve the problem of the legal statehood of the Jewish people and further development of its centuries-old culture. No one has been able to solve this problem for centuries. It can finally be resolved only in our great socialist country.

This letter, recorded in the registration books kept in the party archive, has not yet been fully declassified. It was not shown when during the visit President Yeltsin in 1992, archive materials of the JAC were shown to Washington.

On February 15, 1944, a draft letter was presented to Molotov. At his direction Lozovsky, Molotov's deputy, edited this document. The letter has been forwarded Molotov and set a new date - February 21. Three days later it was registered with the secretariat of the government of the USSR under the number M-23314 and on the same day sent to Secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov, Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces Shcherbakov and Chairman Gosplan to Voznesensky with instructions to consider this issue.

I should note that Litvinov, being ambassador to the United States during the war years, in correspondence with Molotov and the NKVD strongly opposed ties with the Zionist movement, as well as against our active participation in the solution of the Palestinian problem. Exact motivations I don't remember Litvinov's position, but its meaning boiled down to the fact that our possible influence on the Zionist movement will be extremely insignificant. Therefore, Litvinov believed expedient to entrust all contacts with Zionist circles exclusively to employees Soviet special services or especially verified agents. There is nothing in these recommendations. surprising: heading the militant underground organization of the Bolsheviks before the revolution, Litvinov had a very extensive experience in intelligence and operational work, including attracting people from circles hostile to it to cooperate with the Bolshevik Party.

Our operative Kheifets, who proved himself very successful in obtaining from US atomic bomb materials, told me that the letter in question is in essence, was a proposal to form a Jewish republic in the Crimea, where they could Jews would come from all over the world. This, of course, would require the relocation of residents Crimea. In March and April 1944, the Crimean Tatars were deported: and transported one hundred and fifty thousand people to Uzbekistan. That the letter is on the one hand and deportation order, on the other hand, are practically dated on the same date (February 15 and 14 respectively) is a coincidence. Stalin's order for the expulsion of the Crimean Tatars, whom accused of mass cooperation with the Germans, was signed earlier, but for execution to Beria arrived the day before the letter was received from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

Coordination and execution of Stalin's plan to attract Jewish capital were entrusted to Kheifetz and our resident in Washington, Zarubin, who organized Mikhoels' trip to America in 1943.

Before going to the United States, Mikhoels summoned Beria to the Lubyanka and

instructed him how to make extensive contacts with American Jews. Our plan was to enlist the support of the American public and get loans necessary for the development of the metallurgical and coal industries. Mikhoels and Fefer brilliantly coped with their mission.

The success of Mikhoels' trip to America immediately made him suspicious in the eyes of Stalin. No wonder, because he, a representative of Jewish culture, became a true hero, known throughout the world, so he was destined for the fate of Erlich and Alter.

The role of Mikhoels and Fefer was also significant in the reconnaissance operation to access to the circles of scientists close to Einstein, engaged in the development at that time no one knows "superweapon". These people met with those close to the Einstein family. Russian emigrants, the Konenkov spouses, and through them, however, orally to us received important information about the prospects of a new "superweapon", discussed in Princeton with the participation of Fermi and Oppenheimer. Coordination of all this work along the line In addition to the Zarubins, Kheifets and Pastelnyak were engaged in our intelligence in the United States.

It was rumored that Mikhoels might be offered the post of chairman of the Supreme Council in the Jewish Republic. In addition to Molotov, Lozovsky and several responsible employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mikhoels was the only person who knew about the existence of Stalin's plan to create a Jewish state in the Crimea. In this way Stalin expected to receive \$ 10 billion from the West for the restoration war-torn economy.

I did not know about the details of the letter from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to Stalin. Beria was aware that our initiative is supported by the American side, or rather, by the Jewish US organizations, since he personally received both Mikhoels and Fefer after a trip to America. Discussion of the question of establishing a Jewish republic within the framework of the Soviet Union personally regarded as a kind of probing of the West, in order to find out how far-reaching are their plans to provide us with economic assistance after the end of the war. However, the decision on the establishment of the Jewish Republic was postponed until the end of war, and the letter lay without movement for four years, the most different rumors. Then, already in 1948, Malenkov used it to conduct a campaign against members of the JAC, and later against the old guard in the leadership of the country. Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Voznesensky and, finally, Beria himself, involved in the discussion of the creation Jewish Republic on the territory of Crimea, themselves, due to the fact that they had Jewish relatives were vulnerable during this campaign.

The plan to raise American capital was, as I mentioned, connected with the idea creation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea, the so-called "Crimean California". This idea was widely discussed in American Jewish circles, as Heifetz told me. According to him According to him, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, Eric Johnston, whom in June 1944, together with the American ambassador Averell Harriman accepted by Stalin to discuss the problems of reviving the regions that were the main Jewish settlements in Belarus, and the resettlement of Jews in the Crimea. Johnston painted before Stalin a very rosy picture, saying that for this purpose the Soviet Union after war will be given long-term American loans. The idea of creating a

Jewish socialist republic in the Crimea openly discussed in Moscow not only among the Jewish population, but also in the highest echelons of power.

It is known that Mikhoels, as chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, in his relied heavily on Fefer, a major NKVD agent (Mikhoels, of course, did not know about this), who was "guided" by State Security Commissar Reichman. It happened that Beria himself received Fefer at the safe house to discuss the issue of creating Jewish Republic in Crimea.

Until June 1945, this project seemed to remain in force and should have been be realized. During the preparations for the Yalta Conference, Harriman asked me and assistant Molotov Novikov, how are things going with the formation of the Jewish Republic in connection with future American loans for this project. I remember seeing a report that Stalin, immediately after the war, discussed with a delegation of American senators a plan

the creation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea and the revival of the Gomel region, a place of compact residence of Jews in Belarus. He asked them not to limit loans and technical assistance to these two regions, but to provide it without being tied to specific projects. Then, in June 1945, after

Yalta and the victory over Nazi Germany, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree: Crimea became an administrative region within the RSFSR. Meanwhile, before the war, Crimea was an autonomous republic with a significant representation of the Tatar population in all administrative structures. In November 1945, when Harriman attempted to contact Stalin through Molotov to discuss matters of economic cooperation, his request for a face-to-face meeting was denied at Stalin's direction. After the war, Stalin preferred to pursue a different line:

attempts to infiltrate our agents into the ranks of the Zionist movement intensified. Until 1948, Great Britain had a mandate from the League of Nations to administer the territory of Palestine. Stalin and Molotov hoped to calm the British, who were afraid of being thrown out of Palestine after the creation of a Jewish state there. The project of Jewish autonomy in the Crimea was supposed to divert the attention of the leaders of world Jewry from Palestine as the only option for solving the Jewish problem. When at the end of 1945 it became clear that Stalin did not consider himself connected with the former unofficial sounding, the British and Americans organized the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine without the participation of the Soviet Union. This contradicted the previously reached agreement on joint consultations of the military allies on the Palestinian problem. And in April 1946, Deputy Foreign Ministers Dekanozov and Vyshinsky sent a memo

to the government, emphasizing that the interests of the Soviet Union were ignored: the Palestinian issue would be resolved without the participation of our state. In this document, they proposed a policy of favorable attitude towards the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. With the consent of Molotov, Vyshinsky publishes under a pseudonym an article in the journal *Novoye Vremya*, in which he speaks of the need to create a democratic Jewish state in the mandated territory of Palestine. The calculation was to strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East and at the same time undermine British influence in the Arab countries that opposed the emergence of a new state, showing that the British were not able to stop the Jews in their desire to create their own state.

Simultaneously with the political steps being taken, orders were received in 1946 to send our agents to Palestine via Rumania. They were supposed to create an illegal intelligence network in Palestine, which could be used in combat and sabotage operations against the British. For this purpose, I singled out three officers: Garbuz, Semyonov (real name Taubman - he was Grigulevich's assistant in the Lithuanian underground and helped liquidate Rudolf Klement in Paris in 1938) and Kolesnikov. Garbuz and Kolesnikov had experience of guerrilla warfare in Ukraine and Belarus, where they participated in operations against the German occupation authorities. Semenov and Kolesnikov settled in Haifa and created

two intelligence networks, but did not take part in sabotage against the British. Kolesnikov managed to organize the delivery from Romania to Palestine of small arms and anti-tank grenades captured from the Germans. Semyonov, for his part, tried to renew contact with our agent in the Stern organization. It was an anti-British terrorist group, where Serebryansky managed to send his man in 1937. Garbuz remained in Romania, selecting candidates there for future resettlement in Israel.

From the very beginning it was clear to me that while helping the Jews, it would seem, we actually set ourselves the task of creating our own network of agents within the Zionist political and military structure. Jews aspired to independence and were closely associated with America. But we were not sure that we would be able to influence them, as in Eastern Europe. However, we considered it extremely important to indicate to a certain extent our presence there. As Kheifets told me, back in 1943 Litvinov in his message

Molotov from Washington emphasized that Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state become one of the main issues of post-war world politics. In the second

half of 1946, Stalin took a position of active opposition to activities of international Jewish organizations and British-American policy on the Palestinian question - he was irritated by the demands of Soviet Jews to improve their living conditions when they returned from evacuation. He started warming up anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR: purges began in the party apparatus, diplomatic service, military leadership and intelligence. The campaign culminated in the Doctors' Plot and accusations of Jewish doctors in Zionism. The anti-Semitic campaign was a repetition of the purges of the 30s years, another Stalinist maneuver to reshuffle the entire party and Soviet apparatus in order to replace the old leadership - Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and others new people who would not threaten his position as the sole ruler of the country.

### **The massacre of the Jewish intelligentsia in the Soviet Union after the start "cold war"**

In October 1946, the bogey of Jewish bourgeois nationalism was raised for the first time in as a threat to communist ideology. Newly appointed minister Abakumov, in a letter to the leader, accused the leaders of the Jewish anti-fascist committee in nationalist propaganda, in that, in his opinion, they put Jewish interests above the interests of the Soviet country. Such an accusation was made a serious warning. Heifetz, who excelled in obtaining information on the atomic bomb and was able to establish contacts at a high level in American Jewish community fell out of favor. He continued to work at the Jewish anti-fascist committee as secretary for foreign relations, but was forced to interrupt their contacts with the American Jewish community.

In the letter, Abakumov accused the committee of taking over the functions of represent the interests of the Jewish population in the return of property to those who returned to people's homelands. Thousands of Jews during the war fled from Kyiv, Minsk, Riga, Leningrad and Moscow, fleeing from the advancing German troops. The Nazis came under slogans of liberation of Ukrainians and Balts from "Jewish domination". It found fertile ground among the nationalists who seized houses, apartments and other Jewish property. When the surviving Jews began to return home in 1945, they saw that their property was in the wrong hands. I remember how Khrushchev, then

the secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, called Usman Yusupov, secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and complained to him that Jews evacuated during the war to Tashkent and Samarkand "flock to Ukraine as crows." In this conversation, which took place in 1947, he stated that he simply did not have a place to receive everyone, since the city was destroyed, and this flow must be stopped, otherwise in Kyiv will begin pogroms. At that moment I was in Yusupov's office, and he told me this conversation, because I came to him with a request to resettle three thousand Kurds who fled from Iran to Azerbaijan, led by Barzani. It was extremely dangerous to leave them on Caucasus, and the leadership decided to resettle the Kurds in Uzbekistan. At the time it was hard to find housing for the Jewish intelligentsia returning to Kyiv. The problem of their placement cannot be was to be solved by creating several collective farms, as they did for the Kurdish refugees.

Chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Mikhoels did his best to protect the interests of Jews in property and housing matters. Abakumov strove prove that the committee's attempt to protect the interests of Jewish refugees was a manifestation of Jewish bourgeois nationalism. His letter reflected the concerns of local party leaders who had to deal with these problems. Behavior Mikhoels, speaking on behalf of the Jews returning home, his awareness of

top secret probing approaches of the Soviet leadership to the Zionists are not just alarmed Stalin - they increased his suspicion. And indeed, only imagine: in the Soviet system, with a strict hierarchy, a person suddenly appears,

enjoying international prestige and impeccable reputation, and begins act on their own initiative.

The situation worsened further in 1947. I remember Obruchnikov's instructions and Svinelupov, deputy ministers of state security and internal affairs for personnel accept Jews for officer positions in the state security agencies. I couldn't imagine that such an openly anti-Semitic order came directly from Stalin, and believed that all this was the work of Abakumov. It became clear to me that the grand plan use of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia to strengthen the international cooperation with world Jewry was rejected. Eitingon, complaining all the time to the harassment of his relatives at the university and in medical institutions, was convinced that anti-Semitism was an essential element of state policy. Looking back ago, I admit that he understood the situation much better than I did.

Beria and Bogdan Kobulov often told me that Stalin loved jokes and anecdotes. anti-Muslim, and in particular anti-Azerbaijani, especially when they told in the presence of Bagirov, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, who simply could not stand the mocking intonations of Kobulov, who pronounced Russian words with Azeri accent. This makes me think that humor directed against that or another national group, was to Stalin's liking and he, in essence, was an anti-Semite no more than an anti-Muslim. Stalin

and his closest aides showed interest in the Jewish question in order to extract political dividends in the struggle for power and for the consolidation of their forces. So anti-Semitic "games" began in the highest party echelons. After Stalin started campaign against the cosmopolitans in 1946-1947, middle-level leadership and ordinary party officials began to perceive anti-Semitism as an official line parties. The term "rootless cosmopolitan" became synonymous with the word "Jew": it meant that Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality shared the worldview of the Jews of the West and, by virtue of this could not be completely devoted to the Soviet state. The campaign

against the cosmopolitans coincided with a change in the balance of political forces around Stalin. Malenkov was demoted, and Beria was removed from overseeing any affairs related to state security. Rumors began to circulate that Molotov and he surrounded themselves Jews.

Stalin's efforts after the war were aimed at spreading the influence of the Soviet Union, first on the countries of Eastern Europe, located near our borders, and then wherever we competed with Great Britain. Stalin foresaw that the Arab countries will turn towards the Soviet Union, disappointed in the British and Americans because of their support for Israel. The Arabs therefore had to appreciate the anti-Zionist trends in Soviet foreign policy. Molotov's assistant Vetrov, later our ambassador to Denmark, retelling Stalin's words to me: "Let's agree with the formation of Israel. This will be like a needle in the ass for the Arab states and make them turn their backs on Britain. Ultimately, British influence will be completely undermined in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq." The Cold War

began in earnest in 1946-1947, when illusions disappeared about our post-war cooperation with the West. Allied relations during wars with England and America turned into confrontations. Chinese Civil War became more and more intense; tensions also rose in Italy and France, where The Communists waged a fierce political struggle for power. With the onset of cold war," our hopes of receiving Jewish capital vanished. to the leadership of the country it became clear that to rely on the support of Jewish business circles abroad and their investment is no longer necessary.

And the first victim of the change of course was Mikhoels, who was at the very center of the discussions to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea.

In addition, Stalin received operational materials stating that Mikhoels allegedly seeks to enlist the support of his son-in-law G. Morozov in order to ensure in the Soviet leadership, a solution that is beneficial to him to improve the situation of the Jewish population and



development of Jewish culture. The MGB also suspected that through Mikhoels' connections with Zionist organizations in America became aware of some tragic events in the life of the Alliluyevs, relatives of Stalin. Stalin probably feared that a large personal Mikhoels' authority can be used by the international Zionist movement in their purposes. Mikhoels enjoyed worldwide fame and, of course, was a strong, outstanding personality, therefore, in the conditions of the totalitarian regime of that time, there could be no question of applying to him a well-established scheme of arrest and reprisal, covered with a fig leaf judicial trial. Mikhoels was

liquidated in the so-called special order in January 1948. TO Fortunately, I had nothing to do with this operation. Details of the murder became known only in April 1953. It is remembered that directly by this operation on the place was headed by Abakumov's deputy Ogoltsov and the Minister of State Security of Belarus Tsanava. Mikhoels and Golubov, who accompanied him, were lured to Tsanava's dacha under the pretext meetings with leading Belarusian actors, were given a fatal injection and thrown under the wheels truck to stage a bandit run-in on the outskirts of Minsk. Behind the wheel the truck was sat by an employee of the transport department of the MGB on the Belarusian railway.

Golubov was an agent of the MGB among the creative intelligentsia, which Mikhoels, of course, did not knew. In that situation, however, he turned out to be an undesirable witness, since it was under his help managed to bring Mikhoels to the dacha.

The news of the death of Mikhoels aroused suspicions in my soul, about which I do not tell anyone. began to speak. However, I could not imagine that Ogoltsov himself would go to Minsk to personally supervise the operation. The murder was committed, as I thought, by some anti-Semitic a determined bandit who was told in advance where and when he could find a person who imagined himself to be a spokesman for Jewish interests. The fate of Ogoltsov

is typical for the leaders of the MGB of that time. Beria in April 1953 achieved his arrest formally for the illegal liquidation of Mikhoels, in August 1953 after Beria's arrest, he was released. And no one even blamed him for this action. Still would! After all, at that time everyone who approved it in the Politburo in 1952-1953 during the "doctors' case" was in power. Only in 1957, in order to compromise Ogoltsov, who was closely associated with Malenkov, who had followed Beria on behalf of Stalin since 1951, he was expelled from party for "violating the social legality in the course of investigative work in Leningrad 1941-1943 years."

For most of 1948 I was busy with the Berlin crisis and the creation of a Kurdish underground network in Iran, Iraq and Turkey to overthrow the Nuri Said government and Faisal in Iraq, as well as Czechoslovak affairs. I flew to Prague with Zubov to try to neutralize the supporters of President Beneš when transferring power to a new government led by Gottwald. In 1947 my

wife became seriously ill and soon retired. Back in 1940 she showed enough wisdom to move away from operational work, and was appointed senior teacher of special disciplines at the Higher School of the NKVD (later the MGB). Time from time it was used to contact female agents representing a special interest for the leadership of the counterintelligence department, but for the most part it I tried to keep a low profile and not draw attention to myself. Her illness coincided with the campaign for cleaning from the Jews of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1949 and went through the personnel lists under her maiden name Kaganova.

In 1949 and 1950, when I had to travel frequently to Prague, Western Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, Eitingon performed my duties in the Bureau of Intelligence and sabotage work. He visited Emma and told her about the anti-Semitic campaign that gained momentum and assumed ever greater scope. Eitingon's sister Sonya, famous therapist and chief physician of the polyclinic of the automobile plant (now ZIL), was arrested, younger sister my wife Elizaveta was expelled from the graduate school of the medical institute in Kyiv. We tried to somehow help them, using friendly relations with Muzychenko, the director MONIKI in Moscow. In the 1930s, he was an illegal NKVD immigrant in France and Austria, but in 1938 he left intelligence and was able to return to his former profession as a doctor. He arranged for

the work of Elizabeth, who, by the way, still works at this institute.

The news of Heifetz's arrest in 1948 or 1949 came as a great shock to me: here intercession, either mine or Eitingon's, was useless. Both I and he connected this arrest with antisemitic campaign. As a result, almost all members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and other figures of Jewish culture were arrested and put on trial for accused of plotting to separate Crimea from the USSR.

### **Struggle for power in the Kremlin leadership. provocative fabrication of a case about a conspiracy in the leadership of the MGB with attraction to him Zionist conspirators doctors**

The internal struggle for power between 1948 and 1952 caused a new wave anti-Semitism, the "Doctors' Plot" arose. Although it was part of an anti-Semitic campaign, it was not limited to Jews alone. Rather, it can be said that the "case of doctors" was continuation of the struggle in which old scores were settled in the country's leadership. Stalin at help Malenkov and Khrushchev wanted to purge the ranks of the old guard and remove Beria. Molotov, Voroshilov and Mikoyan, those "last of the Mohicans" in Stalin's Politburo, were to become the main figures in the notorious "Doctors' Plot". However, all the truth about the "doctors' case" was never made public, even during the Gorbachev's publicity. The reason is that it was about the dirty struggle for power that unfolded in the Kremlin before the death of Stalin and captured, in essence, all management.

It is generally accepted that the "doctors' case" began with a hysterical letter to Stalin, in which Jewish doctors were accused of hatching plans to kill the leaders of the country with the help of wrong methods of treatment and poisons. The author of the letter was the acquirer scandalous fame Lydia Timashuk, doctor of the Kremlin polyclinic. Timashuk's letter, however, was not sent to Stalin in 1952, on the eve of the doctors' arrests, but in August 1948. IN it claimed that Academician Vinogradov incorrectly treated Zhdanov and others leaders, as a result of which Zhdanov died. Then Stalin's reaction was expressed in contemptuous "nonsense", and the letter went to the archive. There it remained without any movement. for three years until it was removed at the end of 1951. The letter was needed as a tool in struggle for power. All members of the Politburo knew about the letter—they also knew about the Stalinist reaction. However, the most important thing is that Timashuk did not accuse anyone of conspiracy. In a letter it only signaled the shortcomings and omissions that had taken place in providing treatment of party and state leaders. For this reason, the text of the letter is still not published, it sets out, in essence, the mutual claims of medical personnel to each other friend, usually of a quarrelsome nature. About this to me already in the Vladimir prison said Colonel Ludwigov, Beria's assistant for the Politburo and the Council of Ministers. I always believed that Abakumov started the "doctors' case" as a continuation of the campaign against cosmopolitans. However, in 1990, when I got to the military prosecutor's office, where I was summoned as witness in connection with the new investigation of the Abakumov case in the post-war years, I learned something otherwise. It turned out that he was not the initiator of the "case of doctors", on the contrary, Abakumov, who was arrested in 1951, accused of concealing evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate Stalin. He did this ostensibly in order to seize power. At the same time, Abakumov, according to his accusers, relied on Jewish doctors and Jewish employees in the apparatus of the minister state security, in particular on Eitingon.

Malenkov and Beria undoubtedly sought to eliminate Abakumov, and both were ready for to achieve its goal by any means. Sukhanov, Malenkov's assistant, in the spring

1951 received in the reception room of the Central Committee of the investigator of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the MGB lieutenant colonel Ryumin, known for his anti-Semitism. The result of this meeting was fatal for the fate of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia. At that time, Ryumin was afraid dismissal from the state security agencies due to a reprimand received for forgetting a folder with materials of the investigation in the official bus. In addition, he hid from the party and management

security personnel, that his father was a kulak, that his brother and sister were accused of theft, and father-in-law served in Kolchak's army.

We must pay tribute to Abakumov: he perfectly understood that the previously undertaken Ryumin attempts to present the arrested doctors as terrorists were just prelude to the "case of doctors". For several months in 1950, he somehow managed to keep Ryumin in line. In order to save his career and give vent to his anti-Semitic sentiments, Ryumin willingly met Sukhanov's demand to write a letter to Stalin with exposure of Abakumov. Thirty

years after the events described, my relative, who worked typist in Malenkov's secretariat (her immediate supervisor was Sukhanov), told me that Ryumin was so uneducated and illiterate that eleven times rewrote his letter with accusations against Abakumov. Sukhanov kept him in the waiting room about six o'clock, while he himself negotiated with Malenkov about the content of the letter Stalin. Only Sukhanov knows why Ryumin was chosen to accuse Abakumov of conspiracy. However, he did not say anything about this side of the matter when he spoke on Russian television. In July 1992 in a program about the history of the "conspiracy of

doctors". In his letter accusing Abakumov (at the suggestion of Malenkov), Ryumin stated that he ordered the Investigative Unit not to release materials on the Zionist conspiracy against the leaders of the Soviet state.

By this time, a number of people had already been arrested for anti-Soviet Zionist propaganda. well-known Jewish doctors. Perhaps the most famous of them, a specialist with world named Etinger tragically died in prison during interrogation. This happened before the arrest Abakumov. Ryumin accused Abakumov of being responsible for the death Etinger, as he was specially placed in a cold cell in Lefortovo prison in order to remove one of the participants in the "conspiracy of doctors" and thereby prevent him from betraying others Zionist conspirators. To make these allegations more credible, Timashuk's letter was extracted from the archive.

Abakumov, more experienced in such intrigues than Ryumin, was overly afraid inflate the "Zionist conspiracy" by resorting to too obvious falsifications. He foresaw that Stalin might demand real evidence in this highly risky provocative game. In addition, Abakumov knew perfectly well that in cases where the initiative belonged to the highest leadership was not supposed to show its own. Some of the arrested doctors were the attending physicians of Stalin. Many of them were sometimes associated with members of the Politburo not only professional, but also trusting relationships. Considering

all the circumstances, Abakumov was not eager to expand the scope of the case Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to the level of a world conspiracy. He knew that such the accusations will certainly cause tension at the top, especially the discontent of Voroshilov and Molotov, married to Jewish women, and Kaganovich, who himself was a Jew. The caution shown by Abakumov played a fatal role in his fate.

The energetic Ryumin, meanwhile, was appointed head of the Investigative Unit for special important cases, and then Deputy Minister of State Security for Investigative Work. This untied his hands to manipulate materials against Abakumov so that, after eliminating him, he could freely promote the case of the "conspiracy of doctors" and the leaders involved in it. employees of the MGB are Jews by nationality.

Ryumin investigators demanded from Abakumov to name members of his cabinet ministers, which he allegedly intended to create after the overthrow of Stalin. Its also Molotov's wife Polina Zhemchuzhina was accused of concealing the treacherous plans, particular of her contacts with the Israeli politician Golda Meyer.

Abakumov vehemently denied his guilt, arguing that he did not hide any materials about "conspiracy of doctors" and, moreover, was not its leader or inspirer and did not attract to the "conspiracy" of subordinate Jewish employees from the Ministry of State Security. He continued to completely deny the charges against him, even under torture, they did not get a "confession" from him. Thus, the case of a "conspiracy" in the Ministry state security depended on the recognition of Colonel Shvartsman, a journalist by profession.

While working in the Investigation Department, he, as a rule, did not interrogate himself, but mostly edited falsified testimonies torn from prisoners. When Stalin ordered the arrest of the head of the Investigation Department, Leonov, and his deputies, one of Shvartsman, a Jew by nationality, also turned out to be arrested. He showed that he is assistant to Abakumov in the Zionist terrorist organization, which included all senior officers of the MGB. During interrogation, he "confessed" that he allegedly received a task from Abakumov create a group of Jewish conspirators in the Ministry of State Security to develop terrorist acts against members of the government.

Schwartzman also "confessed" that, being a homosexual, he was in intimate relations with Abakumov, his son and the British Ambassador to Moscow. Their homosexual contacts with American double agents Gavrillov and Lavrentiev, he, according to him, used in order to through these embedded in US embassy people receive instructions and orders for Jewish conspirators.

Shvartsman knew well how the investigation machine worked, and in order to prove his cooperation, brought one charge against officials of Jewish nationality after another. At the same time, he invented the most incredible stories like this: to terrorist activities he was helped by "relatives", "Zionists". He also told investigators that he slept with his stepdaughter and at the same time had homosexual relationship with his son. He sought to be sent for a psychiatric examination - and such a proposal was made by the Deputy Military Prosecutor, Colonel Uspensky. When about charges brought by Shvartsman against thirty employees of the Ministry security officers of Jewish nationality who were involved in terrorism reported to Stalin, he told Ignatiev and Ryumin: "You are both fools. This bastard is just wasting time. No expertise. Arrest the entire group immediately." (Ludwigov told me about this when we were both in jail.)

By order of Stalin, all Jews were arrested - responsible employees the central office of the Ministry of State Security, as well as "a number of senior officials non-Jewish origin. So Eitingon, Reichman, deputies ended up behind bars Minister of State Security Lieutenant General Pitovranov and Selivanovsky. Arrested and retired colonel Maklyarsky, who by that time had become very famous a screenwriter who specialized in scenarios from the life of scouts: Shvartsman in mentioned him in his testimony. Was thrown into prison and the son of the first head of the Soviet Sverdlov State Colonel Andrey Sverdlov.

Together with these people, their direct subordinates were also arrested, according to Russian nationalities. The MGB and the Investigative Department have new faces from the party organs. They, as a rule, were distinguished by complete incompetence. On a wave of strength anti-Semitic campaign and hysteria leadership of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases The MGB was strengthened in 1951-1953 by special decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU Konyakhin and Monthly. The latter had extensive experience during the war years as a chief investigative department in the front-line bodies of military counterintelligence (SMERSH). In the 60s and 70s years he became chairman of the USSR State Radio and Television, then ambassador to Australia.

People from the Central Committee led the Investigation Department, sometimes participating in interrogations, recalled former head of the accounting and registration group of the Investigative Unit, colonel, later famous writer Ananin.

Those under investigation were brutally beaten, placed in punishment cells with special refrigeration, almost constantly kept in handcuffs and shackles, and unwanted protocols interrogations and decisions were destroyed.

Of all the arrested "conspirators in the MGB" only Abakumov, Eitingon, Pitovranov and Matusov pleaded not guilty to anything.

The Jewish doctors arrested by Ryumin, who were under investigation, were accused of carrying out the tasks of Abakumov. The crimes attributed to the members of the Doctors' Plot seemed unbelievable to me. One of these "terrorists", Professor Alexander Feldman, treated our entire family, enjoyed our full confidence, and I always congratulated happy holidays and sent him flowers.

According to Ryumin's scenario, in the role of a liaison between doctors and "conspirators in the MGB" should Eitingon's sister Sonya was speaking, who allegedly kept in touch between medical scientists and a brother who planned the assassination of the leaders of the country.

The arrests were not publicly reported, and I did not immediately realize the extent of this purge in the MGB. I sensed the seriousness of the threat when I attempted to contact Colonel Shubnyakov, General Utekhin, Deputy Heads of the Chief counterintelligence department. The attempt was unsuccessful, although at that moment I urgently needed a certificate-check for one important agent. information that was to me needed, only they could give, and Shubnyakov and Utekhin disappeared into the water. Meanwhile, no one wanted to clearly explain where they had gone, although due to their official position (head of the Special Bureau for Intelligence and Diversions) and the rank (lieutenant general) I had to this right. Outraged, I called Pitovranov, Deputy Minister, immediate supervisor, but it turned out that he could not be contacted either: he mysteriously disappeared. Then it dawned on me that the same thing was being repeated that happened during the period of mass arrests in post-war years. And Shubnyakov, and Pitovranov, and Utekhin by that time were already in Lefortovo prison.

In 1951, when Abakumov was arrested, I got a call from Ryumin, who had just was appointed head of the Investigative Department of the MGB. He stated that he had serious compromising material on Eitingon and his sister. Eitingon at that moment was on a three-month business trip in Lithuania. I asked for these to be brought to me. materials: I wanted to see them personally. An hour later, Ryumin appeared with a skinny dossier. There was no data against Eitingon, but against Sonya there were excerpts from undercover reports that she denied medical assistance to Russians, and treated and advised only Jews. I told Ryumin that this did not convince me at all and Eitingon in my eyes still remains reliable and trustworthy responsible security officer. Ryumin objected: "But the Central

Committee found these data quite convincing." - And then, snatching the folder from my hands, he left with an angry look. The situation in the Ministry of State

Security was confusing and extremely uncertain. Minister Abakumov was under arrest in Matrosskaya Tishina. However his place remained vacant - no successor was appointed. When I called the deputy Minister Ogoltsov in order to discuss with him the situation with Eitingon's sister, he replied: - This is a political matter, and it can be considered only in the Central Committee.

According to him, until a new minister is appointed, he will not sign any papers or give any orders. After the

conversation with Ogoltsov, there was only one thing left for me: to call Ignatiev, the then secretary of the Central Committee of the party, who oversaw the work of the MGB-MVD. He was a member commission of the Central Committee created by Stalin for the reorganization of the ministry after the arrest of Abakumov. I have already been summoned to one meeting, and, I confess, I criticized the leadership of the ministry for mistakes in conducting intelligence and counterintelligence operations abroad, and also in Western Ukraine and Central Asia. Ignatiev then said that he was ready, if necessary, to discuss this or that urgent issue with me. When I called him, he seemed to gladly agreed to receive me at the Central Committee on Staraya Square.

When I met him, I said that I was concerned about attempts to slander Eitingon and his sister, attributing to them nationalist views. Ignatiev summoned Ryumin to his office with materials on Eitingon and his sister. In my presence, Ryumin opened the folder and began to read out extremely obscure testimony against Eitingon and his sister, in which both of them were said to display hostility towards the Soviet state. This time, intelligence reports that Sonya refused to treat the Russians were not even mentioned.

"As members of the Party, we are obliged," I said, "to evaluate people not by rumors, but by their affairs. Here is the work of Eitingon: the organizer of the action to eliminate Trotsky in Mexico, the creator of a successfully operating intelligence network abroad, and finally, he is one of

key figures in providing our country with classified information about atomic weapons. Rumin was silent. Ignatiev interrupted me: "Let's leave

Eitingon and his family alone. After meeting with Ignatiev, I have my heart was relieved: I thought that nothing bad would happen to Eitingon and his sister.

About a month later, Ignatiev was appointed Minister of State Security. And in October 1951, it was on his direct instructions that Eitingon was arrested when he returned to Moscow from Lithuania, where he managed to neutralize the leadership of the anti-Soviet underground organizations. His stepdaughter Zoya Zarubina told me that Eitingon was arrested on her eyes at Vnukovo airport.

Eitingon's arrest put an end to Zoya Zarubina's service in our intelligence agencies. She successfully worked with materials on atomic weapons, at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, but was forced to leave the bodies after his arrest. Fine knowledge English helped her to become one of the leading teachers of the Institute of Foreign languages, and later supervised the training of translators for the United Nations. 3. Zarubina is still an excellent lecturer, public figure, participant in many international conferences.

A few days after Eitingon's arrest, I had the opportunity meet with Ignatiev at a meeting of the leadership of the ministry. Taking me to aside, he reproachfully said:

"You were wrong about Eitingon. What do you think of him now? I still remember my answer: "My assessment is based on the concrete results of people's work and on the party line.

Here I must dwell a little on my illusions. I've always considered the case doctors" and the "Zionist conspiracy" as pure fiction, spread by such criminals like Ryumin, who then reported on the "results" of the investigation incompetent people like Ignatiev. Every time I met Ignatiev, I was amazed at how incompetent this person was. Each agent's message was perceived by him as discovery of America. He could be convinced of anything: he had only to read any document, as he immediately fell under the influence of what he read, without trying to double-check the

facts. Ignatiev was completely unsuited for the work entrusted to him. Once upon a time in the morning meeting on operational matters in his office, which was attended by more than ten people, he suddenly fell into a real hysteria because of the phone call of the general Blokhin, head of the commandant's office of the MGB. I remember how he literally shouted into the phone:

You are required to act according to the law. No one gave you the right to drag me into your affairs! Hanging up, he

explained: "I can't stand these calls from Blokhin. Always asking me to sign orders for execution of death sentences. Says he exists on that score instruction. Why should I have something to do with all this and sign these paper?! There is the Supreme Court, let Blokhin act according to the law. No one answered. There was an awkward silence in the

office. Ignatiev easily started criminal cases against innocent people. Later I realized that he did not act on his own initiative, but carried out orders received from above from Stalin, Malenkov and others.

When TASS announced that doctors and medical scientists widely known in the country accused of organizing a Zionist conspiracy to assassinate Stalin and everything Politburo through improper treatment, I considered it a provocation, a continuation of the earlier launched anti-Semitic campaign. When I received materials with accusations against Eitingon, I learned that he allegedly trained doctors-conspirators in the conduct of terrorist actions against Stalin and members of the Soviet government. In this regard, it was said in indictment, Eitingon kept mines in his office, explosive devices disguised as ordinary electrical appliances. Meanwhile, everyone knew perfectly well that this there were samples of operational equipment that was constantly at our disposal.

In those days, Moscow was literally flooded with rumors, one more terrible than the other: Jewish

doctors and pharmacists are trying to poison ordinary Soviet people. There was also talk of possible pogroms. I was overcome with anxiety when the children—they were ten and twelve years old then—returned from school and told us about these rumors. My wife and I found ourselves in a very difficult position: it was extremely risky for the children of high-ranking state security officials to speak out against brazen anti-Semitic statements, since any dispute would simply draw attention to them and their parents. This would certainly have become known "at the top" - the party bodies that controlled all spheres of public life. Our children went to school together with the children of Malenkov and Kaganovich, which meant that the school was under constant surveillance. Our children could not even afford to say that Lenin and Stalin were always against manifestations of anti-Semitism, since such a statement would immediately be interpreted in a completely different spirit and beyond recognition.

distorted.

My wife and I advised our sons to say that they need to be especially vigilant, that rumors that are a provocation should not be spread. We all then had to adhere to the official version of events given by the Pravda newspaper, and there was not even a hint of pogroms in it. And spreading rumors is playing with fire, especially dangerous because it plays into the hands of the enemies of the people. Another thing is the feeling of indignation towards traitors and specific terrorists, we taught our children. I wonder, I thought, how will they say this at the pioneer gathering? Shortly after this conversation, the director of the school called and thanked for the excellent upbringing of children. According to him, he was in a rather difficult situation: after all, many Jewish children studied at the school. The director told his wife: Your children's speech at the Pioneer gathering that spreading rumors is a provocation caused a roar of approval and deflated the tense situation.

Gradually, the campaign that was inflated around the "Zionist conspiracy" began to clearly get out of the control of its organizers. Ryumin and Ignatiev supported the accusations of the Minister of State Security of Georgia Rukhadze against Beria that he concealed his Jewish origin and secretly plotted against Stalin in Georgia. It was clear that Beria was the first on Stalin's list for destruction. By August 1952, the so-called "Crimean case", which had been dragging on since 1948, ended - all the arrested members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, except for Lina Stern, and the former Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky were shot. In my opinion, Kheyfets was kept alive only so that he could testify against Beria and Molotov when the time came to charge them with establishing links with the circles of international Zionism, under whose dictation the proposal to create a Jewish republic in the Crimea was initiated. My opinion is based on reading the materials of the Abakumov case, which I met in the military prosecutor's office forty years after the events described, and Kirill Stolyarov's book "Golgotha",

dedicated to the circumstances of Abakumov's death. I always believed that Ryumin was investigating the "doctors' case" until Stalin's death. But Stalin turned out to be far-sighted enough to understand: the conspiracy, as Ryumin painted it, was too primitive and one could hardly believe in it. Ryumin gave only a bare outline of the "conspiracy" but could not fill it with convincing details that would make this fiction look plausible. On November 12, 1952, Stalin ordered Ryumin to be dismissed from the MGB as having failed in his duties and seconded to the reserve of the Party Central Committee. Ryumin was appointed to the modest position of an accountant, which he held before starting work in the authorities. And before that, Ryumin worked as an accountant in the Arkhangelsk consumer cooperation.

Thus, since January 1953, when the TASS report about the "conspiracy of doctors" was published, the Minister of State Security Ignatiev, his first deputy Goglidze, Deputy Personnel Officer Epishev, and the heads of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases bear responsibility for the lawlessness and crimes that took place in the MGB investigative apparatus. . Those who came to leading work in the state security organs during this especially terrible period by decision of the Central Committee - Ignatiev, Epishev - not only were not held accountable, but, on the contrary, received high-ranking appointments in the 50-70s to a responsible party and

Soviet work. Goglidze was made the scapegoat as an accomplice of Beria and illiterate pathological anti-Semite Ryumin. At the end of

February 1953, a few days before Stalin's death, I noticed in the behavior Ignatiev growing uncertainty. My intuition told me that all anti-Semitic the campaign is about to bog down and its organizers will become unwanted witnesses and will subjected to arrest. Indeed, after the death of Stalin, Beria accused Ignatiev of deception of the party and sought to bring him to criminal responsibility, but support in The Presidium of the Central

Committee did not receive. Another important detail of this case: among those who were interrogated by MGB investigators for case of the so-called "Zionist conspiracy", was Mairanovsky, head state security toxicological laboratory Ministries ("Laboratory-X"). In 1951 he was arrested - he was immediately made a key figure "Zionist conspiracy" in the MGB, since he knew all the accused academic doctors and worked closely with them. Later, they wanted to make him a member of the "conspiracy of doctors".

According to Ryumin, Mairanovsky acted in accordance with the instructions of Eitingon - in order to eliminate the entire top leadership of the country. Ryumin did not realize what shaky ground he is treading: after all, in his top-secret work, Mairanovsky carried out orders from Stalin himself. During interrogations, the head of "Laboratory-X" confessed to everything from he was pursued. True, Ignatiev soon felt that Ryumin had gone too far, and decided to separate Mairanovsky from the case of the "conspiracy of doctors".

Stalin's death put an end to the "doctors' cause", but anti-Semitism continued to exist very formidable force.

## Persistence of repressive politics in the national question

The "doctors' case" seriously undermined the prestige of doctors in society and caused a wave of distrust of people in this profession. After the fake conspiracy was exposed, the rivals among themselves, groups in scientific medical circles were in a difficult position. My friend, professor Muzychenko, rector of the Moscow Regional Scientific Institute of Clinical research (MONIKI), told me that in the dispute of physicians are always involved in one way or another influential people in the government, since it is on them that the allocations for scientific research. The "doctors' cause" taught officials to avoid any professional disputes, since it is never possible to predict which of the conflicting parties will receive support in at the top, and which one will be a political loser and even intervention will be required security agencies. This created an unfavorable atmosphere for scientific disputes and delayed the adoption of government decisions on appropriations for health care. There are still concerns that conflicts over medical and other professional problems may end up with an investigation at the Lubyanka.

Now they say that on the eve of Stalin's death there was a deportation plan Jews from Moscow. I myself have never heard of him, but if such a plan really existed, references to it could easily be found in the archives of the state security agencies and the Moscow Committee of the Party, because in terms of its scale it certainly required great preliminary preparation. An expulsion operation is a rather difficult matter, especially if it is prepared secretly. In this case, there must have been some directive approved by the government at least one month before the start of such stock. Therefore, I believe that this is only a rumor, possibly based on Stalin's or Malenkov's statements, clarifying the attitude of society towards Jews in connection with "doctors'

business". Despite the atmosphere of anti-Semitism that arose under Stalin and continued under Khrushchev, the so-called selective approach to the Jewish intelligentsia was observed, in according to which individual small groups of creative intelligentsia and highly qualified specialist professionals were allowed to occupy a prominent position position in society. The "Zionist conspiracy" and the elimination of Beria put an end to the reception Jews to responsible positions in the intelligence service and the Central Committee of the party. As far as I know, the Committee



State Security in 1960-1970, there were two ordinary Jewish operatives who were used against Zionist organizations. From the point of view of Soviet thinking, the intention to create a Jewish republic under support from abroad was seen as gross interference in our internal affairs. Foreign participation is unheard of in our closed society. When at one time I probed Harriman's attitude towards the creation of a Jewish republic, I followed the instructions received from Beria. I knew that such probing is often not leads to no results is just a common practice of collecting intelligence information. At that time, I could not even imagine that the mere fact of participating in such a discussion can threaten me with a death sentence.

The tragedy was that in a closed society like the Soviet Union, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 was perceived as an undesirable existence for Jews like a second homeland. This was especially evident after Israel inflicted defeat to the Arabs during the War of Independence in 1948. The pride of the Israelis for the victory in this war led to a revival within our country of a craving for a national Jewish culture, which was actually destroyed in the 20-30s. Jews and Germans who had a historical homeland abroad and, therefore, potential support, not received permission to create their own republics within the Union. Discrimination such ethnic groups was especially brutal. This is also seen in the example of fate Meskhetian Turks who were deported from the Caucasus to Uzbekistan.

Stalin's use of anti-Semitism and cosmopolitanism in his political machinations, always characteristic of him, turned into a free hand for those leaders who harbored hatred for the Jewish population in their souls. For Stalin, anti-Semitism was instrument to achieve the goal, but in the hands of his subordinates, he became the principle state personnel policy. Support by the country's top leadership for anti-Semitism ultimately deprived the state of capable people who accepted the revolution and who worked for the creation of the Soviet state. When hard times come and The USSR collapsed, a significant part of the creative and scientific intelligentsia, enterprising people found themselves outside of Russia, emigrating to Israel and the West.

## CHAPTER 11. THE LAST PERIOD OF STALIN'S RULE

### Changes in the political leadership of the country after the war

In 1946, Stalin appointed Abakumov Minister of State Security, and this changed the balance of power in his environment. At that time, he carefully concealed his true goals, and we thought that the new appointments in the Kremlin leadership (Zhdanov was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow, Kuznetsov was introduced to the secretariat of the Central Committee, Rodionov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers Russian Federation) are just ordinary insignificant permutations. But it wasn't So. Stalin once again introduced new people to the leadership in order to emphasize his superiority over rival factions in the Kremlin. In 1946-1948 the second after Stalin, Zhdanov had a voice in making party and government decisions.

Two episodes shed new light on the struggle for power. The first is a cover-up case. facts of the release of low-quality products in the aviation industry; the second is related to the first was the resignation of Marshal Zhukov and other heroes of the war. It all started with an accusation Air Chief Marshal Novikov and People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin in hiding defects on aircraft, which caused air crashes.

Abakumov, as head of military counterintelligence in 1945, reported letters pilots who complained about the poor quality of the aircraft. When he was appointed minister state security, he, at the direction of Stalin, opened a criminal case against the leaders aviation industry and Novikov, commander-in-chief of the Air Force, who allegedly concealed these problems. The question was very sensitive. Stalin was furious when his son Vasily, a general

Air Force, and Abakumov reported that the highest ranks of the aviation industry deliberately hid equipment defects in order to receive bonuses and awards. Malenkov in his own way position in the Politburo was responsible for industry and received a gold medal and the title Hero of Socialist Labor for outstanding work in the organization of military production products.

The investigation showed that the number of air crashes with tragic consequences was distorted. Basically, all these cases were attributed to the mistakes of the pilots, and not to the shortcomings of the equipment. Before the war, failures were severely punished. When Valery Chkalov, a pilot who made a non-stop flight over the North Pole to America, died in plane crash in 1938, the officer in charge of Chkalov's security was arrested, and he was shot for negligence, which led to the death of a national hero. When

Stalin, at a meeting of the highest officials of the MGB in July 1946, asked Abakumov: "The guilt of Novikov and Shakhurin has been proven. What kind of punishment do you propose? - the one without hesitantly replied: "Shooting."

- It's easy to shoot: it's harder to make it work. We must make them work," Stalin said unexpectedly. Novikov and

Shakhurin were arrested, and Stalin demanded that confessions be obtained from them in order to revelations of the military leadership. Their confessions were filed in the files of Marshal Zhukov and other generals and posed a serious threat to Malenkov. These confessions Stalin used to remove Marshal Zhukov from the position of his deputy and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in 1946. In an order dated June 9, 1946, signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Zhukov was accused of "lack of modesty", "excessive personal ambitions" and "attributing to himself a decisive role in the fulfillment of all major combat operations during the war, including those in which he played no role at all roles." Zhukov was demoted and appointed commander of the Odessa military district. The order also stated that "Marshal Zhukov, feeling embittered, decided to gather around themselves as losers, commanders, relieved of their posts, thus becoming in opposition to the government and the High Command. These

accusations were based on the confessions of Marshal Novikov, who, under pressure was forced to testify against Zhukov. In a letter to Stalin, he spoke about ambitions Zhukov and said that he had "anti-Stalinist conversations" with him, and also testified that he helped him to hide that he is from the family of the royal policeman.

The removal of Zhukov had far-reaching consequences. This was the start of a campaign to debunking a number of military leaders - heroes of the Great Patriotic War. So Stalin wanted get rid of potential enemies. Soon Admiral Kuznetsov, commander Navy, was removed, and as a result of the reshuffle by the Minister of Armed Forces Bulganin became the force. He was unable to cope with the serious problems of mobilization and changes in the structure of the armed forces. I ran into him several times in the Kremlin during meetings of the heads of intelligence services. His incompetence was simply amazing. Bulganin did not understand in such matters as the rapid deployment of forces and means, the state of combat readiness, strategic planning. He did not understand that sabotage in the rear warehouse structures are much more important than a direct attack on airfields. Discussing these plans, Bulganin argued with me and with General Zakharov, head of the intelligence department of the General Staff, arguing that instead of explosions in Innsbruck, in Austria - in areas where there are American fuel depots - it would be much more effective to blow up American planes right on the airfields in Germany and France. He said that this will undermine American morale and the Americans will not be able to use their bases in Europe.

Bulganin by all means tried to avoid responsibility for decision-making. Letters demanding an immediate response went unsigned for months. Whole secretariat The Council of Ministers was horrified by this style of work, especially when Stalin, having left for the Caucasus on vacation, entrusted the performance of the duties of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to Bulganin. Beria personally turned to Stalin with a request to expedite the passage through Bulganin documents on the atomic bomb, which were in the secretariat of Bulganin. Stalin allowed

his deputies to sign the most important decrees, bypassing Bulganin. So in Council of Ministers set a precedent for the creation of bureaus in various areas of work government.

Bulganin's appearance was deceiving. Unlike Khrushchev or Beria, Bulganin, always beautifully dressed, had a noble appearance. I later learned that he was an alcoholic and greatly appreciated ballerinas and singers from the Bolshoi Theatre. This man had not the slightest political principles - an obedient slave of any leader. Stalin appointed for loyalty his first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev made him Chairman of the Council of Ministers to replace Malenkov. Later, in 1957, when Bulganin together with Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov tried to remove Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, at a meeting of the party activists, put forward an original accusation. "He was a Stalinist snitch. For this, Stalin made him Marshal of the Soviet Union. Union," Khrushchev said. - Of course, after we revealed his anti-Party treacherous behavior, we will strip him of his rank and demote him." (This was telling me my former deputy, Colonel Studnikov, who was present at that meeting.)

In March 1958, Bulganin was appointed chairman of the board of the State Bank, then, three months later, he was sent to work in the Stavropol Economic Council, in an area where no one then famous Mikhail Gorbachev began his career. Bulganin eventually went to retirement, and I met him in the center of Moscow in the early 70s in line for watermelons.

Having appointed Bulganin, whom the military did not respect, as Minister of the Armed Forces, Stalin achieved the goal and became the arbiter of the destinies of both real commanders - such as Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, Konev, Rokossovsky and Bagramyan - and Bulganin himself. Bulganin would never take responsibility for any major decision, even competence, although no one could do anything without his resolution. Thus, none of sides - neither the true leaders nor the puffed up figure - could act independently of each other. friend. This encouraged hostility and rivalry between the military.

Abakumov arrested generals close to Zhukov in Germany on charges that at first seemed non-political: embezzlement of funds and removal (for themselves) of valuables, furniture, paintings and jewelry from Germany and Austria. From recently published archival materials show that testimonies about anti-Stalinist statements were knocked out of these people Zhukov. In 1944, during the war, Stalin ordered Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy, to install listening devices in Zhukov's Moscow apartment. Listening apartments of Zhukov and Admiral Kuznetsov did not give the results that were so hoped for. However some famous marshals and generals were imprisoned, and some of them shot for anti-Stalinist statements recorded by eavesdropping devices, or in connection with the testimony that was knocked out of them by Abakumov's people.

Zhukov and Kuznetsov, retaining their dignity, openly admitted their mistakes; Zhukov "repented" that he awarded the famous singer Ruslanova with the Order of the Red Star. Although during the war he had such a right, in peacetime only the Supreme Advice.

Marshal Kulik and General Rybalchenko were shot in 1959. The rest sat in prison; they were released after Stalin's death. Novikov and Admiral Kuznetsov were reinstated in positions in 1951-1953, and after the death of Stalin, all charges were dropped from them. Zhukov remained in the post of commander of the military district, in 1952 Stalin introduced him to composition of the Central Committee. Only after March 1953, he was recalled back to Moscow and appointed first Deputy Minister of Defense.

Zhukov, of course, was hostile to the entire apparatus of the Ministry state security. He didn't care who gave orders to follow him - Beria, Abakumov or Bogdan Kobulov; they all climbed into his personal life. Listening Zhukov's apartment was discontinued in 1953, after Stalin's death, but resumed Khrushchev in 1957, and Brezhnev continued to audition until Zhukov's death in 1974. Even in retirement, Zhukov remained a potential threat to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the military a hero who could lead the military opposition if he were nominated by the military.

Viktor Abakumov was born in 1908. He served as Minister of State Security from 1946

to 1951. He was a tall man with a mop of dark hair and a strong, strong-willed face. Despite the fact that he had no education, thanks to his innate intelligence and firmness of character, he climbed to the very top. His work in the Cheka began with the technical support of operations, he did not deal with agents and was engaged in safe houses, cars. Later, during the purge of the 1930s, he made a name for himself under Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy. Shortly before the war, Abakumov was promoted: he became deputy people's commissar of internal affairs. When Mikheev, head of military counterintelligence, shot himself while surrounded by Kiev, Stalin replaced him with Abakumov, then only thirty-four years old. In his new position, Abakumov was responsible for the political reliability of the troops and the fight against German espionage in the armed forces; at the same time, he gained experience in intelligence and counterintelligence matters. He could not be compared with Beria in terms of professional abilities, but his business acumen greatly distinguished him from the rest of the apparatchiks.

## Rivalry of Malenkov-Beria and Zhdanov-Kuznetsov groups

In December 1945, Beria was relieved of the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, which he had held since 1938. He no longer supervised the security agencies, if this did not directly concern his main work: he led the Special Committee on Problem No. 1 - the atomic bomb and the fuel and energy complex. When Abakumov was appointed Minister

of State Security instead of Merkulov in 1946, he was not close to Beria. On the contrary, Stalin instructed Abakumov to collect dirt on everyone in whose hands was power, including Beria. Abakumov was able to prove that Malenkov was well aware of the concealment of problems in the aircraft industry, and in 1947 Malenkov was reprimanded, removed from his post and temporarily exiled to Kazakhstan. He was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and his duties passed to Kuznetsov, Zhdanov's protégé. Abakumov and Kuznetsov established the closest friendly relations.

However, two months later, Stalin appointed Malenkov Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria at that time supported Malenkov and did not hide the fact that they often met. Abakumov, for his part, informed Stalin that Malenkov and Beria sympathized with the repressed leaders of the aviation industry and the military. Abakumov got acquainted with police documents about Beria's guards, who grabbed women on the street and brought them to Beria, which caused complaints from husbands and parents. The alignment of forces in

Stalin's entourage was as follows: both Beria and Malenkov maintained close working relations with Pervukhin and Saburov, who dealt with economic issues. They were all part of the same group. They promoted their people to positions of power in government. The second group, later called "Leningrad", included: Voznesensky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and head of the State Planning Commission; Zhdanov, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; Kuznetsov, secretary of the Central Committee, who was in charge of personnel, including those of the state security agencies; Rodionov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation; Kosygin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Light Industry and Finance, nominated during the preparation and implementation of the monetary reform (in 1948 he was Minister of Finance), and after the "Leningrad affair" he was transferred to a low-prestigious job in the Ministry of Light Industry. The second group appointed its people to the posts of secretaries of district party organizations. Kuznetsov in 1945 nominated Popov, the former director of the aircraft factory, as secretary of the Moscow Party Organization, and Popov became a member of the Orgburo of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the same time. Zhdanov encouraged his attempts to control the ministers through elections to the Moscow Party Committee. Zhdanov and Kuznetsov exercised double control over members of the government: through Popov and through the Central Committee (Yeltsin tried to do something similar when he became secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. This is one of the

reasons for his conflict with the Central Committee apparatus). Thus, members of the government could be manipulated without the intervention of Beria, Malenkov and Pervukhin. When Zhdanov

the ministers, as members of the party, were subordinate to him, the head of the Moscow Party Committee. Malenkov, seeking to remove Popov, interpreted his demand as evidence of a "conspiracy" and the emergence of an "independent" center of power in the Moscow Party organization. Malenkov's opinion was supported by the ministers, who complained to Stalin that Popov constantly interfered into their work. Khrushchev attended weekly meetings of the Politburo in Moscow and years was close to the group of Beria and Malenkov.

Stalin encouraged this rivalry; he knew that his power would not suffer. In addition, Stalin was aware that the struggle for power within his old guard gave him the ability to get rid of them all at the first opportunity. He could always replace them young party workers from the field who had no experience of intrigue at the top.

During this struggle for power, Stalin and Zhdanov launched a campaign "to fight cosmopolitans" in order to strengthen the isolation of the country and knock out of the intelligentsia any outside ideological influences. Another goal of Stalin was to strengthen the position USSR in Eastern Europe and establish there, basically, the same regime that existed in Soviet Union.

At the same time, Israel's victory in the War of Independence strengthened the Soviet Jews consciousness of their own cultural community. It

was this campaign that allowed Stalin to get rid of the leaders who had long annoyed him. Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. They insisted on fulfilling the data in time wars of promises, which were known abroad. Their much-needed connections during the war with influential people in the West became a sufficient pretext for Stalin to decide destroy them. An important role was played by the anti-Semitic views of the party leader.

A year after Churchill in Fulton, in 1946, uttered his famous speech and the "cold war" began, a cold snap immediately followed in all aspects Soviet intellectual life, so-called scientific discussions arose in biology, literary criticism and linguistics, philosophy, and political economy. Both Kremlin factions used this campaign, each in their own interests, trying to find ideological sins of their opponents. It was not just a confrontation between the Jews (cosmopolitans) and orthodox communists; the essence of the campaign, rather, was in the cardinal shuffling personnel in scientific and creative circles in the interests of the ruling elite.

Everyone knows the "case of biologists": the disputes on genetics that arose in the 30s quickly moved from the realm of science to the realm of politics. On one side were the world well-known biologists who justified the need to fund further research by genetics. They were opposed by a group of careerists from science, headed by Trofim Lysenko, who speculated on Marxist ideology. He presented to the government picture of an uninterrupted food supply based on the achievements of the Marxist biology, promised in ten years the beginning of a new era of abundance, openly fought against geneticists, claiming that they put spokes in the wheels of progress.

His promises turned out to be a bluff. New debates started, articles in scientific journals criticized Lysenko and his followers. Eminent scientists wrote to the Central Committee, opening serious mistakes of the Kremlin biologist.

Zhdanov nominated his son for the post of head of the Department of Science of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yuri, who at one time was married to Stalin's daughter Svetlana. Yuri Zhdanov supported Lysenko's critics. At the same time, Abakumov's information from scientific biological circles, received from trustworthy sources: Academician Lysenko tries to deceive the government by unsubstantiated reports of its achievements in agrobiolgy, which are in fact absent. In their letters, scientists said that the reign of Lysenko in agrobiolgy since the 30s and his rejection of any research on genetics were detrimental to scientific progress. Ludvigov,

head of Beria's secretariat in the Council of Ministers, told me how Zhdanov used this situation to increase his influence in scientific circles. He was not a supporter of the freedom of scientific activity, he was not interested in proper scientific questions

He was more concerned with expanding his influence. Speeches of scientists against Lysenko helped him appoint his people to posts controlling science and industry.

The official line in science after the death of Zhdanov again began to lean towards support Lysenko and rejection of genetics. Unfortunately, published works on the fate of genetics in 40s almost never mention that the sudden changes in the official attitude towards scientists-genetics coincided with cardinal changes in the party leadership responsible for science, and were largely caused by them.

## **Selective repressions against military leaders in the late 40s**

In the late 40s, I became friends with Anna Tsukanova, deputy head Department of leading party bodies, that is, in essence, Deputy Malenkov.

I knew that my wife had a friend Anna, but I didn't meet her until one day they invited me to dinner at the Ararat restaurant in the center of Moscow. When I arrived for dinner, met Anna and learned her full name, I realized that this was Malenkov's deputy. To me I immediately liked her pleasant appearance and the long dark braid laid at the back of her head - a real Russian beauty. This was the beginning of our long friendship. Anna and I they spoke like colleagues who knew each other's responsibilities; we both had access to classified materials, so that we could freely discuss our work. And now, more than forty years, we remain friends.

Anna often said that the line of Comrade Stalin and his colleague Malenkov lies in the constant movement of high-ranking party leaders and state security officials, not allowing them to stay in the same place for more than three years in a row, so as not to get used to power.

I was deeply impressed by Anna's words that the Central Committee does not always accept measures on the facts of bribery, "decomposition", etc. according to the reports of the Commission of the party control and security agencies. Stalin and Malenkov preferred not to punish the devotees high-ranking officials. If they were ranked as rivals, then this compromising evidence immediately used for their dismissal or repression. Anna

revealed to me that management was aware of the costs of almost every major ideological campaign, but the goal, as Malenkov said, justified these costs. Now it is obvious that the terrible price that the people paid for ideological campaigns and purges was a criminal mistake of the then rulers and undermined the entire system.

Anna did not suspect that she had opened my eyes to the real state of affairs at the top by saying that the Central Committee knew that the campaign against the cosmopolitans was overblown and exaggerated. True, she was I am sure that over time these errors will be corrected. It was

from her that I learned that Stalin himself had decided to purge the Georgian party organizations. She said that everyone in the Central Committee was afraid to propose any changes in personnel composition of the leadership of the Georgian Communist Party, since the issue affected personal ties Stalin and it could hurt him. Anna and I thought that Stalin reacted to bribery in Georgia. We now know from archival documents that the so-called The "Mingrelian affair", one of the last purges, was organized by Stalin himself.

In the last years of Stalin's rule, a small circle of leaders included Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Beria, and Stalin in every possible way contributed to inciting among them rivalry. In 1951, Beria fell out of favor. Stalin ordered to put listening devices in Beria's mother's apartment, deciding that neither Beria nor his wife allow no anti-Stalinist statements, but his mother, Marta, lived in Georgia and quite could express sympathy for the persecuted Megrelian nationalists. Beria was a Mingrelian, and Mingrelians did not get along with the Gurians, whom Stalin trusted most of all. The case of the Mingrelians, in essence, was based on trumped-up charges and a conspiracy to separate from Soviet Union. Stalin started this business, wanting to get rid of Beria. He demanded that Beria destroyed his most faithful comrades. Pretending that he still trusted Beria, Stalin granted him the rare honor of addressing party and state activists on celebration of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1951.

In 1948, four years before the Georgian purge, Stalin appointed Georgian State Security General Rukhadze. During the war, he headed the military counterintelligence in the Caucasus. His anti-Beria sentiments were well known. Personally order of Stalin, Rukhadze, with the help of Ryumin, who was notorious, collected compromising information on Beria and his entourage. In the beginning, there was just daily surveillance of Georgian Beria's relatives. Beria did not conceal from either Stalin or Molotov that his wife's uncle, Gegechkori, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia in Paris; Not He also hid the fact that his nephew collaborated with the Germans, being a prisoner during the war.

In the late 30s, and then after the war, Soviet intelligence was engaged in Georgian emigrants in France. The most successful in this regard was the work of an NKVD officer Vardo Maksimalishvili, Beria's former secretary. At that time,

there were rumors in government circles that Beria's son Sergey is going to marry Svetlana Alliluyeva after her divorce from Zhdanov's son. Secretary Beria, Ludwigov, who told me this story in the Vladimir prison, said that Nina, Beria's wife, and Beria himself were strongly against this marriage. Beria knew that his opponents from the Politburo use this marriage in the struggle for power, that Stalin's forces are no longer the same, and if Beria will bind himself with Stalin by family ties, then in the event of Stalin's death he will be doomed. The situation gave rise to their mutual dislike, and from this point of view it is possible to explain why in 1951 Stalin ordered General Rukhadze to continue investigating about bribery of Georgian Megrelian officials. It should be noted that in Georgia the authorities security and in leadership work, the stratum of Mingrelians was very significant.

Stalin ordered Rukhadze to find evidence and look for evidence from foreign contacts of Megrelians of Georgia, then he could sum up: "These Megrelians cannot be trusted at all. I don't want to be surrounded by people with dubious connections abroad." It was enough to make Rukhadze realize that he must fabricate a conspiracy. As told to me writer Stolyarov, working on the book "Praetorians", shortly after this meeting Rukhadze attended a dinner party where, after drinking heavily, he boasted that he was close to Stalin, and he gave him instructions on carrying out sabotage and abductions in Turkey and France. The dinner was also attended by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Bziava, a Mingrelian, who wrote a letter the next day to the newly appointed Minister security officer Ignatiev to Moscow and reported on Rukhadze's behavior at the dinner. Ignatiev reported this to Stalin. Stalin ordered to show this letter to Rukhadze and in his presence destroy the letter. Ignatiev warned Rukhadze that, although he was still using Stalin's disposition, "you must not allow yourself to be dismissed."

Rukhadze's next step was the arrest of the former Minister of State Security of Georgia Rapava, Prosecutor General Shonia and Academician Sharia, a member of the mandate commission of the Council Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who for some time worked as a deputy head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD. All of them were accused of having links with emigrants. organizations through the NKVD agent Gigelia, who returned from Paris with French wife in 1947. Gigelia and his wife, despite her French nationality, were arrested on the orders of Stalin, they were tortured to force them to act in advance thoughtful scenario.

### **"Mingrelian case" as the beginning of Stalin's intrigue to remove Beria from Kremlin leadership**

Thus began the purge of the Georgian leadership, those who were close to Beria. Campaign against bribery in Georgia escalated into accusations of conspiracy to secession of Mingrelians from the Soviet Union. Stalin went for it because of his personal dislike for Beria and in order to to deprive Beria of the foundations of his influence in Georgia.

Stalin began this campaign in 1951, shortly after a marked rise in popularity. Beria in connection with the successful work on the atomic problem and the holding of the second atomic bomb test explosion. The "boss" knew that this was a special achievement, because the nuclear device did not copy American designs of the atomic bomb, but

instead of encouraging the success of his protégé, Stalin wanted was handled by a person more dependent on him.

The Politburo invited Beria to head the party commission to investigate the case "Mingrelian deviators", sending him to Tbilisi to expose the "Mingrelian nationalism" and fired his closest colleague, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Georgia Charkviani, who, on the orders of Stalin, was replaced by an old enemy of Beria Mgeladze. Beria, in addition, had to close the Mingrelian newspapers. At the moment when

Beria addressed the participants of the solemn meeting about celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution, First Deputy Minister State Security Officer of the USSR, Ogoltsov, on the orders of Stalin, sent to Tbilisi to the arrested Megrel to a group of investigators in order to obtain confessions that would discredit Beria and his wife Nina. In addition, Ogoltsov approved a plan for the operational development of relatives and Beria's inner circle. The Mingrelians did not admit to anything. They spent a year and a half in prison, they were not allowed to sleep, they were tortured, and Beria released them only after Stalin's death. Behind eight months before his death, Stalin arrested Rukhadze, who became for him unwanted witness. Officially, he was accused of deceiving the party and the government.

Now Kirill Stolyarov clarified for me the situation in which I found myself in Georgia in 1951 (or 1952) when Ignatiev ordered me to leave for Tbilisi. I should have appreciated capabilities of the local Georgian intelligence service and help them prepare the kidnapping of the leaders Georgian Mensheviks in Paris, relatives of Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. Report I owed Ignatiev personally. I was informed that the initiative to carry out this operation came from Tbilisi, from General Rukhadze, and Stalin personally approved it. Rukhadze insisted on that Georgian agents take over this operation. With this idea, he arrived in Moscow and went to see Ignatiev. Departing back to Tbilisi, he invited me to fly together with him. I preferred to travel by train. What I

saw in Tbilisi shocked me deeply. The only capable agent with well-connected in France, Gigelia, was imprisoned on charges of espionage and Megrelian nationalism. Rukhadze's agents could not be trusted; they even refused speak to me in Russian. Deputy Rukhadze, who planned to go to Paris, never was abroad. He was sure that if he brought the Georgian emigrants a barbecue and a basket Georgian wine, arrange a feast in the most famous restaurant in Paris, then he will conquer them location. It was also proposed to send a delegation of cultural figures to Paris, but all understood that these grandiose plans masked Rukhadze's desire to send his wife. She was a modest woman and a good singer, but she could represent in the delegation only the Tbilisi Conservatory. She had no idea about her husband's plans.

A group of investigators from Moscow, dealing with the Mingrelian case, meanwhile happily told Rukhadze that they had almost established a connection between the Beria family and those arrested nationalists. Then in Rukhadze's office I noticed under the glass on the table a portrait of a young Beria - one of his sworn enemies. Rukhadze actively, trying to please Stalin, tried to to compromise first Beria's former subordinates in the intelligence service, and then himself. Rukhadze's amateur adventurism frightened me and I hurried back to Moscow to report everything to Ignatiev. He and his first deputy Ogoltsov carefully listened to me, but they noticed that it was not for us to judge this matter, but for the "instances", since Rukhadze personally corresponded with Stalin in Georgian. Stalin, however, understood that Rukhadze and Ryumin were becoming dangerous: instead of simply seeking confessions in treason, during the investigation they showed great interest in intrigues in the party and government top. Abakumov wrote from prison to Beria and Malenkov on October 11, 1952, that Ryumin was interested in internal relations in the Politburo, using information from top secret reports sent by the MGB to Stalin.

Stalin decided to sacrifice Ryumin and Rukhadze. Rukhadze was soon placed in Lefortovo; Ryumin was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of State Security and fired from authorities in November 1952. After Stalin's death, he was arrested, but even if Stalin was alive, he would have destroyed it anyway.

After Stalin's death, Beria did not release Rukhadze from prison, but Rukhadze's victims were



released. Rukhadze and Ryumin, both under arrest, showered Beria with letters asking for release, addressing him as "The Great Man". Three months later, when Khrushchev and Malenkov arrested Beria, these letters entangled them in an allegedly organized Beria conspiracy. Thus, Rukhadze was shot in Tbilisi in 1955, along with their former victims, who were again arrested for their connection with Beria.

Hidden motives and ambitions in the late 40s and early 50s played much more important role in political events than it seemed at the time and it seems now. We (those who saw all this and suffered from it as a result) later came to the conclusion that the party elite (Stalin and those who followed him) used campaigns against cosmopolitanism and consequences of the cult of personality only to get their opponents out of the way and opponents. Their goal was to achieve absolute power or introduce new figures into their environment. They expected that the Party Control Committee and the security agencies will constantly supply them with compromising materials. The general rule was collect incriminating facts against everyone, and, if necessary, use this information. I was both a tool and a victim of this system.

Abakumov reported compromising material personally to Stalin, and on the basis of this information Stalin could blackmail the entire top. After Zhdanov's death, he violated fragile balance of power. Stalin did not allow Zhdanov to finally get rid of Malenkov when he became involved in a scandalous story with the aviation industry; instead, he simply demoted him, but kept him a powerful member of the Politburo. Stalin forced Malenkov to "supervise" the correction of errors in the aviation industry, knowing that Malenkov would go out of his way, fearing further revelations. Thus, he remained in his place as a counterbalance to Zhdanov, whose followers soon paid the price.

From Anna Tsukanova, I learned amazing facts about the "Leningrad case", during which all the people of Zhdanov and the rivals of Malenkov and Beria were convicted and shot. IN In 1949, we were unaware of the horrendous accusations against them. At that time Anna told me only that Kuznetsov and Voznesensky were relieved of their posts because they were involved in falsification of the results of party elections in the Leningrad city party conference. Kuznetsov's friendship with Abakumov did not save him; Stalin checked Abakumov's sincerity, forcing him to destroy his friend.

We must remember what is often overlooked: the idealistic mentality minded communists in the late 40's - early 50's. For us the worst crime high-ranking party or statesman was treason, but no less The falsification of party elections was also a crime. The cause of the party was sacred, and in features intra-party elections by secret ballot, which were considered the most effective instrument of internal party democracy. So when Anna told me that the party leaders of Leningrad falsified the results of the elections on party conferences, these people ceased to exist for me.

### **Personnel changes in the Kremlin and security agencies on the eve of death Stalin**

The specific details of the "Leningrad case" remained a secret for the party asset; even Anna had no idea of the gravity of the accusations. Now we know what they were accused of an attempt to split the Communist Party by organizing an opposition center in Leningrad. One of the convicts, Kapustin, was accused of espionage, but evidence was not presented.

All this was fabricated and caused by the ongoing struggle among the assistants. Stalin. The motives that forced Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to destroy the Leningrad grouping were clear: to strengthen their power. They were afraid that the young Leningrad the team will replace Stalin. Now we know that the results of the vote count at secret ballot in Leningrad in 1948 were indeed falsified, but the convicts had nothing to do with it. Politburo in full force, including Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria, unanimously adopted a decision obliging

Abakumov to arrest and try the Leningrad group, but no matter what they write in school textbooks on the history of the party and no matter what Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, the initiator the case was not Abakumov. Indeed, his subordinates under his leadership fabricated this is the case, but Abakumov acted in accordance with the order received. At first,

all those arrested were charged with crimes of moderate gravity. For example, Voznesensky - in the loss of documents from the secretariat and in nepotism: his younger brother and sister held responsible positions in Moscow and Leningrad. Indirectly, this affected Mikoyan: one of his sons married the daughter of Kuznetsov.

The "Leningrad affair" remained a secret even after Stalin's death, and even I, although I was head of the independent service of the MGB, did not know about the fate of those who died in obscurity.

The head of the Leningrad MGB, General Kubatkin, was repressed and shot after closed court. Now the documents of the "Leningrad case" have been partially published. The hands of all who were members of the Politburo at that time are covered in blood, because they signed the death sentence to the defendants three weeks before the start of the trial in Leningrad.

The "Leningrad case" also coincided with the sharp debunking of Molotov, who, although remained a member of the Politburo, was removed from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1949. Vyshinsky replaced him. Molotov took the arrest of his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, a Jewess, very hard; at first she was accused of abuse of power and the loss of secret documents (which could steal at the direction of Stalin). On orders from Stalin, under duress by investigators, to compromise Zhemchuzhina in the eyes of her husband and the Politburo, two of her subordinates forced to slander her and confess that they were intimate with her. She spent in prison for a year, and then she was sent to Kazakhstan. Stalin hoped to receive from Zhemchuzhina dirt on Molotov. Her arrest was kept secret, and I only found out about it just before Stalin's death, when Fitin, who at that time was the Minister of State Security of Kazakhstan, complained to me how difficult it was to personally answer for Zhemchuzhina. Ignatiev kept asking about her, trying to find out about her connections with the Zionists and the Israeli ambassador to the USSR, Golda Meyer. IN January or February 1953 Fitin called Goglidze, First Deputy Minister state security, and ordered to transfer Zhemchuzhina to Lubyanka. Fitin realized that the main the purpose of all this was to accuse Molotov of links with the Zionists, and became worried that changes in leadership may affect those who worked with Molotov, including him.

At that time, in late 1952 - early 1953, we did not know that Stalin openly spoke against Molotov and Mikoyan at the Plenum of the Central Committee. Stalin declared them conspirators. He accused Molotov that he yielded to blackmail and pressure from the imperialist circles, implying that the Pearl (although her name was not mentioned) was related to Zionist conspiracy and secret connections with Golda Meyer.

Immediately after the plenum, Molotov was required to return from the secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Stalin's office original documents on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including secret protocols. From that day until they were published in 1992, they kept in the secret archives of the Politburo. I do not rule out the possibility that Stalin was going to charge Molotov with pro-German sympathies or fawning over Hitler during these secret negotiations.

In September 1950, Drozdov, Deputy Minister of State Security of Ukraine, was transferred to Moscow. We have known each other for almost thirty years. My wife was friends with his wife. Arriving in Lviv to find the leader of the underground OUN, Shukhevych, I lived with Drozdov on country house near the city. In Moscow, Drozdov was appointed head of the Special Bureau No. 2 of the MGB USSR, which was supposed to be engaged in secret surveillance and kidnapping of Stalin's enemies inside the country - both real, as I now understand, and fictional.

At first, Abakumov and Ogoltsov decided that they should engage in similar operations, as in country and abroad, there will be my bureau for sabotage and intelligence, and Drozdov will be my deputy, as Eitingon had fallen out of favor. This did not suit Abakumov, he organized the work that internal operations were entrusted to Drozdov. Drozdov had no connections in Moscow, but he was entrusted with these delicate matters. His first task was to check reliability of the eavesdropping system and make sure that our "bugs" are not detected. It was then that I learned from Drozdov that in 1942 Stalin ordered Bogdan Kobulov,

Deputy Beria, to install listening equipment in the apartments of the marshals Voroshilov, Budyonny and Zhukov. Later, in 1950, names were added to this list. Molotov and Mikoyan. There were grandiose plans to covertly eavesdrop on all telephone conversations in the leadership of the Central Committee, but this was carried out only in the time of Brezhnev, when the technique reached the required level.

Drozdov was glad that he was not involved in any kidnappings ordered by Stalin, but his subordinates twice had to work for the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence: they had to speak in the street with foreign diplomats who met with Russian writers, and start fights. The first thing Beria did when he became a minister Internal Affairs after Stalin's death, dismissed Drozdov because he knew too much about internal intrigues and because he was on bad terms with Bogdan Kobulov. The dismissal of Drozdov at the age of fifty was simply a salvation for him, although it seemed then collapse: otherwise he would have been arrested along

with Beria. In July 1951 Abakumov was arrested. In his last year as minister, especially in the last nine months, he was absolutely isolated from Stalin. Kremlin the list of visitors shows that after November 1950, Stalin did not receive Abakumov. Stalin believed that Abakumov knew too much. For me, his collapse was like thunder among clear sky. In

May or June 1951, the last time I spent a few hours in the office Abakumov, he looked very self-confident, made decisions without hesitation. Only later I learned from my cellmate Mamulov that in the last months of 1950 Abakumov tried to get closer to him, because he knew that he had direct access to Beria. Mamulov said that Abakumov asked him to arrange for Beria to receive him, and claimed that he was always loyal and never took part in intrigues against him. Abakumov was accused of delaying the investigation of important crimes and concealment information that Gavrilov and Lavrentiev (homosexuals who were introduced into American embassy) were double agents for the CIA and the MGB.

Of course, Abakumov's conscience had fabricated confessions and false testimony given under torture, but it's also true that first the prosecutor's office, and then Ryumin, accused him of crimes he did not commit. He was never a politician and could not organize conspiracy to seize power; he was absolutely devoted to Stalin and believed in him.

At first I did not understand the circumstances of the collapse of Abakumov; we often followed him opposing points of view, and it seemed to me that the party leadership wanted to correct serious mistakes in the work of the MGB. Commission of the Politburo, which included Beria, Malenkov. Ignatiev and Shkiryatov (head of the Party Control Commission), from the very beginning it seemed interested in testing the effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence operations. It soon became clear, however, that Abakumov's arrest was the beginning of a new purge. IN As a result, Malenkov's position strengthened, as Stalin appointed his former secretary, later head of the department of leading party and Soviet bodies of the Central Committee, Ignatiev to the post Minister of State Security. In the absence of both Abakumov and the Leningrad group, Malenkov and Ignatiev, in alliance with Khrushchev, formed a new center of power in the leadership.

After a meeting with Ignatiev and his deputies for overseas intelligence, Ryasny and Savchenko, I returned to my office in despondency. Their perceptions of our active operations abroad were different from mine. They planned to start liquidating the chapters emigrant groups in Germany and Paris to report on these high-profile cases Stalin. They did not care that it is much more profitable for us to influence the activities of emigration. They were going to use two agents, a married couple, to massacre a retired general Kapustiansky, a Ukrainian nationalist who received this rank from the tsar himself. He was for seventy, he retired from politics and was not dangerous to us, but Ignatiev wanted to quickly report on its elimination in order to impress the government. I was totally against and convinced Ignatiev and his deputy Epishev not to do this, since the death of Kapustyansky will deprive us of access to his mail, which was our most important source of regular information about the situation in exile.

Even now I am struck by the persistence with which the leaders of the Committee

information of 1948-1951, they sought to initiate terrorist attacks against emigration for border and political repression in the countries of Eastern Europe. I remember how young an employee of the Information Committee Kondrashov, who went there to work from counterintelligence in 1949, who later became a general, defended the need for a terrorist attack in Western Germany. In my opinion, he and Korotkov reported materials received from Austria about the alleged criminal Zionist activities of Rudolf Slansky, General Secretary of the Communist Party Czechoslovakia, who fell victim to the famous trial of 1953.

I remember Ignatiev and Epishev signed a directive for our foreign residencies increase the penetration of agents into the Menshevik organizations, which allegedly belonged to number of our main opponents. This happened in 1952, thirty-five years later after 1917. I stated bluntly that our residency in Vienna was only concerned with American military installations in Europe and she has neither the time nor the manpower to hunt down the Mensheviks. Ignatiev, despite the fact that both of his deputies Rysanov and Epishev supported him, said: "The directive is good, but you are right. Let's call her back."

My wife and I were worried about the frequent arrests among MGB workers. And in the anti-Semitic campaign, and in the internal government intrigue was noticeable growing tension. My wife felt that she and I were following the testimonies of those who had been arrested—Raikhman, Eitingon, Matusov, Sverdlov. When Anna came to visit us, for the first time in my life talked to his wife about the prospects and the possibility of finding another job. Being the boss service under an incompetent minister with deputies like Ryumin, adventurers and careerists, I inevitably had to get into a difficult position. I just got it military academy diploma, and this gave me hope for a new job in the military or party sphere. Anna agreed to help me... In 1952,

Malenkov called me and said that the Central Committee entrusted me with an important task, in details of which Ignatiev will devote to me. Soon I was invited to his office, where, no matter how strangely, he was alone. After saying hello, Ignatiev said: "At the top, they are very concerned about the possibility of forming an "anti-Bolshevik bloc of peoples" headed by Kerensky. This initiative of American reaction must be resolutely suppressed, and the top of the bloc behead." I was ordered to prepare without delay a plan of action in Paris and London, where Kerensky was supposed to visit. A week later, however, I

reported to Ignatiev that in preparation for the operation, difficulties, since our man in Paris, Khokhlov, who could find approaches to Kerensky, fell into the field of view of enemy counterintelligence. The last time he crossed the border, the Austrian police became interested in his documents, and his fake passport was seized for check.

Our illegal fighting group in Paris was led by Prince Gagarin, whose task was search for approaches to NATO headquarters in Fontainebleau to destroy communications and alarm systems in in the event of an aggravation of the situation or the outbreak of hostilities. About the existence of this combat groups reported on various occasions to both Stalin and Malenkov. I asked Ignatiev if we should redirect these agents to the liquidation of Kerensky.

Ignatiev, who never took risks, said that this should be decided at the top. A day or two later, I read a TASS report that Ukrainian nationalists and Croatian emigrants did not agree to the creation of the "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc" under chairmanship of Kerensky - they did not want to have a Russian at the head of this organization.

The next morning I sent a report to Ignatiev on the work of the battle group, attaching information to TASS so that he understands that Kerensky no longer poses a threat to Soviet Union. Ignatiev called me, Rysanov and Savchenko into the office. He began with reproaches that they proposed the liquidation of Kerensky without understanding the internal strife in anti-communist groups. Ignatiev stressed that Comrade Malenkov was especially concerned that we do not deviate from the main action, the fight against the main adversary, the United States.

After the meeting, Ignatiev suggested that we prepare proposals for the reorganization intelligence work abroad. This reorganization was personally led by Stalin. According to him initiative at the end of 1952, the Main Intelligence Directorate was created in the MGB. His

headed by Pitovranov, who had just been released from the Lefortovo prison. New Main management combined intelligence and counterintelligence in order to improve work efficiency. His boss took the position of Deputy Minister. I was not invited

to the Kremlin for a meeting on this issue, at which

Stalin presided, but Malenkov officially announced at a meeting in the MGB about decision, which he described as a plan to create a "powerful intelligence intelligence networks abroad", "supported" by active counterintelligence operations inside the country. At the same time, Malenkov quoted Stalin: "Work against our main enemy is impossible without the creation of a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus abroad. It is not necessary to create residencies directly in the US, but we must act strongly against the Americans, primarily in Europe and the Middle East. We have to use the new opportunities that have opened up for us in connection with the intensification of European, Baltic and Chinese emigration to the United States. America's Vulnerability multinational structure of its population. We must look for new opportunities use of national minorities in America. No non-Native American who works for us should be forced to work against the country of origin. We should make the most of the United States immigrants from Germany, Italy and France, to convince them that by helping us, they are working for their homeland, humiliated American dominance." The

year 1953 began, and I was greatly concerned about the personnel changes in the MGB for Stalin's initiative. I knew my name was on a list of 213 people that included names of top-ranking executives who passed on the basis of testimony repressed in connection with the "Leningrad case", the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist committee and the "conspiracy of doctors". Using these materials, Malenkov dismissed or completely removed many employees from Moscow, starting a serious personnel reshuffle in higher party and government structures. He wanted to recruit new people who would be new to the mechanisms of power in Moscow and who would any order without the slightest hesitation.

This purge soon became bloody. Lieutenant General Vlasik, head of the Kremlin guard, was sent to Siberia to the post of head of the camp and secretly arrested there. Vlasik was charged with concealing the famous letter of L. Timashuk, which Ryumin used to start the "case of doctors", "in suspicious ties with agents of foreign intelligence and secret collusion with Abakumov.

After the arrest, Vlasik was mercilessly beaten and tortured. His desperate letters to Stalin about innocence remained unanswered. Vlasik was forced to admit that he had abused authority that he allowed suspicious people to attend official receptions in The Kremlin, Red Square and the Bolshoi Theatre, where Stalin and members of the Politburo visited, who could thus be exposed to terrorist attacks. Vlasik remained in imprisonment until 1955, when he was convicted now for embezzlement of funds for Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and then amnestied. Despite the support Marshal Zhukov, his requests for rehabilitation were denied.

The dismissal of Vlasik did not mean at all that Beria could now change people in his personal Stalin's protection. In 1952, after the arrest of Vlasik, Ignatiev personally headed the Office protection of the Kremlin, combining this position with the post of Minister of State Security.

All the gossip that Beria's people killed Stalin is unfounded. Without the knowledge of Ignatiev and Malenkov, no one from Stalin's entourage could get access to Stalin. It was an old, sick man with progressive paranoia, but until his last day he remained an all-powerful ruler. He twice openly announced his desire to go to peace, for the first time since the celebration of the Victory in the Kremlin in 1945 and again at the Plenum Central Committee in October 1952, but these were only ploys to reveal alignment of forces in his environment and inflame rivalry within the Politburo.

In January 1953, Malenkov and Ignatiev ordered me to prepare proposals on how use the feedback of our adviser in China, who reported to Stalin about the directive Chinese leadership to recruit agents from among the Soviet specialists who worked there.

Comrade Stalin, according to Malenkov, decided to send a copy of this message to Mao Zedong, announcing that we were withdrawing our adviser because we fully trusted the Chinese leadership. Kovalev, in my opinion, that's his last name, was immediately appointed Stalin's assistant in office of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov ordered me to consult with Kovalev about creating a new intelligence network in the Far East in order to receive reliable information about China. At the same time, he stressed that this network should not have links with the old sources that may have been known to the Chinese since the days of the Comintern.

The atmosphere was tense. At the end of February 1953, I was called to the office Ignatiev, where Goglidze, his first deputy, and Konyakhin, deputy head of the investigation department. Ignatiev said that we were going to the "instance". It was late - Ignatiev, Goglidze and Konyakhin entered Stalin's office, and I remained in reception. Then Goglidze and Konyakhin left, and I was asked to join Ignatiev in two hours to come to Stalin for a report at his nearest dacha in Kuntsevo. I was

very excited when I entered the office, but as soon as I looked at Stalin, this feeling is gone. What I saw amazed me. I saw a tired old man. Stalin has changed a lot. His hair has thinned a lot, and although he always spoke slowly, now he He clearly uttered the words as if through force, and the pauses between words became longer. Apparently, the rumors about two strokes were true: he suffered one after the Yalta Conference, and the other - on the eve of the seventieth anniversary, in 1949.

Stalin began by discussing the planned reorganization of foreign intelligence. Ignatiev asked if there was a need to leave two independent intelligence centers: the Bureau of Diversions Abroad and the Main Intelligence Directorate. To me invited to speak. I explained that in order to carry out operations against American strategic and NATO bases surrounding our borders, we must constantly cooperate with the intelligence of the MGB and the Ministry of Defense. Rapid deployment of forces for performing special tasks, such as sabotage, requires cooperation.

I emphasized that the success of our sabotage operations against the Germans would degree depended on the quality of the intelligence network spread in the immediate vicinity of the bases to be destroyed, adding that we were ready in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee blow up American fuel depots in Innsbruck, Austria. We didn't just send operational group. Our agents had direct access to the facilities, but an unexpected order Abakumov about the cancellation of the operation, which could greatly complicate the American air transportation to Berlin, confused us.

Stalin did not answer. There was an awkward pause for several minutes. Then he said: "The Bureau of Subversion Abroad should be kept as an independent apparatus with direct reporting to the minister. It will be an important tool in case of war to cause serious damage to the enemy at the very beginning of hostilities. Sudoplatov should also be made deputy chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate so that he is in aware of all our undercover capabilities in order to use all this in sabotage purposes."

Stalin asked me if I knew Mironov, a former party worker, now a senior official in military counterintelligence, an assistant to Epishev, and suggested that Mironov become one of the deputies of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. I replied that he had met with Mironov only once, when, by order of the minister, he told him about the main tasks of the

bureau. There was another awkward pause. Stalin handed me a handwritten document and asked to comment on it. It was a plan to assassinate Marshal Tito. I never had not seen this document before, but Ignatiev explained that the initiative came from Ryasny and Savchenko, deputy ministers of state security, and that Pitovranov is aware of this action.

Pitovranov stood out sharply for his intellect and outlook among the leadership of the MGB. During the war, he became head of the NKVD department in Gorky. For a while Ryumin put him in jail on charges of "Abakumov's conspiracy", but he was released in 1952. He was friends with my deputy Eitingon, but was compelled, under orders, to arrange for his arrest in October 1951. Two days later, he himself ended up in Lefortovo and sat in

cell opposite Eitingon. Later I heard that Pitovranov had written a letter from prison to name of Stalin, where he accused Ryumin of provocative disruption of the plans for an active operation of our counterintelligence. He was released, he returned to his original place, after a month of treatment in Arkhangelsk, in a military sanatorium for the high command.

I told Stalin that the document proposed naive methods for eliminating Tito, which reflect a dangerous incompetence in the preparation of the plan. The letter to Stalin read:

"The Ministry of State Security of the USSR asks for permission to prepare and organize a terrorist attack against Tito, with using an illegal agent "Max" - comrade. Grigulevich I. R., citizen of the USSR, member CPSU since 1950 (certificate attached).

"Max" was transferred by us on a Costa Rican passport to Italy, where he managed to gain confidence and enter the environment of South American diplomats and prominent Costa Rican leaders and businessmen visiting Italy.

Using his connections, "Max", on our instructions, achieved an appointment to the post Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica to Italy and at the same time Yugoslavia. Fulfilling his diplomatic duties, he in the second half of 1952 twice visited Yugoslavia, where he was well received, had access to circles close to the cabal Tito, and received a promise of a personal audience with Tito. Currently occupied by Max position allows you to use its capabilities to carry out active actions against Tito.

At the beginning of February with. Mr. "Max" was summoned by us to Vienna, where a meeting under confidential conditions. During the discussion of the possibilities of "Max" in front of him was the question is raised how he could be most useful, given his position. "Max" proposed to take some effective measure personally against Tito.

In connection with this proposal, a conversation was held with him about how he himself represents, resulting in the following possible embodiments terrorist attack against

Tito: 1. Instruct "Max" to obtain a personal audience with Tito, during which he must will release a dose from a silently operating mechanism disguised in clothes pneumonic plague bacteria, which guarantees the infection and death of Tito and those present in the premises of persons. "Max" himself will not know about the essence of the drug used. In order to to save life, "Max" will be pre-vaccinated with anti-plague serum.

2. In connection with the expected trip of Tito to London, send "Max" there using his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in England Velebit, to get to a reception at the Yugoslav embassy, which, as one would expect, Velebit will give in honor of Tito. Perform a

terrorist attack by silently firing from a personal weapon disguised as an object. use of a mechanism with the simultaneous release of tear gases to create panic among present, in order to create an environment conducive to the departure of "Max" and hiding traces.

3. Take advantage of one of the official receptions in Belgrade, to which wives of the diplomatic corps. To carry out the terrorist attack in the same way as in the second option, entrusting it to "Max" himself, who, as a diplomat accredited to the Yugoslav government, will be invited to such a reception.

In addition, instruct "Max" to develop a variant and prepare the conditions for delivery through one of the Costa Rican representatives of Tito's gift in the form of any jewelry in box, the opening of which will activate a mechanism that instantly ejects active poisonous substance. "Max" was

asked to think again and make suggestions on how he could carry out the most effective measures against Tito. Are conditioned with him means of communication and it was agreed that additional instructions would be given to him.

Would consider it expedient to use the capabilities of "Max" to carry out a terrorist attack against Tito. "Max" in terms of his personal qualities and experience in intelligence is suitable for performing such a task.

We ask for your consent."

Stalin did not make any notes on the document. The letter was not signed. In the office Stalin, looking into his eyes, I said that "Max" was not suitable for such an assignment, since he was never a terrorist fighter. He participated in the operation against Trotsky in Mexico, against an Okhrana agent in Lithuania, in the liquidation of the leader of the Trotskyists in Spain A. Nina, but only with the task of ensuring the access of the militants to the object of the action. In addition, from the document it follows that direct access to Tito is guaranteed. Whatever we think of Tito, we must treat him as a serious enemy who participated in military operations in war years and, of course, will keep the presence of mind and repel the attack. I referred to our agent "Val" - Momo Dzhurovicha, major general in the protection of Tito. According to his reports, Tito was always on the alert because of the tense internal situation in Yugoslavia. TO Unfortunately, "Val", due to internal intrigues, not so different from ours, lost Tito's favor and is currently in prison.

It would be wiser to use the differences in Tito's circle, I noted, frantically figuring out how to bring Eitingon, who was under arrest, into the game so that he was responsible for the execution of the operation, since Grigulevich appreciated him very much - for five years they worked side by side abroad.

Ignatiev did not like my remarks, but I suddenly felt confident, because the mention of a high-ranking source of information from the security service Tito made an impression on Stalin.

However, Stalin interrupted me and, turning to Ignatiev, said that this matter should be done again. think it over, taking into account the internal "fights" in the leadership of Yugoslavia. Then he looked at me intently and said that, since this task is important for strengthening our positions in Eastern Europe and for our influence in the Balkans, we must approach him solely responsibly in order to avoid a failure like that which took place in Turkey in 1942, when the assassination attempt on the German ambassador von Papen failed. All mine hopes of raising the issue of Eitingon's release instantly vanished.

The next day, the ministry gave me two letter cases - "The Vulture" and "Nero", containing compromising evidence on Tito. There were also weekly reports from our residency in Belgrade. The dossier included Molotov's idiotic resolutions: look for connections Tito with pro-fascist groups and Croatian nationalists. I did not find it in the dossier there is no real evidence to get close to Tito's inner circle so that our agents can get close enough to strike.

When I was called the next day to Ignatiev's office, there were three of the people Khrushchev - Savchenko, Rjasnoy and Epishev - and I immediately felt out of place, because before I discussed such delicate issues only in private with Beria or Stalin. Among those present, I was the only intelligence professional with experience abroad. How could one tell the deputy ministers that their plan was naive? I didn't believe his ears when Epishev gave a fifteen-minute lecture on the political importance of tasks. Then Rjasnoy and Savchenko joined in, saying that Grigulevich, like no one else, is suitable for such work, and with these words they showed his letter to his wife, in which he spoke of intention to sacrifice oneself for the sake of a common cause. Grigulevich, apparently, being insured, forced write this letter.

I realized that my warnings would not work, and I said that, as a member of the party, I it is our duty to tell them and Comrade Stalin that we have no right to send an agent to certain death in peacetime. The operation plan must include the possibility of the militant leaving after the action, one cannot agree with the plan in which the agent ordered to destroy a heavily guarded facility without prior analysis operational environment. In conclusion, Ignatiev stressed that we all need to think, think and think again about how to fulfill the directive of the party.

This meeting turned out to be my last business meeting with Ignatiev and Epishev. Ten days later, Ignatiev raised the operational staff and troops of the MGB on alarm and confidentially informed the heads of departments and independent services about Stalin's illness. Stalin died two days later, and the idea of an assassination attempt on Tito was finally



buried. In the

meantime, my attempts to go to work in the party bodies or the Council of Ministers seemed to be beginning to bear fruit. In 1952, I sent information received from of our residency in Vienna, about the plans of the Americans to kidnap the secretary of the Central Committee of the Austrian communist parties. I was summoned to the Central Committee to Suslov to discuss these data. A few days later, in the first days of March 1953, I was told that my candidacy was being considered for vacancies of the deputy chairman of the newly formed foreign commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on "illegal" connections with foreign communist parties. In fact, it was about my appointment as head of the special intelligence service under the Central Committee of the party. We my wife and I were full of hopes that maybe the end of my service in the authorities would come security, which were headed by absolutely incompetent people who committed crimes due to both incompetence and careerist motives.

But rapidly unfolding events radically changed my fate. 5th of March Stalin died, and on the same day, late in the evening, Beria was appointed Minister of Expanded The Ministry of the Interior, which now included both the police and the apparatus of the organs security (MGB). I was at Stalin's funeral and saw how unprofessionally Serov, Goglidze and Rjasnoy controlled the situation in the city. Before I could get to Hall of Columns to stand guard from my ministry, the cordon of trucks blocked way, so I had to wade through the cabs of the trucks. Didn't even think about how accommodate all delegations arriving for the funeral. There was some kind of idiotic confusion, due to which hundreds of grieving people, unfortunately, died in the stampede.

During Stalin's funeral, my grief was sincere; I thought that his cruelty and the massacres were mistakes committed because of the adventurism and incompetence of Yezhov, Abakumov, Ignatiev and their henchmen.

The day after the funeral, I realized that another era had begun. Beria's secretary called me at six in the evening and said that the new Boss had left the office and ordered not wait for his return. From that moment on, I could leave work every day at six in the evening. unlike those years when you had to work until two or three in the morning, while Stalin sat at desk in the Kremlin or at your dacha.

A shake-up of personnel began in the new ministry. Kruglov, who worked with Malenkov in the Central Committee in the 1930s and has been a minister for the last seven years of Internal Affairs, became Beria's first deputy in the expanded Ministry of Internal Affairs. Goglidze, who unwittingly became involved in the "Mingrelian case", ceased to hold the post of deputy Minister and headed the military counterintelligence. Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's protégé, whom Abakumov in 1946 dismissed from the state security agencies, returned to the Lubyanka in his position Deputy Beria. Serov, Khrushchev's man, retained his position and remained the first Beria's deputy. Rjasnoy and Savchenko, who, like Serov, worked with Khrushchev on Ukraine, headed the Main Intelligence Directorate. Fedotov, always balanced and disciplined, who briefly replaced Fitin in 1946 in the leadership of the foreign intelligence, and later worked in the Information Committee, again, as before the war, headed Main counterintelligence department. Beria appointed Lieutenant General Sazykin, my former deputy in the department of "atomic" intelligence, head of the Directorate for Combating with ideological sabotage and nationalism, the future of the 5th "political" directorate KGB.

Parallel to these quick appointments was the debunking of the accusers in the case. the Zionist conspiracy and the Doctors' Plot. Eitingon, Reichman, Selivanovsky, Belkin, Shubnyakov and other high-ranking workers arrested on cover-up charges Zionist conspiracy or assisting Abakumov in plans to seize power were released at the end of March 1953. The Zhemchuzhina case was closed by Beria himself on March 23, but she was released the day after Stalin's funeral, on the occasion of Molotov's birthday, March 9th. Beria ordered to reconsider the cases of Eitingon and Reichman and quickly settle everything formalities necessary for their release. Later, Eitingon

told me that he did not expect anything good when, after death, Stalin, about which he did not know, he was summoned to the investigator. To his surprise, he saw there

Goglidze and Kobulov, who was fired from the authorities seven years ago. He knew immediately that a big change had taken place. He was asked only one question: will he continue his service after his release? He did not feel well, but after treatment he was ready to continue working. Kobulov then told Eitingon that Stalin had died and that he, Kobulov, was speaking on behalf of Beria, the newly appointed head of the enlarged Ministry of the Interior, and he was his deputy for investigative work and counterintelligence. Kobulov promised that although the formalities would take several days, Eitingon could rest in peace in his cell while awaiting release. Eitingon asked to be moved away from the investigative block so that he would not have to hear the screams of prisoners on whom Ryumin was trying "active methods of investigation." Kobulov replied that Ryumin himself was under arrest for the crimes committed, and Beria, having become a minister, with the very first order forbade beatings and torture of those under investigation at Lubyanka and Lefortovo.

Then Kobulov called for an escort, and an escort entered the investigation room to escort Eitingon to his cell. Showing off in front of Kobulov, the guard ordered Eitingon: "Hands behind your back!" - the usual treatment of prisoners. Kobulov immediately cut him off and ordered that Eitingon be treated with due respect, as with a major general of state security, since he was no longer under investigation, but under administrative arrest. This finally convinced Eitingon that everything that was happening was not a game.

Beria ordered me and other generals to check the trumped-up charges of the Zionist conspiracy. What struck me most was that Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, allegedly established secret contacts through Mikhoels and Jewish activists with her brother in the United States. Her letter to her brother, dated October 1944, had nothing to do with politics at all. As an intelligence officer, I immediately realized that the leadership allowed her to write this letter in order to establish a formal covert channel of communication with the American Zionist organizations. I could not imagine that Zhemchuzhina could write such a letter without proper authorization. I remembered my contacts with Harriman about the creation of a

Jewish republic in the Crimea; From the testimony of Zhemchuzhina, I realized that the sounding of the American representatives on this issue was carried out not only through me, but also in other directions, in particular through Mikhoels. This convinced me that my communication with Harriman was only one of a few attempts to discuss how the Jewish question could be used in the broader context of Soviet-American relations. When I began to discuss with Beria the role that Zhemchuzhina could play in

renewing informal contacts with the international Jewish community, he cut me off, saying that this issue in intelligence operations was closed once and for all.

Instead, he pointed to Maisky, who he said was a much more important figure and an ideal candidate for sounding out our new initiatives in the West. He could make personal contacts at a high level in order to carry out our policy that has changed dramatically since Stalin's death. Academician Maisky, a former ambassador to London and deputy minister of foreign affairs, was already close to seventy at the time. Once he was one of the Menshevik leaders, opponents of Lenin, but later reached amazing heights in the Soviet diplomatic service. In 1952, he was also accused of a Zionist conspiracy. Absurd accusations were fabricated against him: it was alleged that Jewish organizations abroad wanted to appoint him as foreign minister in the new government after "Abakumov seized power." Beria told me: "Since you knew Maisky during the war, even before Yalta, and your wife

befriended his wife, you should prepare to work with him in the future."

The head of counterintelligence, Fedotov, who was "reviewing" Maisky's case, advised me not to meet with him for the time being. "Pavel Anatolyevich, from the very first meeting with him, when I officially announced to him: 'You are under the jurisdiction of the head of counterintelligence, General Fedotov, who is instructed to consider the absurd accusations leveled against you and the circumstances of your illegal arrest,' he began to admit that was a Japanese spy, then an English one, and then an American one." Maisky, of course, tried to convince Fedotov of his guilt in order to avoid beatings and torture. He refused to believe that Stalin

died and was buried in the mausoleum; he said it was another provocation. Fedotov suggested me to postpone all discussions on important diplomatic and intelligence matters for two or three weeks. On the orders of Beria, he transferred him from the cell to the rest room for his office where Maisky was able to see his wife and where he was shown documentary footage Stalin's funeral. The

three-week delay almost became fatal, because Maisky's case was not closed unlike the others in May 1953. When Beria was arrested, Maisky, to whom Malenkov and Molotov treated badly, lived on the Lubyanka with his wife, in a room behind Fedotov's office. Now Maisky was accused of colluding with Beria in order to become with him. Minister of Foreign Affairs and sent back to prison, where he suffered a nervous breakdown.

Later, my wife met his wife in Butyrok's waiting room, where both Maisky and I were sitting. Maiskaya said she was leading a fantastic life, although all Maisky's money and all government bonds were confiscated, her personal bonds of the past five years remained with her, and one of them won 50,000 rubles on a state loan (then one ruble was equal to four US dollars). When she met my wife in prison, where they both brought food parcels for their husbands. Maiskaya could not immediately remember where they met. "In Paris, in London, or at a reception in the Kremlin?" asked she. My wife smiled and reminded her that it was at Emelyan Yaroslavsky's dacha, not far from our dacha, and at Yaroslavsky's apartment in the center of Moscow.

After spending four years in prison, Maisky finally appeared before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court on charges of complicity with Beria to seize power and maintain ties between Beria and British intelligence. Maisky denied all accusations, and the Military Collegium could not find evidence of his guilt. Gorsky (resident of the NKVD in London at that time) was summoned. time when Maisky was ambassador there) to testify about Maisky's treacherous connection with Beria, but he changed his initial testimony and did not support the prosecution. Guilt was reduced to exceeding the powers of the ambassador, since Maisky sent telegrams from London, not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also to the NKVD of Beria - suddenly he blamed the standard requirements for sending special messages to ambassadors. It also accused of criminally admiring the Western way of life and cultivating Western manners of communication in the Soviet embassy in London. Maisky was sentenced to ten years in prison, four and a half of which he had already served, and soon he was amnestied. He was rehabilitated only in 1964. Academician

Maisky published his memoirs without once mentioning misadventures and ill-fated acquaintance with the Soviet prison.

The Zionist conspiracy case in the security agencies was finally closed in the middle May 1953, when Andrei Sverdlov and Matusov, senior officials, were released MGB. Beria appointed Sverdlov to the post of head of the department responsible for investigations and verification of anonymous letters. His colleague Matusov, from whose notes you can learn very interesting chronology of the purges from 1930 to 1950, was released in 1953, but not restored to service. He died in the late 60s. My wife enjoyed it legal advice to support requests for my release. Matusova

soon he was expelled from the party and deprived of the pension of the MGB for his involvement in the repressions. Relying on Sverdlov's support, he constantly appealed to the CPC under the CPSU Central

Committee. In 1963, Matusov and Sverdlov were summoned by the Deputy Chairman of the Committee party control Serdyuk, Khrushchev's protégé, who demanded that they stop write letters to the Central Committee, otherwise the party will punish both of them for spreading gossip, and beyond moreover for the illegal persecution of the famous writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Sverdlov and Matusov protested vehemently, claiming that they had not fabricated the case. Solzhenitsyn's letter, criticizing the Soviet system and Stalin personally for military failures, was intercepted during the war by military censorship, which began the case against Solzhenitsyn. In war conditions, criticism of the military command was regarded as at least least suspicious. Serdyuk interrupted them and said that, judging by what the Commission had party control evidence, Solzhenitsyn was always a die-hard Leninist, and

showed them a letter that Solzhenitsyn had written to Khrushchev.

Sverdlov received a reprimand from the party line, but continued to work as a senior researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he was transferred after the arrest of Beria. Matusov was expelled from the party "forever". It was official announced that this decision would never be reviewed, but he was left alone and allowed to engage in literary activities. Together with Sverdlov, he wrote a series detective stories.

Abakumov was not released. Beria and Malenkov had a grudge against him. He was accused of falsification of the Zhemchuzhina case. At that time I was not interested in Abakumov, I had my reasons for disliking him, but I learned from Reichman that Abakumov denied accusations linking him to the Zionist conspiracy, despite Ryumin brutally torturing him. Reichman told me that he behaved like a real man with a strong will. In 1990

I was called as a witness when his case was checked by the military prosecutor's office; I changed his mind about him, because whatever crimes he committed, he paid for everything is in prison. He had to endure incredible suffering (he spent three months in refrigerator in shackles), but he found the strength not to submit to the executioners. He fought for life, categorically denying the "conspiracy of doctors". Thanks to his firmness and courage in March and April 1953, it became possible to quickly release all those arrested who were involved in so called a conspiracy, since it was Abakumov who was accused of being their leader.

However, Beria and Malenkov decided to put an end to Abakumov. At a meeting in Beria's cabinet officially announced that although Abakumov's accusations of conspiracy were bankrupt, but he still remains under investigation for squandering government funds, abuse of power and, more seriously, for falsifying a case against former leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, Air Force Command, against Polina Zhemchuzhina, for the murder of Mikhoels. As soon as Eitingon was

released on March 23, 1953, he was immediately admitted to the hospital. due to ulcers and general emaciation. He asked me to expedite the release of his sister Sonya, who was arrested with him in 1951 and sentenced to ten years in prison. imprisonment "for refusing to treat Russian patients and aiding the Zionist conspiracy." Sonya initially sentenced to eight years, but prosecutor Daron, an ethnic Jew who watched the investigation at the MGB, fearing accusations of sympathy for the Jews, insisted on more term. I took advantage of my next meeting with Beria to give him a letter from Eitingon, who asked for his sister. Fortunately for Sonya, Beria's first deputy Kruglov was also in Beria's office then. When I tried to explain what was the matter, Beria me interrupted, handed the letter to Kruglov without signing it, and said: "Immediately organize it liberation."

I followed Kruglov to his office, where he dictated a short introduction in Supreme Court:

"Initiated by the Ministry of the Interior review of the charges against Sonia Isakovna Eitingon testified that the case was fabricated, and the evidence of her guilt falsified. The Ministry of Internal Affairs enters the Supreme Court with a proposal to cancel the verdict, and the case against Eitingon S.I. to terminate for lack of corpus delicti." Signature: "S. Kruglov, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

I saw to it that the letter was taken to the Supreme Court and tried to expedite formalities necessary for her release. The decision of the Supreme Court was signed only three weeks later, but it took another week to receive it administration of the camp where she was imprisoned. I personally called the head of the camp, asking for her release as soon as possible, but he replied that she was in the hospital and would be operated on. Using my position, I gave the order to immediately release her from the camp and transfer to local hospital as soon as the operation is done. She was

lucky that Kruglov, and not Beria, signed the letter of her release. Through a few weeks Beria was arrested, and his resolution in a letter would not allow her to get out of prison for at least two years, when other prisoners were also released,

who were serving time on charges of Zionist conspiracy and agitation. Sonino case was one of the first in the wave of rehabilitation launched by Beria after Stalin's death. Of course, it is clear that even this wave, which seemed to correct past mistakes, was caused by the ambitious plans of Beria.

The new Charter of the Communist Party was approved at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, before Stalin's death. According to this Charter, there was only one ruling body - the Presidium Central Committee, greatly expanded. Politburo, which had only eleven members were abolished. There were twenty-five people in the new Presidium, including the old guard - Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov - and relatively young people like Brezhnev, Chesnokov and Suslov.

However, the real power was concentrated in the Bureau of the Presidium, unknown general public, which was chosen at the last Plenum of the Central Committee. Where Stalin presided in October 1952. The Bureau included Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov, Pervukhin. It did not include Molotov and Mikoyan, influential figures of the old guard, who by this time had been deprived of real authorities. The new Bureau was ruled by Stalin and the younger generation.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee on April 2, 1953, when not even a month had passed since Stalin's death, Beria made public the facts that Stalin and Ignatiev had abused power by fabricating the "case doctors."

Ignatiev was Malenkov's man. His elimination after Stalin's death as secretary The Central Committee, which oversaw the security agencies, suited Beria and Khrushchev, but did not suit Malenkov, who was losing his support in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party. For Malenkov it was especially dangerous, since in April 1953 he retired from work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, being dismissed from the post of secretary of the Central Committee.

The materials of the April Plenum of 1953 contain basically all those sensational accusations with which Khrushchev surprised the world in 1956 in a revealing report at the 20th Party Congress.

Without going into an assessment of the motives for Beria's initiatives in April-June 1953, one cannot but admit that his proposals to liquidate the Gulag, release political prisoners, and normalize relations with Yugoslavia contained all the main measures to "eliminate consequences of the cult of personality", implemented by Khrushchev during the years of the "thaw".

During the last years of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev used the alliance with Malenkov and Beria to increase his influence in the party and the state. He achieved the rare honor to address the 19th Congress of the CPSU with a separate report on the Party Rules. Having won a victory over his rivals through intrigue, he placed his people in positions of influence. It is rarely noticed that Khrushchev managed in the last year of Stalin's rule to introduce four his proteges to the leadership of the MGB-MVD: Serov, Savchenko, Rjasnoy and Epishev became deputy ministers. The first three worked with him in Ukraine. The fourth served under his beginning as the secretary of the regional committee in Odessa

and Kharkov. Immediately after the Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1953, Malenkov lost his leadership position as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, supervising all current work party apparatus. And although he concentrated a lot of power in his hands, being the head government, he actually moved away from controlling the situation in the regions and republics countries. There, power continued to remain in the hands of the secretaries of the regional committees. In Moscow, young Malenkov, having lost his reliance on regional leaders, turned out to be, as it were, a hostage "in captivity" from members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, who were members of the Council of Ministers.

Thus, his position in the leadership now depended entirely on an alliance with Beria. He did not understand this and exaggerated his authority, still thinking that he was second after Stalin, a person in the party and the state and that everyone around him, including the Presidium The Central Committee is interested in good relations with him. However, after Stalin's death, the behavior members of the Soviet leadership became more independent, and everyone wanted to play their own role. Thus, a new situation arose that opened the way for Khrushchev's ascent to pinnacles of power.

## CHAPTER 12. CONSPIRACY AGAINST BERIA AND HIS FALL

### Beria's initiatives in domestic and foreign policy after death Stalin

Within a day from the moment of Stalin's death, the Ministry of State Security and The Ministry of Internal Affairs were united under the unified leadership of Beria. 10th of March 1953, four groups were set up in the ministry to review and revise falsified cases: "conspiracy of Zionists and doctors", "Mingrelian case" and "MGB case". The announcement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the press on the release of the arrested doctors significantly different from the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In this message, Beria used stronger expressions to condemn the illegal arrest of doctors. However, his proposals rehabilitation of the executed members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were rejected Khrushchev and Malenkov. Members of the JAC were rehabilitated only in 1955. Offers Beria on the rehabilitation of doctors and members of the JAC gave rise to false rumors about his Jewish origins and his connections with the Jews.

In early April 1953, Khrushchev sent a closed directive to the party organizations with the requirement not to comment on the message of the Ministry of Internal Affairs published in the press, and do not discuss the problem of anti-Semitism at party meetings.

On April 2, 1953, Beria sent a memorandum to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in which stated that Mikhoels was slandered and villainously killed on the orders of Stalin a group of employees of the MGB, headed by Ogoltsov and Tsanava, which included five more operational workers. He proposed to cancel the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR about awarding these persons with orders, and Ogoltsov and Tsanavu as the perpetrators of the villainous action arrested on murder charges. Tsanava,

arrested on the orders of Beria for the liquidation of Mikhoels in April 1953, turned, while in prison in July 1953, into a "member of Beria's gang", and died in custody without waiting for trial in 1955.

Ogoltsov and his group were deprived of their awards, but they were not put on trial. From the part of Ogoltsov expelled only in 1957 in another case. So, for killing Mikhoels for real no one paid, except for the fact that several people had to return their orders. By

the way, Beria spoke at the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and submitted a draft for discussion broader amnesty for political prisoners. However, his suggestions were not accepted. The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on amnesty applied to all persons, including political prisoners sentenced to up to five years. This decision turned out to be ill-conceived: over a million ordinary criminals - thieves, rapists, swindlers, hooligans - were simultaneously released from the camps. Cities and towns were literally flooded with punks and hooliganism, the situation became dangerous and tense. In this regard, Beria transferred the apparatus ministries to work in an enhanced mode, ordered his deputies and chiefs departments to ensure public order in the capital. The troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were sent to patrolling Moscow and mass searches of attics and basements. Order fast restored. There is no doubt, however, that the rampant crime caused by the amnesty has shaken the prestige of Beria rose after the release of the doctors. It is significant that Beria decided to transfer the Gulag from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice and raised the question of its elimination. After the arrest of Beria, this decision was canceled.

At the suggestion of Khrushchev, at the famous July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1953, Beria accused of trying to transfer real power from the Central Committee of the party to the Council of Ministers. With this link and now his plans to reform the structure of power.

These remarks are completely wrong. Even in the last years of Stalin's rule decision-making functions were already concentrated in the Council of Ministers, which he headed.

It was the Council of Ministers that included all members of the Politburo, and later the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It should be recalled that appeals to the Soviet people in 1949-1953 began words: "The government and the Central Committee notify the Soviet people about ..." So, in particular, began appeal - a message about the death of Stalin.

In April 1953, I began to notice some changes in Beria's behavior: talking by telephone in my presence (and sometimes several other senior officers State Security) with Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchev, he openly criticized members Presidium of the Central Committee of the party, addressed them familiarly, on "you". Once upon a time in the presence Sazykin, head of the ideological counterintelligence department, he began to recall how he had saved Ilya Ehrenburg from Stalin's wrath. According to him, in 1939 he received an order from Stalin arrest Ehrenburg as soon as he returns from France. At the Lubyanka, Beria was waiting a telegram from Vasilevsky, resident of the NKVD in Paris, in which he highly appreciated Ehrenburg's political contribution to the development of Soviet-French relations and his anti-fascist activities. Instead of following Stalin's order, Beria next meeting with him showed Vasilevsky's telegram. In response, Stalin muttered: - Well, if you love this Jew so much, work with him further. Once, going into Beria's office, I heard him arguing on the phone with Khrushchev: - Listen, you yourself asked me to find a way to eliminate Bandera, and now your Central Committee prevents the appointment to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of competent employees, professionals in the fight against nationalism.

Beria's cheeky tone in dealing with Khrushchev puzzled me: after all, he had never allowed himself such liberties when his subordinates were nearby. In May 1953,

Grigulevich was recalled to Moscow. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, it was necessary to make sure that Orlov (Nikolsky) did not "light up" him in his revelatory articles published a month earlier in Life magazine. Secondly, if he remained beyond suspicion, he was supposed to be involved in the Beria plan.

unification of Germany and settlement of relations with Yugoslavia. In the spring of

1953, my position in the service was uncertain. Deputy Beria Bogdan Kobulov wanted to appoint me the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Inspectorate, that is, to supervise execution of orders and instructions of the central office by all territorial bodies state security. It didn't suit me too much since I had to carry the load responsibility for the entire machine of the ministry and to deal with personnel matters and conflict situations on the ground. Kruglov, Beria's first deputy, instead suggested that Eitingon and I, while maintaining our positions in the Bureau of Intelligence and Subversive work, were appointed deputy heads of the newly created department ideological counterintelligence. Our main task was to be the final the defeat of the nationalist underground on the territory of the Soviet Union, mainly in the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine.

I agreed, but never started a new job. Less than a week later, as Beria suggested that I replace the head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate, Fedotov. However, the next day, when Fedotov and I came to Beria's office, Kobulov completely unexpectedly offered me the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; then said that, perhaps, it was necessary to send me to the commissioner of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Germany in order to give the opportunity to live in more comfortable conditions. Knowing Bogdan Kobulov as a great masters of intrigue, I replied that I could not accept these offers for personal reasons. character. I referred to the state of health of my wife and named as a possible candidate for work in Germany Amayak Kobulov, at that time the head of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for prisoners of war.

I think Bogdan Kobulov just wanted to get rid of me in the central office ministries, because I knew too much about the operations that he and Beria carried out against Georgian emigrants in Paris. I also knew that the nephew of Beria's wife, someone Shavdia, was captured by the Germans and acted as our double agent, collaborating with the Gestapo in Paris. In 1945 he returned to Moscow and then left for Tbilisi. IN In 1951, Stalin ordered his arrest for collaborating with the Nazis and as one of

Mingrelian nationalists. Shavdia was sentenced to twenty-five years in strict regime camps. Beria did not release him from prison when he became head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but family ties with a convicted criminal remained a dark spot in his biography and fraught with potential danger. Beria agreed that

I could not leave Moscow. Within a week, I was appointed to the post of head of the new 9th department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reporting directly to the minister. This department, better known as the Bureau of Special Assignments, was supposed to have a brigade of special forces under its command for conducting sabotage operations abroad. Although no one spoke directly about the nature of the tasks that the brigade should perform, my new job was consistent with Stalin's earlier recommendation - I actually became the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of State Security and was able to mobilize all intelligence forces and means in case of emergencies.

After Stalin's death, we began to reconsider the main tasks in our work abroad and within the country. Beria took the initiative into his own

hands. I was among those whom he instructed to prepare memos with a detailed list and analysis of the mistakes made by party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against the nationalist underground in Lithuania and Ukraine. Beria considered it necessary to nominate local cadres to leadership positions, and to appoint people of Slavic nationalities to the positions of deputies. Our notes noted cases of unjustified deportations and repressions against ethnic groups that were not engaged in anti-Soviet activities. Beria strongly insisted on the development of national traditions in the field of culture and language. In particular, he was concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for whom socialist ideals would be truly close. I remember Beria's proposal to introduce their own orders and awards in the republics - this, he believed, would raise a sense of national pride. All this created sometimes awkward situations. The newly

appointed Minister of the Interior of Lithuania naively sent a memorandum in Lithuanian to Beria's secretariat, causing a real stir - no one in the center, of course, knew Lithuanian. In addition, when the minister came to Moscow to meet with Beria, he could not explain the details of a very delicate operation - a radio game with British intelligence. The reason this time was that he had lost his briefcase with documents in the hotel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kolpachny Lane. Later there was a rumor that he lost his documents on purpose. A former party functionary, and then chairman of the executive committee of Vilnius, he had no desire to work in the state security agencies. He achieved his goal - he was given a job in the planning and economic department of the republic.

Unfortunately, at the time the note was prepared on the mistakes in national policy in Ukraine, a conflict broke out between the newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs Meshik and local party officials, as well as employees of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Meshik, by all means, sought to expel Khrushchev's protégé Strokach, who was fired from the authorities in 1941 for failing to take out part of the NKVD archive when the Germans surrounded Kiev. In addition, Meshik did not get along with the party leaders of Ukraine Serdyuk and Shelest. Serdyuk tried to take away from the Ministry of Internal Affairs a house that was used as a kindergarten for children of ministry employees: he chose this mansion in Lvov for himself and his family. Serdyuk sent his assistant to the kindergarten, and Meshik posted guards. Shelest, at that time the secretary of the Kyiv regional party committee, took the fire supervision boat for his use for hunting and did not return it. Meshik reported this to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the gove

Although it was customary to speak Russian at the meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Meshik allowed himself to boldly address those present in Ukrainian, recommending that the shocked Russians, including the first secretary of the Central Committee Melnikov, learn Ukrainian. He was enthusiastically supported by the writer Alexander Korneichuk, who also spoke in Ukrainian and praised Beria, since one of his closest relatives, thanks to Beria, was appointed head of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and promoted to the rank of general.



Meshik proudly told me about these episodes, which, according to him, testified words, about the correct line in national politics. I told him he was a fool if comes into conflict with local authorities. Then he introduced him to Muzychenko, who was in his time as our illegal immigrant in Paris and had a lot of experience with real Ukrainian nationalists. We knew that he would be able to distinguish real terrorists from talkers and help Mexic avoid unnecessary clashes. Muzychenko, however, had to postpone his trip to Kyiv, because at that time Beria, at the request of Khrushchev ordered the delivery to Moscow of the Bandera sisters, exiled to Siberia. Here they were placed on safe house where they were under house arrest, and Muzychenko had to convince them to send a message to Bandera in Germany in order to force him to go to a meeting with our representative.

Muzychenko was in Moscow when Beria and Meshik were arrested. Because he is not yet was approved in the new position of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, this saved him from arrest. He simply stopped coming to work in the state security agencies and resumed his former medical activity in MONIKI. He was interrogated twice at the prosecutor's office regarding the alleged plans in the Meshik case for the revival of the bourgeois nationalism in Ukraine. But he was experienced enough and replied that he knew nothing, since did not start a new job. Abakumov

remained in prison all this time, despite the fact that almost all employees security guards, who were arrested in the same case, were released, except for the chief its secretariat and heads of the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases SMERSH and former MGB.

Beria also put an end to the investigation of the so-called "Mingrelian case", begun two years ago on Stalin's orders. He released the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Baramia and Sharia and the former Minister of State Security, Rapavu, who, despite the torture, remained adamant and did not make false confessions. However, the main organizer "Mingrelian case" Rukhadze, who, on the orders of Stalin, fabricated it, and also installed listening devices in the apartments and dachas of Beria and his mother in Abkhazia and Tbilisi, remained in prison. Khrushchev

helped Beria put an end to the "Mingrelian case", formalizing this by the decision of the Central Committee CPSU. Beria personally went to Tbilisi, after the Georgian party organization the charge of nationalism was dropped. Mgeladze, the main opponent of Beria, who wove intrigues against him, was removed from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. WITH blessing Khrushchev, Beria appointed a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee for Personnel of the Communist Party of Georgia Mamulov, former head of his secretariat in Moscow. in the Republican Communist Party there was a massive cleanup. Mamulov later told me that this it was not Beria, but Khrushchev who entrusted him with a bloodless campaign without arrests. The Irony of Fate was that Mamulov had to get rid of those who deceived Stalin and wrote slanderous letters to Moscow about the connection of Beria and Malenkov with the Georgian Mensheviks and nationalists, although it was Stalin who ordered such letters to be written in Georgian in order to have dirt on Beria. Later we learned that Stalin, Rukhadze and Mgeladze discussed over dinner what the content of these denunciations should be. The

Megrelian origin of Beria had hindered his career before, and ultimately turned out to be fatal. The cordial friendship between Beria and Malenkov came to an end in May 1953. The well-known playwright Mdivani, who personally knew Beria, handed over to the head of his secretariat A letter to Ludwigov, in which he accused Malenkov, who had just become Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR in that in his report at the 19th Party Congress he allegedly used material from the speech of the tsarist Minister of the Interior Bulygin in the State Duma, when said that new Gogols and Shchedrins were needed in order to raise the spiritual atmosphere in society. The accusation of such borrowing - it was about party documents - was a serious one. business, especially during the struggle for power, which escalated after the death of Stalin. Beria with indignantly ordered Lyudvigov to write off this letter and stop communicating with the "Georgian bastard." However, a letter in May 1953 from Beria's secretariat was forwarded to Malenkov's secretariat - "cordial friendship" came to an end.

## Changes in the alignment of forces within the Kremlin leadership in April-June 1953

These intrigues took place just at the moment when Beria began to implement another initiative, this time it concerned my area of work. At the meeting heads of intelligence services of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he sharply criticized Riasny, the last head of foreign intelligence of the MGB, a nominee of Khrushchev, for primitive and ineffective methods: Stalin's directives on the destruction of the elderly emigration (Kerensky) and secondary figures, according to him, had no practical meaning. Beria

said that now the main task is to create a powerful base for holding reconnaissance operations. In Germany, for this you need to use what is left of former intelligence network of the "Red Chapel" in Hamburg. In countries bordering United States of America, it was necessary to strengthen the position of illegal immigrants. It is also necessary, he continued, to prepare a government decision obliging the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry foreign trade, TASS and other Soviet foreign agencies to expand support Soviet intelligence operations abroad. He also noted the feasibility of two parallel intelligence services - in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the Ministry of Defense. The first was to collect intelligence information of the usual type, and the second - to conduct special operations in the event of a danger of unleashing war. His arguments, in essence, were a repetition of Stalin's attitudes, with the only difference that from now on sabotage operations under preparation were suspended until further notice and liquidation abroad objectionable to the government of

persons. Beria instructed me to prepare within a week, together with the head of the military intelligence by Army General Zakharov and Marshal Golovanov, who commanded a special long-range bomber aircraft, report on measures to neutralize American strategic air superiority and sabotage of nuclear and strategic facilities of the USA and NATO. Was ordered to submit a plan of incapacitation US Air Force and Navy supply bases in Europe. Next week in a spacious office Beria in the Kremlin, where the meeting was held, Admiral Kuznetsov, commander of the Navy, thanked Beria for rehabilitating his assistant, Vice Admiral Goncharov, who died in 1948 during interrogation. Abakumov accused him, along with Kuznetsov, of anti-Stalinist views. Almost all of Kuznetsov's deputies were arrested in 1948, and he himself Kuznetsov was demoted to rear admiral and appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet. Three a year later, Kuznetsov wrote a letter to Stalin with proposals for a strategic rearmament of the navy and the construction of a large submarine fleet, the creation of nuclear submarines. Kuznetsov's plan provided for a significant change the ratio of surface and submarine ships in the Navy. Stalin supported Kuznetsov's proposals and reinstated him as commander of the naval forces, although his former deputies remained in prison. I have always treated Kuznetsov with great respect and considered him, like many others, an outstanding military leader, highly valued in the circles of our intelligence. And this time Kuznetsov, as always and everywhere, set the tone for the meeting.

I reported on the plan for the creation of special residencies that will be able to conduct regular surveillance of approximately one hundred and fifty major Western strategic facilities in Europe and the United States of America. Admiral Kuznetsov presented to our consideration of another course of action. In his opinion, special operations and sabotage must be developed in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare. Current military conflicts are fleeting, he said, they must end quickly and decisive outcome. Kuznetsov suggested discussing the possibility of applying preemptive strikes calculated due to our limited resources to destroy 3-4 aircraft carriers United States, which would give our submariners great advantages in deploying operations against enemy sea lanes. It would make sense, he continued, to

sabotage at naval bases and ports in Europe to prevent the arrival reinforcements to American troops in Germany, France and Italy. Army General Zakharov, later chief of the General Staff, noted that the question of a preemptive strike against strategic enemy targets is fundamentally new in the art of war and must be work seriously. Marshal

Golovanov did not agree with us. He noted that during the war limited resources, it would be more realistic to assume that we could inflict the enemy no more than 1-2 strikes on strategic installations. And in this case it should attack not ships at enemy bases, but first of all destroy part of it at airfields powerful air force capable of inflicting a nuclear strike on our cities.

I supported Zakharov, citing examples from the practice of the Second World War and our little experience gained in the Korean War - then our legal residencies had the opportunity only to monitor US military bases in the Far East. As for the experience of the last war, it was limited to the capture of individual objects, as well as persons who possessed the most important operational and strategic information. New requirements in conditions of a supposed nuclear war brought to life the need to revise the entire our system of sabotage operations. I said we need more than just individually trained agents, but also in mobile strike teams that could be used by all major illegal residencies. In their task should include an attack on nuclear weapons depots or bases where aircraft with nuclear weapons. Our attack tactics worked well against the Germans in 1941-1944. However, our successes were partly due to the fact that the Germans acted on a hostile territory, and we had a strong network of agents at our disposal. I also pointed out that experience the Second World and Korean Wars shows: the disruption of enemy supply lines, especially when they are stretched over long distances, can be operational far more important than direct strikes against military targets. True, with direct blows panic arises in the ranks of the enemy and outwardly it is very effective, but the destruction of the lines supply is more significant, and its impact is long-term. Besides military installations are under heavy guard and in case of an attack it is not necessary count on putting out of action more than 2-3 structures.

The plan I put forward for the use of sabotage operations instead of limited our capabilities of air and naval strikes seemed to the military leadership convincing. Everyone present at the meeting in Beria's office agreed with me.

Beria listened attentively to me. But he did not yet imagine how the reorganized a service of sabotage with broader rights should build its work. Maybe, he asked, we are talking about a combined reconnaissance and sabotage group of all kinds troops? If so, wouldn't it be as bad as the Information Committee that was set up? IN In the years 1947-1949, the committee, developing operations, proceeded primarily from the needs foreign policy and overlooked military issues. During the discussion, General Zakharov suggested that sabotage operations special services were carried out through all types of armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior affairs. However, in his opinion, the priority in undercover work should belong to my service. At the same time, there should be a permanent working group for coordination. at the level of deputy heads of military intelligence departments, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and intelligence services Navy and Air

Force. Beria agreed and closed the meeting. In a month we had to submit a detailed plan with proposals for coordinating sabotage work abroad. To me promised to help with resources and personnel, especially experts in the field of weapons, oil refining, transport and supply.

The next day, Beria summoned Kruglov and me and ordered me to give me additional staff and funds. We decided to form a special purpose brigade for carrying out sabotage. The same brigade was under my command during the war years and was dissolved by Abakumov in 1946. Beria and Kruglov approved my proposal to involve our specialists in intelligence and guerrilla operations in active work in

organs. Vasilevsky, Zarubin and his wife, Serebryansky, Afanasiev, Semyonov and Taubman, dismissed from the authorities, were again returned to the Lubyanka and occupied high positions in expanded 9th department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but three months after my arrest they were fired again, and Serebryansky was arrested shortly after me and he died in prison.

Meanwhile, I consulted with Marshal Golovanov about the possibilities in air strikes on NATO bases in Western Europe. I suggested doing a test flight of aircraft capable of attacking strategic targets and to see if they are detected by enemy radars. The fact is that we have already received from our agent, a Dutch pilot officer seconded to NATO headquarters, a special a device ("friend or foe") that determines the identity of the aircraft on the radar screen. Our reconnaissance bomber equipped with this took off from Murmansk at the end of May 1953 and flew along the northern tip of Norway, and then Great Britain, approached NATO strategic objects at a distance sufficient to inflict bomb strike. The flight was not recorded by NATO air defense.

We coordinated the test flight with the strategic aviation command. Our officer In connection with the General Staff, in my opinion, Colonel Zimin reported the success of the operation to me, and I to Beria. Generals Shtemenko and Zakharov, I was told, were greatly impressed by the success of this intelligence

operation. In May of the same year, Beria, using his position as first deputy head government, prior agreement with Malenkov and Khrushchev, ordered preparing and testing the first hydrogen bomb.

Beria's intentions towards Germany and Yugoslavia reflected the prevailing Malenkov's confusion among the leaders of the country. The idea of German unification is not at all belonged personally to Beria: in 1951, Stalin proposed the idea of creating a united Germany with taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union (the problem was discussed up to the construction Berlin Wall in 1961). Ignatiev, even before Stalin's death, approved a special probing questionnaire of our special services abroad on this issue. just before On May Day 1953, Beria instructed me to prepare secret intelligence activities to probe the possibility of German reunification. He told me that a neutral united Germany with a coalition government will strengthen our position in the world. East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic, became would be an autonomous province of the new unified Germany. United Germany was to become a kind of buffer between America and the Soviet Union, whose interests encountered in Western Europe. This would mean concessions on our part, but the problem could be resolved by paying us compensation, although that would be more like betrayal.

Beria's plan called for the use of the German contacts of Olga Chekhova, Prince Janusz Radziwill and Grigulevich's connections: in the Vatican they were supposed to start a rumor that The Soviet Union is ready to compromise on the question of German unification. Us it was necessary to probe the reaction of the Vatican and political circles in America, as well as influential people from the entourage of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. After such a sounding, Beria hoped to start negotiations with the Western powers.

It was originally planned to involve General Utekhin in this case, with whom Olga Chekhova maintained personal contact on behalf of Abakumov in 1945-1951. But Utekhin after being beaten in prison during a one and a half year sentence after his release in the spring of 1953 he was in poor working shape. Colonel Zoya Rybkina, head of the German intelligence department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was supposed to go to Berlin and Vienna and conduct a sounding through Olga Chekhova, which, we hoped, would entail negotiations, just as it was in Finland in 1944. Beria warned me that this plan was top secret and the Molotov apparatus, like the entire Ministry

Foreign Affairs, will join the case only at the second stage, when negotiations begin.

Events in East Germany soon got out of our control, in part because Beria's initiatives. (Details of the events in Germany in May-June 1953 and of the debate on

German policy that took place among the Soviet and GDR leadership, I learned from Zoya Rybkina.) In May, we summoned to Moscow General Wollweber, Minister of the State Security of the GDR, who informed us of a serious split in the leadership after statements by Walter Ulbricht that the main goal of the GDR is the construction of a socialist state of the proletarian dictatorship. Ulbricht's statement caused heated discussions and greatly worried Moscow, since it had to reckon with the mood of the Western public and politicians. Our political adviser to Ulbricht, former Ambassador to China Yudin, received a scolding. Molotov suggested that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party adopted a special decision that the course towards the accelerated construction of socialism in Germany as the main target is misguided. But Beria, drawing his line and speculating on the slogan of a democratic, united and neutral Germany, said: we do not need a permanently unstable socialist Germany, the existence of which is entirely depends on the support of the Soviet Union.

Molotov sharply objected, and soon a commission was created consisting of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov to develop a political line on the German question. The commission should have prepared the terms of the German unification agreement, subject to a 10-year extension of payment of reparations in the form of equipment for the restoration of industry and construction of roads and railways in the USSR, which would allow us to solve transport problems and, in case of war, quickly transfer troops to Europe. Reparations of about 10 billion dollars is the amount that we previously expected to receive in the form of loans from international Jewish organizations to restore the national economy. The plan was to strengthen our position both in East Germany and in Poland, where the then raging economic crisis forced thousands of Poles to flee to West Germany. The question of German reunification was acute, because we had to supply raw materials and foodstuffs at cheap prices to both East Germany and Poland, before collective agriculture and the restored industry in these countries will be able to bear fruit.

On June 5, 1953, Semyonov, the newly appointed High Commissioner, arrived in Germany to oversee the implementation of Moscow directives not to force the course of the socialist building and push for German reunification. Later Semyonov told Zoya Rybkina that the German leaders begged for two weeks so that they could justify a change in policy. Semyonov insisted on a speedy response, arguing that the GDR would become an autonomous region within a united Germany. Therefore, starting from June 5, the government of the GDR was in a state of complete paralysis - they went so far as to spread rumors that Ulbricht's days are numbered.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, General Wollweber and Colonel Fadeikin, our deputy resident in Berlin, told me about the growing discontent in Germany caused by economic difficulties and inaction of administrative structures. Ulbricht along with other leaders of the GDR in early June was summoned to Moscow, where they were informed about our new policy towards East Germany, endorsed by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party on June 12. In connection with Molotov's statement that at present the accelerated construction of socialism in Germany seems unpromising, the Presidium adopted a decision "On measures to improve the political situation in the GDR." This document obliged Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht to change the direction of their politics and to some extent reflected the views of Beria (today there are references to this decision in a number of official publications, but the document itself has not been made public).

Despite the fact that I was not present at the meeting with the delegation from East Germany, which included Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Semyonov and the commander of the Soviet troops in Germany, General Grechko, I later learned that Ulbricht expressed serious objections to our plan. Therefore, Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev decided to remove him.

The outbreak of strikes and protests in the GDR on June 17, 1953, was probably provoked by its instigators, who believed that the government was not in a position to take reciprocal steps and is about to fall under pressure from Moscow. Another version was that

the riots were provoked by Ulbricht himself, who refused to comply with the demand striking workers for wage increases. For my part, I believe that both factors were present. In East Germany, there was a false idea that the Ulbricht government was not supported by the Russians and they would not oppose strikers. When these events took place, Beria ordered Grechko and Semyonov to visit order through military force. The result was tragic - thousands of people died. However, Beria did not abandon the idea of German reunification. Show of strength like him hoped it would only increase our chances of reaching a compromise with the Western powers on the question of the peaceful unification of Germany. The West, he believed, would part with the illusion that the Soviet presence in Germany can be eliminated by mass demonstrations.

As I have already said, in order to sound out the reaction of the West on the question of the unification of Germany in Zoya Rybkina arrived in Berlin. She met with Olga Chekhova and reported via special communications me that contact has been renewed. I did not have time to report to Beria about the completion of the task: on June 26 he was arrested in the Kremlin. Without explaining anything, I ordered Rybkina to immediately return to Moscow by military aircraft. But it

was easier to order than to carry out an order. The fact is that General Grechko received instructions from Moscow obliging him to detain all employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, recently arrived in Germany. Amayak Kobulov, representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Germany, and Goglidze, not so long ago appointed by Beria as head of military counterintelligence, who came to Berlin to put things in order, they were immediately arrested and sent to Moscow under guard. All means communications were under the control of Grechko. Zoya Rybkina had to turn to him personally with a request to give her the opportunity to fly to Moscow. Fortunately, the general never took women seriously, especially since she did not report anything about her assignment. Arrest Beria was still kept a secret at that time. She said she was ordered to come to Moscow. Grechko had no idea who I was and who this woman could be - a colonel in the state security service. He allowed her to fly out, however, accompanied by military intelligence officers. She was clearly lucky: these officers knew Rybkina from frequent visits to Germany and managed to persuade Grechko not to detain her. They also knew that for the past five years she has been the head of the German direction in the Information Committee, and then in the Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. And finally, she was lucky that the secret mission was given in verbally and there was no written confirmation. Probing by Beria about the reunification of Germany was interrupted before it began. June 29, 1953 Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU canceled its decision of June 12 on the German question. A similar

story happened with Yugoslavia. Beria persuaded Malenkov the need for reconciliation with Tito. The plan to eliminate Tito was cancelled. Beria suggested send his representative, Colonel Fedoseev, to establish contact with Yugoslav leadership. He was supposed to inform the Yugoslavs of our new course for restoration of cooperation between our countries. The choice fell on Fedoseev because this young and energetic intelligence officer had already considerable experience and had recently been appointed to the position of Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Directorate. I knew him from the years of the war, when he headed the counterintelligence service in the Moscow city department of the NKVD and provided us with very valuable assistance in conducting radio games with German intelligence. Since 1947 he worked in the Information Committee. Since he did not travel to the West, he was not known to foreign intelligence agencies. Beria approved him as a resident in Belgrade, and Malenkov approved this candidacy, which was documented. Knowing nothing about

Fedoseyev's mission, I was engaged in conducting a parallel sounding aimed at reconciliation with Tito. Our agent Grigulevich was summoned to Moscow to discussions with Beria on options for improving relations with Yugoslavia. And this attempt did not take place due to the arrest of Beria.

After the publication of articles by Orlov (Nikolsky) in the American magazine Life, we considered that it was risky to send Grigulevich on this mission, since he might already lit by Western intelligence agencies. As a result, Grigulevich never returned to Italy, and the government of Costa Rica, whose ambassador he was in the Vatican and Yugoslavia, lost him from mind. In Moscow, he became one of the leading Latin American scholars. Fedoseev, like

Grigulevich never went to Belgrade: when he had to go there, Beria was arrested. Beria's plans included a

personnel reshuffle in the Hungarian leadership. He proposed Imre Nagy as a candidate for prime minister. Since the 1930s, Imre Nagy was a full-time agent of the NKVD (code name "Volodya") and was highly valued by our leadership. That is why Beria planned to put him in a key post in the Hungarian government: there was no doubt that Imre Nagy would obediently carry out all the orders of Moscow.

In 1956 he led an uprising in Hungary. As I was later told, he was lured into a trap - allegedly for a secret probing conversation with representatives of the Soviet government. He was immediately arrested by a KGB task force led by Serov, Korotkov and Krokhin. Imre Nagy's cooperation with the NKVD played a fatal role in his life.

On June 5, 1953, my wife and I sent our children on vacation to Kyiv to stay with relatives, while we ourselves moved to the dacha. The Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Meshik, arranged for our children and their niece, who looked after them, to a government rest house. Everything was going perfectly, and I had no reason to worry. Things were going well in Moscow. These days I did not have to report to Beria or his deputy Kruglov about any urgent matters, and no one, in turn, bothered me with urgent assignments. Meanwhile, in the top leadership, the situation was becoming more and more tense, which I did not know at the time. True, I noticed something. Reporting to Beria about the dispatch of Zoya Rybkina to Berlin on a special assignment and sharing with him my plans for restoring our wartime intelligence ties in Germany (using the "remains" of the Red Chapel in Hamburg and previous contacts with industrial circles - the leadership of the largest AEG companies and "Thiessen"), I noticed that he was listening to me inattentively, obviously preoccupied with something.

In describing the events associated with the arrest of Beria, a number of our and foreign historians lost sight of the fact that the actual leadership of the country after the death of Stalin in March-June 1953 was not in the hands of the "troika" - Malenkov, Beria and Molotov, but the "four" together with Khrushchev. His role was very significant, because by the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 5, 1953, it was he, together with Malenkov and Beria, "instructed to put in order all the documents in the secretariat of Comrade Stalin." Khrushchev's position in the leadership placed him in an exceptionally advantageous position of blocking one by one with any influential member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was he who, sensing Molotov's wound with Beria's foreign policy ambitions, plotted initially against Beria, and then against Malenkov.

## **Selective massacre of the leadership of security agencies under Khrushchev**

On June 26, returning from work to the dacha, I was surprised to see a moving column of tanks that filled the entire highway, but I thought that these were ordinary exercises, poorly coordinated with the traffic police service. When I came to Lubyanka the next day, I immediately understood that something extraordinary had happened. The portrait of Beria, which hung in my waiting room on the seventh floor, was missing. The officer on duty reported that one of the employees of the commandant's office had taken the portrait without explaining anything. The atmosphere in the ministry remained calm. Contrary to widespread rumors, no orders were issued for the transfer of Interior Ministry troops to Moscow. About an hour later I was called to a small conference hall, where all the heads of independent departments and departments and all the deputy ministers had already gathered, except for Bogdan Kobulov. Kruglov and Serov sat in the chairs. Kruglov said that for the provocative anti-state actions taken in recent days, by order of the government, Beria was arrested and detained, that he was appointed Minister of the Interior. Kruglov asked us to continue to work quietly and follow his orders. We were also obliged to report personally to him about all the provocative steps of Beria known to us. Serov interrupted Kruglov, announcing that he would remain at the post of First Deputy Minister. He also reported on the arrest of Bogdan Kobulov, his brother

Amayak and the head of military counterintelligence Goglidze for criminal connection with Beria. Except of them, Serov said, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Meshik, the head of security Beria Sarkisov and head of his secretariat Ludwigov. We were all amazed. Kruglov hastened to close the meeting, saying that he would report to Comrade Malenkov: The Ministry Internal Affairs and its troops remain loyal to the government and the party. I

quickly went to my office and immediately summoned Eitingon. It became clear to both of us that there's going to be a major cleanup. However, we were so naive that we thought that Kruglov, in deciding the fate of the leading cadres, would take into account the interests of protecting the state. Two a month ago, Beria invited Eitingon and me to work under him, although we were not close to him. Eitingon turned out to be a greater realist than I am. He immediately realized that the first blow will be inflicted on Jewish employees recently reinstated in the service.

I immediately called the secretary of the party bureau of the 9th department, summoned him and informed us of what Kruglov had told us: Beria had been arrested as an enemy of the people. He stared at me in disbelief. I urged him to be vigilant but remain calm and warn members parties so that they do not spread any rumors. Kruglov, I said, demanded that the arrest of Beria and his henchmen remained secret until the publication of the official government message.

The list of those arrested puzzled me by the fact that it included not only large bosses, but also simple performers like Sarkisov, who was removed by Beria in three weeks before his arrest. After that, Sarkisov was appointed to the post of deputy chief department for special operations of counterintelligence inside the country, but the head of the department Colonel Prudnikov refused to take him in. Beria's deputy Bogdan Kobulov said Prudnikov, a participant in the partisan war, Hero of the Soviet Union:

"First of all, who are you to question the minister's orders? And secondly, not worry, Sarkisov will leave Moscow soon. It doesn't threaten your career.

In a word, it was absolutely clear that Sarkisov was not in favor. This indicated that the decision to arrest Beria was made earlier, when Sarkisov was still close to him, or but he was received by people who did not know that Sarkisov had been removed from the post of head of the minister's security.

Beria was arrested on the orders of Malenkov. However, I still cannot imagine that Beria could speak out against Malenkov, with whom he was in a trusting relationship. As soon as Beria was arrested on June 26, 1953, all members of his secretariat who knew about Mdivani's letter, denigrating Malenkov, were immediately arrested and thrown into prison. And only after the fall of Khrushchev, eleven years later, they were amnestied.

Without waiting for the end of the working day, I went to my sick mother, who had been was in our hospital. I notified Kruglov's secretariat about this. Calling his wife dacha, I arranged to meet her after the hospital in the center and have lunch together. She was more alarmed than I, and believed that the list of those arrested would be replenished, I will definitely get in too. As the head of a particularly important department of the ministry, well known to Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev, I could not avoid their close attention. All that remained for us was to be quieter than water and lower than grass, to do nothing and how as soon as possible to bring children from Kyiv. My wife immediately called my brother, the director cannery in Kyiv, and asked to immediately send the children to Moscow using it own channels, and in no case should you turn to the Ukrainian service for help state security. She alluded to the man with whom he had lunch, referring to Mexic, about whose arrest has not yet been publicly announced.

Fortunately, in the hospital I met Agayants, the head of one of the departments the intelligence department of the ministry, who did not yet know what was happening. When If necessary, he could always confirm that I had indeed visited my sick mother.

In the evening of the same day, my wife and I visited my older sister, confidentially telling her about the events that had taken place and about the arrest that threatened us both. We called again from her. Kyiv, so as not to use our home phone. Elder brother Gregory confirmed that he would send our children along with his niece to Moscow the next day. As a plant manager, he had the right to order train tickets and did not have to ask for a favor. We decided that my older sister Nadezhda would meet the children at the station and



will take them to his home if my wife and I are already arrested. I was sure that the wife arrested either with me or shortly after me. On the same day I learned the details of arrests: Bogdan Kobulov was arrested in the building of the Central Committee on Staraya Square, where he was summoned to discussion of personnel appointments, Meshik - in the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Ukraine. Important information was given to me two days later by my younger brother Konstantin, a private officer of the Moscow Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. His wife was a typist in the secretariat Malenkova and worked in the Kremlin. I learned from Konstantin that Beria had been arrested by Zhukov and several generals at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and was kept in the bunker of the headquarters Moscow military district. According to her, a nervous mood reigned in the Kremlin on the day of Beria's arrest. situation. Sukhanov, head of Malenkov's secretariat, ordered that all employees for three hours - while the meeting of the Presidium lasted - remained at workplaces and did not go out into the corridor. I learned from Konstantin that in the Kremlin (thing absolutely unprecedented!) appeared more than ten armed generals from The Ministry of Defense, which was summoned to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. By order of Serov and Kruglov, first deputies of Beria, the government guards handed over to them the carrying of combat duty in the Kremlin. Among them was Brezhnev, deputy head of the Chief political directorates of the Soviet Army and Navy. Two more employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were arrested, about which was not announced to anyone: the head of the government security department, Major General Kuzmichev and the head of the accounting and archival special department "A" Major General

Gertsovsky. Konstantin's information seriously alarmed me: the struggle for power in the Kremlin took dangerous dimensions. Under Stalin, it was strictly forbidden to enter the Kremlin with weapons. The only ones who had weapons with them were the guards. What precedent did Defense Minister Bulganin, leading a group of armed officers and generals, covertly carrying their weapons! The armed officers did not know anything about the purpose of the call to the Kremlin: the Minister of Defense ordered that they come with their personal weapons, but nothing explained. But what if the officers with hidden weapons were stopped by security, someone would have survived the nerves and the shooting began in the Kremlin? The consequences could be tragic. Later I learned that Marshal Zhukov had heard about the plan to arrest Beria only a few hours before how it happened. Lyudvigov

was arrested at a football match by two high-ranking officers operational management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. waiting for him at the exit from the Dynamo stadium. They they officially announced to him that he was under trust, and took him to the Butyrka prison. Later, in prison, he told me that at that moment he decided: he was arrested by order Beria, and therefore was shocked when a few days later, during interrogation, the investigators said him that he is accused, along with Beria, of conspiring against the Soviet government. He I thought if this was not a provocation on the part of Beria in order to wrest false confessions from him and get rid of him. Then the thought flashed: since he is married to Mikoyan's niece, Beria, who knew Mikoyan closely and sometimes quarreled with him, wants to have dirt on him. However, the prosecutors soon convinced Lyudvigov that the accusations against him and Beria can end with the execution of both.

Sarkisov was arrested on vacation, and he was also quite sure that this was done on Beria's order.

It was clear that Khrushchev was behind the coup in the Kremlin and Beria was arrested by his people, not Kruglov and Serov, deputy ministers of the interior, and the military, subordinate directly to Bulganin, who, as everyone knew, was Khrushchev's man. IN In the 1930s they worked together in Moscow, Khrushchev was the first secretary of the MK and MGK of the party, and Bulganin as chairman of the Moscow City Council. The fact that Beria was being held under military arrest testified that Khrushchev had taken Beria's "case" into his own hands. Later, I

learned that the military, on the orders of Bulganin, took unprecedented steps not to allowed Kruglov, the new Minister of the Interior, to interrogate Beria. Malenkov, formally still the head of the government, although he ordered the arrest of Beria, in fact had little influence on the course of events. Being a person close to Beria in the previous decade, he, in fact, was also doomed.

Khrushchev's memories of Beria's arrest look unconvincing. It has now been established that Beria did not enter into any conspiracies to seize power and overthrow the collective guides. For this, he did not have real strength and support in party and government apparatus. The initiatives he took showed that he wanted only to strengthen its influence in solving issues of both domestic and foreign policy. Beria used his personal connections with Malenkov and actually put him in a difficult position. position, isolating from other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party. However, Beria's position depended entirely on Malenkov and his support. Beria irritated Malenkov: in alliance with Khrushchev, Beria hurried to get rid of Ignatiev, Malenkov's man, who was responsible for party control over security agencies. Malenkov, in turn, overestimated own forces; he did not see that Beria's support was decisive for his position in Presidium of the Central Committee. The fact is that Beria, Pervukhin, Saburov and Malenkov represented relatively young generation in the Soviet leadership. The "old men" - Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich - deprived of real power by Stalin in the last years of his reign, were hostile to this young generation that came to power as a result of repressions in the 1930s and 1940s. A delicate balance was established between these two age groups in March-April 1953, but the social prestige of the senior leaders was higher than that of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria, who in the eyes of the people were servants Stalin, and not at all favorite leaders.

Khrushchev successfully maneuvered between these two groups - he supported Beria to weaken Malenkov when Ignatiev was compromised after the failure of the case. about the Doctors' Conspiracy. He supported him even when it was necessary to deprive Malenkov of the power that the post of secretary of the Central Committee gave him. Now it is quite clear to me that Khrushchev is on time took advantage of discontent among other leaders caused by a surge in activity Beria to eliminate him. In 1952, the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee was abolished. party, this made Khrushchev the only member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU among the secretaries Central Committee. To achieve the highest power in the country, he needed to get rid of Malenkov both from the head of government and the Central Committee. To do this, it was necessary to destroy the Malenkov-Beria alliance, which provided Malenkov with real power and control over the work of the party and state apparatus. Khrushchev should have been placed at the head of the organs security and prosecution of people devoted to him.

Archival documents testify that Khrushchev, after the arrest of Beria, intercepted initiative. Under his pressure, the Presidium of the Central Committee removed the Prosecutor General Safonov and appointed Khrushchev's protégé Rudenko to this position. Just appointed On June 29, 1953, the Prosecutor General was entrusted with the investigation of the Beria case. To to imagine in what haste it was carried out, it should be borne in mind that it was carried out in basically the same investigators who had previously been engaged in prosecutorial supervision so the so-called "Zionist conspiracy" and the "case of the MGB". I never believed that Beria organized a conspiracy to seize power. Now the writer has convinced me of this even more. Kirill Stolyarov, who had the opportunity to get acquainted with the materials of the Beria case. IN the indictment makes no reference to his orders, specific dates, or oral orders. There is no indication of the meeting places of the "conspirators" and the content of their plan. seizure of power. On the contrary, the case materials indicate that Beria was busy at that time with their love affairs. Stolyarov asked the question: how can a person striving for seize power, spend time with his mistress on the day when he was allegedly appointed coup d'état? There is no reference in the file to what forces he planned use for the coup.

The accusations against Beria were based only on his "treacherous initiatives" in areas of national policy, steps aimed at resolving relations with Yugoslavia, and his intentions of German unification. According to Stolyarov, the version about "conspiracy" included Beria's connection with the British "Intelligence Service": the prosecutor did this conclusion, based on Beria's order to close the investigation into the case of Maisky, our ambassador to Great Britain, who was accused of spying for the British. IN indictment, Stolyarov told me, it was stated that Maisky was supposed to

take the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Beria. Beria was accused of being without the sanction of the Central Committee ordered the preparation of a test of a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile, this no one canceled the order after his arrest, and preparations continued throughout June, when Beria was already in prison, and the test was carried out in August.

One of the main accusations against Beria was that during the civil war, in 1919, he was an agent of the Musavat nationalist intelligence and allegedly established covert contacts with the British intelligence service in Baku, which planted it in Bolshevik organization. The verdict in his case stated that Beria destroyed all the witnesses of their treacherous behavior during the years of the civil war in the Caucasus and slandered the memory of the glorious Bolshevik Sergo Ordzhonikidze, the hero of the Georgian people and true friend of Lenin and Stalin.

Later, in the 50s and before the August 1991 coup, all leaders from Khrushchev before Gorbachev, they continued to claim that Ordzhonikidze became a victim of Stalin and Beria because of his opposition to the Stalinist repressions of the 1930s. However, archival documents draw a completely different picture. According to Mamulov, head of Beria's secretariat, Ordzhonikidze prepared and personally wrote a statement to the Party Control Commission confirming that Beria had been sent by the Communist Party to the organization

Azerbaijani nationalists in order to infiltrate their special services. His work there was of value to the Bolshevik underground in Baku in the period 1918-1920. This the document is in the "Beria fund", in the presidential archive. There should also be documents confirming Stalin's personal conflicts with Ordzhonikidze. Last defended individuals, but there is no evidence that he objected in principle against arrests and reprisals. In

January 1991, a protocol was unexpectedly printed in the journal Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Plenum of the Central Committee on the case of Beria. The speeches at the Plenum of Molotov, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others show that the accusations against Beria were based on rumors that the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee themselves distributed it. The protocol does not contain any direct evidence, but is full of vague remarks: "I thought", "From the very beginning I did not trust him" and the like.

Following the arrest of Beria, in late June or early July 1953, Malenkov appointed Secretary of the Central Committee of the party Shatalin concurrently as First Deputy Minister Internal Affairs, entrusting him with the supervision of foreign intelligence. I immediately informed him of my work against US strategic bases and asked for further instructions, showing that I am concerned about serious matters, and not about the intrigues of the authorities. I asked him to authorize further study of the combat readiness of NATO bases. In response, he stated:

"I'm not here to make decisions. And I'm not going to sign the papers. And he returned my note-report without comment. After the arrest of Beria was officially announced and he was expelled from the party and called an enemy of the people, a party asset of the leadership of the Ministry internal affairs. Speeches by Malenkov and Shatalin explaining the reasons for the arrest of Beria for professionals gathered in the conference room sounded naive and childishly helpless. The audience silently listened to Shatalin's revelations that in order to lull vigilance Beria, the Central Committee deliberately deceived, accepting deliberately false decisions and giving appropriate orders. All this was unprecedented. All of us believed that our leadership would not, under any circumstances, accept directives to deceive party members even for the most noble cause. I was then so

naive that I believed that everything was different under Stalin. Yes and all of us thought that such cynicism was impossible. Meanwhile, Shatalin continued his performance. According to him, the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Malenkov along with famous military leaders - he mentioned Marshal Zhukov and generals Batitsky and Moskalenko, who helped carry out the arrest of Beria, committed a heroic feat.

"It was not at all easy to plan and carry out the arrest of such a villain," said

Shatalin.

Eitingon, Reichmann, and I, who were sitting side by side, exchanged significant glances. We immediately realized that there was no Beria conspiracy, there was an Anti-Beria conspiracy in the leadership of the

country. Immediately after Shatalin, Deputy Minister for Human Resources Obruchnikov took the floor and called Reichmann, Eitingon and myself by persons who are not trustworthy. He wasn't ours at all. enemy - he did what he was ordered to do. Obruchnikov attacked me for being surrounded himself with odious and suspicious personalities like Eitingon, Serebryansky and Vasilevsky, who had previously been arrested and suspended from work in intelligence. All mine attempts to answer these accusations were suppressed by the presiding Serov.

Only in 1991 did I find out: Obruchnikov simply repeated word for word what he said Kruglov at the Plenum in the Kremlin. Unlike Serov, Kruglov was not a key figure in conspiracy against Beria: he was so afraid for himself that in these anxious days he lost half of his weight.

Shatalin said that the head of the department in the counterintelligence department Colonel Potapov showed political myopia and blatant incompetence: meeting with his informants on the eve of Beria's arrest, he allowed himself to praise him political acumen. Shatalin quoted a letter from an informant who studied at Institute of Foreign Languages. I saw Potapov's face turn pale when he heard Malenkov's question: "Is this man here?" Potapov got up, but was unable to do anything. say. Serov intervened, declaring that such irresponsible people, allowing anti-party statements, cannot attend closed party meetings, and Potapov was expelled from the room. Fortunately for him, he did not occupy such a high position that it was worth to start a high-profile case - he was fired from the bodies with a party penalty.

Although the party activist knocked me out of my peace of mind, I still hoped that life in the ministry will soon be back on track. I came to work carefully, but I wasn't given any significant work. Judging by my notes, the asset took place on July 15, and on August 5 I was summoned to Kruglov's office and ordered to bring the undercover file Stamenov, the Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow in 1941-1944, an agent of the NKVD whom I supervised. Without any explanation, Kruglov said that they were waiting for us at the "instance" - this meant that we were going to the Kremlin. We passed through the Spassky Gate and turned right towards familiar to me building of the Council of Ministers. There we went through the same corridor as February 1953, when I last saw Stalin. We were received in a very special way. We with Kruglov they immediately understood: something unusual must happen. Instead of invite the minister and his subordinate to the office, head of the secretariat Malenkov asked Kruglov to stay in the waiting room (this did not happen under Stalin), but he offered me go to the former office of Stalin.

It wasn't an accident. The leaders of the country were aware that Kruglov and Serov, who headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were not aware of a number of important details and circumstances in the work security agencies of 1945-1953, because the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by them, only interacted with the MGB under Abakumov and Ignatiev. It is possible that the members

The Presidium of the Central Committee has not yet decided for themselves the question of whether it is worth dedicating them to a number of special actions inside the country and abroad, in which, in addition to Beria, Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov and Bulganin were personally involved - the current accusers of Beria.

In Stalin's former office, Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Mikoyan and Voroshilov sat at the meeting table of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Although it was thought that as Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov was the head of the collective leadership, he greeted me and invited me to sit not he, but Khrushchev. According to established practice at meetings of this kind, an official address was adopted by last name with the addition of the word "comrade". However, Khrushchev addressed me differently:

Good afternoon, Comrade General. You look just like the picture (I was in the military form). Sit down.

Then he continued in the usual official manner of a party leader: - Comrade Sudoplatov, you know that we arrested Beria for treacherous

activity. You have worked with him for many years. Beria writes that he wants to explain himself to us. But we don't want to talk to him. We invited you to find out some of it.

treacherous actions. We think that you will be frank in your answers to the game.

After a pause, I

answered: "It is my party duty to present to the leadership of the party and government the true data. - Explaining that I was struck by the exposure of Beria as an enemy of the people, I added: Unfortunately, I learned about his conspiracy against the government only from an official report.

Malenkov entered the conversation and demanded that I explain my participation in secret attempts by Beria in the first months of the war to establish contact with Hitler in order to start peaceful negotiations based on territorial concessions.

Stamenov was our longtime agent, I replied. At the beginning of the war, on July 25, Beria called me to his place and ordered to meet with Stamenov. I should have used it for spreading disinformation among the diplomatic corps in Moscow. Disinformation came down to the fact that a peaceful settlement with the Germans on the basis of territorial concessions quite possible. I specified at the same time that Beria wanted to meet with Stamenov himself, but he Molotov banned. On his own initiative, Stamenov, in order to impress Bulgarian Tsar, had to convey these rumors, citing "a reliable source in the top." There was no written order to this effect. I also said that with Molotov's permission agreed on the placement of Stamenov's wife to work at the Institute Biochemistry of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Our interception service, which had access to all encryptions Stamenov and diplomatic mail of the embassy, did not find our disinformation - the rumor did not leave the Bulgarian embassy. The operation was decided to turn.

Malenkov interrupted me, suggesting that I go to the reception and write an explanatory note. note on this issue. Meanwhile, Kruglov was called into the office, and when the secretary Malenkov reported that I had already written an explanatory note, I was again invited to cabinet.

Later, I learned that Beria's testimony on this episode said that he received from government order to create conditions with the help of Stamenov that would give us room for maneuver to buy time to gather forces. For this, it was decided plant disinformation through Stamenov and prevent further progress German troops.

Khrushchev read out to the audience my explanation, which took up one page. Molotov continued to remain silent, and Khrushchev again took the initiative in his own hands and proposed tell about my work under Abakumov and Beria in the post-war period. And here, it seems to me, I made a fatal mistake. After I outlined

the planned operations against NATO military bases, Khrushchev asked me to report on secret liquidations. I started with actions against Konovalts and Trotsky, and then moved on to special operations in Minsk and Berlin during the war years. I named four post-war actions: with Oggins, Samet, Romzha and Shumsky - and in each case, indicated who gave the order for liquidation, and that all these actions were taken with approval not only of Stalin, but also of Molotov, Khrushchev and Bulganin. Khrushchev is here corrected me and, turning to the Presidium, said that in most cases the initiative came from Stalin and our foreign comrades. The awkward silence that followed lasted a full minute. Unexpectedly, I received support: Bulganin said that these operations taken against sworn enemies of socialism. Khrushchev ended the conversation by addressing to me:

The party has nothing against you. We believe you. Keep working. Soon we will ask you to prepare a plan for the liquidation of the Bandera leadership, which is at the head of Ukrainian fascist movement in Western Europe, which has the audacity to insult leaders of the Soviet Union.

After that, he made it clear that there were no more questions, and Kruglov gestured for me to waiting for him in the waiting room. I stayed there for an hour and a half, my anxiety gradually growing. I don't I believed not a single word of what Khrushchev told me in conclusion. heavy impression

Malenkov's hostility and Molotov's silence produced on me. undercover business Stamenov, begun in 1934, when he was the third secretary of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome, they never returned it to me. I saw how Molotov and Bulganin carefully looked through it when I answered questions. It then remained in the Presidium of the Central

Committee. I was greatly disturbed. The probability that Kruglov leaves the office with an order to my arrest, seemed quite real. Finally he appeared and made a sign to follow him. Already in the car, he told me to immediately present him with my own handwritten a report on all cases of liquidation known to me - both domestically and abroad - including the cancellation of orders. It was about operations, orders for which or the cancellation came from Beria, Abakumov and

Ignatiev. In my office, I made a list of all the special promotions I knew and introduced them to Colonel Studnikov, secretary of the party bureau of the 9th department. In the report I listed only those operations that were personally known to me and in which I somehow way was involved. Then he asked Studnikov to take the document to the secretariat Kruglov, because he wanted to be sure that I had a witness. And they already walked around the ministry rumors that my service was responsible for covert massacres perpetrated by Beria's order.

After Kruglov's secretary confirmed that Studnikov had forwarded my report to sealed envelope, I went to the country to discuss the situation with my wife. Although we tried to remain optimistic, she turned out to be right in believing that, most likely, a new the leadership considers me as an active accomplice in all Beria's affairs.

After 2-3 days, I learned from my younger brother Konstantin that my name began pop up in the protocols of interrogations of Beria, Kobulov and Mairanovsky. By turntable to me General Prosecutor Rudenko called and demanded to come to him so that, as he put it, "to clarify some essential facts known to you." Before go to the Prosecutor General on Pushkinskaya Street, I said to myself: I won't shoot myself I am going to and will fight to the end - I have never been either Beria's accomplice, or even person in his inner circle. In the USSR Prosecutor's

Office, I ran into an army general, Hero of the Soviet Union Maslennikov, who left Rudenko's office. We nodded to each other and I noticed that his face was gloomy. As First Deputy Minister Internal Affairs, he commanded the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union as front commander during the war. I have always treated him with great respect.

As I considered the proposal for a vacation, I became more and more inclined to think that they might want to arrest me quietly, outside of Moscow, and keep the arrest secret. Later I learned the news that shocked me - Maslennikov shot himself in his office. After interrogations about Beria's alleged plans to bring into Moscow the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were under his command, and arrest the entire government. Such a plan is not really existed, and Maslennikov decided: it is better to commit suicide than to be arrested. So he defended the honor of an army general.

Colonel of Justice Tsaregradsky was in Rudenko's office: during the conversation he did not uttered not a single word and only neatly wrote down Rudenko's questions and my answers. Rudenko stated that he had received instructions from the Central Committee of the Party to draw up my explanations, then attaching them to the Beria case, and emphasized that in my explanations stories with Stamenov contain references to Stalin and Molotov. They should be excluded, he said, and replaced with references to Beria, who gave you all the instructions and orders that he received in the "instance". I did not mind: after all, for everyone who was familiar with order of those times, such a formulation of the question was considered normal. Yes, in their memorandums to the minister, I never wrote that I propose this or that action on order of Comrade Khrushchev or Malenkov. Instead of names and positions, they spoke and wrote the "instance", which recognized it as expedient to carry out this or that operation.

From the very beginning, I did not like the tone and the very questions that Rudenko asked. They were something like this: -

When you received Beria's criminal order to start probing the possibility of a secret

peace agreement with Hitler?

I immediately protested, noting that expressions such as "criminal order" did not were used by comrades Malenkov and Khrushchev when they asked questions and listened to my explanations. I learned about the criminal acts of Beria only from the official government messages. I myself, as a senior operative worker, could not myself imagine that the man appointed by the government to lead the security forces is a criminal, now unmasked.

Rudenko was very dissatisfied with my recorded answers. Although he retained his politeness, but reproached me for being too formal and I use bureaucratic expressions in exposing such a sworn enemy of the Party and governments like Beria. I returned to the Lubyanka, of course, in the darkest mood: replaying the conversation in the prosecutor's office in my mind, I tried to imagine that this will follow. I understood that the future did not bode well for me, and I was absolutely

rights. Soon I became aware of changes of a very ominous nature. First Deputy Minister Internal Affairs Serov announced to me: the 9th Department is no longer independent unit, but is part of the Main Intelligence Directorate, which, after the arrest of Beria headed by Panyushkin. He was a self-confident but lacking in initiative bureaucrat who never acquired any experience in intelligence operations, despite the fact that he was both ambassador and resident in China and then in Washington in the early 1950s. It was clearly going contrary to Khrushchev's assurances that I would continue my work as before. Panyushkin and Serov tried to find out from me as much as possible about the operational plans of my services. Although they confirmed that I was still the deputy head of the intelligence department, to my surprise, they offered me to take a vacation - to rest, for example, in the ministerial sanatoriums. I agreed, but said that the school year was about to start, I could take a vacation after the children go to school. The

situation was extremely tense. My wife made sure that at home I did not had access to weapons - she was afraid that I would commit suicide to avoid arrest and save the family from deportation to Siberia. These days we were visited by Raikhman, fired Serov a week after the party activist in the case of Beria. According to Reichman, who had connections in government circles, he was assured that the purge would be limited to those who already arrested along with Beria, and he hoped that he and Eitingon would only be forced to go to resignation. We both wanted to think it would. 'Cause we never belonged to the number persons close to Beria, and those who really belonged to them, such as Kruglov and Serov, were still in power. Reichman's assumption turned out to be wrong.

Eitingon, Elizabeth and Vasily Zarubin, Serebryansky, Afanasiev, Vasilevsky and Semenov were suspended from work. Eitingon and Serebryansky were later arrested, while others fired, although the oldest of them was a little over fifty. Semenov, famous by his heroic actions in obtaining atomic secrets for our country, was expelled from the bodies without a pension. Six months after my arrest, Zoya was fired from intelligence Rybkin. She was sent to serve in the Gulag system in the North. She retired in 1955, having received a pension from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and not from the KGB.

### **Confrontation with the authorities and the investigation**

Several days have passed. On August 21, 1953, I was arrested. It was Friday. I was in his office when the duty officer of the secretariat of the Ministry and inquired if I was going to call Eitingon, my deputy, to draw up his pension case due to the lack of documents on foreign business trips in the personnel. The officer on duty, a lieutenant colonel, that is, younger than me in rank, was interested in a case that did not fall within his official competence. I understood: this is a bad omen ... After some time, Eitingon called and said that he was called to the personnel department ministry, and he has developed an ulcer, so he cannot go. I replied that I did not know why he was called. An hour passed - Major Bychkov, my secretary, appeared at the door of the office.

A package had been delivered, he said, with the minister's secret personal directive. At this time I have the report was Studnikov, one of my deputies and secretary of the party organization. I ordered him to leave the office, and Bychkov brought in three

officers. I knew one of them - it was Lieutenant Colonel Gordeev, head of the service responsible for arrests, detentions and searches in especially important cases. Gordeev personally carried out arrests Voznesensky, member of the Politburo, Kuznetsov, secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Shakhurin, minister aviation industry, and other senior officials. I immediately asked if them a warrant for my arrest. Gordeev presented it and said that the order was signed by Kruglov, and order - Serov. Then I suggested not to go through the reception, so that the employees would not cause panic, and go out the other door. This was a gross violation of the law, but they agreed. According to all the rules, I had to sign the act of conducting a search in my cabinet and stay put until it is finished. We went down from the seventh floor to the inner prison located in the basement.

Lubyanka. Without formalities, I filled out a registration card and was locked in prison cell as prisoner number eight. I was so worried that I

didn't remember what was going on around me. I only remember - I was terribly ill ready, but, fortunately, I found pills in my pocket. Here I am I realized, to my surprise, that I had not even been subjected to a personal search, only checked to see if I had a weapon on me. It's time for dinner, I hardly made myself eat a spoonful of soup to swallow a pill, and began to consider his position. In this moment the door opened and two guards hurriedly took me to the administrative block prisons, where they were searched. They took everything from me, including headache pills. Removed from hands a Swiss chronometer watch I bought fifteen years ago in Belgium, and put in the breast pocket of my jacket. I was taken to a closed prison car, and in At the last moment, one of the guards snatched my watch out of his pocket. This is petty theft. shocked me: I could not imagine that the guards of the especially secret internal prisons can act like pickpockets. That's what I thought at that moment, although I It became clearer and clearer that I was doomed. Then I suddenly thought that maybe I could use the clock theft to your advantage.

I was taken to the Butyrka prison, where the search was repeated again, then I was placed in solitary cell, which was no different from the cell in the Finnish prison where I had to young years to sit a few months. The first interrogation took place on the same day, late In the evening. Rudenko and Colonel of Justice Tsaregradsky interrogated me. Rudenko rude announced to me in a tone that I was arrested as an active participant in Beria's conspiracy, the purpose of which there was a seizure of power, that I was a confidant and accomplice of Beria in secret deals with foreign powers against the interests of the Soviet state that I organized a number of terrorist acts against personal enemies of Beria and planned terrorist attacks against the leaders of the Soviet states.

After hearing these monstrous accusations, I began to protest sharply against illegal regarding me as an arrested action: I was not present during the search in my office, I was not given an inventory of the things seized during the search, and finally, upon delivery under escort to At the Butyrka prison, Swiss manual clock-chronometer.

Rudenko and Tsaregradsky stared at me dumbfounded, not believing their own ears. Finally, Rudenko came to his senses and said that he would order everything to be sorted out. While both were confused, I decided to go ahead and protest that I was against the law interrogated at night. But Rudenko was already on the alert and cut me off: - We

will not adhere to the rules, interrogating sworn enemies of Soviet power. You might think that formalities were observed in your NKVD. With you, Beria and with all your gang will do the same. Rudenko

sent a copy of the protocol of my first interrogation dated August 21, 1953 Malenkov. I learned about it forty years later, when President Yeltsin's adviser Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov showed this document to my son. Protocol, please to pay tribute to Rudenko, did not contain falsifications and fabricated confessions. In him



it was recorded that I did not admit the charges against me, that I became aware of the "treacherous" activities of Beria from an official report and that there was no conspiracy in The Ministry of the Interior I did not know. True, my protests were not mentioned in the protocol. The next morning, the duty officer appeared in the cell with an inventory of the items taken from me. search of things, among them was a chronometer watch. I signed the document.

At the second interrogation, which, by the way, took place in the afternoon, Rudenko politely asked about my biographies. Answering his questions, I stressed that I had no connection with Beria before his appointment in 1938 to the central apparatus of the NKVD.

Suddenly, Rudenko suggested that I give evidence against Beria: to tell about his plan to conspire with Hitler to conclude a separate peace through Bulgarian Ambassador Stamenov, about the involvement of the "English spy" Maisky for establishing secret contacts with Churchill and, finally, about the terrorist attacks being prepared against destruction of the Soviet leadership with the help of poisons. Rudenko added that Beria also canceled the government's order to kidnap the leaders of the Georgian emigration in Paris, because among them was his wife's uncle. It is your Party duty to help us expose Beria's villainous plans, he said.

Firstly, I did not know about these monstrous plans, I replied, and secondly, Stamenov was our agent, through him, on the orders of the government, disinformation was launched, calculated on diplomatic circles and, ultimately, on the Germans, about a possible peace treaty with Hitler on the basis of territorial concessions to buy time, stop the offensive German troops. As for Maisky, the last time I spoke to him was in 1946, when Beria was no longer in charge of the state security agencies, but was only engaged in intelligence on atomic weapons, and I have had no connection with him since. The memorandum presented to me during interrogation British sector, in which Maisky's contacts were analyzed, signed by Fedotov, one of the leaders of the Information Committee at that time, was an ordinary official document and sent to all heads of intelligence services. I also denied participation in terrorist plans against the enemies of Beria: during thirty years of service in the organs security, I did everything, often risking my life, to protect the government, the state and the Soviet people from our common enemies. Rudenko rudely interrupted me and

presented another accusation: I did not comply with the order Stalin and Malenkov on the liquidation of such worst enemies of the Soviet state as Kerensky and Tito. He said, "Don't

be under the illusion that if you and Eitingon operated on elimination of Trotsky and Konovalovs, then this will save you. Party and government offer you cooperate with us in exposing the criminal actions of Beria, and on how you will help us, your fate depends. If you refuse to cooperate with us, we will destroy only you, but your entire family. You are now prisoner number eight of the a group of fifty people arrested in the Beria case.

During the years of repressions and show trials, of course, I knew by what methods sought confessions and perjury. Vannikov, Beria's deputy in the special committee for atomic problem, arrested in 1941 on the orders of Stalin, told me that his beaten, deprived of sleep until he falsely testified that he was engaged in sabotage.

From the investigation files of our intelligence officers arrested in 1937-1938 (their dossier I looked through in 1941, when he suggested that Beria release employees with experience from prisons work and fight against the enemy abroad), I understood one thing: although your fate is predetermined, the only way to keep human dignity and your name pure is to deny crimes attributed to you, as long as you have the strength. At the same time, I understood that in saving myself and my family, I should not be skeptical about the existence of Beria's conspiracy. That is why I declared that I was ready to report all the facts known to me. At the same time I continued to insist that he did not know anything about Beria's conspiracy and the liquidations of people objectionable to him of people. I said that the order for the planned kidnapping of the leaders of the Georgian emigration in Paris and its cancellation came from the government, which was confirmed after the arrest of Beria at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 5, 1953, Minister Kruglov in my presence.

This was my last meeting with Rudenko. A day later, the interrogations resumed, but he conducted them now Tsaregradsky, who formally charged me with a conspiracy involving Stamenov in order to conclude a secret separate peace with Hitler; in creating a special groups under the people's commissar of internal affairs to commit secret murders on the orders of Beria persons hostile to him and leaders of the party and government in collusion with "Zionist" Mairanovsky, the former head of "Laboratory-X", to commit these murders with the use of special poisons that cannot be detected. According to him, I used Mairanovsky, who was arrested before me, as allegedly his relative and confidant for the murder of Beria's enemies in safe houses and summer cottages NKVD-MGB.

To these accusations, he added participation in a conspiracy to seize power in the country and concealment from the government of information about the treacherous actions of the Yugoslav "Tito clique" in 1947 and

1948. At the same time, knocked out in the Lefortovo prison from a person under investigation were used Deputy Minister of State Security Pitovranov testified about my indulgence "Treasonous actions of the Yugoslav leadership." In particular, it was about Beria's plan use a bomber from an air base nearby to escape to the West Murmansk. I rejected these speculations and stated: the air force did not obey me, and therefore I could not assist in carrying out such a plan. Air Force base reference Murmansk clearly showed how the operation to successfully test the air defense system was distorted NATO. Flight of our long-range bomber over military installations in Norway made it possible to determine the vulnerability of the Americans and the British. When, almost forty years later, I met with Colonel Zimin, our officer, who was in contact with General Staff, he told me that that flight almost led to his arrest. It is known that Beria, as the first deputy head of government, authorized this flight, but did not report Malenkov. It was this fact that was cited as evidence that Beria wanted to use air force base near Murmansk if his plot failed. Colonel General Shtemenko,

Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as the initiator of these "treacherous plans", who was not even fifty at that time, was forced to go to resignation. Khrushchev and Malenkov spared him - they did not want him to stand trial in the case of Beria the highest military officials appeared. Brezhnev returned Shtemenko to the active army almost fifteen years later to develop plans for a military invasion of Czechoslovakia. Shtemenko completed the task brilliantly and received for this the rank of army general and the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Tsaregradsky charged me with the fact that I "in the most cowardly and treacherous" way disrupted the operation to eliminate Tito. All protests and demands give me the opportunity to refute these accusations was, of course, ignored.

Tsaregradsky accused me of having links with the executed "enemies of the people" - Shpigelglaz, Mali and other spies. He tried to present me as their accomplice, stating that Beria knew about the existence of incriminating connections with them, but preferred keep silent about them in order to more reliably recruit me into your organization of conspirators. By deceiving the party and the government, I allegedly received from the hands of Beria undeservedly high awards for your work. At the same time, he said, Beria hid from the Central Committee and the government that I there are many compromising materials in the Investigative Department of the NKVD-MGB, and achieved my appointment as one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence.

During the war years, according to Tsaregradsky, following the instructions of Beria, I secretly mined government dachas and country residences, and then hid the mining of these objects from the Kremlin Security Department to eliminate the leaders of the party and government in an opportune moment for the conspirators. Later, I found out that my Deputy Colonel Orlov, with whom we worked together during the war years - he was chief of staff of the Special Group of Forces under the NKVD and commanded a brigade of special destination. He was ordered to examine, together with a group of employees, government residences in the area of the Minsk highway in search of mines laid on my order. Search lasted a month and a half, no mines were found.

In reality, the situation was as follows. I was assigned to lead mining roads and facilities in Moscow and the Moscow region in order to block the German offensive in October 1941 near Moscow. But after the Germans were beaten off, the mines were removed, and all this was done under strict control according to a detailed plan. Obviously, Khrushchev and Malenkov believed this story about the mining of their dachas, concocted in prosecutor's office or obtained at the cost of forced confessions. Special teams of sappers also tried to discover the treasures "hidden" by Beria in special caches: they were looking for them near his dachas, safe houses and dachas of the NKVD in the Moscow region, but nothing was found.

I was not beaten during interrogations, but I was deprived of sleep. Investigation teams of young officers who succeeded each other, until five in the morning, endlessly repeated the same question: do you admit your participation in the treacherous plans and actions of Beria?

After about a month and a half, it became clear to me that recognition was not at all important for Tsaregradsky. I will simply be brought under the formal completion of the case and shot as undisarmed enemy of the party and government, stubbornly denying his guilt. However, I realized that some of the arrested, for example, Bogdan Kobulov, they are trying to play for time. Tsaregradsky showed me excerpts from the record of his interrogation: Kobulov did not testify about espionage, operations with foreign agents, instead he said that the apparatus Sudoplatov "was littered" with suspicious personalities. Experienced Investigator, Kobulov tried to create the impression that he was cooperating with the prosecutor's office and could be useful to her in future. For me, this option was unacceptable. I understood that I was included in the list of persons and ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, subject to destruction. The accusations against me were based on facts which the government of the country did not consider in their true light, but as an excuse to get rid of me, an unwanted bystander.

While the interrogations were going on, I was in solitary confinement. I was not satisfied with confrontations with witnesses or so-called accomplices, but I had a feeling that very close there are other key figures in this case. For example, I recognized Merkulov's gait when he was taken for interrogation along the corridor past my cell. I knew that Merkulov was close to Beria in the Caucasus and later in Moscow, but did not work with him for the last eight years, since he was removed from the post of Minister of State Security back in 1946. I realized that Rudenko was instructed to arrange the liquidation of people who were part of Beria's entourage even in past. I also knew that Merkulov suffered a heart attack immediately after Stalin's death and was seriously ill. If Beria planned his plot, it is impossible to imagine that Merkulov could play some serious role in it.

At this stage of the investigation, I decided to act in the spirit of the advice given by my predecessor and mentor Spiegelglaz to his illegal immigrants caught red-handed and not who had the opportunity to deny their guilt: gradually stop answering questions, gradually stop eating, without declaring a hunger strike every day, throw away part of the food in bucket. Guaranteed that in two to three weeks you will go into prostration, then complete failure from food. It will be some time before the prison doctor appears and makes a diagnosis.

- exhaustion; then hospitalization - and force-feeding.

I knew that Schliegelglaz was "broke" in the Lefortovo prison. He survived this game only two months. An example for me was Kamo (Ter-Petrosyan), who headed the underground militant group that, on the orders of Lenin, seized money from a Tbilisi bank in 1907 and sent them to Europe. There, Kamo was captured by the German police as his men tried to exchange stolen money. The tsarist government demanded his extradition, but Kamo provided passive resistance: pretended to have fallen into a stupor

immobility, silence). The best German psychiatrists pointed to the deterioration of his mental state. This saved Kamo. After four years in a German prison psychiatric hospital, he was issued to Russia to continue medical treatment in prison infirmary, from which he managed to escape. After the revolution, Kamo worked in the Cheka with Beria in the Caucasus and died in Tbilisi in 1922: he rode a bicycle along a steep street and literally rolled under the wheels of the car.

As Kamo told the young Chekists, the most crucial moment is coming

when a spinal tap is done to check the patient's pain response and get him out of his rut. If one manages to endure terrible pain, any commission of psychiatrists certify that you cannot be interrogated or stand trial.

By the end of autumn, I began to lose strength. Tsaregradsky tried to deceive me, saying that for me all is not lost: past merit can be taken into account. But I didn't answer to the questions he asked me. Indeed, the despair that seized me was so strong that I once threw an aluminum bowl of prison gruel in the face of the overseer. Soon a female doctor appeared in the cell, I did not answer a single question, and she offered to transfer me to the hospital block of inpatient examination.

I was taken to the hospital block on a stretcher and left lying in the corridor in front of the doctor's office. Suddenly, a group of imprisoned criminals appeared, three or four used as orderlies. They started yelling to end this. Cops, and rushed to beat me. I was too weak to resist, and only dodged, trying to weaken the force of blows. The beating lasted several minutes, but I knew there was a strong belief that doctors were watching this scene from their offices. The returning guard drove my tormentors away. I understood: the criminals were instructed not to hit me in the head. In

the ward, they began to force-feed me. About this time the most vague memories, because I was actually in a semi-conscious state. Through I had a puncture for several days in the hospital - the pain actually was terrible, but I still survived and did not scream.

From the records kept by the wife, it follows that I remained in the psychiatric ward of hospitals in Butyrki for over a year. And all this time I was force-fed. I was able to survive only thanks to the secret support of his wife. After two or three months, I began to feel this support: every week a parcel was delivered to the prison, and the orderlies laid out in front of me its contents to awaken the appetite - fresh fruits, fish, tomatoes, cucumbers, fried chicken ... I saw that the food that was brought to me was not like the one that they sometimes give especially important prisoners to make them talk, and he knew, looking at stuffed fish: only mother-in-law could cook it. Heart filled with joy that the family is all right, you don't have to worry, and Tsaregradsky said that my loved ones exiled and renounced me as an enemy of the people.

A few months later, the nurse who was constantly on duty in my room said words that struck me: -

Pavel Anatolyevich, I see you don't eat tomatoes. And, looking into my eyes, she added: "I will make you some tomato juice." He will back you up. People say to survive just necessary. Thus,

a special friendship developed between us. During her tour, she sat down on my hospital bed and silently read a book. Once I turned attention to the newspaper in which the book was wrapped, and saw a message about the execution of Abakumov. This led me to the idea that he was shot, therefore, Beria, and all responsible officers arrested in his case. There were several names of employees of the MGB are much lower than me in rank. Well, I decided, there is no need to wait for mercy. So the game must continue. Resisting Force Feeding - Sometimes It Happened with a sister who was friendly to me, but more often with others - I often struggle with the overseer who force-fed me was losing consciousness from weakness. But thanks to the nurse I now knew something about what was going on in the wild. The books she read turned out to be wrapped in a newspaper with important information for me. I understood that the move with the newspaper was invented by the wife, who was able to attract her sister to her side. Every week the wife appeared in Butyrki - about her visits spoke of transmissions and small sums of money transferred to my check.

I was lucky that I did not get into the first wave of convicts in the Beria case. Beria's wives Goglidze, Kobulova, Meshik, Mamulov and others were arrested and exiled.

Shortly after my arrest, Vera Spector, our housemate (with her husband Mark Spector in the twenties, my wife worked in the Odessa GPU), met my wife and with a gesture

showed that she wanted to talk to her without witnesses on the back stairs. Upon meeting she said:

Mark sends his regards and asks me to make sure to tell you: the government canceled the decree by which the Ministry of the Interior or any other department had the right to subject to administrative expulsion members of the families of enemies of the people without relevant court decision.

Although his wife was bullied in every possible way and demanded that she vacate the apartment, she persisted and declared that she would obey only the decision of the court.

Her meeting with Spector himself, Colonel retired security officer. He was a very insightful person. During the war he headed the counterintelligence service of the Navy in the Northern Fleet, and then during the year he was deputy head of the secretariat of the NKGB-MGB. He suffered a heart attack and retired 1946, then worked as deputy chairman of the Moscow City Collegium lawyers.

They met as if by chance - in the clinic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and not at our house. To me Spector always treated with great sympathy and was well aware of how absurd charges against me. When rumors reached him about my condition and that I am actually near death, he developed a plan for how my wife would secretly establish with me contact. Mark arranged for her to meet with Volkhonsky, with whom my wife and I used to work in Kharkov in the GPU of Ukraine. Volkhonsky was deputy head of the Main Directorate places of detention, and Butyrki were also under his jurisdiction. Learning about my critical condition, Volkhonsky proposed the following option: the wife on a predetermined day, when he will receive relatives of prisoners, will come to his office in Butyrskaya prison on the pretext that she does not believe the claims that her husband is alive and wants to know why - in violation of all prison rules - the Butyrki administration requires weekly gear with gourmet foods. She really brought at the insistence of doctors Literally everything but alcohol.

Bolkonsky urged her to appear at a strictly defined time, so that he had the opportunity to call a newly appointed nurse, who constantly on duty in my cell-ward. This was the same nurse who surprised me - young, years twenty-five, good woman.

"And then it depends on you, work with her and turn her over to your side," Volkhonsky admonished. The duties of

Maria Kuzina, a civilian employee of the medical unit of the prison, included report to the authorities about all suspicious contacts of prisoners. We decided that the wife tell Maria about the slandered Bolshevik, war hero, and try to woo her location. For his part, Volkhonsky warned his wife that he could spend on this the conversation is no more than three or four minutes.

Less than a month later, the plan was carried out. At the appointed time Volkhonsky summoned Maria, who was on duty, and in the presence of the wife of one of the prisoners, as he expressed himself, asked to be informed about the state of his health. The wife began to beg her sister to help me and do everything possible for my treatment. She said it was about a man, more than once who risked his life during the war years when he conducted underground work against the Germans. She asked both Kuzina and Volkhonsky to save my life so that I could appear before a court that will justly decide my fate. Of course, the entire conversation was recorded on film and then got into my prison file, but she should not have been the attention of the prosecutor's office attract.

After Volkhonsky confirmed that Maria was deeply moved by my fate, my wife got hold of her phone and managed to establish a trusting relationship with her. She's like She could have tried to thank this kind-hearted woman by helping her financially. We maintained friendly relations with her even after my release. In prison, I never spoke to Maria - she only gently squeezed my hand, showing that in a newspaper wrapper on the next book I will find the information I need for myself.

This went on for about six months, but suddenly they put me on a stretcher and

A special medical car under guard was taken to the railway station. stood winter 1955. About a year and a half has passed since my arrest.

Two armed escorts in civilian clothes carried me into a docked car. But where did the train leave? I didn't know this. However, although it was night, I managed to read the sign on carriage: "Moscow-Leningrad".

Maria and I were in the compartment. Immediately after the train left, the guards locked the door and left, saying that they would come in half an hour. I was on the bottom bunk and Maria was on the top bunk. Without saying a word, she handed me a book wrapped in Pravda with the same article about execution of Abakumov's group. The article also spoke about the release of Malenkov from the post of head of government, Bulganin was appointed instead. This information was especially important to me. My

mood lifted. Now that Malenkov was removed, there was a faint hope that I could somehow turn this situation to my advantage. Since I've been

I am sure that the coupe is tapped, I did not comment on the article in any way and did not even try talk to Maria, who again, as usual, gently squeezed my hand. Soon the guards returned drunk, and I, exhausted by the tension and uncertainty of my position, fell asleep like the dead.

At the Moscow railway station in Leningrad, we were met by an ambulance, and I were taken to the infamous "Crosses" - a prison that was used in tsarist times for a preliminary ruling. One wing of the prison was turned into a psychiatric hospital. Formalities were strictly observed here. I was examined by the chief psychiatrist lieutenant colonel of the medical service Petrov, who subsequently followed "medical treatment" of dissident human rights activist Vladimir Bukovsky. And in my time the prison was filled not only with ordinary criminals, but also with political prisoners, some of them have been here for more than fifteen years. Petrov seemed to be

quite satisfied with the examination and placed me in the ward together with General Sumbatov, head of the economic department of state security, and Sarkisov, Beria's head of security. I understood that the ward was being tapped. Both mine neighbors seemed to me mentally ill people. Sarkisov, who was once a worker textile factory in Tbilisi, complained all the time that the false accusations of treason against him were frustrating the urgent implementation of the five-year plan in the textile industry. He asked the doctors to help him expose Prosecutor Rudenko, who prevents the introduction of the machine invented by him and the increase in the production of textiles, thereby does not allow him to receive the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

Sumbatov sat on the bed, crying and shouting. From incoherent individual words it was possible understand that Beria's treasures are buried at the dacha of the Council of Ministers in Zhukovka near Moscow, and not smuggled out of the country. Soon his cries became even louder. At first I thought it was a reaction to the injections, but when he died, we found out that he had cancer and was tortured unbearable pain.

In "Crosses" I became an invalid. There I had a spinal tap for the second time and seriously injured the spine. I lost consciousness, and only intravenous nutrition returned me to life. It was especially hard for me to endure electroshock therapy, it caused the strongest headache attacks. I stayed at

Kresty for a week when my wife arrived in Leningrad. It saved me because she managed to call for help many of our friends, former employees of the Leningrad MGB. The uncle of Krimker's wife, a charming man of extraordinary abilities. Having changed more than one profession in his life, he achieved amazing results in each results. He began his activity as a loader in the port of Odessa, then became an illegal immigrant GPU first in Romania, then in Argentina, where his relatives lived, and from the mid-50s years, he switched to large-scale economic work in Leningrad, then at one time he was commercial director of Lenfilm. His inventive mind came up with a special diet for liquid feeding and provided me with regular transfers to the ward, and to supply me information, my wife and Krimker came up with an allegorical form for me to receive information. The reception was the same: the book in the hands of the nurse was wrapped in letters, supposedly

addressed to her by a relative.

So the wife made it known that the "old man" (Stalin) was exposed at a general meeting "collective farmers" (XX Party Congress), "accountants" (those who were arrested with me) are bad feel, the conditions on the "farm" are the same, but she has enough money and connections to keep going on and on. I was confused by the phrase: "no one knows when Lev Semenovich recover from tuberculosis. It turned out that the letter was about a real person: Leo Semenovich Rapoport - conductor of the Akimov Theater. He rented a room to the children of my nurse, who came to study in Leningrad from the countryside. This was done as a precaution if the letter was intercepted. Then it would be easy to prove that a person actually exists. I thought that Lev Semenovich was my encrypted name and that the authorities consider me as really sick and, therefore, I must stay in the hospital and keep playing for time.

Regular injections of chlorpromazine made me depressed, and my mood often changed. There was no meeting with his wife until the end of 1957. Prosecutors seeking to shut down my business, allowed dates. In December, my wife and I saw each other seven times. On every date Investigator Tsaregradsky and two doctors were present. I didn't say a word, but second date could not hold back the tears. The wife said that everything is fine with the children and everything in the family healthy. I also learned that Reichmann was amnestied, Eitingon received twelve years, which no one believes in my guilt, it is still supported by old friends and what should I start eating. I didn't answer her. I thought we were allowed dates to get me out of state of stupor and prove that I am feigning mental illness in order to avoid execution.

Looking back, however, I do not exclude that under the influence of painful procedures treatment, I could indeed be in a state of reactive psychosis. Nevertheless experts and attending physicians expressed certain doubts in the assessment of my condition. IN in one of the secret conclusions in my case it is written that "the arrested Sudoplatov, being in the conditions of a special prison hospital, on the merits of the incriminated acts kept proper secrecy, in some cases switched to the behavior of a normal type." An undercover report was also filed to the grandfather that "c / c sl. Sudoplatov entered into speech contact, revealing the safety of the intellect, the integrity of the personality, the ability to judge with using a socio-political orientation, especially the conspiracy of the service.

It is also recorded in the secret prison file that "Sudoplatov, in relation to his was active in the situation, clarified his prospects with the doctor; based on pain transferred state and after three days of normal behavior again fell into a state of stupor (stupor), with refusal to eat..." After a

month, however, I began to eat solid food, although my front teeth were broken due to prolonged force-feeding. I began to get better and answer simple questions. The conditions of my detention immediately improved - I began to receive a soldier's ration instead of prison. In addition, I also had transmissions from home. April 1958 lieutenant colonel Petrov announced that, based on my state of health, it is possible to resume consequence. In the prison "funnel" they brought me to the station and placed me in a wagon in which transporting prisoners. In Moscow, I again found myself in the familiar Butyrka prison.

I immediately felt how the political situation in the country had changed dramatically. Already through I was visited for two or three days by several guards and the head of the prison corps, former officers and soldiers of the Special Purpose Brigade, which was under my command in years of war. They came to greet and cheer me up, openly scolded Khrushchev for the fact that he abolished the additional payment for military ranks in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and thereby put them in the position second-class people in comparison with the military personnel of the Soviet Army and the KGB. They are also outraged that Khrushchev postponed for twenty years the payment of government bonds loans to which we were all obliged to subscribe in the amount of ten to twenty percent of wages. I did not know what to answer them, but thanked for the moral support and for the opportunity to shave himself for the first time in five years.

## CHAPTER 13. YEARS OF CONCLUSION. FIGHT FOR REHABILITATION

### The technique of reprisals against political parties that are undesirable for the authorities witnesses

The interrogations began again. This time, Tsaregradsky was no longer in charge of my case (later I they said that he was fired from the prosecutor's office on suspicion of bribery). He was replaced special assistant to Rudenko Preobrazhensky, who worked in tandem with the senior investigator Andreev. Preobrazhensky was over fifty, he walked on crutches, which reflected in his character - skalyzhnogo and closed. By the way, he entered the history of wrestling authorities with the intelligentsia, having prepared a note for Rudenko in the Central Committee that Boris Pasternak allegedly behaved cowardly during interrogations. The sullenness of Preobrazhensky was striking contrast with Andreev's demeanor. Andreev was younger, always neatly dressed, ironic and often indulged in jokes about the charges brought against me. He recorded the interrogation without distorting my answers, and I felt that he began to sympathize with me, after I found out that by the time of the murder of Mikhoels I had no attitude, as well as to experiments on people sentenced to death, conducted toxicological laboratory staff. The essence of my case, according to Andreev, was is clear, but I still can't avoid a long prison term. given the attitude of the higher guides to people who worked with Beria. He suggested that they give me fifteen years.

Preobrazhensky, meanwhile, prepared falsified protocols of interrogations, but I refused to sign them and crossed out all the false accusations that he incriminated me. Then Preobrazhensky tried to blackmail me, saying that he would add a new charge - a simulation of insanity, to which I calmly replied: - Please, but you will have to cancel two conclusions of the medical commission,

confirming that I was in a state of stupor and completely unsuited for interrogation. In turn, I accused Tsaregradsky and Rudenko of having brought me down, depriving me of sleep for more than three months and, concluding in a windowless cell, to the state from which it is impossible come out without long-term treatment.

Preobrazhensky tried all the time to beat confessions out of me, but I did not give in. IN the end he announced: "The investigation of your case is over." And in the first - and the only one! - since they gave me all four volumes of my investigative file. accusatory The conclusion was two pages long. Reading it, I was convinced that Andreev kept his word - due to the lack of any evidence, the accusation that I tried in collusion with Beria participate in the seizure of power, was withdrawn. Accusations that I disrupted the assassination operation on the life of Marshal Tito and in 1947-1948 hid the information I had about the impending them conspiring against our country were also withdrawn. No longer appeared in my case fantastic plans for Beria's escape to the West from a special air force base under Murmansk with the assistance of General Shtemenko. There was no mention of Mairanovsky as a my relative. Still the indictment presented me as hardened a villain who, since 1938, was in collusion with the enemies of the people and opposed the party and government. For evidence, they used accusations against intelligence officers who were released from prison at the beginning of the war at my insistence, and my connections with "enemies of the people" - Shpigelglaz, Serebryansky, Mali and others, although all of them, except for Serebryansky, were by that time already rehabilitated posthumously. From a legal point of view these accusations lost their legal force, but this circumstance did not bother anyone. Three of the original accusations remained: the first was a secret conspiracy with Beria to achieve a separate peace with the Nazis. Germany in 1941 and the overthrow of the Soviet government; the second - as a man of Beria and the head of the Special Group created before the war, I carried out secret murders of people hostile to Beria with the help of poison, issuing their death for accidents; third - from 1942 to 1946 I watched the work of "Laboratory-X" - a special chamber where



the effect of poisons on prisoners sentenced to death was tested. The indictment did not name a single specific case of killing people. But mentioned my deputy Eitingon, who was arrested in October 1951, "wrongly and criminally" released by Beria after the death of Stalin in March 1953 and again convicted on the same charge - treason - in 1957. The indictment ended with a motion to hear my case in

closed procedure by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court without the participation of the prosecutor and the defense.

I remembered how my wife, during a meeting in Kresty, spoke about Raikhman and mentioned that the practice of closed trials without the participation of the defense, introduced after the murder of Kirov, is prohibited law since 1956. Reichman managed to avoid a secret trial and was therefore amnestied. I faced a difficult task: how to tell Preobrazhensky what I know about

a law prohibiting the consideration of cases without a lawyer? After all, I was in a coma. Then I turned to Preobrazhensky with a written request to motivate why

a proposal is made to hear the case without the participation of a defense counsel. He replied that in the indictment conclusion, there is no need to go into such small details, and announced to me under receipt of the decision to refuse to provide a lawyer. I demanded

Code of Criminal Procedure, so that the constitutional right to

protection, but this petition was also rejected by Preobrazhensky on receipt. For me

it was very important to record in writing a deliberate violation of the law. Andreev, who treated me sympathetically, said that it would be naive on my part

to expect that a lawyer will be admitted to my case. After that,

I turned to the deputy head of the prison, my former

subordinate during the war years, with a request to provide me with a Criminal Procedure

code. The warden said that my application was denied, but the deputy head

prison is ready to receive me and listen to my complaints regarding the conditions of detention in

prison. When they brought me to his office, which, of course, was bugged, we did nothing

pretended we knew each other. He confirmed that my application was denied, but said that I

I can familiarize myself with the instructions on the conditions of detention of persons under investigation in prison, before than write a formal complaint. I caught a special meaning in his phrase. On the table next to

the instruction was an application in which there was just what interested me - Decree

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 30, 1956 on the abolition of the special order closed trial in cases of high treason without the participation of the defense.

My official application for the provision of a lawyer was ignored, most likely due to order of the "authorities", that is, Khrushchev himself, who by this time had become the head and parties and governments. I decided to wait a while and repeat my claim about defense counsel during the course of the trial itself. The last

meeting with the investigator ended for me in an unexpected turn. Preobrazhensky suddenly demanded that I write about Molotov's participation in the sounding

Stamenov. This puzzled me greatly, and I realized that Molotov must be out of

favor. I knew nothing about the "anti-Party group" removed from the leadership in 1957, which included Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich. My note clearly produced on

Preobrazhensky impression, especially the message that Molotov got a job for his wife

Stamenov to the Institute of Biochemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences to Academician Bach. I also

remembered that Molotov had been consulted about the gifts that Stamenov presented at his

home of the royal family. The reaction of the investigator strengthened my hope that, despite the closed meeting, I will be left alive as a witness against Molotov.

Thirty-three - that was the number of my statements sent to Khrushchev, Rudenko, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorkin, Serov, who became chairman

KGB, and others with a demand to provide me with a defense lawyer and a protest about rude

falsifications contained in the charges brought against me. None of them I

received an answer.

Usually, when the investigation at the highest level in especially important cases was completed, the case immediately referred to the Supreme Court. Within a week, or at most a month, I should have received notice of when the hearing would take place. But it's gone

three months and not a word. Only at the beginning of September 1958 was I officially informed that my case will be considered by the Military Collegium on September 12 without the participation of the prosecutor and protection. I was transferred to the Lubyanka inner prison and then to Lefortovo. Through a lot of years, I learned that Major General Borisoglebsky, chairman of the Military Collegium, three times sent my case to the prosecutor's office for further investigation. And thrice the case was returned with

a refusal. Now it seems to me that my fate was predetermined, but no one wanted to take on responsibility for violation of the law during the period of broadcast assurances of observance of the law, which came after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's revelations of his crimes at the 20th Party Congress. Later it became known to me that my appeals to Serov and Khrushchev, in which I referred to our meetings in the Kremlin and operational cooperation in years of war and after its end, caused a quick reaction. My former subordinate Colonel Aleksakhin was immediately sent to the prosecutor's office to seize all operational materials from my file concerning Khrushchev's participation in covert operations against Ukrainian nationalists. The prosecutor's office assured him that none of the four volumes of my

there are no references to Khrushchev in the criminal case.

Colonel Aleksakhin was an experienced intelligence officer, and when he was shown indictment against me, he directly told the military prosecutor that the charges inaccurate and falsified. The junior investigators agreed with him, but they said that orders are not discussed, but carried out - they come from above.

Aleksakhin took three sealed envelopes from the prosecutor's office with unseen operational materials seized from my office safe during a search in 1953. He gave the envelopes to Serov's secretariat and never saw them again. I can't remember everything that was in my safe, but I know for sure that there were records of sanctions the then top leadership - Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin - to eliminate persons objectionable to the government and, in addition, records on undercover affairs our intelligence about penetration through Zionist circles into government spheres and environment scientists engaged in research on atomic energy.

Later, in 1988, when Aleksakhin and two intelligence veterans petitioned for review of my case, they referred to this episode. They were advised to remain silent and not compromise the party even more by bringing such unseemly deeds into the light of God.

I was brought to the building of the Supreme Court on Vorovskogo Street in a prison car. On I was not handcuffed, and the KGB escorts who accompanied me were ordered to wait in the reception room of the Deputy Chairman of the Military Collegium, that is, outside the courtroom meetings. They were not allowed to enter the hall contrary to the accepted procedure. I was in civil. The room I entered didn't look like a courtroom at all. It was a well-furnished office with a desk in the corner and a long conference table, headed by Major General Kostromin, who introduced himself as deputy chairman of the Military Collegium. The other judges were

Colonel of Justice Romanov and Vice Admiral Simonov. There were also two secretary - one of them, Major Afanasiev, later was a secretary at the Penkovsky trial. I sat at the end of a long table, and at the other end were the judges - all three. The meeting was opened by Kostromin, announcing the names of the judges and inquiring whether me objections and challenges on the composition of the court. I replied that I had no objections and no objections, but I protest against the closed session itself and the flagrant violation of my constitutional rights to protect me. I said the law forbids closed meetings without the participation of a defense counsel in criminal cases, where, in accordance with the Criminal Code code, we can talk about the application of capital punishment - the death penalty, and because of serious illness that I have suffered, I cannot competently carry out my own defense in court.

Kostromin was dumbfounded by this statement. The judges looked at chairman, the admiral seemed particularly concerned. Kostromin announced that the court retired to a conference to consider my application, and indignantly remarked that

I have no right to challenge the procedural form of the hearing. Right there he asked the secretary to escort me to the reception.

The judges deliberated for about an hour, and during that time I unexpectedly managed to see those who was to testify against me as a witness. The first one in the reception appeared Academician Muromtsev, who previously headed the bacteriological laboratory of the NKVD—MGB, where they tested bacteriological agents on those sentenced to death until 1950. I barely knew him and never worked with him except for what I sent him.

intelligence materials received from Israel on the latest developments in the field bacteriological weapons. Mairanovsky was another witness: pale and frightened, he appeared in the waiting room, accompanied by an escort. He was wearing a worn suit - immediately it was evident that he had been brought straight from prison. It became clear to me that the work toxicological "Laboratory-X" will be one of the main charges in my case. Seeing me, Mairanovsky burst into tears.

He obviously did not expect to find me in the waiting room, without convoy, sitting in a chair in a good suit and tie. The secretary ordered escort to withdraw Mairanovsky and ran to report to Kostromin. He returned quickly and led me back to the office, where the judges were already waiting to continue the session. Kostromin announced that my application for the provision of a defense counsel and a declaration of unlawfulness hearing of the case in closed session without the participation of a lawyer rejected personally by the chairman Supreme Court of the USSR. This order has just been received by telephone. government communications. In the event that I persist and refuse to answer questions of the court, the hearing will continue without me and the verdict will be delivered in absentia. The Supreme Court, he noted, in agreement with the Presidium of the Supreme Council as the highest the judiciary has the right to establish any procedure for hearing cases of particular importance to the interests of the state. He asked me a question, I admit am I guilty. I categorically denied all the accusations against me. Then he announced that two witnesses, former employees of the state security organs Galiguzov and Pudín, cannot attend the court session for health reasons. Two others, academician Muromtsev and convicted Mairanovsky, are in the next room and are ready to give witness's testimonies.

Kostromin further stated: the court was not convinced by the testimony of Beria during the preliminary investigation in his case, that you were not his confidant, but only carried out orders that he transmitted on behalf of the government. Moreover, Kostromin said, the court considers that Beria tried to hide the fact of high treason, and the testimony available in your investigative case, are irrelevant to the court.

The episode with Stamenov was only mentioned. Kostromin emphasized the fact of the undoubted treason, adding that new data showing that Beria discussed the question of contacts with Stamenov and with other members of the government, will be reported Supreme Court and, possibly, a private ruling will be adopted against government instances. I emphatically denied that I had made any attempts to establish secret contacts in bypassing the government, since Molotov not only knew about these contacts, but also authorized them, and government-sanctioned sounding for intelligence purposes cannot be classified as a fact of treason. However, my statement ignored. Moreover, I said personally Comrade Khrushchev five years ago, on August 5 1953, assured me that he did not find any criminal violation in my actions law or guilt in the episode with Stamenov.

Turning pale, the chairman forbade me to mention Khrushchev's name. secretaries here stop keeping records. I felt the blood rush to my face, and, unable to restrain myself, shouted out:

- You are trying a man sentenced to death by the fascist OUN, a man who risked his life for the Soviet people! You judge me the same as you predecessors who brought the heroes of Soviet intelligence under execution.

I began to list the names of my dead friends and colleagues - Artuzov, Shpigelglaz, Mali, Serebryansky, Sosnovsky, Gorazhanin and others. Kostromin was stunned; Vice Admiral Simonov sat as pale as chalk.

After a short pause, Kostromin pulled himself together and said: "No one has sentenced you to death in advance. We want to establish the truth. Then the witness Muromtsev was called and in his presence the testimony he given five years ago. To the surprise and displeasure of the judges, Muromtsev declared that he could not confirm your previous statements. According to him, he does not remember any facts of my involvement in the work of a secret bacteriological research laboratory.

Then Mairanovsky was called. He testified that he had advised me on four occasions. WITH permission of the chairman, I asked him: was he subordinate to me at work, were there the four cases he mentioned of human experimentation or military operations and, finally, from whom did he receive orders to use poisons? To my surprise, Admiral supported me. And the whole well-thought-out scenario of the court crumbled. Mairanovsky gave testified that he had never been subordinate to me at work, and began to cry. Through his tears acknowledged that the experiments in question were in fact combat operations, and Khrushchev and Molotov gave orders to exterminate people. He told how he met Molotov in the building of the Information Committee, and then, arousing the wrath of the chairman of the court, mentioned about a meeting with Khrushchev in a railway car in Kyiv. Here Kostromin interrupted him, saying that his testimony was already clear to the court. After that, he pressed the button, and the convoy appeared took Mairanovsky away. I did not see him after that for three years - until the day when we met on a walk in the courtyard of the Vladimir prison. The judges were clearly confused. They received confirmation that the so-called terrorist acts were actually military operations carried out against bitterest opponents of Soviet power on the direct orders of the government, and not on my initiative. I also indicated that I was not the senior official in the execution these operations, since in each case there were special representatives government - First Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR Ogoltsov and Minister State Security Service of Ukraine Savchenko, and local state security agencies were subordinate directly to them. I offered to call them as witnesses and demanded to know why they were not held accountable for directing these actions.

I also referred to the fact that it was precisely in the decision of the government in July 1946 that established a special procedure for the liquidation of the most dangerous enemies of the state within the country and abroad through the state security agencies and the intelligence department of the General headquarters of the Red

Army. And again, the judges felt out of place. I knew that in my protocols interrogations, all references to work during the Cold War period of 1946-1953 were extremely vague and vague. The thought that ran like a red thread through all the accusations boiled down to the following: Mairanovsky, with my help, killed people, hostilely tuned to Beria. I quite clearly felt that the judges were not ready to admit the real fact that all these liquidations were sanctioned by the leaders who stood in tables of ranks above Beria, and he didn't have any episodes told at the trial relationship.

Kostromin quickly and efficiently summed up the court session. According to him, I not for these operations against the enemies of Soviet power. The court believes that I supervised on his dacha with other covert operations directed against Beria's enemies. I'm right there asked me to give at least one specific fact of a terrorist act with my participation against the government or enemies of Beria. Kostromin objected harshly: Beria's case is closed, and it is well established that this kind of action was committed more than once, and since I worked under his command, I am also guilty. However, the court does not yet have relevant evidence for this. With these words, he closed the hearing, giving me the opportunity to make my final statement. I was brief and stated my innocence and that the massacre of me is taking place in the interests of Ukrainian fascists, imperialist secret services and Trotskyists abroad. And finally I demanded to exercise my legal right to familiarize myself with the minutes of the court session, to enter into it your comments. This was immediately denied to me.

Kostromin announced a break. I was taken to the waiting room, where they offered tea with

sandwiches. The admiral came up to me, shook hands and said that I behaved as expected man. He reassured me that everything will be fine. After a while I was taken back to the office Kostromin to read the verdict. The judges stood up and the presiding judge read handwritten verdict that is exactly the same as the indictment prosecutor's office with one addition: "The court does not consider it appropriate to apply to me capital punishment - the death penalty and bases his sentence on the materials available in the case, but not considered in the court session.

I was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The verdict was final and not subject to appeal. It was early autumn 1958. From the time of his arrest in 1953, I had already spent five years in prison.

The strength has left me. I could not get out of a state of shock, I felt that I was about to fall fainted and was forced to sit down. Soon I was already in the inner prison of Lubyanka. At I got a terrible headache, and the warden even gave me a pill. I still don't came to my senses when I was unexpectedly taken to Serov's office - the former possessions of Beria. Glancing at me gloomily, Serov offered to sit down.

"Listen carefully," he began. You will have plenty of time to think about your position. You will be sent to Vladimir Prison. And if there you remember any suspicious actions or criminal orders of Molotov and Malenkov related to those or other matters at home or abroad, let me know, but don't mention Nikita Sergeevich. And if, he concluded, you remember what I told you, you will stay are alive and we amnesty you.

Despite the terrible headache, I nodded in agreement. I will never have him again did not see.

### **Vladimir prison as a place of detention of the most dangerous regime of unwanted witnesses**

I was immediately transferred to the Lefortovo prison, and two days later I was allowed to see wife and younger brother Konstantin. Finally, I gave vent to tears, and they consoled me as best they could. The news that I would be in the Vladimir prison caused a hidden joy: the younger sister of his wife lived in this city, her husband Alexander Komelkov was responsible officer of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Vladimir region, deputy head GAI. They lived in the same house as all the prison authorities, including senior guards. Komelkov and his wife were on excellent terms with all their neighbors. Soon on summer holidays my youngest son Anatoly came to Vladimir. There he became friends with Yuri, a boy of his age, the son of the head of the Vladimir prison, Colonel Kozik. With them in the company was Olga, the daughter of Kozik's deputy, who lived next door.

My wife was lucky that she was not arrested when I was under investigation, like other wives officials involved in the Beria case. She prudently interrupted acquaintances with former co-workers. As for our non-organ friends, they are very supported us, especially Marianna Yaroslavskaya. Her father Emelyan Yaroslavsky was secretary of the Central Committee of the party from the 1920s to the 1940s. Informally, Yaroslavsky was considered an ideologue parties. I met him and his charming wife, an old revolutionary, in 1943, when I got a dacha near his house. Acquaintance with the Yaroslavskys played a big role role in my life and helped the family survive. Through Marianne, the wife made friends among sculptors, painters, writers. After the death of Yaroslavsky, I paid attention to him family and widow Claudia Ivanovna Kirsanova. She, in turn, introduced me to Kuznetsov, secretary of the Central Committee of the party, who supported me in the conflict with Abakumov. Anna Tsukanova, transferred by Suslov after the fall of Malenkov from the Central Committee to the post of deputy Minister of Culture of the RSFSR for Personnel, gave us great moral support and help. It was Anna who advised her wife to pretend that she did not know what she was being accused of. husband. Therefore, her motions for a fair hearing of my case, which she sent Khrushchev and Malenkov, always began with assurances that she did not know essence of the charges against me. She made copies of my letters from abroad, in which I

wrote to her that, despite the dangers surrounding me, I was ready to sacrifice my life for the cause of the party and the people. She sent these letters to Khrushchev and Malenkov to prove the fact that a person who is completely devoted to the ideals of the party is being held under arrest. Wife collected from thirteen of my former colleagues, of which five were Heroes of the Soviet Union, reviews about me, certified by their party committees, and sent them to the prosecutor's office and the Military panel of the Supreme Court with a request that these people be called as witnesses on my case. When I found out about this, I understood the indecisiveness of the judges and why my investigator Andreev was sympathetic towards me and contrary to the rules evaded signing the indictment in my case. Two circumstances related to the

Beria case slowed down the search in a certain way.

compromising evidence on family members of those arrested. And although Beria's daughter-in-law, the granddaughter of Maxim Gorky, who at that time was in high esteem, divorced her husband, after he, along with mother was arrested and then exiled, for the authorities this family connection was extremely inconvenient. The second circumstance was connected with the case of Sukhanov, head of the secretariat Malenkov in Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, which took an active part in the arrest Beria. Top management was literally shocked by the news that Sukhanov had stolen from the safes of Beria and his employees, a gold watch - and there were eight of them - bonds and a large amount of money, including part of Beria's award for leading the work on the creation of an atomic bombs.

In 1956-1958, rumors circulated in the highest circles of the capital about mysterious thefts related to the arrest of Beria, and about where the traces of these crimes lead. Beria's safes and employees of his apparatus were, of course, opened immediately after the arrests. In law It was necessary to make a detailed inventory of the confiscated items. However, military prosecutor Uspensky and Sukhanov, who was assisted by Puzanov (head of the department of the Central Committee of the party and the future ambassador of the USSR to Bulgaria), did not make any inventory.

The wife of one of the arrested employees of Beria's apparatus, Ordynstev, imprisoned in prison, and then released, but expelled from her job and deprived of her livelihood, had a list of bond numbers that belonged to her husband and were kept in a safe on his work. Sukhanov demanded that a clause on confiscation of property. But since he was not a state security officer, he did not have military rank and was not accused of treason (he was charged only non-information about the criminal intentions of Beria), the court did not include in the verdict a clause on confiscation. Then Ordynstev's wife began to seek the return of the bonds through the court. At first, her requests received no response, but then Khrushchev ordered that Serov tracked down these bonds. At this time, a woman presented in a savings account cash desk for payment of one of the missing bonds, on which the winnings fell. She was detained. She turned out to be a typist who worked for Sukhanov.

Sukhanov was forced to confess to stealing valuables from the safes of Beria and his subordinates, for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. About this scandal, although no there were no official messages, all of Moscow was talking. He undermined confidence in the investigators who were involved in the Beria case, and even interest in exposing all kinds of dirty the intrigues that were attributed to him began to fall. The

position of my wife at this time improved markedly. She learned to sew and soon the dressmaker became popular among new friends from the art world, which gave her extra income. She was still able to support the children and your mother. The Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to take away our apartment in the center of Moscow, but could not do it legally, since the wife was a participant in the war and received military pension. Anna Tsukanova supported her wife in her lawsuit with the HOZU of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their tactics was simple: I have not yet been convicted, I am in the prison hospital and therefore cannot be discharged. Then Khozu went for a sharp increase in rent, but, fortunately, his wife had the ability to pay bills without much difficulty. In 1956-1957,

it became clear to her that the purge in the state security organs, the victims which Beria and I became, ended. Witnesses who knew too much were shot, including falsifiers of criminal cases.

Raikhman, thanks to the intervention of his wife, who had connections in the Kremlin, was accused only of abuse of power and soon amnestied. released from prison and Maisky. The wife found out that Khrushchev ordered to be expelled from the party and deprived of military ranks about a hundred generals and colonels of the KGB-MVD retired from among those who in the 30s, occupying leadership positions, took an active part in repressions or too knew a lot about internal party intrigues. Unlike past years, all these people, having lost large pensions and party cards, nevertheless remained alive - they were not shot, not put in jail. Among them were two who distinguished themselves in the affairs of atomic intelligence: Major General Ovakimyan, who coordinated the work of the NKVD in 1941-1945 United States for the collection of information on the atomic bomb, and my deputy Vasilevsky, the only accusation against which was his allegedly too close connection with Beria.

The mood in Moscow was clearly changing, and this, in particular, was indicated by the fact that Vasilevsky managed to recover in the party. He used his past connections with Bruno Pontecorvo, who at that time was in Moscow and became an academician. Pontecorvo personally asked Khrushchev for his friend. Vasilevsky and Gorsky, who proved themselves in the line of "atomic" intelligence, took up the translation of adventure novels from English and French. Some former state security officers - with the support of Ilyin, who became after rehabilitation in 1954 as the organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Union of Writers of the USSR, became writers and journalists. Although rehabilitation gave the right to restoration in former position, it turned out to be practically impossible. But still people were allowed start a new life and get a higher pension.

Fortunately, my stay in the Vladimir prison coincided with a brief period liberalization of the penitentiary system carried out under Khrushchev. Yes, I was You are allowed to receive up to four food parcels per month. And although at first I often lost consciousness and felt severe dizziness due to terrible headaches, my strength gradually began to return to me. True, they kept me in solitary confinement, but yet I was not completely isolated - I had access to newspapers, I could listen to the radio, use the prison library. The Vladimir prison was remarkable

from many points of view. Built at Nicholas II at the beginning of this century, it was used as a place of detention for the most dangerous from the point of view of the state of criminals, which the authorities always needed to have at hand. In essence, the Vladimir prison performed the same role under the Soviet regime, and prisoners from there were often taken to the capital for additional interrogations. Ironically fate, I was placed in the second building of the prison, which I had visited twice before to conversations with captured German generals who were serving their term here. At that time I showed the remaining unoccupied prison cell in which the future hero of the revolution was sitting and civil war, one of the organizers of the Red Army, Mikhail Frunze.

In my time, the prison consisted of three main buildings, which contained approximately eight hundred prisoners. After 1960, the prison was expanded, and now in three rebuilt buildings could accommodate up to a thousand people. The prison regime was strict. All got up at six in the morning. Food was distributed to the cells: meager food was passed through a small window cut through the heavy metal door of the cell. The hunger was ours constant companion, it was enough to look into the dull eyes of the prisoners to make sure of it. At first, the bed was raised against the wall and locked with a padlock, so that it was impossible to lie down during the day. It was possible to sit on a chair screwed to the cement floor cameras. On the day we were allowed to walk from half an hour to forty-five minutes in the so-called box - a courtyard with high walls, more like a room with an area about twenty meters, but without a ceiling. The presence of a guard was mandatory. For daytime rest was supposed to be only one hour after dinner, when the overseer unlocked the bed. There was no toilet in the cell - it was replaced by a bucket. Every time the prisoner needed go to the restroom, he had to address the warden. (They say that now in the cells Toilets appeared in the Vladimir prison.) And although it was allowed to sleep from ten o'clock in the evening,

the light was on all night.

After a few days of confinement, I began to notice a sympathetic attitude towards myself from side of the prison administration. I was transferred from solitary confinement to the prison hospital, where they gave me a glass of milk a day and, more importantly for me, allowed me to lie in bed during the day for as long as I wanted.

Pretty soon I discovered that there were quite a few people in the prison that I knew well. For example, Munters, the soon-to-be-released former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. In 1940, after the coup in Latvia, I took him to Voronezh, where he began to work as a teacher in local university. Or Shulgin, for whom the NKVD intelligence was hunting abroad for years twenty. After the capture of Belgrade by our troops in 1945, the former deputy Chairman of the State Duma was arrested, taken to the Soviet Union and put on trial for anti-Soviet activities during the civil war and in subsequent years.

Three or four cells away from me was a certain Vasiliev: in fact it was Stalin's son, Vasily, who even here, in prison, managed to make scandals. Once, when his wife, the daughter of Marshal Timoshenko, came to visit him, he attacked her with fists, demanding that she immediately turn to Khrushchev and Voroshilov with a request for his release.

Mairanovsky was also in the Vladimir prison, who had been imprisoned here since 1953 - I already said he was given ten years. You could hardly recognize him: it seemed that from the former Mairanovsky, only one shell was preserved. To survive and escape prison beatings, he, broken and vainly hoping for release, agreed to testify against Beria, Merkulov and Abakumov, testifying to their participation in secret murders. True, he could not name any victims. All three - Beria, Merkulov and Abakumov - shot, and Mairanovsky continued to serve time, sometimes he was interrogated employees of the Fifth Special Department of the KGB and the prosecutor's office as a witness on matters of interest to them affairs.

When my case was heard at the court session, he testified that he never received me no orders. to conduct experiments with poisons on living people, nor on their destruction and was not under my control at all. I am grateful to him for this, as well as for that highly dangerous work that this man did during the war years. Disarmament terrorists was an extremely dangerous business. They were paratroopers who came to the safe house an apartment that did not arouse any suspicions in them. While sedated Mairanovsky, with the help of drugs, Abwehr agents were "turned off", he managed to replace ampoules of poison sewn into the collar, so that later, when these agents are arrested, they could not commit suicide.

Sometimes we met with him for a walk in the prison yard, and if there was an opportunity to exchange a few words, I advised him to seek support among the medical scientists whom he personally knew and who highly appreciated him. Mairanovsky was released in December 1961, about his rehabilitation petitioned Blokhin, president of the Academy of Medical Sciences.

Two days later, after Mairanovsky visited Khrushchev's reception room in the building of the Central Committee party and filed a petition for rehabilitation, which mentioned the episode of their meeting in the car special train at the end of 1947 in Kyiv, the KGB arrested him again. By your naivety he did not understand that it was impossible to turn to Khrushchev for help and remind him of their meeting related to the liquidation of Archbishop Romzha in Uzhgorod. He should have kept in mind that Khrushchev in power would like to erase from memory the weight associated with this kind of affairs. Unfortunately, Mairanovsky, who constantly reminded himself of himself, became undesirable. witness. He was immediately stripped of his professorship and all academic degrees and exiled to Makhachkala. In this city, he began to work as the head of a chemical laboratory.

From time to time Mairanovsky visited Academician Blokhin in Moscow, hoping restore his scientific career. In December 1964, on the eve of the next meeting for discussing the results of his experiments with malignant tumors, Mairanovsky mysteriously died. The diagnosis ironically was the same the same as Wallenberg and Oggins: heart failure. An unusual "club" of former high-ranking



employees of the NKVD-MVD. Among them was Eitingon, who arrived in Vladimir in March 1957 with a twelve-year term, Mamulov, head of the secretariat of Beria and deputy

Minister of the Interior, in charge of gold mining. Although Mamulov was an Armenian, he

At one time he was the secretary for personnel of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. His cellmate also Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Academician Sharia, at one time worked as a deputy head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD. After Sharia was released from prison, where he was imprisoned as a Megrelian nationalist, the academician received a new appointment - an assistant to Beria's apparatus in the Council of Ministers, where he was responsible for foreign policy questions, and he fell into the net that was set for Beria - such was his unfortunate fate.

Colonel Ludwigov, head of Beria's secretariat at the Ministry of the Interior, was arrested because he knew too much about him and his love affairs. Ludwigov was married to Mikoyan's niece, which helped him get out of prison in ten days after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. He was pardoned by a special decree of Mikoyan, who three months earlier had been appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council THE USSR. Mikoyan also granted amnesty to his distant relative Sarkisov, head of protection of Beria, who supplied Beria with women.

Daria Gusyak and Maria Didyk, illegal couriers, were imprisoned in Vladimir Prison Bandera underground, which I have already mentioned, captured in 1950. They delivered food prisoner, but when they came across me, they obviously did not recognize me as a high-ranking an employee of the MGB who interrogated them in the Lvov prison.

Sat with us Vladimir Brik, nephew of Osip Brik, a close friend of Vladimir Mayakovsky, who was arrested by the KGB while trying to escape to the United States. was there and Maxim Shteinberg, illegal NKVD resident in Switzerland in the 1930s. refusing to return because of the danger that threatened him to be shot, after the death of Stalin he fell for the bait of false promises of amnesty and came to Moscow with his wife Elsa. Steinberg received fifteen and she ten years for high treason.

How ridicule appeared in the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in his case wording: the court does not consider it necessary to apply capital punishment to him for treason punishment - the death penalty due to the fact that the state is not inflicted by its actions real damage and he returned the funds allocated to him for operational purposes in 1937.

Three months after my arrival at the Vladimir prison for a meeting with me wife brought the children, wisely deciding not to show them her father until he was in the best physical form. My hands trembled and I could hardly control myself when she entered. Warden of the prison Colonel Kozik allowed two additional visits with his wife, in addition to the one per month. Before his resignation in 1959, he arranged a meeting for me in his office with Alexander, the husband of my sister-in-law, who brought me up to date on what was happening in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB. Information about who is in power and who was dismissed, initiatives new KGB chairman Shelepin to expand Soviet intelligence operations abroad gave me hope that I could be of service to the new management through my great experience and therefore I can be amnestied and rehabilitated, as happened with generals and officers released by Stalin and Beria in 1939 and 1941.

Despite my petition to remain in solitary confinement, after a year I was hooked first Brik, then Steinberg, and later the burgomaster of Smolensk under the Germans Menshagin. Our relationship was polite but aloof. Although they were all interesting people, but their former life and superficial knowledge of our reality annoyed me, therefore we couldn't get close. After

six months in the Vladimir prison, I began to bombard The Supreme Court and the prosecutor's office petitions for a review of my case. I knew from my wife that she twice appealed to Khrushchev and to the Supreme Court with a request to allow a lawyer to consideration of my case. But this request was denied to her. She showed me copies of her petitions, and I sent a protest to Moscow, stating that my sentence had no legal

force, because I was denied the right to defense, as well as familiarization with the protocol court hearing, which I never signed. That meant I was in jail illegal. I received only one reply, signed by Smirnov, Deputy Chairman the Supreme Court, which stated that there were no grounds for reviewing the case. For the next forty I did not receive any requests. My cellmates, especially Eitingon, laughed at legal argumentation of my applications. "Laws and power struggles," he told me Eitingon, are incompatible.

## Political games around the struggle for rehabilitation

In 1960, I was unexpectedly summoned to the office of the head of the prison. At the door I ran into Eitingon. In the office, instead of the chief, I saw a tall, stately, imposing, fashionably dressed man in his fifties, who introduced himself as an investigator for particularly important cases of the Party Control Committee by German Klimov (Klimov G.S. - father famous film director Elem Klimov). He said that the Central Committee of the Party I instructed him to study my investigative and working file from the Special Archive of the KGB of the USSR. The Central Committee, Klimov said, is interested in data on Molotov's participation in secret intelligence Beria's operations abroad, as well as, most importantly, the names of people, the abduction and whose murder was organized by Beria inside the country.

Klimov showed me a certificate for the Party Control Committee, signed Deputy Rudenko Salin. The certificate contained a list of secret murders and kidnappings committed on the orders of Beria. So, the prosecutor's office, investigating the case of Beria, found that he was in In 1940-1941, he ordered the liquidation of the former Soviet ambassador to China, Luganets, and his wife, as well as Simonich-Kulik, the wife of Marshal shot in 1950 on the orders of Stalin Artillery Kulik. The

prosecutor's office has, according to the certificate, credible information about other secret murders on the orders of Beria, both within the country and abroad, however The names of the victims could not be established because Eitingon and I covered up all traces. Help it was also pointed out that for a long time the state of health of me and Eitingon did not allowed the prosecutor's office to conduct a full investigation of these cases. Klimov on behalf of the Central Committee of the party demanded to tell the truth about the operations in which I took part, since in the prosecutor's office did not have written documents confirming the oral accusations of me organization of the murder of Mikhoels - this, apparently, confused Klimov. He was quite surprised when I said that I had absolutely nothing to do with the murder of Mikhoels, and I proved it. He needs was to clear up the dark pages of our recent history before the start of the next party congress, which was to be held in 1961, but it seemed to me that he He showed a purely human interest and was sympathetic to my case.

We talked for more than two hours, turning page after page of my investigation case. I did not deny my participation in special promotions, but noted that they viewed by the government as top secret military operations against known enemies of the Soviet state and carried out by order of the leaders, and now those in power. Therefore, the prosecutors refused to record in writing the circumstances of each case. Klimov persistently tried to find out all the details - he I was strongly impressed by my statement that the Ministry of State Security there was a reporting system for the work of each employee who was related to toxicological laboratory.

Klimov admitted that I could not give orders to Mairanovsky or receive from him poisons. Regulations on the laboratory, approved by the government and the leaders of the NKVD-MGB Beria, Merkulov, Abakumov and Ignatiev, forbade such actions. This the document, Klimov said, automatically proves my innocence. If he were in business, Eitingon and I could not be charged with such a charge, but he was in the depths archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the KGB and in the special supervisory office work of the prosecutor's office. Reports on liquidations of "particularly dangerous enemies of the state" in 1946-1953 were compiled Ogoltsov as a senior official who traveled to the venue, and

Minister of State Security of Ukraine Savchenko. They were stored in a special sealed package. After each operation, the seal was opened, a new handwritten report was added, and the bag was resealed. There was a stamp on the package: "Do not open without the permission of the minister. Ogoltsov. While we

drank tea with sandwiches, Klimov listened attentively to me and made notes in notepad.

Klimov spent several days in the Vladimir prison. By his order, I the camera was given a typewriter so that I could type the answers to all his questions. They covered the history of intelligence operations, the details of the instructions given Beria, Abakumov, Ignatiev, Kruglov, Malenkov and Molotov, as well as my participation in the case carrying out underground and sabotage actions against the Germans and collecting information on the nuclear bomb. Finally, at the suggestion of Klimov, I printed another application for release and rehabilitation. Considering his advice, I did not mention Khrushchev's name, but pointed out that all the orders given to me came from the Central Committee of the Party. Klimov assured me that my liberation is inevitable, as is restoration in the party. He made the same promises Eitingon.

Later I learned that the interest in my case was twofold. On the one hand, the authorities in a way they wanted to look deeper into the background of Stalin's crimes and those surrounding his name secrets. On the other hand, the release of Ramon Mercader from a Mexican prison and his arrival in Moscow was spurred on by Dolores Ibarruri and the leaders of the French and Austrian Communist parties to seek the release of Eitingon and me from prison.

Klimov's trip to Vladimir improved his wife's situation in many ways. Recently the appointed chairman of the KGB, Shelepin, sent a certificate positively characterizing my activities and Eitingon to the Party Control Committee; it noted that The State Security Committee "does not have any compromising materials against Sudoplatov and Eitingon, testifying that they were involved in crimes committed by the Beria group. This document contrasted sharply with prepared in 1954 by Serov, Panyushkin, Sakharovsky and Korotkov that the working files of Sudoplatov, Eitingon and Serebryansky cannot be found in the archives succeeded, therefore, to establish the usefulness of the work for the Soviet state of the service of sabotage and intelligence under the leadership of Sudoplatov in 1947-1953 is not possible.

This certificate is still referred to by my ill-wishers from among the historians of the Soviet foreign intelligence, in particular, V. Chikov, who used a number of rigged archival materials.

This kind of assessment immediately made it clear to experienced people that our rehabilitation is not

mountains. This coincided in time with attempts by the KGB to make contact with a Jewish family in United States. This was the same family whose wife helped to leave for America from Western Ukraine, where they ended up after the Germans captured Warsaw in 1939. In 1960 one of their relatives came to Moscow as a tourist and tried to find his wife in "Izvestia", because at one time she told them that she worked there. Upon learning of this, the KGB contacted her, hoping to recruit this person to work for Soviet intelligence in America. The wife was asked to come to the Lubyanka, where the possibility of use of our apartment for meetings with a visiting American tourist. Out of trying to recruit him, however, nothing came of it, but the apartment began to be used as a safe house. Now, it seemed, the threat of losing the apartment in the center no longer hung over us.

The ideological department and major general from the KGB intelligence Agayants became interested experience of my wife's work with the creative intelligentsia in the 30s.

Former students of the NKVD school, whom she taught the basics of attracting agents, and Lieutenant Colonel Ryabov consulted with her on how to use popularity, connections and dating Yevgeny Yevtushenko for operational purposes and in foreign policy propaganda. The wife offered to establish friendly confidential contacts with him, in no case not recruit him as an informant, but send him, accompanied by Ryabov, to the World festival of youth and students in Finland. After the trip, Yevtushenko became active

a supporter of the "new communist ideas" that Khrushchev put into practice.

Agayants also contacted his wife in order to find out a number of people of interest to intelligence episodes in connection with a short visit in the early 1960s to the USSR by M. Budberg-Benckendorff, who handed over Gorky's archives from abroad to the Soviet authorities in 1930s. The meeting between Emma and Agayants took place on this issue in the office of the organizing secretary Moscow Writers' Organization, at that time already a retired KGB Major General Ilyin. The wife, with the participation of Ilyin, "filled in the gap" and pointed to the code archival materials on cooperation between Budberg and the GPU-NKVD. She is lucky to have moved away from this line of work in early 1936, before Gorky's death. However, the wife specifically pointed to the role Budberg-Benckendorf as a double agent of British intelligence and the NKVD. She, in particular, played a significant role through the notorious organizer of the conspiracy against Lenin in 1918 Lockhart in probing the arrival in Moscow in the 1930s of an influential leader of the Conservative Party of England, the future Prime Minister A. Eden. Here follows note that Gorky, being a seriously ill person, died a natural death.

My wife also helped the son of one of our friends, Boris Zhutovsky, a talented graphic artist who openly criticized Khrushchev's policy in the field of culture. She organized a meeting between the artist and the KGB to protect him from persecution. He explained to them that his statements had been misinterpreted and wrote a penitential a note to the party organs and the Union of Artists, which supports the course of the communist parties. His note got to the Ideological Department of the Central Committee of the Party, where they decided that Zhutovsky should continue to receive the support of the young officers who took care of him from the Lubyanka.

However, his wife's "flirting" with the KGB soon ended. Prosecutor Rudenko in every possible way hindered my recovery. The house on Markhevsky Street, where we lived in a large apartment, was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Polish trade mission. With the help of Anna Tsukanova, the wife received a good, but much smaller apartment in the VDNH area, at that time on the outskirts of Moscow. Our move, however, did not interfere Mercader and other leaders of foreign communist parties to support and visit his wife. To that time, the children graduated from high school, and thanks to Zoya Zarubina, dean of the Institute foreign languages, and the rector Varvara Pivovarova accepted them there to study.

In 1961, my wife and my sons finally parted with the illusion that the authorities in finally admit the miscarriage of justice in my case. After Klimov accepted his wife to the Central Committee and told her that both of us, Eitingon and I, were innocent victims in the Beria affair and he seeks a review of our sentences at the highest level, they understood: my fate is in the hands of Khrushchev. The case did not stall in bureaucratic labyrinths - the decision keeping me in jail was accepted at the very top. Although

Klimov spoke more in hints than directly, he nevertheless emphasized that it is necessary to continue petitions for rehabilitation. He said to his wife:

- You need to refer to the materials stored in the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB. You must insist on studying the materials simultaneously both in the main criminal case and in the "observation" proceedings, because that is where all your petitions, testimonies and documents exposing falsification. He explained his thought: - Well, for example, the indictment says: Sudoplatov created before war A special group under the people's commissar of internal affairs in order to carry out special Beria's instructions. At the same time, from 1942 to 1946, he headed the Directorate for Intelligence and sabotage, or 4th management. But in the "observation" case there are excerpts from relevant documents showing that in fact the Special Group and the Directorate for reconnaissance and sabotage were not two different units, but one. It is clear that this fact is in clear contradiction with the statements in the indictment, - he summed up.

During our next meeting, my wife told me about the meeting with Klimov. In that Eitingon had just become my cellmate, and we spent long hours together, thinking about how to expedite our motions. But as time went on, my wife, who thought realistically, began to push me to start preparing after

release from prison to a new job - a translator. Zoya Zarubina gave me and Eitingon a whole pile of books in French, German, Polish and Ukrainian. This there were novels and history books. In a word, we did not have to miss him. We are whole spent the day translating. Special moral support during this period was given to us by Deputy head of Khachikyan prison. We retained affection for him until his death. It was he who forwarded copies of our statements to the Central Committee on rehabilitation, which veterans of intelligence and the partisan movement used in their addresses to the XXIII Congress parties for our protection. In

1961, prison conditions deteriorated sharply: instead of four Only one grocery transfer per month was allowed, and then one every six months. These the restrictions were the result of a rise in crime in the country, caused primarily by worsening economic situation. In September 1961, on the eve of the XXII Party Congress, which revealed new details of Stalin's crimes, secretly tried and shot ten people - the organizers and participants of the hunger riot in the small town of Murom. Family

visits were reduced from once a month to once every six months, but nevertheless, every day I received censored letters from my wife. In the prison administration too changes have taken place - instead of the former friendly-minded people, new ones have appeared, completely unfamiliar to us. In 1962 I suffered a massive heart attack. Soon due to renovations in In prison, we, high-ranking NKVD officers, were placed in one cell. controversy and conflicts arose only over the game of chess, but I never took part in them participation. However, sometimes it was difficult to restrain emotions - nerves could not stand it. One day Ludwigov said that he could not imagine Beria as such a villain. On it's Eitingon sarcastically remarked: "Yeah ... You lifted him up and called your children Lawrence." The others smiled wryly.

Usually Eitingon and I, without interfering, listened to their revelations about internal squabbles in Politburo under Stalin, Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev. We tactfully did not remind them that under pressure from investigators, they all pleaded guilty to "failure to expose Beria as enemy of the people."

In an effort to draw attention to our petitions for rehabilitation, Eitingon and I wrote Khrushchev a letter containing operational proposals for countering the sabotage just organized by President Kennedy special-purpose formations - "green berets". Our letter has been received approving assessment of Shelepin, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who oversaw issues security and intelligence activities. General Fadeikin, my successor as head of the service of sabotage operations abroad in the 1st main management of the KGB. He sent Major Vasiliev to Vladimir to discuss organizational matters with us. details, and he brought us two kilograms of sugar as a gift. This is how our initiative led to birth in the KGB special forces. A training and sabotage center was created, subordinate to the 1st main administration. Later, his employees, as part of the Alpha group, stormed Amin's palace in Kabul in 1979. Inspired by the success of our letter and the

moral support of the KGB, Eitingon and I sent a new proposal to Khrushchev to renew contacts with Kurdish leader Barzani to use against the Iraqi dictator General Qasem, who began to withdraw under Soviet influence. After that, we were visited by Colonel Shevchenko, head Vladimir regional department of the KGB, and said that the leadership uses our offer. This time, in the form of a reward, we received the right to one food transfer not in six months, but in three.

Shevchenko allowed us, and it was very important, to meet with a lawyer for the first time. Yevgeny Zorin, an old acquaintance of my wife, with whom she worked in the Odessa GPU in 20s. Zorin

was the first lawyer to see the sentences handed down by the Military board to me and Eitingon. They were labeled "Top Secret". According to Zorin, my case was hopeless unless it was reviewed at the highest level. But Zorin

saw some possibility of changing Eitingon's sentence because he was in prison for a year and a half under Stalin. By the way, Reichman spent half of his time in prison. term, since a year and a half were credited to him. Zorin believed that in the case of Eitingon a technical error was made due to the non-crediting of these one and a half years, - and filed a petition directly to the Military College. He hoped that, since the presiding then at the meeting Kostromin had already died, no one will be put in an awkward position, admitting that a mistake was made at one time. Zorin's appeal was rejected, but then Zoya Zarubina intervened very successfully and got the chairman of the Military Collegium Lieutenant General Borisoglebsky positive decision in the case of Eitingon.

In December 1963, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court determined that the period of deprivation Eitingon's freedom should include the year and a half he spent in prison before he died Stalin. Thus, the total term of his imprisonment was reduced. Shortly before Eitingon almost died of a tumor in the intestines. Using their connections, Zoya and Eitingon's sister, a well-known cardiologist, obtained permission to let the host into the prison hospital. surgeon-oncologist Mints. It was he who saved Eitingon by performing a brilliant operation on him.

Before the operation, Eitingon wrote to Khrushchev - it was his farewell letter to the party. By that time, Mercader received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for the elimination Trotsky. (Thirty years later, looking through the archives at my prompt, General Volkogonov found this letter from Eitingon.)

"With this letter, I am writing to you after I have spent more than 10 years in imprisonment, and it is quite possible that this is the last letter with which I am addressing in the Central Committee of the CPSU. The fact is that my stay in prison completely undermined my health, and in the next few days I will have a major operation due to the fact that I have a tumor in the area of the intestine. Although the doctors try to cheer me up, it is quite clear to me that even if the tumor turns out to be not malignant, then, taking into account the long-term stay in prison, weakened in this regard, the body, its weak resistance and big age - I am 64 years old, it is unlikely that the outcome of the operation will be favorable for me. IN connection with this, it is quite natural that I wish to apply to the Central Committee of the party, the party to which I entered the days of my youth in 1919, which brought me up, for the ideas of which I fought all my life, which I have been and remain faithful to my last breath. And if the last 10 years I have been torn away from the party and the greatest grief that maybe a communist, it's not my fault. Why was I convicted? I'm in nothing before the party and the Soviet government is not to blame. All my adult life, at the direction of the party, I spent in the most active struggle against the enemies of our party and the Soviet state. At the beginning of 1920, I was sent by the Gomel Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) to work in a special department of the Guba. Cheka. From now on Until the day of my arrest, I worked in the state security agencies. My work in the organs of the party was satisfied. This can be concluded from the fact that soon after I was sent to the Cheka of the Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) I was nominated and appointed a member of the board and deputy chairman of the Gomel province. Cheka. A year and a half later, at the direction of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), I was transferred to the same position in Bashkir Cheka in connection with the difficult situation that then developed in Bashkiria. AND Moscow was satisfied with my work in Bashkiria. After the situation in Bashkiria returned to normal, I was transferred to the central office, where I worked before my arrest. On the personal instructions of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, I was sent to study at the Military Academy (now the Frunze Academy). After graduating from the faculty of the academy, in 1925, I was sent to work in intelligence. And from then until the beginning of the Patriotic War was for outside the country at work as an illegal resident in China, Greece, France, Iran, USA. In 1938-1939. supervised the legal residency of the NKVD in Spain. This was satisfied with the work of the Central Committee. After the liquidation of Trotsky in a special order, I was officially declared on behalf of the authority that they are satisfied with the work I have done, that I have never will be forgotten, as well as the people involved in this case. I was then awarded the order Lenin, and "Andrey" - the Order of the Red Banner ... But this is only part of the work that was done at the direction of the party, in the fight against the enemies of the revolution ....

The investigation into my case misled the Central Committee, b. drug addict never did not do it in any case. As for the work, it took place with the participation of hundreds and

thousand people. People like Malenkov, Shcherbakov, Popov, as well as Mikhailov and Shelepin to the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, who were sent to work people provided with equipment. He was satisfied with the work of our Central Committee. Me and Andrew were awarded the Order of Suvorov ...

And now, from one fake case to another, from one prison to another, for more than 10 years I have been dragging out my aimless existence, I have lost my last strength and health. And completely It is not clear who needed and in the name of what to bring me to such a state. But I could still work a good ten years and benefit the party and the country, if not in the organs state security, then in another sector of communist construction. After all, I have vast experience has been accumulated in the fight against all sorts of

enemies of the Party ... Who needs it that we sit and suffer in prison? parties? Central Committee? I'm sure not. Moreover, I am sure that all the messages with which we addressed you never reached you. reached. You, who spoke so passionately and fought against perversions in a punitive politics and who is opposed to all opportunistic affairs, if they knew, they would never they did not allow innocent people to be brought to such a state. I'm sure if you would know about it. You would have put an end to our torment long ago... The promise of

the Central Committee always remains the promise of the Central Committee... I consider myself entitled to turn to you on this issue, remind you of it and ask you to implement it, release you from prison innocently convicted "Andrey", as well as comrade. Arthur, imprisoned in Taiwan.

Expressing my indignation at the behavior of the Beijing leaders, I submit three specific proposals to destabilize the situation in Xinjiang, Manchuria, Canton, with using the former intelligence agents of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which

may be useful ... I apologize for disturbing you. Let me wish you all the best. Long live our Leninist Party! Long live communism! Farewell!.."

In prison, I was visited by Colonel Ivashchenko, Deputy Head of the Investigative department of the KGB, who arrived in view of the proposed amnesty of one of the prisoners, the talented mathematician Pimenov. Ivashchenko, whom I knew from my previous job, said that although there is no chance for the current leadership to review our affairs, it is possible to state definitely: as soon as the term of imprisonment under the court decision ends, we will release. Stalin's practice of keeping important witnesses in prison for life or destroy seemed to be the end. The first

confirmation of this was the release of academician Shariy - his term ended June 26, 1963. He was arrested on the same day as Beria, ten years ago. We agreed that he, if released, would contact Eitingon's family or mine and say phrase:

"I'm going to start a new life." We

waited impatiently for a signal from him. Despite all assurances, we are still they doubted that he would be released and allowed to return home to Tbilisi. Two weeks from wife received confirmation - Professor Sharia paid her a short visit. She remembered he was still in the NKVD school, then he was a personable, self-confident professor philosophy. Now she saw a deep old man. However, Sharia remained until the end of his days of sound mind and solid memory and studied philosophy at the Georgian Academy of Sciences. He died in 1983. In

1964, Eitingon was released and he began working as a senior editor at the Publishing House foreign literature. After Khrushchev's resignation, Ludwigov was released. He settled to work in the inspection of the Central Statistical Bureau. My wife hoped that I also released early, but her request was immediately denied. Mamulov

was transferred to my cell. Before we were arrested, we lived in the same house and our kids played together so we had a lot to talk about. Meanwhile Eitingon again became an unwanted witness - this time for Brezhnev, who did not want to be reminded about old things. He obviously did not like it when, during the celebration of the 20th anniversary Victory over Germany, he received a petition signed by twenty-four NKVD-KGB veterans, including Rudolf Abel (five of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union), asking

reconsider my case and that of Eitingon. The new people who surrounded Brezhnev relied on certificate of the Prosecutor General Rudenko on my case. It stated that, being head of the Special Group of the NKVD, established by Beria and consisting of the most faithful him people, I organized terrorist actions against his personal enemies. All the signatories of the petition protested, stated that they were employees of the Special group, but in no way belonged to Beria's confidants. They demanded that, in order to confirm the indictment and sentence,

concrete examples of crimes and terrorist acts. Conversation of veterans in the Central Committee ended in vain, but on the eve of the XXIII Party Congress they filed a new application and They directly accused Prosecutor Rudenko of falsifying the court case, mine and Eitingon's. TO he was joined by former Cominternists and foreign communists who were in the years Great Patriotic War in partisan detachments. The pressure on

the "instances" was growing. Former Minister of Defense of Bulgaria, who served under the command of Eitingon in China in the 1920s, turned to Suslov on our behalf, but he came into an indescribable rage.

"These matters have been decided by the Central Committee once and for all. It's all ours an internal matter," Suslov, who was in charge of foreign policy in the Politburo, told him, and also for the personnel of state security and intelligence.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR prepared a draft Decree on my early release after I had already suffered a second heart attack and became blind in my left eye, but on December 19, 1966, Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, rejected this performance. I remained in prison for another year and a half. It

was not until 1992 that I was given copies of archival materials on this page in my life. Even me, wise with life experience and, as they say, worldly-wise, was struck by the following words from the certificate in my case: "The KGB Commission, the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Prosecutor's Office, having read and studied the materials on Sudoplatov P.A., in view of the exceptional nature of the case, does not express his opinion on it, brings the question to the consideration of the leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

My youngest son Anatoly, a graduate student of the Department of Political Economy, as a member of the party I went to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet to work on my case. At first, petty officials refused to take him seriously, but he showed them a notice from the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, signed by the head of the secretariat of Podgorny, and demanded that accepted by one of the responsible employees. Anatoly

was firm but reasonable in his demands. He referred to my case in Party Control Committee and the opinion of the now head of the secretariat of this committee Klimov, who confirmed my innocence to him and allowed him to refer to him. Employees The Central Committee of the party sent their son to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, where he was received by the head Receptionist Sklyarov. Anatoly explained to this gray-haired, calm man, who had extensive experience in party work, the essence of my case. Anatoly was only twenty-three years old, and he just received a party card.

"As a member of the Party," he turned to Sklyarov, "I ask you clearly and sincerely answer: how can the top leadership ignore the evidence of the innocence of a man who has devoted his entire life to the party and the state. How can the Presidium ignore the request of the Heroes of the Soviet Union for the rehabilitation of my father?"

Sklyarov was most embarrassed by the question of Anatoly why the Supreme Council in its refusal referred to the request of his mother, who did not submit it, instead of correctly point out that it was a petition from the prosecutor's office, the KGB and the Supreme

Court. Sklyarov carefully looked at Anatoly and said: - I know that your father is an honest man. I remember him from Komsomol work in Kharkov. But the decision on his case was taken "at the top". It is final. Nobody will have it revise. As for you, you know too much about things that you are better at. to know nothing at all. I assure you, no one will interfere with your scientific career if you act sensibly. Your father will be out of prison in a year and a half, at the end of his term. Think about how you can help your family. I wish you success in this.



Anatoly suppressed the lump that rose in his throat and took a deep breath. He realized that he will need to hide their feelings, like his whole family, in relation to Brezhnev and his environment. The wife, leaving the hospital, was very preoccupied, as if Anatoly's campaign along "Instances" did not cause serious trouble. So she began to teach her son elementary methods of conspiracy. He learned how to determine if he was being followed, if his phone was being tapped, how to identify informants in his environment, what possible approaches can be used for its undercover development. It turned out for him very useful in order not to enter into dangerous political discussions and to keep aloof from circles critical of the regime. His wife warned Anatoly not to meet foreigners without witnesses, and only as official person. August

21, 1968, the day the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, I went free. My brother-in-law brought me to Moscow. They gave me my Swiss watch - chronometer (they were still walking) and 80 thousand rubles of government bonds. IN In 1975, I received money from them, the amount was solid - 8 thousand rubles.

When I returned from prison, our apartment was filled with relatives. All for me seemed like a dream. Freedom is such a joy, but I could hardly sleep - I was used to all night the lights were on. He walked around the apartment and kept his hands behind his back, as required during walks in the prison yard. Cross the street... It was already a problem, because after fifteen years of being in a cramped cell, the space that opened up seemed huge and dangerous.

Soon old friends also came to visit me - Zoya Rybkina, Raisa Sobol, who became famous writer Irina Guro, Eitingon. Even people with whom I was not particularly close came to pay their respects: Ilyin, Vasilevsky, Semyonov and Fitin. They immediately I was offered a job as a translator from German, Polish and Ukrainian. I signed two agreement with the publishing house "Children's Literature" for the translation of stories from German and Ukrainian. Ilyin, as the organizing secretary of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union, and Irina Guro helped me join the section of translators at the Literary Fund. After posting my translations and three books, I received the right to a pension as a writer - 130 rubles a month. This was the highest civil pension.

After a month of freedom, I suffered another heart attack, but recovered after spending two months in Institute of Cardiology. The wife objected to new requests for rehabilitation, believing that you shouldn't draw attention to yourself. She was afraid that conversations with prosecutors and party officials can lead to a new, fatal heart attack. I printed my petitions surreptitiously when she went shopping and sent them to Andropov, the head of the KGB, and to the Committee party control. I got a call from the KGB and very kindly advised where to find documents to expedite my case, but the case itself was not in their competencies. The KGB, for its part, guaranteed that I would not be evicted from Moscow, despite to the fact that formally I remained a dangerous criminal and had a restriction on registration. If not for his help, I would automatically be under police surveillance, I could evict from Moscow. The policeman who came with the check had rounded eyes when I presented a new passport issued by the Main Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

On one of the spring days, in my opinion 1970 or 1971, a polite voice on the phone invited me to a meeting with the head of department "B" - services reconnaissance and sabotage operations of the foreign intelligence of the KGB major general Vladimirov. We met with him at a safe house in the center of Moscow, in Bryusovsky lane. Vladimirov, a rather charming man, greeted me, announcing that he was talking on behalf of his superiors. In a conversation devoted to finding out the

code names of a number of cases in the KGB archives, he raised two fundamental questions: about the essence of the obligations assumed to our government in 1940-1950 by the leader of the Kurds Mullah Mustafa Barzani and about the case ... Raoul Wallenberg. By According to Vladimirov, in 1955 he unofficially, by order of KGB Chairman Serov,

probing informed the responsible diplomat in Finland that the Soviet government authorized him to establish trusting ties with the Swedish leading circles, in particular with the Wallenberg family. Based on the renewed secret dialogue between representatives of the Wallenbergs and the Soviet government, interrupted in 1945, as an act of goodwill and a desire to establish confidential relations, the Soviet leading circles authorized Vladimirov to transfer to unofficial information about the death of Raoul Wallenberg, in Moscow in 1947.

He wanted to consult me, first, about the circumstances of the death Wallenberg, and secondly, about the reasons for the sharply negative reactions of Swedish circles to this offer. According to Vladimirov, the Swedes refused to discuss any circumstances on Raoul Wallenberg case informally. According to him, the Wallenberg family showed a clear interest in sabotaging any discussion of Raul's mission Wallenberg in Hungary and his role as an intermediary between the largest financial magnates Sweden in relations with the business circles of Germany, the USA, England and intelligence services of Nazi Germany, Sweden, USA, England and Switzerland.

The Swedes sharply made it clear that Raoul Wallenberg had, in their opinion, only salvation of Jews through the Red Cross and, to a lesser extent, to the transfer of Jewish capital from Germany and Austria to Switzerland and Sweden.

Moreover, the well-known politician Olof Palme, who then recorded the conversation Khrushchev, emphasized the initiative of the Soviet side in raising the question of Wallenberg. I

expressed my opinion to Vladimirov about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, having read shown me a copy of the report of Wallenberg's death in the inner prison. Vladimirova it was especially disturbing that his unofficial sounding ended in a scandalous reaction Swedes, when Swedish Prime Minister Erlander at a reception in Moscow at the very first hour meetings with Khrushchev and Bulganin officially raised the issue of Wallenberg, referring to Vladimirov's conversations in Helsinki. I explained to Vladimirov that among the employees intelligence only Zoya Rybkina had personal meetings with the Wallenbergs.

It is unlikely that the Wallenberg affair, I remarked, could be a good starting point for establishing a special relationship of trust with Swedish business and political circles on an informal basis. The Swedes acted as an intermediary between us and West in the 1940s, that is, at a time when the preservation of their interests in Northern Europe, and especially in Finland, where the military, economic and the political presence of the USSR was especially noticeable.

Giving publicity to this episode, apparently reflected in Vladimirov's contacts on lines of the Swedish and Finnish archives, documents of the SVR, I want to emphasize that, unfortunately, it was the Soviet side that not only destroyed Wallenberg, but also, on its own initiative, extremely cynically attempted to play off his case for the purpose of a deeply flawed plan to restore unofficial ties with Swedish financial magnates cut off in 1945. After that, I was no longer worried. In the 70s I did a lot of literary

work. Translation and book fees (I wrote under the pseudonym Anatoly Andreev in collaboration with Irina Guro) served as a help to retirement and allowed to live quite tolerably. I have translated, written and edited fourteen books. Among them were four collections of memoirs of partisans who fought in years of war under my command. From time to time I met my friends in the photo studio Geselberg on the Kuznetsky Most, not far from the central building of the Lubyanka. His studio was well known for her wonderful work. Geselberg was a hospitable host: Eitingon, Reichmann, Fitin, Abel, Young and

other employees still serving to talk and have a drink. wife abruptly objected to my trips to Geselberg's studio. Abel, who

supported me, complained that he was being used as a museum exhibit and do not give a real work. The same was said by Conon the Young, known as Gordon Lonsdale, whom I have never met before. Eitingon and Reichman looked at me with disapproval when I remained silent, listening to their critical attacks

against Brezhnev and the leadership of the KGB, or quietly slipped out of the room.

Of course, those times were very different from Stalin's, but it was hard for me to believe that KGB colonels who were still in the service could easily meet for friendly feasts and openly vilify the Brezhnev leadership, morals in the KGB. Abel

told me the story of his arrest when he tried to take thirty thousand dollars hidden in a safe house in Brooklyn, since he had to account for them in front of the Center. We both decided that it was unwise to return for money: after since he was arrested by the FBI, paying lawyers during the process cost much more. But he was afraid that if he did not return the money, he would be suspected of embezzling it.

Lonsdale (codename "Ben") was as outraged as Abel that the Center tied him up with an agent who worked in the countries of the Eastern bloc under diplomatic cover. This was a violation of the elementary rules of conspiracy, which forbade an illegal resident come into direct contact with persons who, due to their long stay in countries of the Warsaw Pact were automatically under constant surveillance counterintelligence of his country. However, our meetings and complaints about the injustice of fate ended in 1980 when Geselberg's studio was demolished and a new KGB building.

Literary work became more and more important to me, it allowed me to adapt to society. The novel about Kosior "Horizons", written together with Irina Guro and edited by his wife, received a good review in Pravda. The book has gone through several publications and brought us a decent income. More important I considered my publications about the years war. In Pravda and other central newspapers, they also received a good rating. IN one review emphasized that the Special Group of the NKVD played a huge role in organization of the partisan movement during the war. In 1976 I resumed my requests for rehabilitation. I wrote that if Pravda, as an organ of the Central Committee, recognized the heroic actions of the Special Group, then it cannot be a Beria terrorist organization, as it is presented in my criminal case.

Friends and acquaintances Geselberg, Fitin, Studnikov, Zarubin and Vasilevsky left life. In 1976, Eitingon and I approached Mercader and Dolores Ibarruri with a request to support our petition for rehabilitation before Andropov and the Committee of the Party control, pointing to the party's moral responsibility for the injustice. Andropov and Pelshe, who then headed the Committee of the Party control, gave an opinion in 1977 on our cases, where they noted that the evidence of our there is no involvement in the crimes of Beria. By this time, fifteen years after death in prison during interrogation, Serebryansky was rehabilitated. For this it was enough orders of the military prosecutor. Our cases with the conclusion of Pelshe and Andropov and a certificate Klimov, deputy chief military prosecutor Baturin and head of the investigative KGB department Volkov had to report to the Politburo. However, Suslov strongly opposed this, and no one in the Party Control Committee and the KGB wanted because of us conflict with him and Rudenko.

By order of Pelshe, for the sake of consolation, or something, Eitingon and I received the right use the Kremlin polyclinic and hospital, as well as the KGB hospital.

In August 1977, on behalf of Pelshe, we were received by his first deputy, Gustov. He said he was glad to welcome the heroic intelligence officers, but, unfortunately, at present time our affairs cannot be resolved positively. We'll have to wait, the time will come and for their revision.

In 1978, Ramon Mercader, who worked there by invitation, died in Cuba. Fidel Castro as an adviser in the Ministry of the Interior. His body was smuggled to Moscow. At that moment, my wife and I were in a sanatorium. Eitingon was also not notified of funeral, which the KGB cowardly tried to hold without our participation and unnecessary publicity. However, Mercader's widow, Roquelia Mendoza, raised a fuss, called Eitingon, and he saw off Mercader on his last journey. In

1981, just after the next party congress, to which we also addressed with letter, but did not receive a response, Eitingon died in the Kremlin clinic from a stomach ulcer.

Throughout the 1980s, especially before Brezhnev's death, I continued to bombard the Central Committee with my statements. The last witnesses, who were still alive at that time, supported my efforts to achieve rehabilitation in 1984, 1985 and 1988, referring to Chernenko and then to Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev, referring to the conclusion of Andropov and Pelsha about my innocence. These petitions were edited by Sklyarov, who was still the head reception of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: an experienced functionary, he knew how to present material in order to get approval from above. Party general secretaries have come and gone, and Sklyarov still remained in his place.

## Publicity and closed archives

In 1984, as Klimov told me, a positive decision was ready, but Chernenko died, but a response from Gorbachev or Solomentsev, chairman of the Party Control Committee, who then became chairman of the Special Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims there were no political repressions. My sister-in-law's father, Deputy Minister of Coal industry, was on friendly terms with Solomentsev, and I asked him to achieve favorable decision. Solomentsev reported my case to Gorbachev, but he refused.

Johann Steiner, Deputy General Secretary of the Austrian Communist party and a former illegal immigrant of the Special Group of the NKVD, demanded in 1988 that his name, like the names of other prominent communists were cleared of the slanderous accusations contained in the Sudoplatov case. He was politely listened to, but did nothing. In 1988 I was invited to the prosecutor's office, where they said that my case would not be reviewed, and handed over an official response signed by the Prosecutor General Rekunkov. In that a serious error has been made in the document; it said that I was convicted as an accomplice and Beria, and Abakumov, although in my indictment there are references to Abakumov didn't exist at all.

In 1986, my wife turned eighty-one years old, and her health deteriorated sharply. At first it seemed that she was simply weakened compared to what she always was, but soon we found out she had Parkinson's disease. As a veteran, she was eligible for hospital treatment. KGB. First Deputy Chairman of the KGB Bobkov helped me get permission stay in the hospital room with his wife. I stayed with her for the last two months. next to her, noticing with pain how life slowly leaves her. She died in September 1988 and her the ashes rest in the wall of the cemetery of the Donskoy Monastery. The ashes of Grigulevich, Eitingon and Abel lie nearby. Irina Guro - Raisa Sobol also died. Zoya Rybkina after my death wife lived for three years.

From a narrow circle of friends, only three of us remained, who survived glorious, but tragic times that have entered the history of our country - Zoya Zarubina, Anna Tsukanova and me. How intelligence veterans Zoya and I receive invitations to Victory Day celebrations on May 9 together with their children and grandchildren at the KGB club and at the Dynamo stadium. Anna and I are getting old and It's getting harder and harder to meet, and we communicate mostly by phone. Zoya is still engaged in social activities and gives lectures. Recently visited Australia was invited to Potsdam and Yalta in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the conferences held there leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition.

After the death of my wife, my health deteriorated, and then my son Anatoly turned to Kryuchkov, then the first deputy chairman of the KGB, with a request for my hospitalizations. Such permission was granted. After being in the hospital for two months, I underwent a course of treatment in the sanatorium of the Central Committee of the party. Top management in the mid-80s occupied an ambivalent position towards me. On the one hand, considering that my the case, apparently, was fabricated, I was invited to the Y. Andropov Institute with lectures on intelligence history. I told how we used the pacifist views of Oppenheimer, Fermi, and the sympathy for the Soviet Union of Szilard and Bohr to obtain information on atomic bomb. Incidentally, Yatskov, who was present at the time, did not dispute my words. I took participation in the KGB conference on the study of the history of intelligence operations in Germany,

held in Yasenevo, the headquarters of foreign intelligence. In 1986, on the eve of the meeting Gorbachev with President Reagan in Reykjavik, I sent a memorandum to the KGB, which outlined our experience in serving the Yalta Conference.

All this is so. But on the other hand, I still haven't been rehabilitated. Publicity was gaining strength, and the son decided to hire a lawyer who would take care of my case. This shocked the Party Control Committee and the prosecutor's office. The lawyer drafted a letter accusing the prosecutor's office of deceit and referred to a factual error in the prosecutor's response. He demanded permission to get acquainted with all the materials of the case, but he was refused.

For the new secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Falin, who was in charge of foreign policy, I prepared a reference on the history of German-Soviet relations in the prewar period. Other my note concerned the conduct of national politics, including Ukrainian and Jewish Problems. He thanked for these materials, but did not give any significant support me in rehabilitation matters.

Gorbachev, meanwhile, was interested in how orders were prepared and transmitted destruction of people and ways to eliminate them. I was visited in connection with this by Major General Shadrin, who was in charge of the KGB for special assignments, but I turned down his request describe how such tasks were performed. I explained that full records of this are kept in the archives of the Central Committee of the party, and indicated that I personally prepared two handwritten reports on operations in Mexico City and Rotterdam for which he was responsible. Other reports were written by hand senior officials directly involved in these operations - Ogoltsov, Savchenko, Tsanova and Abakumov, or Molotov and Vyshinsky, when they headed the Information Committee. It was news to Shadrin that military intelligence in 1930-1950 also eliminated double agents and defectors, this was done special group. I advised him to consult the CCP on these matters. I believe he informed his leadership about our meeting. Ironically, while I was applying for rehabilitation, Gorbachev

received a peculiar message signed by three generals who took part in Beria's arrest. They demanded from Gorbachev in April 1985 that he be awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union, which was promised to them in due time for conducting a secret and risky operation. On April 19, 1985, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Kapitonov sent this letter to Gorbachev. Thus, when the chairman of the Party Control Committee Solomentsev was preparing a case for my rehabilitation, the generals demanded awards for themselves. Gorbachev rejected both petitions - both mine and the general's. The generals were reminded: January 28, 1954 they had already received the Order of the Red Banner for this operation, and the Central Committee did not thought it appropriate to revisit this issue. In 1990, I learned from a

high-ranking KGB officer: Gorbachev was unhappy that the process of democratization was getting out of control. This autumn, the KGB and the armed forces were ordered to prepare a plan to introduce martial law. At the same time twice increased the salaries of all military personnel.

I received substantial moral support from Major Generals of the KGB Kevorkov and Governor. They took advantage of the appointment of the former head of the ideological Directorate of the KGB, General Abramov, Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR, so that he study my case in the office. According to them, the four volumes of the case contained rumors, but not concrete evidence against me. More importantly, they found a note Politburo with a draft decision: to accept the proposal of the Party Control Committee and the KGB on rehabilitation of Sudoplatov and Eitingon due to newly discovered circumstances and in view of lack of evidence of their involvement in the crimes of Beria and his group, as well as taking into account the contribution to the victory over fascism and to the solution of the atomic problem.

This gave me confidence. My new application for rehabilitation was not supported only the KGB, but also high-ranking officials in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party. The publicity gave me opportunity to use the press. I wrote a letter to Alexander Yakovlev's commission on rehabilitation of victims of political repression, in which he stated that he would inform the press: the truth about the real mechanism of repression is still hidden. In another letter to Kryuchkov, I asked to transfer copies of documents about my intelligence work to the prosecutor's office and gave the numbers

orders (they were prompted to me by my friends in the KGB) about the tasks of the units that I led. This could establish that my case was falsified. The KGB reacted immediately.

The deputy head of the personnel department informed me that all the documents listed in my letter were certified by the KGB and sent to the prosecutor's office with a recommendation to analyze and consider them as new materials in my case. I was invited to the Military Prosecutor's Office, where they informed me that my case would be reviewed. They also rechecked the case of Abakumov and his group. New investigation

took a year.

And then strange things began to happen. Beria's case was withdrawn from the prosecutor's office and transferred to Gorbachev's secretariat. Then some documents disappeared. Soon after that, an article attacking me appeared in the Moskovskiy Novosti newspaper, in which quotations were made from the indictment in the Beria case and it was claimed that, on my instructions, secret murders of people were organized in safe houses in Moscow and other cities with the help of poisons. I was accused as an accomplice of Beria, without mentioning my work in intelligence. The newspaper asked readers to send any information related to Sudoplatov, since there are no facts and specific names of his victims in the Beria case. There was no response from readers. In an editorial note to the article, Yegor Yakovlev, the editor of Moskovskiy Novosti, wrote that a law was needed to control the operational work of the intelligence services and, in particular, the toxicological laboratories dealing with poisons, both in the CIA and the KGB. These remarks were made in response to General Kalugin's claim that a similar lab still exists

within the KGB and that the CIA is testing toxic drugs on American citizens. In October 1990, Moscow News published an article stating that Mairanovsky was a victim of Stalinist repressions and, most likely, slandered

himself during interrogations. According to the author of the article, he had a high reputation among Moscow scientists. The article also contained harsh criticism of the way Beria's case was conducted - "in the best Stalinist tradition", without concrete evidence. Thus, although indirectly, the accusations made in connection with the Beria case against me and Eitingon were also called into question.

I realized that the question of my rehabilitation would drag on indefinitely, since no one in power wanted the truth to be made public, which would compromise Khrushchev's liberal policies. And the reformers tried to use Khrushchev's "thaw" as a model for perestroika. The destruction of such political opponents as Trotsky and the Ukrainian nationalists, by decision of the country's top leaders, was no longer discussed in the press. Gorbachev remained silent, he could not afford to expose Khrushchev as an accomplice of Stalin and the organizer of secret political assassinations. After all, then the historical memory of the 20th Party Congress, at which Khrushchev spoke with the exposure of Stalin's crimes, would have been tarnished. Members of the Central Committee of the party and many delegates to the congress knew about his and their own participation in Stalin's crimes. Therefore, if my case had surfaced, the entire party leadership under Khrushchev would have been exposed, using Beria and the people who worked under him as scapegoats. Gorbachev's leadership would then bear the responsibility for concealing the guilt of their mentors who brought them to power.

Beria and his enemies in the leadership of the country professed one morality. I fully agree with the writer-publicist Kirill Stolyarov, who wrote that the only difference between Beria and his rivals is only in the amount of blood shed by them. But, despite their crimes, Beria, Stalin, Molotov managed to transform a backward agrarian country into a powerful superpower with nuclear missile weapons. By committing the same monstrous crimes, Khrushchev, Bulganin and Malenkov, however, to a much lesser extent contributed to the creation of the powerful potential of the USSR as a great power. Unlike Stalin, they significantly weakened the state as a result of their struggle for power. Gorbachev and his assistants, no less guided by their own ambitions, led the great power to complete collapse. Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev behaved like typical

party leaders, hiding behind democratic slogans to strengthen their power. As statesmen, they proved to be bankrupt and harbored the illusion that they could to outwit rivals (Yeltsin, Ligachev, Ryzhkov and others) and thereby preserve absolute power in their hands. Their achievements in the field of domestic and foreign policy are equal to zero. In 1989, Gorbachev, due to personal hostility, removed Erich Honecker from power in East Germany to "strengthen socialism", but, just as in 1953, this led to turmoil, only this time the GDR ceased to exist. He and Shevardnadze proved unable to negotiate economic compensation from West in exchange for the withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe and the reduction of strategic weapons. In

general, important state work in matters of domestic and foreign policy was replaced by philosophical reasoning "about the integrity of the world and the deployment democracy." When it became clear that it was impossible to defend the interests of the country on international arena in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev suddenly started talking about the need to respect the free choice of the peoples of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, who have become disillusioned with the chosen methods of building socialism.

In June 1989, to the dacha of Zoya Rybkina in Peredelkino, where I was then, I called Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov, who wrote biographies of Stalin and Trotsky. I was warned by General Kevorkov that this man should be cautious in my revelations, but I nevertheless decided to go to this meeting, since Volkogonov had access to archives and could imagine the past with its cruelties and triumphs in true light. Caution (after all, he held an official position and was subordinate to Central Committee and military authorities), making mistakes, of course, Volkogonov, however, opened a new chapter in the study of our history. He promised to support my request for rehabilitation. In at the time of our meeting on November 4, 1989, I suggested that he correct the history of Stamenov, just published in the October magazine. Volkogonov claimed that Stalin personally met with Stamenov, but I knew it was not true. Probing and I myself was involved in spreading disinformation rumors among diplomats in order to find out the degree of readiness of the Germans to agree to a peaceful settlement of relations with us in 1941. But Volkogonov's book "Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy" was published, and this episode remained unchanged. Volkogonov adheres to the version that Stalin and Molotov planned a separate peace treaty with the Germans, similar to Brest-Litovsk, and in refers to discussions in the Politburo as a source of information.

The Politburo could, of course, discuss this intelligence operation. As I already wrote, my task was to launch disinformation about a possible peace with Hitler, using Stamenov as a source.

I pointed Volkogonov to the materials on the Trotsky case, which were kept in the archives of the KGB and the Central Committee. parties—without me he would never have been able to find them. Even with access to top-secret archival folders, finding a particular document is as difficult as a needle in a haystack. TO for example, he could not know that Trotsky's personal archive, stolen in Paris in 1937, was not where it should be, but in the International Department of the Central Committee of the party and very actively used.

Since the failed coup attempt in August 1991, there has been virtually uncontrolled plunder of the secret archives of the Communist Party in order to use and selling them for films, research projects and non-fiction. Although Volkogonov notes in the preface to his book on Trotsky the help I rendered, the mention of my name and the citation of excerpts from my and Eitingon's appeals to the Central Committee The CPSU did not agree with me on rehabilitation. That's why my real and code name in connection with the operation against the fascist OUN. Incidentally, based on this and other publications of the same kind, the Ukrainian prosecutor's office in 1992 filed against me a criminal case. It wasn't until 1994 that they left me alone after established that the fascist terrorist OUN of Konovalets-Bandera officially declared a state of war with Soviet Russia and the USSR, which lasted from 1919 to 1991 year.

Mentioning me and Eitingon in a book about Trotsky and reporting on our role in the partisan war against fascist Germany and in solving the atomic problem, Volkogonov, for all its minuses and mistakes, tries to objectively evaluate our work. For many years my name was unknown - it cannot be found either in the descriptions of heroic deeds in the war with Hitler, or in history of our intelligence. It was Volkogonov who conceived the idea of telling the story of my life and my generation. A story that will give me the opportunity now to try to arrange everything according to to their places.

The death of the Soviet state, egregious publications that cross out the heroic history of my homeland, have become a powerful additional incentive to take up pen and tell about the events described in this book. These personal memories force researchers to take a fresh look at a number of episodes of our and world history, to stop the juggling of archival documents about our foreign policy actions, where sometimes deliberately false numbers of archival files, letter intelligence operations are given.

This book comes into being also in order to show the particular danger of incompetent political leadership for the destinies of millions of people. When politicians act according to the principle: "First, we will take power, we will stay in the Kremlin, and we'll figure it out

later." In April 1992, Colonel-General Volkogonov told me: "Why are you so worried about Ukraine, Pavel Anatolyevich, and the Black Sea Fleet, you see, they themselves are falling apart with their Crimea and will come to us anyway."

Such criminal frivolity in solving state issues, a hint to the leadership of the country of ill-conceived decisions turns into human losses and tragedies, similar in scale to the political repressions of the 1930-1950s.

In 1991, the military justice authorities concluded that the Abakumov case was fabricated and, although he was responsible for the illegal repression, he was not guilty of treason or crimes against the party. Military Prosecutor's Office recommended changing the article of the conviction on the basis of which it was sentenced to death. Abakumov's true crime was abuse of power and falsification of criminal cases, and in accordance with the law of that time, the measure of punishment - execution - was supposed to be the same. This conclusion meant that those who stood on the top rung authorities, over Abakumov, were guilty of these crimes to no lesser extent than He.

The military prosecutor's office took a new approach to my case and Eitingon's. materials proved that we did not fabricate false cases against "enemies of the people." Official accusations that we were Beria's accomplices in committing treason, planning and carrying out terrorist acts against the government and personal enemies Beria, were refuted by documents.

After the events of August 1991 and the collapse of the USSR, shortly before retiring, the chief military prosecutor stopped our cases and said: if I had not rehabilitated you, archival materials would have shown that I was another accomplice in hiding the truth about secret springs of the struggle for power in the Kremlin in the 30-50s. He drew a line in our business and signed an order for the rehabilitation of Eitingon and me.

After the collapse of the CPSU, my rehabilitation was no longer a matter of political conjuncture, but became just an ordinary episode during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Military justice should no longer ask for instructions from top leaders country how to handle my case. A new generation has come to power. And although it has grown former regime, the current leaders were not complicit in the atrocities of Stalin and Khrushchev, the country's former authoritarian rulers. Khrushchev's name, actively used at the beginning perestroika, has lost its appeal.

The Soviet Union, to which I was devoted with all my heart and for which I was ready to give life, for the sake of which he tried not to notice the cruelties that were happening, justifying them the desire to turn the country from backward to advanced, for the benefit of which he spent long months away from the homeland, home, wife and children - even fifteen years in prison is not killed my devotion - this Soviet Union ceased to exist.



In a difficult situation after the collapse of the USSR, generated by the lack of political cultures, hatred towards me is retained only by those who would prefer that people who know the real circumstances of the tragedy and heroics of the past silently left life. They openly seek to arrogate to themselves a monopoly on the interpretation of events. our past. Although most of them compromised themselves by deliberately presenting society with grossly falsified explanations of motives and the mechanism of Stalinist repressions and major events in our domestic and foreign policy. I hope that my story will help the current generation to take a balanced position, free from conjuncture and extremism, in assessing our heroic and tragic past.